Global E-waste Regulation and Policy Trend

Transcription

1 Global E-waste Regulation and Policy Trend Raphael Veit 3W Expo and Conference E-waste Asia 2015 SESSION 2: Electronic Waste Management Bangkok, 28-Jan-15 1

2 Outline Global spread and motivations for E-waste legislation Key stakeholder interests Principle models of (E)PR schemes Evolution of models in selected countries Trends 2

3 Spread of producer responsibility legislation E-waste legislation in force in over 90 jurisdictions, planned in producer compliance organisations 2,200+ pieces of legislation affecting WEEE management The lighter the color, the more product groups (EEE, batteries, packaging) subject to (E)PR legislation:

4 What we do E-waste legislation in force in 93 jurisdictions, planned in producer compliance organisations 1,500+ pieces of legislation 4

5 Policy objectives for introducing (E)PR legislation Pioneers: Germany 1991: Packaging Ordinance Taiwan 1988: Waste Disposal Act Environmental and health protection (externality problem) Resource preservation through material recovery Relieving municipal waste budgets Creating employment in waste sector International pressure (obligations, trends, policy envy ) South Korea 1992: Act on the Promotion of Saving and Recycling of Resources Social fairness (beneficiary of product pays, not society at large) National security (recycling reduces reused, counterfeit parts) Removing red tape resulting from existing lex Modernizing waste management sector Breaking up historical (uncompetitive or substandard) waste management structures to enable circular material flows, Encouraging products to be designed in a way to enable circular material flows and reduce environmental impact throughout product lifecyle 5

6 Key stakeholders and interests Waste Management Firms incumbent waste managers ,000 Producers funding control control Gov. fund or Compliance Organisation(s) control Municipal authorities Scrap dealers (formal or informal) Consumers WEEE With Positive / Negative recovery Value Recurring questions: Retailers Which parties may control the compliance organisations? (= Who controls the new funds and often also supply of WEEE?) Which parties must / may / are prohibited from collecting WEEE? (And which collectors may treat WEEE on their own account?) 6

7 Key stakeholders and interests Clear legislation and strong regulator needed to ensure negative value WEEE is collected, all WEEE is properly treated and circular economy can develop, e.g. market distortions are prevented 7

8 (E)PR models State Fund Model Single Organisation Model Competing Organsiations Model Competing Oranisations Model with eco tax backup Model without Organisation Rare Models 8

9 State fund model Producers are held only financially responsible for the costs of waste collection and treatment through payments of fees or taxation to a designated waste management fund. The organisational responsibility for waste management and for the decision about which waste collection operations to fund, lies with a government controlled organisation. + High legal certainty for producers + Good and fair enforceability Producer must only finance WEEE mgmt pays fee/tax Special Puropse Gov. Fund Funds gov. controlled program or financially supports programs of - Risk of funds being allocated to unrelated issues on change of political priorities - Often no reliable data on implementation Municipalities Consumer Recyclers 9

10 Single organisation model An entire industry sector placing a product group on the market commits to financing and organising waste management through a single compliance organisation, often on the basis of an environmental agreement with government. Typically, legislation is in place that would bring into force taxation in the event industry fails to meet mandatory collection targets. + Concentrated build up of collection infrastructure, communication + Easy for producers Producer Obligated to take back & finance WEEE Transfers obligation and pays Sector controlled Compliance Org. organises, finances often pays visible fee - No incentive for fee reduction, often leading to massive financial reserves and market distortions - Powerful to extend that Government intervention can be difficult Waste Mgmt firms Municipalities Collectors Consumer 10

11 Competing organisations model Government authorises several compliance organisations to whom a producer may transfer financial and / organisational obligations. Conditions for authorisation may include producers control of organisation, minimum capital requirements, a minimum market share of EEE of the producers contracted. If there is a collective obligation (e.g. for orphan or historical WEEE), fairness between organisations is achieved by either the mandatory participation in a coordinating body or a collection target applicable to each organisation, backed up by a fine usually in the form of an eco-tax (competing organisations model with eco-tax back up). + Organisations operate lean and mean - Limited transparency (burdensome for producers and regulator s monitoring of waste flows (the more orgs, the more trading relation) - Ineffective built up nationwide collection / communications (unless central coordination body) - High potential for distortions of competition between the organisations (e.g. cherry picking) Compliance Organisation 1 Waste Mgmt firms Producers must meet coll. targets Pays (and tansfers obligation) coordinates, finances Collectors (Municipalities, retailers) Consumer Org n 11

12 Model without compliance organisations A clearing house receives requests from municipalities to take back a full WEEE container and passes it on to a producer with an open collection obligation. The producer contracts a waste management company to execute the request. + no dominant party on the funding side + local (municipal) waste mgmt monopolies exposed to competition - High complexity - Limited possibility to increase collection (collection target cannot be imposed on producers) Allocate request directly to Producer Pass on request, pay for actual collection only Waste Mgmt firm Clearing house request take back Municipalities Collectors Consumer Producer Waste Mgmt firm 12

13 Other rare models Producer centric model w/o municipalities Recycler centric model Producers Producer Returns WEEE (and passes fee) Retailers/ or mail back Returns WEEE (for free or pays recycling fee) Consumer invoice acc. to return share or market share Approved recyclers organise collection for Municipalities Collectors Consumer 13

14 Evolution of (E)PR in selected countries 14

15 Taiwan Producer centric model Waste Disposal Act 1988 Producers of products designated as mandatory recyclables responsible for their recycling. Key pitfalls: no targets on producers, limited enforcement. State fund model Waste Disposal Act 1997 EPA allowed to operate 4-in-1 program (recycling fund, recyclers, municipalities as collectors, consumers). EPA sets Recycling Fees charged to producers in view of balancing fund and pays recycling subsidies to recyclers. Powerful EPA as regulator and manager of the program. 15

16 South Korea privatisation Dominant model: State fund 1992 Act on the Promotion of Saving and Recycling of Resources Gov. agency KORECO operates recycling plants. Producers paid deposit on TVs, washing machines, air cons. This deposit was returned if producers met collection targets. However, deposit cheaper then self organisation > no incentive. Dominant model: Single organisation 2003 revised Act Government's operational role in WEEE management removed; Producers responsible for meeting collection targets or pay fines. In practice implemented by several non-competing sector-based compliance organisations. Annually adjusted collection targets; effective fines; Same system for a all EPR products. 16

17 Pre-WEEE Directive schemes in EU Austria 1991 lamps and cooling equipment ordinance 2005 AG Ordinance Fees fall Netherlands 1998 Decree Evolution in countries with pre-weee Directive single (or non-competing) compliance organisations Switzerland 1998 Ordinance Belgium 2001 Producer Responsibility Decrees Sweden 2001 Greece 2004 WEEE Decree Czech Republic 2005 WEEE Decree or fund Hungary 2000 Product Fee 2005 Competing Orgs, with Eco Fee back up

18 Germany PACKAGING: DSD producer controlled monopoly 1991 German Packaging Ordinance too much collection too fast > held hostage by waste mgmt. firm > massive funding gap > waste exports distorting neighbouring markets > reason for EC Packaging Waste Directive Pitfalls: very ambitious policy goals; no regular government intervention adjusting targets to capacity Monopoly abolished; Organisations no longer controlled by producers Municipalities role strengthened BATTERIES: Support of single joint organisation 1998 Battereis Ordinance, 2008 Batteries Law but some comp. orgs. accepted WEEE: Model without compliance organisations 2005 WEEE Law Made possible because 17 Laender (states) relinquished authority to single, producer controlled register cum clearing house (EAR); EAR, may not be commercially involved in WEEE management 18

19 Japan PACKAGING: Government controlled system JCPRA: 1995 Law for the Promotion of Sorted Collection and Recycling of Containers and Packaging The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry defines annually an amount of waste packaging that producers must finance in the next year based on existing recycling capacity and planned collection volumes by municipalities, whichever is lower. LARGE APPLIANCES: Producer oligopoly, without municipal involvement 1998 Home Appliance recycling Law (in force 2001) air conditioners, TVs, refrigerators, washing machines, clothes dryers Works because: End users willingness to pay on disposal; convenient return channel (retail) SMALL EEE: No producer responsibility 2012 Small appliances recycling law Aims at improving quality of (municipal) recycling programs Challenge: Incentive for municipalities if raw material prices low PCs and batteries: Individual, voluntary producer programs LPEUR enforcement orders computers, monitors and portable batteries (since 2003 from households) Pitfall: mail back too cumbersome for consumers, no targets 19

20 China Establish, upgrade WEEE treatment sector 2007: Management Regulation of Electronic Waste Pollution to the Environment Since 2004, WEEE recycling pilot programs and facilities set up. End 2012: Real time monitoring system of WEEE processing Massive WEEE buy-back program : old for new appliances regulation To stimulated domestic demand and direct WEEE into authorized treatment channels, deprive informal sector of materials. Worked because: Massive gov. funding; State fund coordinates WEEE management 2012 Regulation on the WEEE Treatment Fund, 2009 WEEE Ordinance Fund fed by fees charged to producers, provides treatment subsidies to authorized recyclers. 20

21 USA State programs, or systems with collection targets, or recyclerorganized collection appear to outperform producers programs without collection targets. 21

22 Is there a correlation between model and collection rate? Correlation between years of separate collection of portable batteries and the collection rate achieved in Europe. Collection rates in top performing schemes plateau at 40% to 50% 22

23 Sources of collected WEEE in EU Rough estimate, by weight Municipal collection points ~80% Retail ~15% Prod. or compl. orgs own ~5% Unreported collection 40%? 23

24 Two approaches to leverage municipalities collection potenatial European best practice EPR regime Municipalities no direct legal obligation to collect > Implies they can charge producers for collection Mandatory framework between all compliance orgs and association representing all municipalities compensates municipalities for collection > Performance bonus incentivizes high/ efficient collection (FR, IT); German model without compliance organisation Responsibility allocated to each producer by central clearing house, no compliance organisation Municipalities legally obligated to collect > implies no right to financial compensation from producers; Germany: Share of B2C WEEE collected by municipalities Treated on municipalities' own account Municipalities may treat WEEE on their own account > M s incentive to increase collection depends on metal prices

25 Conclusions on EPR models Optimum (E)PR model depends on national circumstances. However: A single, independent producer register is precondition to share burden equitably and measure performance. Central coordination of collection and communication whether by government or producers is more effective than individual programs. Due to their special market position, compliance organisations should be required to be authorized. All models tend to require continued close supervision and adjustment of the stakeholders obligation. The competing organisations tends to require most fine tuning. Collection targets with credible sanctions generally effective. 25

26 Trends Europe - Fine tuning of legislation Increasing the collection rate: A) Count all WEEE flows, all parties involved in WEEE management to report B) Increase retailers role in collection of small WEEE (0:1 take back obligation) Creating a level playing field: A) New or tighter requirements concerning the governance and authorization of compliance organization (e.g. Italy, France, Portugal) B) Clarifying rights and obligations of entities involved in collection, e.g. retailers rights to deposit collected WEEE at municipal collection points, or treat WEEE on own account. C) Stricter supervision: First license withdrawal of major organization (FR) 26

27 Trends Europe Changing economics: EPR has been a catalyst for scaling up and modernizing the WEEE collection and recovery sector > Net costs became overall net profit. > In an advanced circular economy, (E)PR will play a diminished role and may only activated whenever funding is deemed necessary to remove an externality. More direct Eco-design requirements under Chemicals and Ecodesign Directives or recent French legislation to combat planned obsolensence. (Take back obligation alone has had minimal effects on eco-design (as this would require individual producer responsibility which is not practicable). 27

28 Trends other countries Canada, Australia and a few US states likely to approximate approaches to those in EU, though with different terminology. Long existing e-waste models in Japan, Taiwan and Korea continue to gradually evolve. In Russia modernization of the waste management sector to ensure resource recovery is primary policy objective. Producer responsibility will for some time remain an instrument to raise funds towards this objective. (This latter applies to some extend to China) EPR policies in place or in preparation elsewhere, that are not part of an overall waste management policy or do not integrate incumbents (municipalities, waste sector) are likely to have limited collection results over for a long time. 28

29 Thank you! 29