South Asian Network on Economic Modeling (SANEM), Department of Economics, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh

Transcription

1 MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Rules of Origin and Sensitive List under SAFTA and Bilateral FTAs among South Asian Countries: Quantitative Assessments of Potential Implications for Nepal Selim Raihan South Asian Network on Economic Modeling (SANEM), Department of Economics, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh July 2008 Online at MPRA Paper No , posted 7. April :38 UTC

2 Rules of Origin and Sensitive List under SAFTA and Bilateral FTAs among South Asian Countries: Quantitative Assessments of Potential Implications for Nepal Selim Raihan * July 2008 Paper Prepared for the Nepal Residence Mission of Asian Development Bank * Dr. Selim Raihan is an Associate Professor at the Department of Economics, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. selim.raihan@gmail.com

3 Abstract This study analyzes the implications of the proliferation of ROO and sensitive list under SAFTA and bilateral FTAs among South Asian countries with particular reference to Nepal. In this regard this study makes a comparative assessment of different ROO arrangements under different bilateral FTAs as well as under SAFTA and BIMSTEC with a view to finding out the relative flexibility of SAFTA ROO vis-à-vis ROO in other regional and bilateral FTAs in South Asia. In addition, this study also explores the impact of the sensitive list maintained by India, under SAFTA, on the rise in exports from Nepal to India. The study uses a partial equilibrium model, namely the WITS/SMART model, to simulate different scenarios. It appears that when there is no ROO requirement and there is no sensitive list, the South Asian countries, under a full SAFTA scenario, are able to increase their exports within the region quite substantially. India appears to be the largest gainer from such scenario. However, Nepal also turns out to be important gainer as her exports to the South Asian region as whole increase by around US$ 90 million. Interestingly almost all of hear export increase would be targeted to Indian market (99 percent) under such a scenario. The analysis on trade creation and trade diversion for Nepal suggests that under a full SAFTA scenario, the trade creation effect (US$ thousand) will be higher than the negative trade diversion effect (US$ thousand) resulting in a net trade effect equal to US$ It also appears that the revenue loss and welfare gains for Nepal, resulting from such a scenario, would be US$ thousand and US$ thousand, In the second scenario, because of ROO (and assuming no sensitive list in India) 34 percent of the potential rise in exports from Nepal to India appears to be unrealized. In the third simulation, because of SAFTA sensitive list in India (and assuming no ROO) as high as 47 percent of the potential rise in exports from Nepal to India appears to be lost. In the final simulation, it appears that SAFTA ROO and sensitive list in India eats up more than two-third of the potential rise in exports from Nepal to India. It can therefore, be argued that since the value-additions of most of Nepal s export products are very low, a 30 percent value-addition requirement under SAFTA as well as under the India-Nepal Trade Treaty would act as a significant barrier for her export expansion in India. This is also true for other LDCs in South Asia. Therefore, the problem of ROO will need to be resolved, keeping an eye on the manufacturing/processing capability of the LDCs. In addition, the other criteria of the ROO, namely the change in tariff head, under SAFTA should also be made consistent with those that are currently in force in the bilateral trade agreements within the SAARC region, which happen to be more liberal than the prevailing SAFTA rules. It also appears that SAFTA sensitive list is too stringent to allow significant rise in exports from the LDCs (in this case Nepal) to the Indian market. In almost all the cases, the products, which are included in the sensitive list, have significantly high export potentials. It can thus be concluded that if these sensitive lists are not phased out, there will be very little to gain from SAFTA by Nepal and other LDCs in this region. 1

4 Rules of Origin and Sensitive List under SAFTA and Bilateral FTAs among South Asian Countries: Quantitative Assessments of Potential Implications for Nepal Selim Raihan I. Introduction In recent years, there has been increased interest in regional economic integration in South Asia. With the stalemate of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations, it is expected that the interest in regional trading arrangements will increase further. Regional integration in South Asia got the momentum in 1995 when the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) was signed. In early 2004, the SAARC member countries agreed to form a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), which has become a parallel initiative to the multilateral trade liberalisation commitments of the south Asian countries. SAFTA has come into force since July 01, 2006, with the aim of boosting intraregional trade among the seven SAARC members. Some South Asian countries are also a signatory of inter-regional FTA initiatives such Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral and Technical Cooperation (BIMSTEC) FTA 1 and Bangkok Agreement. Many South Asian countries have also signed bilateral FTAs among themselves and with countries outside the region. Bilateral FTAs among South Asian countries, which currently operate in parallel with SAFTA, including those between: (i) India and Nepal; (ii) India and Sri Lanka; (iii) India-Bhutan; (iv) Pakistan-Sri Lanka; (v) Pakistan-Nepal (limited to trade in tea). There are also on-going discussion for bilateral FTAs between India- Bangladesh, and Bangladesh-Sri Lanka. The proliferation of bilateral and regional FTAs has necessarily been accompanied by overlapping Rules of Origin (ROO). The main reason for the existence of ROO in FTAs is to prevent trade deflection, by which is meant that the country with the lowest external tariff acts as port of entry for the entire bloc s imports, depriving partners of tariff revenue. However, the proliferation of ROO can lead to what Bhagwati termed as the spaghetti bowl effect. 2 ROO induces efficiency costs in production and restricts market access. 3 Complex ROO increases administrative, compliance and business costs, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises, which have limited capacity to deal with them. Furthermore, the demands of negotiating multiple ROOs increasingly strains the scarce trade negotiation resources of many South Asian countries, particularly the least developed countries, which have limited trade policy capacity. Multiple ROO (e.g., value-added rules or changes in customs classification) arising from overlapping agreements among South Asian countries under different bilateral FTAs and that under SAFTA would have significant implications for enhancing trade and welfare in the region within SAARC framework. Depending upon how they are specified, ROO under 1 BIMSTEC FTA comprises of five South Asian countries, namely, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka and two South-east Asian countries, namely Myanmar and Thailand. 2 For a concise treatment, see Bhagwati (2002). 3 There is small but expanding literature on this subject- see for example, Krueger (1993), Krishna and Krueger (1995), Krishna, K. (2005), Vermulst and Bourgeios (1994), and Brenton, P. (2003) 2

5 South Asian bilateral FTAs and those under SAFTA can to varying degrees- restrict trade, misdirect investment, inhibit productivity growth and reduce welfare from levels otherwise attainable. SAFTA would be relatively less attractive to bilateral FTA among South Asian countries if its ROO is more restrictive and costly to those under later categories. Thus, any potential economic gains of SAFTA in terms of increasing trade and welfare would be diluted by bilateral FTAs. Consequently, SAFTA would lose its relevance to enhance trade and welfare among SAARC member countries. In addition to the ROO, all these bilateral and regional FTA agreements allow the member countries to maintain sensitive lists of products which will be outside of the trade liberalisation programme. It has been observed that under SAFTA the sensitive lists maintained by the developing countries in this region, especially by India, are too stringent and long to allow the LDC members expanding their exports significantly into the markets of these developing countries. Against this backdrop, the main objective of this study is to analyze the implications of the proliferation of ROO under bilateral FTAs among South Asian countries on SAFTA with particular reference to Nepal. In this regard this study makes a comparative assessment of different ROO arrangements under different bilateral FTAs as well as under SAFTA and BIMSTEC with a view to finding out the relative flexibility of SAFTA ROO vis-à-vis ROO in other regional and bilateral FTAs in South Asia. In addition, this study also explores the impact of the sensitive list maintained by India, under SAFTA, on the rise in exports from Nepal to India. II. Pattern of Trade in South Asia Any analysis on the impact of any regional or bilateral FTAs in South Asia should be preceded by an analysis on the existing pattern on trade in South Asia. The intra-regional trade among the South Asian countries is very low. Until 1951, total intra-regional trade in South Asia as a percentage of the region s total trade was in the double digits. However, as South Asia became progressively more closed relative to the world market and also the political rivalry between India and Pakistan intensified over time, by 1967 intra-regional trade fell to just two percent of the region s total trade. The share began to recover during the 1990s and by 2002 it rose to 4.4 percent (Baysan et al, 2006). Figure 1 suggests that, in 2003, Bangladesh was the single largest importer in South Asia and accounted for 36.4 percent of regional imports followed by Sri Lanka, who accounted for 26.6 percent. Nepal accounted for 14.5 percent of total intra-regional import. In contrast, Figure 2 indicates that in 2003, Bangladesh had the least share in exports to the region, after Maldives, which accounted for only 2.3 percent of the total regional exports. While India was the largest exporter accounting for over 77 percent of the total regional exports, Nepal accounted for 5.4 percent. 3

6 Figure 1: Country-wise Share (%) in Intra-SAARC Imports in 2003 Sri Lanka 26.6% Bangladesh 36.4% Pakistan 7.1% Nepal 14.5% Maldives 2.6% India 12.8% Data Source: UN COMTRADE Figure 2: Country-wise Share (%) in Intra-SAARC s in 2003 Pakistan 7.3% Nepal 5.4% Sri Lanka Bangladesh 7.5% 2.3% Maldives 0.3% India 77.2% Data Source: UN COMTRADE III. Pattern of Nepal s Trade with her Neighbouring Countries Nepal s trade with her neighbouring countries is very much dominated by trading with India. It appears from Tables 1 and 2 that Nepal trade very little with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. After a long decline in relative importance, Nepal s dependence on exports to India increased sharply more than 50 percent during early 200os (Table 1). Karmacharya (2005) observes that the major underlying factors responsible for this trend are the long porous borders, free movement of people and capital, preferential trade treaty (signed in December 1996), special regime of payments between the two countries, a slowdown in exports to other key markets, and limited success in penetrating other regional 4

7 markets. Table 1 also suggests that Nepal s export to other SAARC countries accounts for only about 1 percent of its total exports during the last eight years (Table 1). Table 1: Direction of Nepal s Merchandize Trade Nepal s Trade US $ Million Share in Total s (%) South Asia Bangladesh (.) (.) Bhutan (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 0.1 India Maldives (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 0.2 (.) (.) (.) (.) Pakistan (.) (.) (.) (.) Sri Lanka (.) 0.3 (.) (.) 298 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) ROW (.) (.) Total Source: Karmacharya (2005). Quarterly Economic Bulletin (various issues), Nepal Rastra Bank; Nepal Overseas Trade Statistics (various issues), Trade Promotion Center. Note: (.) means negligible. With respect to import, India still accounts for more that 50 percent of Nepal s total imports (Table 2). Nepal s import from other SAARC countries is only about 1 percent of its total imports. Table 2: Direction of Nepal s Merchandize Import Trade Nepal s Trade US $ Million Share in Total s (%) South Asia Bangladesh (.) (.) Bhutan (.) (.) 0.4 (.) (.) (.) (.) India Maldives (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) Pakistan (.) (.) (.) Sri Lanka (.) (.) (.) ROW Total Source: Karmacharya (2005). Quarterly Economic Bulletin (various issues), Nepal Rastra Bank; Nepal Overseas Trade Statistics (various issues), Trade Promotion Center. Note: (.) means negligible. III. Rules of Origin in the Regional Trading Arrangements Rules of origin are the criteria used to define where a product was made. They are an essential part of trade rules because a number of policies discriminate between exporting countries: quotas, preferential tariffs, anti-dumping actions, countervailing duty (charged to counter export subsidies), and more. Because the preferential treatment provided for in a free trade agreement is usually granted only to products originating from members of that FTA, rules of origin are important. These are the criteria which determine the national origin of a product. The country of origin of a product is usually seen as the country where the last substantial transformation took place. 5

8 Enforcing and defining rules of origin for goods or services poses major problems. This issue has been very controversial in a number of agreements and trade unions and other critics have campaigned to highlight the ways in which rules of origin can be used and abused by governments and corporations alike. In particular there are concerns about the ease with which goods processed partly or fully in a third country can get duty-free access under a bilateral agreement by being re-exported with just enough processing to satisfy rules of origin requirements. This is further complicated by the fact that different bilateral free trade agreements use different criteria to set rules of origin. The proliferation of free trade areas and consequently of bi-lateral and regional trade agreements within the multilateral trading system have encouraged the use of preferential rules of origin. Such preferential rules of origin are aimed at distinguishing products that are entitled to preferential tariff treatment from products that are not (OECD, 2002). Though covered in Annex II of the Rules of Origin Agreement as the Common Declaration with regard to preferential rules of origin, they contain no prohibition barring them from being used as instruments to pursue trade policy objectives. Rules of Origin have become problematic mostly in the context of preferential trade agreements; exactly the arena where WTO rules do not apply (Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995). The 2001 Doha Ministerial declaration reaffirmed WTO s commitment to the least developed countries (LDCs) through trade preferences and trade-related technical assistance (Brenton, 2003). It did so by laying down the objective of duty free, quota free market access for products originating from LDCs while also committing to consider other measures for progressive improvements in market access for LDCs. Schemes such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) providing duty-free access to products from developing countries and other initiatives like the European Union s Everything But Arms (EBA) Agreement are some examples of preferential treatment in tariffs accorded to both developing countries and LDCs. However, as much as these initiatives have been taken to secure beneficial and meaningful integration into the multilateral trading system and the global economy for the developing countries and LDCs, its objectives are undermined by the rules of origin criteria they impose. Apart from these schemes, rules of origin are used extensively in other preferential trade agreements like bi-lateral trade treaties and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). Nepal is a party to bi-lateral treaties with India as well as RTAs like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA). In such arrangements, members confer origin to products if a pre-specified proportion of its value added takes place within the union. By bypassing the multilateral trading system s principle of most favoured nation (MFN), members of preferential arrangements make a politico-economic decision to exclude third parties from receiving any preferences. At the same time, if members of such arrangements face stringent rules of origin requirements, their exporters might opt to forego available preferences and pay MFN rates instead. Whether rules of origin requirements in preferential arrangements are actually beneficial or not is a matter for debate. The importance of rules of origin has grown significantly as preferential agreements expand and countries have treated similar imported products differently according to where the product was made (Lazaro and Medalla, 2006). 6

9 Though justified as a means to avoid trade deflection 4 particularly in preferential arrangements, rules of origin are also being seen as discriminatory trade policy instruments. Since the liberalization of tariffs barriers, countries have turned to narrowly drawn rules of origin as the second best means of providing a measure of protection to domestic industries (Coyle, 2004) WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin With a rise in the aforementioned issues regarding rules of origin, particularly those concerning the adoption of individual rules of origin requirements by WTO Members, a harmonization of the rules was sought. In order to make them simpler, uniform and stable, the Rules of Origin Agreement was adopted in The Agreement lays down guidelines for broad approaches in formulating the harmonized rules (Das, 1999). But this agreement is only confined to non-preferential rules of origin. This agreement is divided into four parts containing nine Articles and two annexes: Article 1 in Part I of this agreement defines Rules of Origin as those laws, regulations and administrative determinations of general application applied to determine the country of origin of goods except those related to the granting of tariff preferences. 5 Article 2 in Part II covers the disciplines to govern the application of rules of origin and lists out disciplines applicable to all WTO Members during the transition period. 6 The work to harmonize the rules of origin is being carried out by a Committee on Rules of Origin (CRO) in the WTO and a Technical Committee on Rules of Origin (TCRO) under the auspices of the World Customs Organization (WCO). Article 3 in Part II of the agreement outlines disciplines to be adhered to after the transition period. Article 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 in Part III of the agreement outline Institutions, Information and procedures for modification and introduction of New Rules of Origin, Review, Consultation and Dispute Settlement respectively. Article 9 in Part IV defines objectives and principles, work programme and the role of the committee in the harmonization of rules of origin. Annex I outlines the roles and responsibilities of the Technical Committee on Rules of Origin. Annex II covers the Common Declaration with regard to preferential rules of origin. For the determination of the origin of a product as defined in Article 9 of the Rules of Origin, there are several criteria, such as (i) substantial transformation: when a product is accepted as being wholly obtained in the country, there is no dispute on its origin but whenever a product is manufactured with a combination of imported and domestic materials, origin disputes arise. So far, in such disputes, origin is conferred to the country where the product is considered to have undergone substantial transformation. (ii) process criterion: Imported inputs are considered to have undergone substantial transformation if the finished products fall under a 4 A situation where companies located in non-preference receiving countries might place a processing or assembly plant in a preference receiving country to take advantage of lower tariffs. 5 The agreement only covers ROO used in non-preferential commercial policy instruments such as MFN treatment, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, safeguard measures, origin marking requirements and any discriminatory quantitative restrictions or tariff quotas as well as those used for trade statistics and government procurement (WTO, 2006). 6 The time period until the work on the harmonization of rules of origin is complete. 7

10 different HS code than they did when those inputs were first used in the manufacturing process. (iii) percentage criterion: If a certain percentage of value is added to the imported inputs, they are considered to have undergone substantial transformation. One way is to predetermine the maximum percentage of imported inputs in production. For example, the percentage value of imported inputs must not exceed 40 percent. The other way is to predetermine the minimum percentage of domestic inputs in the production process. For example, the value of domestic inputs used in the production process must not be less than 40 percent ROO under SAFTA The rules of origin criterion are contained in SAFTA as the SAFTA Rules of Origin in Annex IV of the agreement. Its Rule 5 contains a list of products or types of products 7 which will be considered as wholly produced or obtained in the territory of the exporting Contracting State. Besides the wholly produced criterion, SAFTA rules of origin also contain Single Contracting State Content criterion. It uses both the Process and Percentage criterion and outlines the conditions which will grant originating status to a Contracting State as follows: The final product is classified in a heading at the four digit level of the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System differently from those in which all the non-originating materials used in its manufacture are classified and Products worked on or processed as a result of which the total value of the materials, parts or produce originating from other countries or of undetermined origin used does not exceed 60 percent of the free on board (FOB) 8 value of the products and the final process of manufacture is performed within the territory of the exporting Contracting State. Least Developed Contracting States will be allowed a favourable 10 percentage points. It thus appears that SAFTA allows differential rules of origin for the LDC and non-ldc members. The ROO agreed under SAFTA are general in nature (i.e. one criterion for all products) barring 1991 products for which product specific rules are applied. SAFTA ROO requires that in order to enjoy the preference under SAFTA a product must undergo sufficient processing for changing the tariff heading from the non-originating inputs and for having value of at least 40 percent value addition measures as percentage of fob value. However, value addition requirements are lower for Sri Lanka and LDCs, which are 35 percent and 30 percent respectively. In terms of regional cumulation, Members are eligible for preferential treatment if the value of inputs from other Members plus domestic value addition is not less than 50 percent of FOB 9 value. For domestic value content (value of inputs originating in the exporting 7 Rule 5, Annex-IV of SAFTA Agreement. 8 It means that the seller pays for transportation of the goods to the port of shipment, plus loading costs. The buyer in turn, pays freight, insurance, unloading costs and transportation from the port of destination to the factory. 9 Free on Board- It means that the seller pays for transportation of the goods to the port of shipment, plus loading costs. The buyer pays freight, insurance, unloading costs and transportation from the port of destination to the factory. 8

11 Member State plus domestic value addition in further manufacture in the exporting Member State), must not be less than 20 percent of the FOB value ROO under BIMSTEC The idea of establishing Bangladesh-India-Thailand-Sri Lanka Economic Cooperation was first initiated by Thailand in 1994 to explore economic cooperation on a sub regional basis involving contiguous countries of South and South East Asia surrounding the Bay of Bengal. It was formally launched as BIST-EC (Bangladesh-India-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation) on 6 June 1997 in Bangkok with the adoption of the Bangkok declaration. In a special ministerial meeting, held in Bangkok on 22 December 1997, Myanmar was accorded full membership of the group, and following the Myanmar s entry it was renamed as BIMST- EC (Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation). At the Ministerial meeting held in February 2004, Bhutan and Nepal were welcomed as new members. Subsequently, the Grouping was renamed as Bay of Bengal Initiatives on Multi- Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). The draft proposal of BIMSTEC s ROO was submitted during the Burma round talks during April Seven South and East Asian member countries of the (BIMSTEC) put their heads together on the most crucial issues. The developing countries - Thailand, India and Sri Lanka - proposed changes in customs tariff. Along with such change, India and Sri Lanka favoured 35 to 40 per cent value addition. But the least developed countries (LDCs) - Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal and Bhutan - wanted to fix the ROO criteria only on value addition basis and it to be fixed at 30 percent. However, concrete decision on the ROO under the BIMSTEC agreement is yet to be taken ROO under India-Nepal Trade Act Historically India has remained the largest trading partner of Nepal. Trade relations between Nepal and India are governed by bilateral treaties on trade. Nepal signed its first trade and transit treaty with India in They were subsequently renewed in 1960, 1971, , 1991, 1996 and The trade treaty that was signed in 2002 is due to be renewed in March India and Nepal have signed three trade treaties. These are: 1. India-Nepal Treaty of Trade: This treaty of trade to regulate bilateral trade was last revised and renewed for a period of 5 years with effect from 6 th March 2002 up to 5 th March India-Nepal Treaty of Transit: This treaty was renewed in March 2006 for a period of 7 years with effect from 1 st April India-Nepal Agreement of Cooperation to control unauthorised trade between the two countries: This was last renewed for a period of 5 years with effect from 6 th March Trade was de-linked from transit 9

12 Nepal India Treaty of Trade, 2002 is a continuation of the Treaty of Trade 1996 in a revised form. Some of the major provisions made in the treaty are exemption from basic customs duties and quantitative restrictions on imports of primary products on a reciprocal basis. Nepali manufacturing exports 11 has been given access to the Indian market free of basic customs duties and quantitative restrictions on the basis of non-reciprocity. Also, manufacturing goods imported from Nepal have been granted preferential entry, without any quantitative restrictions. Preferential Access for Nepali manufacturing exports to the Indian market is subjected to Rules of Origin (ROO) conditions that have changed over time. The 90 percent value added condition 12 of the 1960 trade treaty was reduced to 50 percent in the 1992 treaty. Under the 1996 trade treaty, the value addition requirement was further reduced to 40 percent of ex-factory prices 13 and included the provision that ROO certificate could be issued by the FNCCI. The 1996 trade treaty also substantially reduced the negative list to include only items such as alcoholic liquors/beverages and their concentrates except industrial spirits, perfumes and cosmetics with non-nepali/non-indian brand names, cigarettes and tobacco. The Nepal- India Treaty of Trade, 2002 also introduced several changes in the ROO. Firstly, the new ROO provisions include domestic content value addition requirement of 30 percent of ex-factory prices and changes in tariff heading (CTH) at four digit level of the harmonized system code 14. Secondly, this treaty emphasises clear specification of safeguard clauses. The treaty denotes "safeguards" against significant damages to the domestic producers, from an "export surge". Thirdly, a provision has been made for submission of information regarding the basis of calculating ROO to the Indian government by the Nepal government on an annual basis ROO under India-Sri Lanka FTA India and Sri Lanka signed an FTA deal in The rules of origin under this FTA deal state that products worked on or processed as a result of which the total value of the materials, parts or produce originating from countries other than the Contracting Parties or of undetermined origin used does not exceed 65 percent of the f.o.b. value of the products produced or obtained and the final process of manufacture is performed within the territory of the exporting Contracting Party shall be eligible for preferential treatment, subject to the provisions of clauses (b), (c), (d) and (e) of rule 7 and rule 8. Non-originating materials shall be considered to be sufficiently worked or processed when the product obtained is classified in a heading, at the four digit level, of the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System different from those in which all the nonoriginating materials used in its manufacture are classified. For cumulative rules of origin, in respect of a product, which complies with the origin requirements provided in rule 5(b) and is exported by any Contracting Party and which has used material, parts or products originating in the territory of the other Contracting Party, the value addition in the territory of the exporting Contracting Party shall be not less than 25 per 11 Except for those on the Negative list i.e., goods excluded from preferential treatment. 12 For materials originating in India or Nepal 13 'Ex-factory price' means the price of the product at the time of clearing from the factory gate. 14 For Nepalese manufacturing exports, which cannot fulfill CTH criteria, the new ROO provision requires that these products have undergone a "sufficient manufacturing process within Nepal," determined on a case by case basis. 10

13 cent of the f.o.b. value of the product under export subject to the condition that the aggregate value addition in the territories of the Contracting Parties is not less than 35 per cent of the f.o.b. value of the product under export ROO under Pakistan-Sri Lanka FTA Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Pakistan and Sri Lanka is operational from June 12, Under the Free Trade Agreement, Sri Lanka and Pakistan have agreed to offer preferential market access to each others exports by way of granting tariff concessions. Sri Lanka would be able to enjoy duty free market access on 206 products in the Pakistani market including tea, rubber and coconut. Pakistan, in return, would gain duty free access on 102 products in the Sri Lankan market. These products include oranges, basmati rice and engineering goods. Annex C deals with the rules of origin, which have to be complied with by the exporters of the two countries in order to qualify their products for preferential duty benefits. Based on the origin, the Rules of Origin categorize the products exported under the PSFTA into the following two main segments. a) products wholly produced or obtained in the territory of the exporting country such as agricultural, fishery and mineral products. b) products, not wholly produced or obtained in the territory of the exporting country (manufactured products). All manufactured products falling under the category of products, not wholly produced or obtained in the territory of the exporting country (manufactured products) should contain a minimum of 35 percent of Domestic Value Addition of their FOB value in order to qualify for preferential treatments. Further, it is also necessary that all non-originating materials, used by the exporters change their HS codes at six-digit level against that of the final product as a result of the manufacturing process undertaken in the exporting country. The Cumulative Rules of Origin encourages exporters to source their inputs from the other contracting country. However, the Domestic Value Addition in the territory of the exporting country shall not be less than 25 percent of the FOB value of the final product, while the aggregate value addition in both contracting parties should be minimum of 35 percent of the FOB value. In addition, the respective products should also conform to the Change of HS code requirement (at six digit level) as in the case of the manufactured goods, referred to under category (b) above A Comparison of ROOs under different Regional and Bilateral FTAs in South Asia Table 3 presents a comparison of different ROO requirements under different regional and bilateral FTA agreements in South Asia. The comparison is made on the basis of three criteria: the value-addition requirement, change in tariff heads and requirement for regional cumulation. It appears that in terms of value-addition and change in tariff heads requirements, SAFTA does not differ much from India-Sri Lanka BFTA and India-Nepal Trade Treaty. As an LDC, Nepal s export products are subject to 30 percent value-addition requirement as well as are subject to change in tariff head at the four digit HS code. However, though the value- 11

14 addition criteria under the Pakistan-Sri Lanka BFTA is similar to SAFTA, the provision for change of HS codes at six-digit level, has made the ROO of this BFTA relatively more flexible. In the case of regional cumulation, SAFTA appears to be more stringent than other BFTAs in South Asia. Table 3: Comparison of ROOs RTAs SAFTA Value addition requirement 30% for LDCs, 35% for Sri Lanka and 40 % for India and Pakistan Change in Tariff Heads Change in tariff head at the four digit HS code Regional Cumulation Value of inputs from other Members plus domestic value addition is not less than 50% of FOB value. Domestic value content must not be less than 20% of the FOB value. BIMSTEC Proposed: 35-40% for the developing countries and 30 percent for LDCs Proposed: change in tariff head to be included in the ROO, but not yet decided India-Sri Lanka BFTA 35% Change in tariff head at the four digit HS code India-Nepal Trade Treaty 30% for Nepal. But, India doesn t enjoy any preference Therefore, India-Nepal Trade Treaty is silent about ROO (value addition) requirement for India's exports to Nepal. In actual practice, India's exports to Nepal have never been subjected to ROO requirements. Change in tariff head at the four digit HS code Pakistan-Sri Lanka BFTA 35% Change in tariff head at the six digit HS code Not yet decided Value of inputs from other Member plus domestic value addition is not less than 35% of FOB value. Domestic value content must not be less than 25% of the FOB value. No mention Value of inputs from other Member plus domestic value addition is not less than 35% of FOB value. Domestic value content must not be less than 25% of the FOB value. IV. Sensitive List: A Major Hindrance to Trade Expansion In addition to the ROO requirement, the sensitive list or the negative list act has a major hindrance to trade expansion in South Asia. Bayson et al (2006) analyse the political economy of the selection of excluded sectors and ROO. When countries are allowed to choose sectors that can be excluded from tariff preferences in an FTA, domestic lobbies make sure that the sectors in which they may not withstand competition from the union partner are the ones that get excluded. In addition, the ROO can also be subject to abuse by the 12

15 bureaucrat administering them. In cases where imports from the partner may be threatening an inefficient domestic competitor, bureaucratic discretion may be employed to block entry of the imports Sensitive List under SAFTA The Agreement provides scope for maintaining of sensitive lists, which are not subject to tariff reduction programme. Although the Agreement maintains that sensitive list shall be different for LDCs and non-ldcs, only three countries namely Bangladesh, India and Nepal maintain different sensitive lists for LDCs and non-ldcs. Besides, the LDCs maintain longer sensitive lists than the non-ldcs. Table 4: Sensitive Lists among the SAFTA Members Country Total number of Sensitive List Coverage of Sensitive List as % of Total HS Lines For Non-LDCs For LDCs For Non-LDCs For LDCs Bangladesh 1,254 1, Bhutan India Maldives Nepal 1,335 1, Pakistan 1,191 1, Sri Lanka 1,079 1, However, a major flaw of the SAFTA Treaty is that it does not subscribe categorically to phasing out the negative list or eliminating non-tariff barriers (NTBs), let alone prescribing time limits for doing so. It only provides that the negative list shall be reviewed after every four years with a view to reducing the number of items. 15 It is also a matter of grave concern for the LDCs in South asia, i.e., Bangladesh and Nepal with regard to the size of the negative list maintained especially by India Sensitive List under India-Nepal Trade Treaty Under the India-Nepal Trade Treaty the MFN list of articles which will not be allowed preferential entry from Nepal to India are (i) alcoholic liquors/beverages 16 and their concentrates except industrial spirits, (ii) perfumes and cosmetics with non-nepalese/non-indian Brand names, and (iii) cigarettes and tobacco. However, government of India may, in consultation with government of Nepal, modify this list. 15 There are also concerns about the size of the negative lists, as they appear to be too long. This will detract from the provision of Article XXIV of GATT which lays down that a free trade area should cover substantially all trade. 16 Nepalese beers can be imported into India on payment of the applicable liquor excise duty equal to the effective excise duty as levied in India on Indian beers under the relevant rules and regulations of India. 13

16 4.3. Sensitive List under India-Sri Lanka Trade Treaty Of Sri Lanka s rather extensive negative list of 1180 items, a relatively high share of nearly 623 products actually being imported from India stood to be excluded from receiving any benefits. By contrast, of the Indian negative list of 429 products, Sri Lankan exports consisted of only 50 items. Where both countries have offered zero tariff reduction, India s export interests are again receiving only marginal benefits. Of 319 items on which Sri Lanka reduced its tariffs to zero, the actual number of Indian exports that received immediate benefits stood at only 3 items. By contrast, on the 1351 items on which India offered immediate zero tariffs, Sri Lankan exporters stood to gain from at least 68 products traded products Sensitive List under Pakistan-Sri Lanka Trade Treaty The Negative list of Pakistan consists of 540 HS tariff lines (products) at six digit level. Being on the Negative List, these products will not be entitled to enjoy any tariff concessions, when imported from Sri Lanka. On the other hand, the Negative list of Sri Lanka contains a total of 697 HS tariff lines (products) at six digit level and these products will not be entitled to enjoy any tariff concessions, when exported to Sri Lanka A Comparison of Sensitive Lists under different Regional and Bilateral FTAs in South Asia It appears that among all the regional and bilateral FTAs, the India-Nepal Trade Treaty possess least negative list for Nepal as far as Indian market is concerned. For example, under this trade treaty only three categories of products are specified in the Indian negative list, whereas under SAFTA, as an LDC, Nepal is supposed to receive no concession on the exports of 744 items at the four digit HS code to the Indian market. When compared to other bilateral FTAs, i.e., India-Sri Lanka BFTA and Pakistan-Sri Lanka BFTA, the negative lists of the SAFTA member countries appear to be too long. V. The Effects of ROO and Sensitive List on Expansion for Nepal: Simulation Exercises through WITS/SMART partial equilibrium model 5.1. Rationale for a Partial Equilibrium Model There is no denying that trade policy analysis is more robust when undertaken within a general equilibrium modelling framework. This can be seen as the first-best option as general equilibrium models, not only measure the first-round effects of simulated changes, but also the second-round effects which include inter-industry effects and macroeconomic adjustments. However, Nepal is not individually captured in the GTAP modelling methodology due to lack of data disaggregation. Consequently, the partial equilibrium modelling framework lends itself as a second-best option. The main distinction that should be noted at the outset is that as a partial equilibrium model, the inter-sectoral implications (second-round effects) of a trade policy change are not taken into account, as is the case in the general equilibrium model. Similarly, the inter-regional 14

17 implications are also ignored in a partial equilibrium framework. The only point of convergence of the partial and general equilibrium models is that it is still possible within a partial equilibrium model to analyse the trade policy effects on trade creation and diversion, welfare and even on tariff revenues while holding everything else constant. Milner et al. (2002) provides a simple analytical framework explaining the theory behind partial equilibrium modelling and notes that to adequately capture the interactions between sectors and elasticities of substitution between factors, a general equilibrium model would be desirable. However, due to scarcity of individual and regional CGE models for developing countries then partial equilibrium models would be alternative choices. Milner et al. (2002) also raise a valid observation that the database for general equilibrium models lacks the commodity detail to take account of the specific sensitive and special products. Despite its shortcomings, a partial equilibrium framework is more suitable as it allows the utilization of widely available trade data at the appropriate level of detail to capture the principle of special and differential treatment in the simulation analysis. It however remains true that although partial equilibrium models have drawbacks, as a modelling approach they have the advantage of working at very fine levels of details such as at tariff line level The WITS/SMART Model For the purposes of this study, it is proposed that the WITS/SMART model will be the applied partial equilibrium framework. The World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) brings together various databases ranging from bilateral trade, commodity trade flows and various levels and types of protection. WITS also integrate analytical tools that support simulation analysis. The SMART simulation model is one of the analytical tools in WITS for simulation purposes. SMART contains in-built analytical modules that support trade policy analysis such as effects of multilateral tariff cuts, preferential trade liberalization and ad hoc tariff changes. The underlying theory behind this analytical tool is the standard partial equilibrium framework that considers dynamic effects constant. Like any partial equilibrium model, it has these strong assumptions allowing the trade policy analysis to be undertaken a country at a time. In spite of this weakness, WITS/SMART can help estimate trade creation, diversion, welfare, revenue effects and effects on exports for those countries whose data is available. WITS database comes from various sources. The external trade statistics comprise of UN COMTRADE, UNCTAD TRAINS and the WTO Integrated Data Base (IDB). The tariffs data is derived from UNCTAD TRAINS, WTO IDB and WTO Consolidated Tariff Schedule Data Base (CTS). The non-tariff measures are compiled from UNCTAD TRAINS database. The underlying analytics of the theory are clearly defined in Laird and Yeats (1986) and ECA (2000). The derivation begins with a basic trade model composed of simplified import demand and export supply functions and an equilibrating identity: A simplified import demand function for country j from country k of commodity i: M = f Y, P, P ) (1) ( j ij ik The export supply function of commodity i of country k can be simplified as: X = f P ) (2) ( ikj 15

18 The equilibrium in the trade between the countries is the standard partial equilibrium equation: M = X ikj (3) In a free trade environment, the domestic price of the commodity i in country j from country k would change with the change in an ad valorem tariff as follows: P = P 1+ t ) (4) ikj ( ikj In order to get the price equation, differentiating (4) we obtain: dp = P dt + ( 1+ t ) dp (5) ikj ikj ikj ikj Equations (4) and (5) are substituted into the elasticity of import demand function: M P m = α i (6) ) ( P ) ( M Using this, one obtains the change in imports: dm M = α dt dp m + i (1+ t ) P (7) In the similar process one can obtain, with the elasticity of export supply function, the change in exports: dx X dp x = α i ( P ikj ikj ) Using (7) one can calculate the trade creation effect: dt m TC = M α i (8) m α ( 1+ t )(1 ( i m )) γ Where i TC is the sum of trade created in millions of dollars over i commodities affected by m tariff change and α i is the elasticity of import demand for commodity I in the importing country from the relevant trading partner. M is the current level of import demand of the given commodity i, while 0 t and 1 t represent tariff rates for commodity i at the initial and end periods respectively. According to the UNCTAD model, trade creation depends on the current level of imports, the import demand elasticity, and the relative tariff change and 16

19 occurs when there is a shift from higher cost producer to lower cost producer as a result of elimination of tariffs on imports from the partner. If γ approaches infinity, then equation 8 can be simplified as follows: TC 1 0 (1+ t ) (1+ t ) m =α i M (9) 0 (1+ t ) The elasticity of substitution is expressed as the percentage change in relative shares of imports from two different sources due to a 1 percent change in the relative prices of the same product from the two sources. Conceptually, the elasticity of substitution is a measurement of the ease with which various imports can be substituted for one another. Technically, it is measured as the slope of the import isoquant. ( ( M / M ijk ) / ( M / M ijk ) σ M (10) ( P / P )( P / P ) = ijk ijk In this equation, k denotes imports from the RTA member countries and K denotes imports from the rest of the world. Trade diversion occurs when an efficient producer from outside the free trade area is displaced by less efficient producers in the preferential area. Essentially, trade diversion depends on the current level of imports from RTA member countries and the ROW, the percentage change of tariffs facing imports from RTA member countries with those from ROW remaining unchanged, and the elasticity of substitution σ M of the imports between the RTA member countries and ROW into the concerned country. In the SMART framework, the trade diverted to the RTA member countries can be expressed as: TD M M ((1+ t /1+ t ) 1) σ RTA ROW 1 0 RTA RTA m = (11) RTA ROW RTA 1 0 M + M + M ((1+ t RTA /1+ t RTA ) 1) σ m The strength of trade diversion depends on whether one assumes that goods are perfectly substitutable or whether goods are imperfectly substituted and whether calculations are made at official rates or on actual collected rates. WITS/ SMART has a very precise and elegant methodology for calculating revenue effects. The tariff revenue is the product of the tariff rate and the tariff base (value of imports). Thus, before the change in the ad valorem incidence of trade barriers, the revenue is given as: = R t, P, M 0 0 (12) i k 17

20 After the change in tariff rate, the new revenue collection will be given by: = R 1 t, P, M (13) i k 1 The revenue loss as a result of the implementation of any RTA is the difference between R 0 and R 1. The WITS/SMART model estimation of welfare effects is quite simple. This is unlike the equivalent variations measurement in general equilibrium models. Essentially, the welfare effect is mainly ascribed to the consumer benefits in the importing country as a result of lower import prices. This allows them to substitute more expensive domestic or imported products with the cheaper imports that are affected by the relevant tariff reduction. Increased imports leads to a net welfare gain that can be thought as the increase in consumer welfare and is measured as follows: w =.5( t M ) (14) 0 The coefficient of 0.5 captures the average between the ad valorem incidence of the trade barriers before and after their elimination/reduction. Equation (14) assumes that the elasticity of export supply is infinite. If this is not the case, the import prices in the importing countries fall by less than the full reduction in trade barriers. Therefore, while the equation can be used to measure welfare effect, it is no longer a representation of consumer surplus alone but has some element of producer surplus (Laird and Yeats, 1986) The Simulations It appears from the discussion in the aforementioned sections that the value-addition requirement under the SAFTA ROO is as good as that under any other bilateral FTA agreement in South Asia. Therefore, as far as the value-addition criteria is concerned, there is no problem in overlapping ROO in South Asia. However, the problem of overlapping ROO arises when the criteria change in tariff head is considered, as it appears that only the Pakistan-Sri Lanka BFTA has the most liberal provision in this regard. Also, when the regional cumulation criteria is considered SAFTA appears to be the most restrictive one. In the case of sensitive list, SAFTA, also appears to be more stringent than any other BFTA. However, to run the simulations in the WITS/SMART partial equilibrium model and to observe the implications for Nepal, we can only use the information on value-addition in different sectors in Nepal (using the social accounting matrix of Nepal) as the information on change in tariff heads and regional cumulation is not available. Therefore, when only the value-addition criteria is used, there is no distinction between SAFTA and the India-Nepal Trade Treaty as far as the interests of Nepal is concerned. In the WITS/SMART model we therefore, simulate the SAFTA scenario by taking into account the ROO and sensitive list. In all the simulations bilateral tariff rates for the SAFTA member countries are reduced down to zero. Four simulations have been run and they are: 18