Flight Delays, Capacity Investment and Welfare under Air Transport Supply-demand Equilibrium
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1 Flght Delays, Capacty Investment and Welfare under Ar Transport Supply-demand Equlbrum Bo Zou 1, Mark Hansen 2 1 Unversty of Illnos at Chcago 2 Unversty of Calforna at Berkeley
2 2
3 Total economc mpact of flght delay: 3
4 Total economc mpact of flght delay: $32 bllon n
5 Total economc mpact of flght delay: $32 bllon n 2007 Ball, M., Barnhart, C., Dresner, M., Hansen, M. Neels, K., Odon, A., Peterson, E., Sherry, L., Tran, A., Zou, B., Total Delay Impact Study: A Comprehensve Assessment of the Costs and Impacts of Flght Delay n the Unted States. Major Partcpant. Report Prepared for the US Federal Avaton Admnstraton. Zou, B., Hansen, M., Impact of Operatonal Performance on Ar Carrer Cost Structure: Evdence from US Arlnes. Transportaton Research Part E: Logstcs and Transportaton Revew, 48 (6), Hansen, M., Zou, B., Arport Operatonal Performance and ts Impact on Arlne Cost. In: Odon, A. and Zografos, K. (eds.), Modelng and Managng Arport Performance: Theory and Practce, John Wley & Sons, Inc. 5
6 Means to mtgate flght delay Managng demand 6
7 Means to mtgate flght delay Managng demand Congeston prcng 7
8 Means to mtgate flght delay Managng demand Congeston prcng Slot control 8
9 Means to mtgate flght delay Managng demand Congeston prcng Slot control Swaroop, P., Zou, B., Ball, M., Hansen, M., Do More U.S. Arports Need Slot Controls? A Welfare Based Approach to Determne Slot Levels. Transportaton Research Part B: Methodologcal, (9), Ball, M., Hansen, M., Swaroop, P., Zou, B., Desgn and Justfcaton for Market-Based Approaches to Arport Congeston Management. In: Odon, A. and Zografos, K. (eds.), Modelng and Managng Arport Performance: Theory and Practce, John Wley & Sons, Inc. 9
10 Means to mtgate flght delay Managng demand Congeston prcng Slot control Swaroop, P., Zou, B., Ball, M., Hansen, M., Do More U.S. Arports Need Slot Controls? A Welfare Based Approach to Determne Slot Levels. Transportaton Research Part B: Methodologcal, (9), Ball, M., Hansen, M., Swaroop, P., Zou, B., Desgn and Justfcaton for Market-Based Approaches to Arport Congeston Management. In: Odon, A. and Zografos, K. (eds.), Modelng and Managng Arport Performance: Theory and Practce, John Wley & Sons, Inc. Increasng supply 10
11 Outlne Background Research Framework Equlbrum Model Concluson 11
12 Background Framework Framework Model 1 Model Model 2 Concluson Investment Infrastructure Capacty ( ) Benefts Arlne Cost Passenger travel tme ( ) ( ) Flght Delay ( ) 12
13 Background Framework Framework Model 1 Model Model 2 Concluson Issues wth the approach Ceters parbus assumpton Predctng future Investment Infrastructure Capacty ( ) Benefts Arlne Cost Passenger travel tme ( ) ( ) Flght Delay ( ) 13
14 Background Framework Framework Model 1 Model Model 2 Concluson Objectve of the Research Develop an nnovatve methodology to systematcally capture supply-demand response to nvestment 14
15 Background Framework Framework Model 1 Model Model 2 Concluson Outlne Background Research Framework Equlbrum Models Arlne competton model User equlbrum model Concluson 15
16 Background Framework Framework Model 1 Model Model 2 Concluson No congeston Hgher densty Hgher flght frequency Lower unt cost Improved servce qualty Lower fare Reduced generalzed cost More demand 16
17 Background Framework Framework Model 1 Model Model 2 Concluson Wth congeston Hgher densty Hgher flght frequency Lower unt cost Improved servce qualty Lower fare Reduced generalzed cost More demand 17
18 Background Framework Framework Model 1 Model Model 2 Concluson Demand Unconstraned user supply Demand (passenger-mles) 18
19 Background Framework Framework Model 1 Model Model 2 Concluson Demand Constraned user supply Unconstraned user supply Demand (passenger-mles) 19
20 Background Framework Framework Model 1 Model Model 2 Concluson Demand Constraned user supply Constraned user supply after nvestment Unconstraned user supply Demand (passenger-mles) 20
21 Background Framework Framework Model 1 Model Model 2 Concluson Demand Constraned user supply Constraned user supply after nvestment Unconstraned user supply Demand (passenger-mles) 21
22 Background Framework Framework Model 1 Model Model 2 Concluson Conventonal vew Investment Infrastructure Capacty Flght Delay 22
23 Background Framework Framework Model 1 Model Model 2 Concluson Proposed framework Investment Passenger Demand Flght Traffc Infrastructure Capacty Arfare Flght Delay Arlne Cost 23
24 Background Framework Framework Model 1 Model Model 2 Concluson Proposed framework Investment Passenger Demand Flght Traffc Infrastructure Capacty Arfare Flght Delay Maxmzng Proft Arlne Cost Output 24
25 Background Framework Framework Model 1 Model Model 2 Concluson Proposed framework Investment Passenger Demand Flght Traffc Infrastructure Capacty Arfare Flght Delay Maxmzng Proft Arlne Cost Output 25
26 Background Framework Framework Model 1 Model Model 2 Concluson Outlne Background Research Framework Equlbrum Models Concluson 26
27 Background Framework Framework Model 1 Model Model 2 Concluson Outlne Background Research Framework Equlbrum Models Arlne competton model User equlbrum model Concluson Zou, B., Hansen, M., Flght Delays, Capacty Investment and Socal Welfare under Ar Transport Supply-Demand Equlbrum. Transportaton Research Part A: Polcy and Practce 46 (6),
28 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Consder a duopoly market 28
29 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Consder a duopoly market Utlty of a representatve ndvdual U( q0, q1, q2 ) q0 ( q1 q2 ) ( 01q q1q2 01q ) 29
30 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Consder a duopoly market Utlty of a representatve ndvdual U( q0, q1, q2 ) q0 ( q1 q2 ) ( 01q q1q2 01q 2 Consumpton of numerare goods ) 30
31 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Consder a duopoly market Utlty of a representatve ndvdual U( q0, q1, q2 ) q0 ( q1 q2 ) ( 01q q1q2 01q 2 Consumpton of arlne 1 s servce ) 31
32 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Consder a duopoly market Utlty of a representatve ndvdual U( q0, q1, q2 ) q0 ( q1 q2 ) ( 01q q1q2 01q 2 Consumpton of arlne 2 s servce ) 32
33 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Consder a duopoly market Utlty of a representatve ndvdual U( q0, q1, q2 ) q0 ( q1 q2 ) ( 01q q1q2 01q ) 02: parameters ( 01 ) 00, 01, 02 33
34 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft max U( q0, q1, q2) s. t. q 0 Pq 1 1 P2 q2 I 34
35 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft max U( q0, q1, q2) s. t. q 0 Pq 1 1 P2 q2 I Generalzed cost for choosng arlne 1 35
36 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft max U( q0, q1, q2) s. t. q 0 Pq 1 1 P2 q2 I Generalzed cost for choosng arlne 2 36
37 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft max U( q0, q1, q2) s. t. P q 0 Pq 1 1 P2 q2 P kl f I 1,2 37
38 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft max U( q0, q1, q2) s. t. P q 0 Pq 1 1 P2 q2 P f kl I 1,2 Arfare 38
39 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft max U( q0, q1, q2) s. t. P q 0 Pq 1 1 P2 q2 P f kl I 1,2 Arfare Schedule delay 39
40 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft max U( q0, q1, q2) s. t. P q 0 Pq 1 1 P2 q2 P f kl I 1,2 Arfare Schedule delay Delay 40
41 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft max U( q0, q1, q2) Composte of ncome and travel tme constrants s. t. P q 0 Pq 1 1 P2 q2 P f kl I 1,2 Arfare Schedule delay Delay 41
42 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Indvdual demand q ( ) 00 01P 02P kl, 1,2 f f ( )
43 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft q Indvdual demand ( ) 00 01P 02P kl, 1,2 f f ( ) 02 Market demand 01 Q P 2P L, 1,2 f f ( 1 2) 43
44 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Flght operatng cost for trp C c 0 s s L 44
45 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Flght operatng cost for trp C c 0 s s L Fxed cost 45
46 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Flght operatng cost for trp C c 0 s s L Fxed cost Varable cost as a functon of arcraft sze s 46
47 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Flght operatng cost for trp C c 0 s s L Fxed cost Varable cost as a functon of arcraft sze s Delay cost as a functon of arcraft sze s and delay L 47
48 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Flght operatng cost for trp C c 0 s s L Fxed cost Varable cost as a functon of arcraft sze s Delay cost as a functon of arcraft sze s and delay L 48
49 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Assumpton: each flght s full 49
50 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Assumpton: each flght s full Q f s Passenger demand Flght frequency Arcraft sze 50
51 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft max P Q f C for 1,2 51
52 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft max P Q f C for 1,2 Arfare Passenger demand Flght frequency Operatng cost per flght 52
53 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Assume arlnes compete on fare and frequency smultaneously n a Nash fashon 0 0 1,2 P f 53
54 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Assume arlnes compete on fare and frequency smultaneously n a Nash fashon Symmetrc arlnes 0 0 1,2 P f P P P 1 2 f f f
55 ) ( 2 L L f P 55 Demand Supply Equlbrum Prce response Equlbrum shft
56 ) ( 2 L L f P 56 Demand Supply Equlbrum Prce response Constant Equlbrum shft
57 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Prce response P ( 1 2) 0 1 f L 1L Constant Frequency effect on WTP 57
58 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Prce response P ( 1 2) 0 1 f L 1L Constant Frequency effect on WTP Delay effect on WTP 58
59 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Prce response P ( 1 2) 0 1 f L 1L Constant Frequency effect on WTP Delay effect on WTP Arlne delay cost passed onto passengers 59 59
60 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Compare equlbrum wth and wthout congeston 60
61 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Compare equlbrum wth and Wth congeston Frequency ( ) wthout congeston 61
62 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Compare equlbrum wth and Wth congeston Frequency ( ) wthout congeston Passenger generalzed cost ( ) 62
63 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Compare equlbrum wth and Wth congeston Frequency ( ) wthout congeston Passenger generalzed cost ( ) Passenger demand ( ) 63
64 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Compare equlbrum wth and Wth congeston Frequency ( ) wthout congeston Passenger generalzed cost ( ) Passenger demand ( ) Fare (?) Arcraft sze (?) Unt operatng cost per passenger (?) 64
65 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Smulaton analyss 65
66 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Smulaton analyss Assumpton about arport delay L Delay on a market s determned by the more congested arport N ndependent and dentcal markets nto that arport 66
![arport delay L L [ N( f f K )/ ], 1](/docs-images/95/123046472/images/67-4.jpg "2 1 Total arport traffc Arport")
67 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Smulaton analyss Assumpton about arport delay L L [ N( f f K )/ ], Total arport traffc Arport capacty 67
68 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Smulaton analyss Assumpton about arport delay L L [ N( f K 1 f2)/ ], 1 All other parameters derved from emprcal evdence 68
69 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Scenaros Fare Arcraft sze Unt operatng cost ($/passenger) Infnte capacty (no delay) Fnte capacty (720 operatons per day, wth delay)
70 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Scenaros Fare Arcraft sze Unt operatng cost ($/passenger) Infnte capacty (no delay) Fnte capacty (720 operatons per day, wth delay) Decreased WTP domnates arlnes tendency to pass part of the delay cost to passengers 70
71 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Scenaros Fare Arcraft sze Unt operatng cost ($/passenger) Infnte capacty (no delay) Fnte capacty (720 operatons per day, wth delay) Use larger planes to avod hgh delays 71
72 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Scenaros Fare Arcraft sze Unt operatng cost ($/passenger) Infnte capacty (no delay) Fnte capacty (720 operatons per day, wth delay) Delay cost partally offset by economes of arcraft sze 72
73 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Comparson between equlbrum and conventonal approaches 73
74 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Increase arport capacty by 50% 74
75 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Increase arport capacty by 50% Conventonal 5.6 Equlbrum 4.7 Arport delay savng (mn/flght) 75
76 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Increase arport capacty by 50% Conventonal 5.6 Equlbrum 4.7 Equlbrum 163 Conventonal 70 Arport delay savng (mn/flght) Consumer surplus (mllon$) 76
77 Outlne Background Research Framework Equlbrum Models Arlne competton model User equlbrum model Concluson 77
78 Introducton of basc concepts Route Segment Market Non-stop Route Segment AB Spoke cty B Segment CB One-stop Route Spoke cty A Segment AC Hub cty C 78
79 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Demand estmaton 79
80 Demand NL3B Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Scale λ m Nest structure Ar Non-Ar Scale λ a O-D Arport Scale λ p O 1 O 1 H 1 D 1 O 1 H 2 D 1 O 1 H h D 1 D 1 O 1 D 2 O 1 H 1 D 2 O 1 H 2 D 2 O 1 H h D 2 O o D n O o H 1 D n O o H 2 D n O o H h D n Source: Hsao, C. and Hansen, M., A passenger demand model for ar transportaton n a hub-and-spoke network. Transportaton Research Part E: Logstcs 80 and Transportaton Revew, Vol. 47,
81 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft User equlbrum formulaton Demand = G 1 (Fare, Flght Traffc, Arport delay) s.t. Constrants 81
82 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Investment Passenger Demand Flght Traffc Infrastructure Capacty Arfare Flght Delay Maxmzng Proft Arlne Cost Output 82
83 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Flght traffc = G 2 (Demand, Arport Delay) Fare = G 3 (Demand, Arport delay) Arport delay= G 4 (Flght traffc) Zou, B., Hansen, M. Flght Delay Impact on Arfare and Flght Frequency: A Comprehensve Assessment. Paper to be submtted to Transportaton Research Part 83 A.
84 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft (++) (-) Flght traffc = G 2 (Demand, Arport delay) (+/-) (+) Fare = G 3 (Demand, Arport delay) (++) Arport delay= G 4 (Flght traffc) 84
85 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft User equlbrum formulaton Demand = G 1 (Fare, Flght Traffc, Arport delay) s.t. Flght traffc = G 2 (Demand, Arport delay) Fare = G 3 (Demand, Arport delay) Arport delay= G 4 (Flght traffc) 85
86 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Smultaneous equaton system Demand = G 1 (Fare, Flght Traffc, Arport delay) Flght traffc = G 2 (Demand, Arport delay) Fare = G 3 (Demand, Arport delay) Arport delay= G 4 (Flght traffc) 86
87 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Smulaton analyss 87
88 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Network S 50 S 1 S 2 S 3 H 400 mles S S j 88
89 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Network S 50 S 1 S 2 S 3 H 400 mles S S j 89
90 Demand Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft stop 1-stop Spoke-spoke market demand O-D Dstance (mles)
91 Demand Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft stop 1-stop Spoke-spoke market demand Total demand s low because the dstance s too short O-D Dstance (mles)
92 Demand Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft stop 1-stop Spoke-spoke market demand 1-stop routes more attractve because of reduced crcuty (actually dstance/ OD dstance) O-D Dstance (mles)
93 Flghts/quarter Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft 250 Spoke-spoke segment frequency Segment Dstance (mles) 93
94 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Delay (mn/flght) Hub Spoke Before
95 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Increase hub capacty by 50% Delay (mn/flght) Hub Spoke Before
96 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Increase hub capacty by 50% Delay (mn/flght) Hub Spoke Before After
97 Demand Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Spoke-spoke market demand shft 0-stop (before) 1-stop (before) 0-stop (after) 1-stop (after) O-D Dstance (mles)
98 Total Demand Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Before After Total spoke-spoke market demand O-D Dstance
99 Total Demand Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Before After Total spoke-spoke market demand Induced demand O-D Dstance
100 Flghts/quarter Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Spoke-spoke segment frequency change 250 Before 200 After Segment Dstance (mles)
101 Flghts/quarter Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Spoke-hub segment frequency change Before After
102 $ Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Consumer surplus change per ar travel decson makng Negatve Dstance (mles) 102
103 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Comparson between equlbrum and conventonal approaches 103
104 Background Framework Model Concluson Other Research Conventonal 14.2 Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Equlbrum 9.0 Hub delay savngs (mn/flght) 104
105 Background Framework Model Concluson Other Research Demand Supply Equlbrum Equlbrum shft Conventonal 14.2 Equlbrum Equlbrum 9.0 Conventonal 69.5 Hub delay savngs (mn/flght) Passenger welfare gan (mllon$/qtr) 105
106 Outlne Background Research Framework Equlbrum Models Arlne competton model User equlbrum model Concluson 106
107 Summary An equlbrum framework 107
108 Summary An equlbrum framework Larger and broader benefts 108
109 Summary An equlbrum framework Larger and broader benefts Addtonal nsghts Delay trggers nvestment 109
110 Summary An equlbrum framework Larger and broader benefts Addtonal nsghts Delay trggers nvestment Returns more than delay savngs 110
111 Summary An equlbrum framework Larger and broader benefts Addtonal nsghts Delay trggers nvestment Returns more than delay savngs Delay reducton less than expected 111
112 Summary An equlbrum framework Larger and broader benefts Addtonal nsghts Delay trggers nvestment Returns more than delay savngs Delay reducton less than expected Investment paradox: some markets can be worse off 112
113 Extensons 113
114 Extensons Infrastructure nvestment decson makng Sze, locaton, tmng 114
115 Extensons Infrastructure nvestment decson makng Sze, locaton, tmng Envronmental externaltes 115
116 Extensons Infrastructure nvestment decson makng Sze, locaton, tmng Envronmental externaltes Consder ntermodal competton 116
117 Thank you! Questons? 117
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