Consultation paper on CEBS s draft implementation guidelines on the revised large exposures regime

Transcription

1 12 June 2009 Consultation paper on CEBS s draft implementation guidelines on the revised large exposures regime Introduction 1. A revised large exposures regime is included in the amended Capital Requirements Directive 1 (referred to hereafter as the CRD ). The amendments will have to be transposed into Member States national law by 31 October 2010 and will be applied from 31 December The revised provisions on large exposures build on CEBS s advice to the European Commission. CEBS proposes to issue guidance on a number of aspects to ensure harmonised implementation across the Member States. The draft guidelines set out in this consultation paper focus on three aspects of the large exposures regime: the definition of connected clients, in particular interconnectedness ; the calculation of exposure values for arrangements with exposure to underlying assets; and reporting requirements. The last of these links into the COREP framework to ensure a unified European reporting system. 3. CEBS presents its draft proposals of the implementation guidelines on these three aspects for public consultation, which will run until 11 September Responses should be sent to the following address: cp26@c-ebs.org. Comments received will be published on CEBS s website unless respondents request otherwise. In addition, a public hearing will be organized on 7 September 2009 at CEBS s premises in London from 10:00 to 13:00 to allow interested parties to share their views with CEBS. 4. CEBS would particularly welcome market participants views on the questions set out at the end of each section. 1 Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) is a technical expression which comprises Directive 2006/48/EC and Directive 2006/49/EC. Please note that in general references to Directive 2006/48/EC and Directive 2006/49/EC or CRD refer to the amended versions of the Directives. The amending Directive can be found under: 1

2 Executive summary 5. The draft guidelines set out in this consultation paper build on CEBS s advice to the European Commission regarding the review of the large exposures regime. These guidelines focus on particular aspects where CEBS sees a need for further guidance in order to achieve convergent implementation and application of the revised CRD provisions. The paper is structured in three main parts: i) the definition of connected clients, in particular interconnectedness; ii) the treatment of schemes with exposures to underlying assets; and iii) reporting requirements for large exposures purposes. 6. For the large exposures regime effectively both to act as a backstop regime and to mitigate the impact on an institution of the failure of a counterparty, large exposures need to be clearly identified by institutions. This requires as a prior step that connected clients are identified. Consequently, the guidelines seek to provide clarity on the concept of interconnectedness, in particular when control issues or economic dependence should lead to the grouping of clients. 7. CEBS provides a non-exhaustive list of indicators of control that will guide institutions in the identification of control relationships. Even if the issue of control of one client over another does not apply, an institution is obliged to determine whether there exists a relationship of economic dependence between clients. If it is likely that the financial problems of one client would cause repayment difficulties for the other(s), there exists a single risk that needs to be addressed. An economic dependency between clients may be mutual or only one way. CEBS provides a non-exhaustive list of examples that illustrate possible dependencies between clients which should cause institutions to carry out further investigations regarding the need to group the clients. 8. CEBS also gives consideration to the possible connection of clients through a common main source of funding. If two counterparties are likely to draw on commitments from one institution (such as guarantees, credit support in structured transactions or non-committed liquidity facilities) at the same time, these counterparties may have to be considered as connected clients under certain circumstances. 9. The identification of connected clients should be an integral part of an institution s credit granting and surveillance process and every institution should have in place a robust process to conduct this identification. While institutions should strive to apply this process to all of their exposures, CEBS recognizes that this can be difficult in practice and proposes a proportionate approach: as a minimum, the process should be applied to all exposures that exceed 1% of an institution s own funds at a solo or consolidated level. 10. Exposures can arise not only through direct investments by institutions but also through investments in schemes 2 which themselves invest in underlying assets. Ideally, the underlying assets of a scheme should 2 Such as collective investment funds (CIUs) and structured products (e.g. securitisations) 2

3 always be taken into account when calculating exposures for large exposures purposes. 11. Therefore, CEBS considers that the look-through approach is a superior approach as it provides the most prudent treatment from a large exposures perspective. However, CEBS also recognises that is not always possible or feasible to look through and proposes as an alternative a set of more conservative approaches to deal with such cases. CEBS believes that these approaches provide the right incentive to use the look-through approach and accordingly the decision on the most appropriate approach for a specific scheme should be left to the institution. 12. These fallback solutions reflect the greater uncertainty inherent in unknown underlying exposures (or entire schemes) by offering a conservative treatment that considers all unknown underlying exposures and schemes to belong to one separate group of connected clients. The examples set out in Annex 1 illustrate how these approaches would work. 13. CEBS also gives consideration to the differences of treatment for static portfolios where the underlying assets do not change over time and for dynamic portfolios where the treatment is more complicated as the relative portions of underlying assets, as well as the composition of the scheme itself, can change. 14. CEBS has also considered the application of the proposed approaches to tranched products and has developed a number of examples, which are set out in Annex 2, to illustrate how the different approaches would work. 15. CEBS believes that the harmonization of the reporting requirements for large exposures purposes is fully necessary and proposes a common template with unique data-definitions for the information to be reported. CEBS presents in Annexes 3 to 5 its proposals for a common template and some illustrative examples. 16. This common template will be included in the COREP framework and as such the remittance dates and frequency of reporting which have been agreed for the COREP will also apply to large exposures reporting. However, in the exceptional cases where exposures exceed the limit, the value of the exposure must be reported to the competent authorities without delay (i.e. as soon as the credit institution becomes aware of the breach). As these breaches are expected to be exceptional, and will not necessarily have common features, standardised reporting is not proposed. 3

4 Table of contents Introduction...1 Executive summary...2 I. Background...5 II. Methodology...6 III. Connected clients...7 A. Definition of a group of connected clients in Article 4(45) of Directive 2006/48/EC 7 B. Interpretation of control...8 C. Exemption from the requirement to group clients in relation to control...10 D. Interpretation of economic interconnectedness (single risk)...10 E. Interpretation of connection through the main source of funding being common.12 F. Control and management procedures in order to identify connected clients...13 G. Comments from the industry experts on the draft consultation paper...15 H. Consultation questions...16 IV. Treatment of exposures to schemes with underlying assets according to Article 106(3) of the CRD...17 A. Principles underlying the draft guidelines...17 B. Treatment of schemes with underlying assets...18 C. Treatment of tranched products...21 D. Consultation questions...23 V. Reporting Requirements...25 A. CRD amendments with regard to the reporting of large exposures...25 B. Description of large exposures reporting templates...27 C. Reporting of 20 largest exposures for IRB banks...32 D. Details on the composition of groups of connected clients...33 E. Consultation questions...34 Annex 1: Example of the application of partial look-through-base approach...36 Annex 2: Examples of the application of the proposed approaches to tranched products...38 Annex 3: Reporting Template Annex 4: Reporting Template 1 - references to COREP...44 Annex 5: Reporting Template 1 Examples

5 I. Background 17. The previous large exposures framework applied to all credit institutions and investment firms falling within the scope of the CRD and the cross reference in Article 3(1)(b) of the latter Directive to Article 4(1)(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFiD). 18. Article 119 of Directive 2006/48/EC and Article 28 of Directive 2006/49/EC, require the European Commission (referred to hereafter as the Commission ) to submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the functioning of the large exposures provisions of the CRD. A review of the large exposures framework was therefore carried out by the Commission together with the European Banking Committee. 19. CEBS has contributed to this review by issuing two pieces of technical advice to the Commission. The first advice delivered during the course of 2006 included a stock-take of current supervisory practices 3 and a report on current industry practices CEBS s second technical advice focused on substantive aspects of the large exposures framework and was called for in two parts. Part 1 of the advice was delivered in November and dealt with the objectives of a large exposures regime - the purpose, the need for and appropriate levels of large exposures limits; whether the large exposures regime can be considered to be achieving its objectives; examination of the 'metrics' for the calculation of exposure values; and consideration of the extent to which the credit quality of a counterparty can or should be recognised. Part 2 of the advice was delivered in April and addressed the questions of credit risk mitigation and indirect exposures; treatment of inter-bank exposures; treatment of intra-group exposures and other group-related issues; trading book aspects; scope of application of the regime including the question whether a 'one size fits all' approach is desirable or not; consistency of definitions, in particular the definition of connected clients; treatment of breaches of limits; and reporting requirements. 21. Following up the review of the large exposures regime included in the amended CRD, CEBS proposes to issue guidance on a number of aspects of the revised rules to ensure their harmonised implementation across the Member States. 3 Supervisory stock-take on large exposures, published on 3 May 2006, ebs.org/publications/advice/2006/current-supervisory-practices-on-large- EXPOSURES.aspx 4 Report on industry practices on large exposures, published on 31 August 2006, First part of CEBS s second technical advice, published on 06 November 2007 : ebs.org/publications/advice/2007/cebs-publishes-the-first-part-of-its-technical- ADV.aspxhttp:// 6 Second part of CEBS s second technical advice, published on 03 April 2008: ebs.org/publications/advice/2008/cebs-publishes-advice-on-the-review-of-the-large- E.aspx 5

6 II. Methodology 22. CEBS has developed its technical advice to the Commission in a manner consistent with the Commission's better regulation agenda. CEBS has done that by following, as far as time constraints allowed, the Impact Assessment (IA) guidelines that have been developed by the 3L3 Committees 7. The guidelines are consistent with the Commission's own IA methodology but have been refined to take account of the regulatory objectives of the 3L3 Committees and their existing working practices. 23. The draft guidelines set out in this consultation paper build on CEBS s second advice to the Commission. Nevertheless, CEBS has conducted a high-level IA when developing the draft guidelines on connected clients and treatment of schemes with underlying assets and has included the main findings of the IA exercise in this paper. An IA was not conducted for the guidelines on reporting requirements since the proposed reporting template and guidance will be included in the COREP framework for which an overall IA will be conducted. CEBS sought advice from an IA adviser and followed the methodology set in the 3L3 IA guidelines. 24. On connected clients, CEBS assessed the cost and benefits of issuing detailed guidelines against the current situation. CEBS has concluded that there is a clear cost/benefit analysis case for choosing to issue detailed guidelines, as set out in this consultation paper. While it is likely that there will be some additional costs for institutions as a consequence of the requirement to meet the guidelines, the benefits appear to outweigh the costs. Clear rules for the identification of connected clients (cluster risk) will improve risk management of these risks, foster a level playing-field and provide a positive contribution to financial stability. 25. On the treatment of schemes with underlying assets, CEBS has considered the costs and benefits of applying the full look-through approach or of applying a combination of approaches compared with the current situation. CEBS has concluded that a combination of approaches appears to address major failures in this area while keeping costs to a minimum. The application of the full look-through approach also addresses the market failure, but appears to impose large costs on institutions and does not fully consider the benefits of granularity or tranched exposures. 26. Members and Observers from the Consultative Panel were invited to nominate industry experts to provide technical input to CEBS s work 8. These industry experts were invited to comment on a previous draft of the guidelines. The experts provided CEBS with their technical input on a number of important aspects and have significantly contributed to the finalisation of the draft guidelines now published for consultation. 7 The Impact assessment guidelines have been published on 30 April 2008: 8 The list of industry experts is published on CEBS s website: 6

7 III. Connected clients 27. During the previous consultations and public hearing on the revised large exposures regulation, it became clear that there were varying interpretations by institutions of the interconnectedness element of Article 4(45) of Directive 2006/48/EC. In addition, many of the industry representatives did not see the need to view interconnected clients as one risk and objected to keeping the entire Article in the CRD. 28. The large exposures regime is a backstop regime designed to limit the impact on an institution of a counterparty failing. Idiosyncratic risk represents the effects of risks that are particular to individual borrowers. The objective of the definition on connected clients in the CRD is to identify clients so closely linked by idiosyncratic risk factors that it is prudent to treat them as a single risk. In market failure terms the regime aims to mitigate a negative externality, i.e. the wider systemic impact of a failure. In this context, the risk of counterparties being connected needs to be addressed prudently. However, in the past, varying levels of application of the requirements in Article 4(45) to groups of connected clients indicate a lack of clarity regarding the concept of interconnectedness. This implies a regulatory failure. 29. For the regime effectively both to act as a backstop regime and to mitigate such failures, large exposures need to be clearly identified by institutions. This requires as a prior step that connected clients are identified. Consequently, there is a need for regulators to be clear on the concept of interconnectedness, in particular when control issues or economic dependence should lead to the grouping of clients, although this has to be an area of discretion based on some general principles. The development of comprehensive guidelines as set out above seeks to ensure that institutions are aware of their responsibilities in this area and to provide assistance in properly identifying interconnections. A. Definition of a group of connected clients in Article 4(45) of Directive 2006/48/EC 30. Group of connected clients means: (a) two or more natural or legal persons, who, unless it is shown otherwise, constitute a single risk because one of them, directly or indirectly, has control over the other or others; or (b) two or more natural or legal persons between whom there is no relationship of control as set out in point (a) but who are to be regarded as constituting a single risk because they are so interconnected that, if one of them were to experience financial problems, in particular funding or repayment difficulties, the other or all of the others would be likely to encounter funding or repayment difficulties 31. The concept of connected clients is applied in two different contexts in Directive 2006/48/EC. Apart from large exposures, it is also applied when categorizing clients into the retail market portfolio (see Article 79 of 7

8 Directive 2006/48/EC). However, in these guidelines CEBS is focusing on the application of Article 4(45) in relation to the large exposures regulation only. 32. The definition of connected clients as per Article 4(45) of Directive 2006/48/EC refers to interconnectedness arising from the following: one client has control over the other; the clients are interconnected by some form of material economic dependency; or the clients have a main common source of funding within the institution, its group, its connected party or associate in the form of credit support, potential funding or direct, indirect or reciprocal financial assistance. 33. In cases of divergence between the opinion of the institution and that of the competent authority, it is the competent authority which decides whether a client must be regarded as part of a group of connected clients. 34. The definition of control in Article 4(9) in Directive 2006/48/EC is specifically aimed at describing the conditions for requiring a consolidated annual report. While the concept of connected clients within the large exposures regime includes control, as defined in Article 4(9), it also covers interconnectedness arising through other means such as economic dependence. These draft guidelines seek to provide clarity on interconnectedness however it arises. B. Interpretation of control 35. The institution must first rely on the CRD definition of control (Article 4 (9) of Directive 2006/48/EC) which is taken from the accounting definition (Article 1 of Directive 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts). Control means the relationship between a parent undertaking and a subsidiary or a similar relationship between any natural/legal person and an undertaking. 36. This means that control is presumed to exist when the client owns directly, or indirectly through subsidiaries, more than half of the capital or voting power of an entity, unless, in exceptional circumstances, it can be clearly demonstrated that such ownership does not constitute control. 37. Normally, a client owning 50 % of the shares/voting power of another client will be able to exercise one or more of the powers mentioned below. This is even the case when there are two equal partners/owners who share the power and govern the entity jointly. 38. However, control may also exist when the client owns less than half of the voting power of an entity or does not hold any participating interest in the entity at all. 39. In those cases, the institution should refer to indicators of control that are seen in cases where the client is able to exercise one or more of these powers: power to direct the activities of the other entity 9 so as to obtain benefits from its activities; 9 In this context, a client which is a natural or legal person (undertaking). 8

9 power to decide on crucial transactions such as the transfer of profit or loss; power to appoint or remove the majority of directors, the supervisory board, the members of the board of directors or equivalent governing body where control of the entity is exercised by that board or body; power to cast the majority of votes at meetings of the board of directors, general assembly or equivalent governing body where control of the entity is exercised by that board or body; and/or power to co-ordinate the management of an undertaking with that of other undertakings in pursuit of a common objective, for instance in the case where the same natural persons are involved in the management or board of two or more undertakings. 40. In cases where the institution needs to make a discretionary judgement, these indicators, along with other relevant indicators used for accounting purposes, could be used in order to identify a control relationship. 41. There will be some situations where there could be a requirement to include an entity in more than one group of connected clients, for example, in the case of an entity in which two persons/companies hold 50:50 participations if they exercise a common influence on the entity. The same applies to a case where a client has entered into a shareholders agreement with other shareholders so as to obtain the majority of the voting power of an entity and this implies that all of the shareholders involved have control over the entity. A natural or legal person that is a partner in one or more (limited) partnerships also exercises control over these (limited) partnerships and (limited) partnerships are therefore to be included in the group of connected clients of every one of their partners. 42. It follows from the control criterion that exposures to entities within the same group as the reporting institution are to be regarded as a single risk. All entities within the same group are connected clients, although exposures to some or all of them may be exempted from the large exposures regime depending on how the Member State has implemented Article 113(4)(c). 43. It follows from the definition above that horizontal groups according to Article 12 of the Directive 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts, which draw up consolidated accounts and a consolidated annual report, are to be grouped as connected clients. This is the case if an undertaking is related to one or more other undertakings because they all have the same parent or are managed on a unified basis. This management may be pursuant to a contract concluded between the undertakings, or provisions in the Memoranda or Articles of Association of those undertakings, or if the administrative management or supervisory bodies of the undertaking and of one or more other undertakings consist for the major part of the same persons. 44. The entire exposure to a connected client must be included in the calculation of the exposure to a group of connected clients, it is not limited to, nor proportional to, the formal percentage of ownership. 45. It should be understood that the control situation is not just for a transitional period but seems reasonably stable. In Article 4(45) of Directive 9

10 2006/48/EC the wording unless it is shown otherwise is used. It should be interpreted in the sense that if the institution is able to demonstrate that what seems to be a control relationship truly is not, then there is no requirement to group the clients. Most notably, this would be the case for owners of shares without voting rights. However, in cases where control exists, it is not relevant that the client for the time being does not actually exercise its potential control. Accordingly, voluntarily self-imposed limitations on the exercise of control such as legal ring-fencing or statements of a similar nature issued by the client do not obviate the need to consider such clients as connected. C. Exemption from the requirement to group clients in relation to control 46. For subsidiaries where the majority of the shares are owned by the central government, and exposures to the central government 10 receive a 0 % risk weight under the Directive 2006/48/EC, there is no requirement to group the subsidiaries as connected clients. This also applies to subsidiaries controlled by regional or local authorities under the same central governments. In such cases, even though the owner has control over each subsidiary, the risk connected with the exposure to one subsidiary is normally not related to the risk of the exposures to other subsidiaries. In addition, the failure of one subsidiary, which is a separate legal person, does not necessarily impose a duty on the owner to invest more capital. If the owner still decides to do so, it is assumed that this ultimately could be financed by raising revenues. D. Interpretation of economic interconnectedness (single risk) 47. Even if the issue of control of one client over another does not apply, an institution is obliged to determine whether there exists a relationship of economic dependence between clients. If it is likely that the financial problems of one client would cause repayment difficulties for the other(s), there exists a single risk that needs to be addressed. An economic dependence between clients may be mutual or only one way. 48. Dependence might arise in the context of business interconnections (such as supply chain links, dependence on large customers or counterparty exposures) which are not linked to respective sectoral or geographic risks, and suggests that the clients involved are exposed to the same idiosyncratic risk factor. If this idiosyncratic risk materializes, the solvency of one or both obligors can be threatened. Consequently, interdependencies between enterprises (or persons) due to bilateral business relationships may lead to default contagion which is independent from sectoral or geographic risk. The fact that the existence of common idiosyncratic risk factors may lead to default contagion for otherwise independent clients, is the core of the 10 It was implicitly understood in the original advice from CEBS of April 2008 that this exemption is limited to 0 % risk weighted governments (and their regional and local authorities), as the default of 0 % RW governments is outside the scope of the risks that the large exposures regime is designed to address. 10

11 concept of economic interconnectedness 11. Sectoral concentration is a common risk affecting all entities in the same industry, geographic risk is a risk affecting all entities in the same region whereas interconnectedness is an idiosyncratic risk that arises in addition to sectoral and geographic risk. Therefore sectoral and geographic concentrations fall outside the scope of the large exposures regime and are addressed by other means such as Pillar The rationale for the definition of economic interconnectedness in Article 4(45)(b) is to identify dependencies that a client cannot overcome without experiencing repayment difficulties. However, even if a client is depending on another client through, for instance, a business relationship, it could still be possible for the client to find a replacement for this business partner (in case of his default) or to compensate for such a loss by other means, for example through reduction of costs, concentration on other sectors etc. This may cause practical problems, such as lower margins or other inconveniences, but as long as the institution comes to the conclusion that the client will be able to cope with such a situation without facing repayment difficulties, there is no requirement to consider such clients to be interconnected. On the other hand, if it is likely that a client would not be able, for example, to cope with the loss of an important customer, i.e. the institution comes to the conclusion that the failure of such a customer would lead to repayment problems for the client, then these clients must be considered to be interconnected. 50. The following examples are illustrations of possible economic dependence between clients, where institutions should carry out further investigations regarding the need to group these clients: when one counterparty has guaranteed fully or partly the exposure of the other counterparty and the guarantee is so significant for the issuer that the issuer is likely to default if a claim on the guarantee occurs. If the guarantee is not significant, meaning that the potential liability if it materializes would not threaten the issuer s solvency, the guarantee relationship is covered through the Credit Risk Mitigation rules or counterparty substitution; the owner of a residential/commercial property and the tenant who pays the majority of the rent; the producer of a given product and the only buyer of this product; a producer and vendors that this producer is depending on and which it would take time to substitute; undertakings that have an identical customer base, consisting of a very small number of customers and where the potential for finding new customers is limited; and for the retail market: - the debtor and his/her co-borrower; 11 This definition of a common idiosyncratic risk factor was developed for the purpose of analyzing aspects of the IRB model, but it is applicable also for large exposures purposes. 11

12 - the debtor and his/her spouse/partner if by contractual arrangements or marriage laws both are liable and the loan is significant for both; or - the debtor and a collateral provider or guarantor, provided that the collateral or guarantee is so substantial for the issuer to the extent that his/her/its ability to service the liabilities will be affected if the guarantee or collateral is claimed by the institution. 51. It is not possible to give a comprehensive list of possible cases of economic interconnectedness. Each case will have its own characteristics, and the identification of interconnected clients requires thorough knowledge of the customer/client and not least a consciousness about connected risks among the institution s staff. 52. Institutions that operate in a well defined geographic area only, or in an area dominated by one specific industry (sector), are not more affected in their conduct of business by the connected clients rule than other institutions. Geographic and sectoral concentration risks are not covered by the large exposures requirements but by Pillar 2 of the CRD. E. Interpretation of connection through the main source of funding being common 53. If two counterparties are likely to exploit commitments from one institution (such as guarantees, credit support in structured transactions or noncommitted liquidity facilities) at the same time, these counterparties may be considered to be connected clients. The intention is not to include cases where the two counterparties draw on the same funding source because the money market or market for commercial paper in general is in trouble, but when the need for funding is caused by a problem which is specific to the clients in question. It could also be a funding problem specific to the category of clients or products in question. 54. In relation to interconnectedness and funding in general, it is clear that the CRD requires institutions to identify clients that are connected due to reliance on the same funding entity and that this entity as the sole source of funding is not easily replaceable. The connected clients in this case are not able to overcome their dependence on this entity for funding even by taking on practical inconvenience or higher margins. Clients that are depending on their existing source of funding simply because they are not creditworthy do not belong in this category. 55. An illustrative case in relation to connected clients due a common source of funding is the following: where a bank has committed itself to be the existing or potential funder or provider of credit support to more than one conduit or SPV under similar conditions and where it is possible that all of these commitments may materialize into exposures at the same time because they are dependant on the same funding entity. As an example, an entity provided liquidity for a number of different conduits, and relied on issuing commercial paper (CP) in order to finance the conduits. The conduits had no other source of funding and invested in long-term assets. As the asset quality of the conduits came into question, the loss of trust in the 12

13 market was immediate and significant, and the funding entity was unable to issue new commercial paper. Consequently, it could not provide the necessary funds to refinance all the conduits. Therefore, the bank, as the main guarantor for the conduits, had to fund the whole structure. Although the different conduits were not invested in the same assets and were legally independent as they were owned by separate trusts, it is obvious that the different conduits constituted a group of connected clients as they formed a single risk. This risk was not a sectoral risk, as it was the specialization in product and niche in the money market or, more specifically, the market for commercial paper, which caused the dependence. The moment there was no market for new commercial paper of the funding entity, the limited scope, competence and solidity of these SPVs became evident. 56. While the above example refers specifically to conduits and the problems experienced in the commercial paper market, it should be noted that the requirement to connect clients due to a common source of funding is not dependent on either the type of entity being funded nor the form of funding used, but rather it is dependent on entities receiving all or the majority of their funding from a common source which cannot easily be replaced. As is general for the concept of interconnectedness, it is a case by case assessment. 57. However, it should be noted that a common source of funding solely due to geographic location does not in itself lead to a requirement to connect clients. Small and medium sized entities will in many cases not have the capacity or commercial incentive to use other than their local bank, and in addition for most of them the personal relationship with their banker is the key to better financial services. This fact does not in itself justify that these clients should be regarded as interconnected, even though they have a common source of funding. Such a situation differs from funding dependencies described in this chapter because the motivation for sharing a common source of funding is the geographic location and because such a common source of funding can normally be replaced. F. Control and management procedures in order to identify connected clients 58. It should be an integral part of an institution s credit granting and surveillance process to identify possible connections between clients at the earliest possible time. It is in the interests of the institution to identify all possible connections in order that it has a clear understanding of its exposures. In this regard it is incumbent on all institutions to use all the information at their disposal to identify connections; this includes publicly available information. It is expected that at a minimum institutions will increase their efforts to identify connections as exposures grow or reach a certain threshold. 59. To have information about connected clients is essential in limiting the impact of unforeseen events. Accordingly, the information required should be available to the institution. The data that needs to be collected may go beyond the institution s client and include legal or natural persons connected to the client. Information about business links or economic dependencies is not usually captured by the existing information systems of banks. The 13

14 necessary inputs require tapping into soft information that typically exists at the level of individual loan officers and relationship managers. 60. In relation to the identification of interconnected clients, every institution should have in place a robust process for determining connected clients. CEBS does recognize the possibility of practical difficulties in determining interconnectedness for all the exposures of an institution. Notwithstanding this, the institution must be in a position to demonstrate to its competent authority that its process is commensurate to its business. In addition the process should be subject to on-going review by the institution to ensure its appropriateness. It will rarely be possible to implement automated procedures for identifying economic interconnections, therefore case by case analysis and judgement will be required. Consequently, for the identification of economic interconnections, institutions need to rely primarily on the expertise of their loan officers and risk managers. Therefore, an institution s board of directors and senior management must ensure that adequate processes for the identification of economic interconnections are in place and risk managers and loan officers are sufficiently trained in this regard. Such processes need to be proportionate to the relative size of the loan. Furthermore, institutions should also monitor for changes to interconnections, at least in the context of their normal periodic loan reviews and when substantial expansions of the loan are planned. 61. In this regard, while an institution should strive to apply its process to all exposures, CEBS expects that as a minimum, the process would be applied to all exposures that exceed 1 % or more of own funds at a solo or consolidated level. 62. A crucial point in the process is the first time an exposure is granted to the client, or the first time an exposure reaches a level that requires individual handling from the institution. At this point, there is normally a loan officer involved and personal contact between the loan officer and the client. This opportunity to collect information relevant to disclosure of connected clients should be utilised. 63. Normally, the institution s largest exposures will be allocated to loan officers dedicated to follow the client on a regular basis. This includes personal contact as well as scrutinizing accounts and reports. The occasions to develop a deeper understanding of the client s business and possible dependencies are there and the collection of such information is a normal part of conducting prudent banking. 64. The credit institution has to assess for example the diversity of the client s customer base or of the tenants. In cases where the institution has identified interconnectedness, it has to acquire information on the other entity(ies) in the group of connected clients if this is necessary to form a view on the creditworthiness of its customer. The credit institution, however, is not obliged to investigate, whether the other entity, to which its client is interconnected, itself is part of other groups of connected clients, as long as the other entity is not a client of the credit institution. 14

15 G. Comments from the industry experts on the draft consultation paper 65. As part of the process of developing this consultation document CEBS consulted a number of experts from the industry to get initial technical feedback on the proposals. Where it was deemed appropriate, the issues raised by the industry experts have been included in the consultation paper. However, there were two issues raised by a number of participants that require specific attention at this stage. These issues refer to: i) One-way connectedness 66. A number of experts commented that the inclusion of one-way connectedness would be an extension of the large exposures regime. It is very clear from the Directive text that including one-way connections is not an expansion of the regime as it is explicitly covered by Article 4(45)(b) of Directive 2006/48/EC if one of them were to experience financial problems, the other or all of the others would be likely to encounter repayment difficulties. There is no premise here that the dependency needs to be mutual. Given that it is clear from the above that the large exposures regime encompasses one-way as well as mutual connectedness the issue raised by the industry experts has not been addressed in this paper or included in the questions to which responses are sought through this consultation. ii) Connections through a common source of funding 67. A number of experts raised concerns that CEBS would expand the large exposures regime by incorporating requirements in relation to connections through a common source of funding. However, it was an explicit decision by the Commission, Council and Parliament to expand the definition of connected clients in this regard. Therefore, the definition of connected clients in Article 4(45)(b) has been expanded by the amended Directive 12 as follows: (b) two or more natural or legal persons between whom there is no relationship of control as set out in point (a) but who are to be regarded as constituting a single risk because they are so interconnected that, if one of them were to experience financial problems, in particular funding or repayment difficulties, the other or all of the others would be likely to encounter funding or repayment difficulties 68. Consequently, with the inclusion of the above text in the definition of connected clients, it is clear that connections through a common source of funding are also covered. Therefore, this issue raised by the industry experts has also not been addressed in this paper or included in the list of questions. 12 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards banks affiliated to central institutions, certain own funds items, large exposures, supervisory arrangements, and crisis management ( 15

16 H. Consultation questions 69. CEBS would like to ask participants in this consultation who believe that the present proposals have shortcomings or are burdensome to provide suggestions on how these proposals can be amended. Such contributions will deliver very valuable input and give indications about how these guidelines can be improved after the consultation. The following questions are of particular interest for CEBS: 1. Are the guidelines in relation to the Interpretation of control sufficiently clear or are there issues which need to be elaborated further or which are missing? Please provide concrete proposals on how the text should be amended. 2. Are the guidelines in relation to the Exemption from the requirement to group clients in relation to control sufficiently clear or are there issues which need to be elaborated further or which are missing? Please provide concrete proposals on how the text should be amended. 3. Are the guidelines in relation to the Interpretation of economic interconnectedness (single risk) sufficiently clear or are there issues which need to be elaborated further or which are missing? Please provide concrete proposals on how the text should be amended. 4. Are the guidelines in relation to the Interpretation of connection through the main source of funding being common sufficiently clear or are there issues which need to be elaborated further or which are missing? Please provide concrete proposals on how the text should be amended. 5. What do you think about the proposed 1% threshold as proposed above? 6. Are the guidelines in relation to the Control and management procedures in order to identify connected clients sufficiently clear or are there issues which need to be elaborated further or which are missing? Please provide concrete proposals on how the text should be amended. 7. Are there remaining areas of interpretation of the definition in Article 4(45) of Directive 2006/48/EC that need to be covered in CEBS s guidelines? 16

17 IV. Treatment of exposures to schemes with underlying assets according to Article 106(3) of the CRD 70. Exposures can arise not only through direct investments of institutions but also through investments in schemes 13 which themselves invest in underlying assets. Consequently, when a credit institution invests in a scheme it is exposed on the one hand to the risk associated with the scheme manager/depositor and on the other hand to the credit and market risk linked to the underlying assets of the scheme. Therefore, ideally, the underlying assets of a scheme should always be taken into account when calculating exposures for large exposure purposes. 71. The revised large exposure rules include the treatment of exposures to underlying assets. The new Article 106(3) is included in the amended CRD: "In order to determine the existence of a group of connected clients, in respect of exposures referred to in points (m), (o) and (p) of Article 79(1), where there is an exposure to underlying assets, a credit institution shall assess the scheme or its underlying exposures, or both. For that purpose, a credit institution shall evaluate the economic substance and the risks inherent in the structure of the transaction." 72. Article 106(3) makes clear that institutions have to separately assess for large exposure purposes schemes with underlying assets in order to determine the existence of groups of connected clients. Institutions are required to assess whether the scheme itself, its underlying assets or both are interconnected with the institution s clients (including other schemes) and therefore should be grouped together with such connected clients for the purpose of the large exposure requirements. Article 106(3) does not, however, specify under what circumstances the scheme or the underlying exposures or both have to be assessed. Article 106(3) also does not provide an option for institutions to choose between these three approaches but requires institutions to decide on the basis of the economic substance and the risks inherent in the structures which approach is the most suitable for a scheme. Further, Article 106(3) does not explain what an institution should do if a look-through is not possible or too burdensome. 73. In addition, there is evidence to suggest that institutions exposures to schemes with underlying assets are not being consistently (or prudently) treated for the purposes of determining the existence of a group of connected clients with regard to the large exposure requirements. This leads to the increased risk of the large exposure limits being breached and consequential risks of firm failure, which can result in negative externalities. Therefore, CEBS has developed the draft guidelines set out below on the appropriate treatment of various structured instruments. A. Principles underlying the draft guidelines 74. CEBS developed the draft guidelines on the basis of the following principles: the guidelines should provide comprehensive prudential guidance for different kinds of schemes with underlying assets; 13 Such as collective investment funds (CIUs) and structured products (e.g. securitisations) 17

18 the look-through approach is considered to be the superior approach for determining interconnectedness of the underlying assets with the institution s clients as it provides the most prudent treatment from a large exposures perspective; because it is not always possible or feasible to look through, the guidelines should provide prudent alternative approaches that adequately deal with such cases. In these approaches, greater uncertainty should be reflected in a more conservative treatment; regardless of the question of interconnectedness of the underlying assets to other schemes or direct exposures to clients, risk arising from schemes themselves should be recognised. B. Treatment of schemes with underlying assets 75. Potential losses stemming from schemes with underlying assets can arise from two sources: the risk associated with the scheme itself and the risk associated with the underlying assets of the scheme. Article 106(3) makes clear that these two sources of risk need to be taken into account in the determination of the existence of a group of connected clients. The different nature of the two sources implies that different factors should be taken into account when assessing the materiality of the risks stemming from each source, and therefore the need to apply look-through to cope with the risk stemming from the underlying assets or to limit the investment in a specific scheme to cope with the risk stemming from the scheme itself. In the case of the risk stemming from the underlying assets one important factor would be the degree of diversification in the scheme. While in the case of the risk stemming from the scheme itself the legal framework applicable to the fund managers would be an important factor to take into account. 76. Regarding the risk of the underlying assets, taking into account the burden that a compulsory full look-through approach could impose in some cases, CEBS s proposal consists of a number of options that introduce incentives to look through instead of applying a more conservative treatment. Thus the decision on the most appropriate approach for a specific scheme is left to the institution. 77. However, institutions should whenever feasible use the most risk sensitive approach and should be able to demonstrate to the competent authorities that regulatory arbitrage considerations have not influenced their choice. Competent authorities would expect that the institution s decision is justified in terms of the relative risk that the scheme could pose in terms of breaching the large exposures limits and the cost to mitigate that risk by the look-through. For example, if an institution makes an investment that represents 5% in terms of its own funds in a fund with a very granular and dynamic portfolio, the marginal contribution of this scheme to the unexpected idiosyncratic credit risk of the institution may be low, while the cost of a full look-through of this portfolio may be high. Conversely, if the institution invests in a non-granular and static portfolio the contribution of this scheme to the unexpected idiosyncratic credit risk of the institution could be material while the cost of a full look through is not likely to be very high. Therefore, competent authorities would expect that in the latter case 18