Examine the Relationship between Corporate Governance and Dividend Taxation (Company Listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange)

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1 Original Aricle Prin ISSN: Online ISSN: X DOI: /ijssI/2017/43 Examine he Relaionship beween Corporae Governance and Dividend Taxaion (Company Lised on he Tehran Sock Exchange) Ahmad Azadeh 1, Seyed Reza Miraskari 2, Sina Kheradyar 3 1 M.A Suden of Accouning, Deparmen of Accouning, Rash Branch, Islamic Azad Universiy, Rash, Iran, 2 Associae Professor of Economics, Universiy of Guilan, Rash, Iran, 3 Deparmen of Accouning, Rash Branch, Islamic Azad Universiy, Rash, Iran Absrac Since one of he main groups of financial saemens users are shareholders, i is generally hough ha earnings managemen and assessmen of corporae profis may lead o a change in corporae behavior. Thus, he main objecive of his paper is o es he impac of he relaionship beween corporae governance and earnings managemen and ax managemen in companies lised on he Tehran Sock Exchange. In his regard, 108 companies lised on Tehran Sock Exchange were seleced using he sysemaic eliminaion sampling during In his aricle we have ried o explain ha earnings assessmen affecs firm value. On he oher hand, insiuional invesors have considerable experience in gahering and inerpreing he informaion on company performance. According o he resuls of hypoheses esing, we can say ha companies wih high qualiy profi have lower risk o arac invesors for finance. Therefore, providers of companies resources are looking o inves in high-qualiy earnings companies. In fac, capial and funding for insiuions and companies wih high-qualiy earnings is easier as bring a reasonable assurance for invesors on reurn. The resuls showed ha here were no relaionship beween corporae governance wih ax managemen, bu has direc relaionship wih earnings managemen. Key words: Corporae governance, Tax managemen, Earnings managemen INTRODUCTION Today, informaion is an imporan ool in economic decisions. Wihou a doub, he qualiy of decisions depends on he accuracy of he informaion. Financial saemens is he mos imporan source of exernal paries especially invesors in access o needed informaion. Among his, profi and loss saemens providing useful informaion abou he profiabiliy of he business has araced he aenion of many invesors. On he oher hand, he exercise of judgmen by managemen in preparing he financial saemens has creaed concerns abou reliabiliy earnings. If managers hrough he exercise of is auhoriy in he field of accouning selecion in Access his aricle online Monh of Submission : Monh of Peer Review : Monh of Accepance : Monh of Publishing : financial reporing have incenives o mislead he users of financial saemens, here is a possibiliy of manipulaion or earnings managemen. 1-5 In recen years, concenraed ownership srucure and is impac on differen dimensions of companies, including earnings managing and consequenly ax managemen because of is prevalence in mos counries, especially among developing economies and emerging markes in Europe and Asia, raised as one of he imporan issues in he lieraure on corporae governance. Concenraion of ownership wih increasing conrol may cause posiive changes in he company; however, oher mechanisms may ac in he opposie direcion. Following he bankrupcy of big corporae and economic crisis, corporae governance is a phenomenon emerging in he world. Corporae governance has impac on he relaionships beween sakeholders and how hey conrol acions in corporae managemen. In he sandard definiion of corporae governance from he perspecive of economiss and lawyers, corporae governance is concerned wih he separaion of ownership and conrol or agency relaionship beween invesors Corresponding Auhor: Seyed Reza Miraskari, Associae Professor of Economics, Universiy of Guilan, Rash, Iran. SeyedRezaMiraskari@gmail.com 329 Inernaional Journal of Scienific Sudy July 2017 Vol 5 Issue 4

2 and managers. The disincion beween ownership and conrol in differen counries varies mainly due o differen regulaory environmens of hese counries. 6- RESEARCH IMPORTANCE Research has been carried ou in recen years on corporae governance, earnings managemen and ax managemen and facors influencing i indicaing heir imporance. The survey also observed he imporance. Since he presen sudy invesigae simulaneously he hree variables ha are he key elemens of accouning managemen. And is purpose is ha how company ac for increasing growing and increasing value of he company as well as gaining a higher percenage of he exising marke and new marke his in urn requires high financial resources. In oher words, how can provide all heir requiremens wih earnings managemen and ax managemen and by manipulaing he balance shee iems o show more profi o increase shareholder value ec? Bu his quesion addressed ha do corporae governance srucure allowing i o managers? THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Tax managemen issue is oo imporan boh for hose who aenion o key role in increasing ax revenues o balance he macroeconomic level and also for hose who are ineresed in ax policy. Tax managemen play a major role in esablishing he rue ax sysem in regard o ax law sysem. In fac, here is a growing convicion among ax policy expers ha changes in ax policy are meaningless wihou a change in ax managemen. And herefore i is essenial o ensure ha change in ax policy is consisen wih he capaciy of ax adminisraion. Usually he purpose of income ax sysem as a measure of performance is pay aenion from officials, so ha he hisory of oal proceeds is only he duy of ax adminisraors. Bu i should be borne in mind ha he bes ax managemen is no simply o collec he income ax. The quesion of how such income is colleced, ha is he sudy of is effec on ax jusice, is poliical consequences for he governmen and is impac on he economic well-being is equally imporan. Successful ax adminisraion reform program required o hree facors, namely: simpliciy, sraegy and commimen. Simpliciy is one of he mos imporan facors for success in any reform of he ax adminisraion. Tax managemen should be simple rules and herefore have high pracicable rules. In addiion simpler mehods are equally imporan. The second rule is he need for a sraegy for a successful reform of he ax adminisraion. In his case he sraegy is a comprehensive program in which cerain prioriies dedicaed o asks ha need o be made based on available resources. The hird elemen necessary for a successful reform of ax adminisraion is he srong ineres and commimen o ax reform in managers and policy makers as well as he minimum echnical abiliy. - On he oher hand, in recen years, concenraed ownership srucure and is impac on differen aspecs of he company, including ineres due o is prevalence in mos counries, especially among developing economies and emerging markes in Europe and Asia, raised as one of he imporan issues in he lieraure on corporae governance. Concenraion of ownership wih increasing conrol may cause posiive changes in he company; however, oher mechanisms may ac in he opposie direcion. Following he bankrupcy of big corporae and economic crisis, corporae governance is a phenomenon emerging in he world. Corporae governance has impac on he relaionships beween sakeholders and how hey conrol acions in corporae managemen. In he sandard definiion of corporae governance from he perspecive of economiss and lawyers, corporae governance is concerned wih he separaion of ownership and conrol or agency relaionship beween invesors and managers. The disincion beween ownership and conrol in differen counries varies mainly due o differen regulaory environmens of hese counries. The cenral issues in corporae governance is he conrol and corporae governance and he mos imporan facor affecing he conrol and corporae governance is concenraed ownership, especially he concenraion of ownership of socks is in he hands of major shareholders. This concenraion of ownership in Iran mainly is on he firs level of major shareholder and in mos cases here is no a need o examine he second and hird levels and ec of major shareholder In one of sudy i was concluded ha he greaer ownership concenraion, greaer conrol will be over he managemen and improved company performance. The relaionship beween ownership concenraion and reurn crieria depends on he ype of owners and facors affecing he reurn. Separaion of ownership from managemen is he mos imporan feaure of Public Companies. In he pas hiry years, many cases of conflic of ineres beween groups and how companies dealing wih hese conradicions had been raised by economiss. This maerial is generally is described under he ile agency heory in Managemen Accouning. In agency heory, he owners aim o wealh maximizaion. In order o achieve his goal, hey oversee labor represenaive and assess his performance. Ne profi is also one of he iems conained in he financial saemens ha has a considerable impac in he decision of financial saemens users and has araced much aenion. One of he main groups of financial saemens users is shareholders. Inernaional Journal of Scienific Sudy July 2017 Vol 5 Issue 4 330

3 Therefore generally are hough ha ownership srucure may lead o behavioral change in companies. Today, informaion is an imporan ool in economic decisions. Wihou a doub, he qualiy of decisions depends on he accuracy of he informaion. Financial saemens is he mos imporan source of exernal paries especially invesors in access o needed informaion. Among his, profi and loss saemens providing useful informaion abou he profiabiliy of he business has araced he aenion of many invesors. On he oher hand, he exercise of judgmen by managemen in preparing he financial saemens has creaed concerns abou reliabiliy earnings. If managers hrough he exercise of is auhoriy in he field of accouning selecion in financial reporing have incenives o mislead he users of financial saemens, here is a possibiliy of manipulaion or earnings managemen. Sudies on earnings managemen are indicaing he presence of he wo main ways o earnings managemen Company managers can manage earnings hrough manipulaing of accruals as well as o manipulae acual aciviies. Mos lieraure on earnings managemen is focus on accrual-based earnings managemen. However, lile sudies have been carried ou on earnings managemen and is impac on firm performance. Real earnings managemen is associaed wih he change in he iming or srucure of he acual aciviies of he eniy. So researchers in sudies on real earnings managemen ry o idenify he unusually level of eniy aciviies. Considering he above issues his quesion arises ha wheher here is a significan relaionship beween corporae governance and earnings managemen and ax managemen in companies lised on he Tehran Sock Exchange? LITERATURE MyBarry e al. (2012) examined a research by he ile smoohing axable income, ax avoidance and he informaion conen of axable income. This sudy examines he issue ha wheher here is a significan relaionship beween he smoohing in axable income and fuure ax avoidance. In his sudy, he effec of smoohing axable income on he informaion conen has been reviewed. In his sudy, he effecive curren ax rae and he effecive cash flows ax rae as measures of ax avoidance during is used. The resuls showed ha here is a significan posiive relaionship beween smoohing he axable income and fuure ax avoidance. Also, here is a significan negaive correlaion beween smoohing he axable income and is informaion conen. In oher words, smoohing axable income reduce is informaion conen. Guan and Pourjalali (2010) sudied he effec of Culural Environmenal and Accouning Regulaion on Earnings Managemen. The final sample in his sudy was 84,748 observaions beween he 27 counries over he years 1987 o In his sudy, he modified Jones model was used o measure discreionary accruals as well as he cross-secional regression. Since he deerminaion of acual ax rae (o deermine ax rae regardless of earnings managemen) is no possible, he average effecive ax rae ha is calculaed based on he company s oal ax paymen and oal axable income o be used. Resuls show ha he higher he rae, he higher end will be o use mehods of reducing profis by corporae execuives. Khodamipour (2014) examined a research by he ile he relaionship beween smoohing of axable income wih ax avoidance and he informaion conen. The aim of his sudy was o evaluae he effec of smoohing axable income on ax avoidance and is informaion conen. For his purpose, a sample of 92 companies lised on he Tehran Sock Exchange has been invesigaed. The crieria used o measure ax avoidance are he effecive cash ax rae. Research hypoheses have been analyzed using mulivariae regression models in panel daa mehods. The resuls indicae ha here is a significan negaive relaionship beween smoohing he axable income and effecive cash ax rae. This resul is in line wih he fac ha axable income smoohing reduces uncerainies relaed o fuure ax benefis. And i makes possible for companies o apply a more successful ax avoidance sraegy. The resuls also provide evidence ha here is significan negaive correlaion beween axable income smoohing and informaional conen and axable income smoohing reduces is informaion conen. Hasas Yeghaneh and Ghol Mahammadi Shouraki (2011) sudied he relaionship beween effecive ax rae and corporae feaures. The main purpose of his aricle was o evaluae he effecive ax rae and is relaionship wih he indusry, profiabiliy, firm size, leverage, invesmen inensiy and ownership srucure as he company feaures. The resuls indicae ha he average effecive ax rae is near he sauory rae of income ax and almos every indusry has is own effecive ax rae. The resuls also showed ha here is significan negaive correlaion beween effecive ax rae wih firm size and profiabiliy and here is a significan posiive relaionship wih financial leverage. In addiion, here was no significan relaionship beween effecive ax rae and ownership srucure and invesmen inensiy. RESEARCH VARIABLES Corporae Governance In 2004, he Inernaional Federaion of Accounans has defined corporae governance as follows: 331 Inernaional Journal of Scienific Sudy July 2017 Vol 5 Issue 4

4 Corporae governance (eniy governance) is he number of responsibiliies and pracices used by he board and adminisraors aiming o deermine a sraegic direcion ha ensures he achievemen of is objecives, risk conrol and responsible use of resources. Davani knows corporae governance as he se of relaionships beween shareholders, direcors and company audiors ha ensure o esablish conrol sysem o respec he righs of minoriy shareholders and correc implemenaion of he decisions of he Assembly and o preven possible abuses. This law ha is based on accounabiliy and social responsibiliy sysem is a se of asks and responsibiliies ha mus be aken by firm pillars would lead o accounabiliy and ransparency (Kohandel, 2011). Earnings Managemen Schipper (1989) in he definiion of earnings managemen has said: Earnings managemen is he public involvemen in exernal financial reporing process wih he inenion o gain profi. Healy & Wahlen (1999) have defined earnings managemen as: Earnings managemen occurs when managers use heir personal judgmens in heir financial repors and manipulae ransacions srucure o aler financial reporing. The goal is o rying o seduce some profi owners on he economic performance or impac on he conracs ha is conclusion is subjec o he achievemen of personal profi. In he accouning lieraure, providing a clear definiion of earnings managemen is difficul as i is no clear boundary beween earnings managemen and financial fraud. Financial fraud is he removal or general manipulaion of facs or accouning daa ha along wih oher available daa ha will change in Judgmen and Decision Making use of he daa. Generally, earnings managemen o be defined on he effeciveness company s profis, so ha mee resources and he demands of he company and is direcors (Miri, 2011). Tax Managemen Tax managemen means ha we collec more ax revenue. The quesion of how such income is colleced, ha is he sudy of is effec on ax jusice, is poliical consequences for he governmen and is impac on he economic well-being is equally imporan. Successful ax adminisraion reform program required o hree facors, namely: simpliciy, sraegy and commimen (World of Economy). According o he saemen of he problem he hypohesis is as follows: H1: There is a significan relaionship beween corporae governance and ax managemen. H2: There is a significan relaionship beween corporae governance and earnings managemen. Research mehod The research mehod is correlaion. In his sudy, for he esimaes of descripive saisics and parameers in he sudy and analysis and saisical inference, Excel and Eviews sofware was used. According o he above characerisics, his sudy in erms of objec was developmen- descripive research. And daa requiremens will be gahering by viewing documens relaing o he financial saemens of companies in Tehran Sock Exchange. Also, economeric models wih he ype of daa, ha is he panel daa and he leas squares mehod was used o model fi. And also o esimae he model, Chow and Hausman and Pagan es is used as Figure 1. Populaion and sample: For his, all companies lised on he Tehran Sock Exchange was considered as populaion according o some condiions: All companies lised on he Tehran Sock Exchange beween 2008 o2013 consiue he research populaion. Accordingly, a sample of lised companies in Tehran Sock Exchange done by considering he following crieria: 1. For he purpose of comparing daa, he end of he financial period ended 29 March. 2. In order o homogeneiy of informaion, is aciviy is producive. 3. The company s equiy is no negaive. 4. Financial Informaion for he sudied period by 4 years of available delay is audied and fiscal year does no see he change. 5. The Company, during he sudied period has no more han six monhs operaing sops. Model and Variables ETR = α1+ α2etr 1+ α3br + α4in + α 5CM i, i, i, i, i, + α SZi, + α RAi + α LV + ε 6 7, 8 i, i, DA = β1+ β 2DA 1+ β3br + β4in + β 5CM i, i, i, i, i, + β6szi, + β7 RAi, + β8lvi + ε, i, Figure1: Deermine he ype of panel daa models Inernaional Journal of Scienific Sudy July 2017 Vol 5 Issue 4 332

5 Dependen Variables ETR i, : Tax managemen (effecive ax rae i a he ime ) and is equal o (axes divided by income before ax deducions) DA i, : Earnings managemen (discreionary accruals of he firm i a ime ) Independen Variables BR: The number of board members IN: Non-bound relaive o he enire Board of Direcors CM: Board Bonus Conrol Variables SZ: Firm Size and is he naural logarihm of firm oal asses RA: Reurn on asses and i is equal o ne income divided by oal asses of he company. LV: Financial leverage and i is equal o oal deb divided by oal asses. Descripive saisics In his secion, descripive saisics of he variables is provided according o he classificaion presened in (Table 1). RESULTS H1: There is a significan relaionship beween corporae governance and ax managemen. H2: There is a significan relaionship beween corporae governance and earnings managemen. Heerogeneiy of Variance To sudy he heerogeneiy of variance, LM-ARCH es is conduced. The resuls of heerogeneiy variance ARCH LM es is as follows: This es is an opional es and used o disinguish beween ols analysis ype and GLS boh for panel daa and he ime series. Our es daa is from he ype of panel. In relaion o he firs model, given ha he es saisic is no significan a he 5% level, so variance homogeneiy assumpion was no rejeced and variance non-homogeneiy will no be acceped. So he resuls of OLS are he mos effecive. Also, in relaion o he second model, is no significan a he 5% level, so variance homogeneiy assumpion was no rejeced and variance non-homogeneiy will no be acceped. So he resuls of OLS are he mos effecive (Table 2). Selecing a Regression Model Tes for he Firs Model To selec a suiable regression model among he combinaion or panel daa as well as he fixed effecs model or random effecs, wo saisics F Limer saisics and Hausman ess should be used. F Limer Saisic Tes In relaion o he firs model, given ha he F-value is and more han criical quaniy (he value of probabiliy is less han 5%), so he firs hypohesis ha he use of fixed-effecs and panel daa mehods is suiable, is confirmed. Also, in relaion o he second model, given ha he F-value is and more han criical quaniy (he value of probabiliy is less han 5%), so he firs hypohesis ha he use of fixed-effecs and panel daa mehods is suiable, is confirmed (Table 3). Hausman Tes Now, he fixed effecs model should be esed agains random effecs model. To do so, he Hausman es is used. To do Hausman es, we mus firs esimae random crosssecional effecs model. Hausman es for he presence of random effecs is se ou as follows: Null hypohesis and he Hausman es is as follows: H0 = here is no a correlaion beween disurbing elemens and explanaory variables H1 = here is a correlaion beween disurbing elemens and explanaory variables According o Hausman es resuls can be seen ha he null hypohesis is rejeced in favor of he alernaive hypohesis. So our way o esimae he desired funcion is he fixed effecs model (Table 4). Significan es of firs model The calculaed probabiliy value for he independen variable of corporae governance is greaer han he level of 5 percen and is esimaed coefficien is posiive. The resul can be saed ha here is no direc and significan relaionship beween corporae governance and ax Table 1. Descripive saisics of variables Variable ETR ETRT DA DAT BR IN CM SZ RA LV Average Mean Maximum Minimum Sandard deviaion Number of observaions Inernaional Journal of Scienific Sudy July 2017 Vol 5 Issue 4

6 managemen, so as o enhance corporae governance, ax managemen will no decrease. On he oher hand, he resuls indicae a direc and significan correlaion beween conrol variables of financial leverage and he Table 2: Tes resuls of heerogeneiy LM ARCH Model Descripion Saisic value Probabiliy Firs model F saisic Obs*R squared Second model F saisic Obs*R squared Table 3: resuls of F Limer es Model Descripion Saisic value Saisic value Probabiliy Firs model Cross secion F (79.310) Second model Cross secion F (79.310) Table 4: Hausman es Model Descripion Saisic value Degrees of freedom Probabiliy Firs model Cross secion F Second model Cross secion F dependen variable. In addiion, by observing he resuls of he ess can be saed ha among he sudied variables, he rae of reurn on asses has he greaes impac on ax managemen. The deerminaion coefficien of he model is approximaely This number shows ha 55 percen of dependen variable can be explained by he independen variables. And since Durbin-Wason saisic for his model is closer o 2 (1.83), we can say ha in his model, here is no firs-order auocorrelaion (confirmed of one of he regression assumpions). In addiion, he resuls of he es show ha F-es p-value is less han 5% and since F saisic shows he oal validiy model, so we can say ha his model was significan wih 95% and has he high validiy (Table 5). Thus, according o he resuls a 95%, he firs hypohesis of his sudy will no be approved. Significan Tes of Second Model As he resuls of he ess show, he calculaed probabiliy value for he independen variable of corporae governance is less han he level of 5 percen and is esimaed coefficien is posiive. The resul can be saed ha here is direc and significan relaionship beween corporae governance and earnings managemen, so as o enhance corporae governance, earnings managemen will increase. The deerminaion coefficien of he model is approximaely This number shows ha 67 percen of Table 5: Resuls of he firs regression model Variable Coefficien Sandard deviaion T saisics PROB Type of Relaionship Significan ETRT Meaningless BR Meaningless IN Meaningless CM Meaningless SZ Meaningless RA Significan posiive 99% LV Meaningless Inercep Significan posiive 99% Deerminaion Adjused deerminaion Mean regression deviaion F saisic F saisic probabiliy Durbin Wason coefficien coefficien Saisics Table 6: Resuls of he second regression model Variable Coefficien Sandard deviaion T saisics PROB Type of Relaionship Significan DAT Significan posiive 99% BR Meaningful IN Meaningful CM Meaningful SZ Meaningless RA Meaningless LV Meaningless Inercep meaningless Deerminaion coefficien Adjused deerminaion Mean regression F saisic F saisic probabiliy Durbin Wason coefficien deviaion Saisics Inernaional Journal of Scienific Sudy July 2017 Vol 5 Issue 4 334

7 dependen variable can be explained by he independen variables. And since Durbin-Wason saisic for his model is closer o 2 (1.90), we can say ha in his model, here is no firs-order auocorrelaion (confirmed of one of he regression assumpions). In addiion, he resuls of he es show ha F-es p-value is less han 5% and since F saisic shows he oal validiy model, so we can say ha his model was significan wih 95% and has he high validiy. Thus, according o he resuls a 95%, he second hypohesis of his sudy will be approved (Table 6). CONCLUSION According o he resuls of hypoheses esing, we can say ha a 95%, he firs hypohesis of his sudy is rejeced and he second hypoheses will be acceped. Companies wih high-qualiy profi have lower risk o arac invesors o finance. Therefore, providers of companies are looking o inves in high-qualiy earnings companies. In fac, capial and funding for insiuions and companies wih highqualiy earnings is easier as bring a reasonable assurance of reurn on invesmen for businesses. The resuls showed ha corporae governance was no relaed o ax managemen bu has direc and effecive relaionship wih earnings managemen. REFERENCES 1. Baha Moghadam, Mehdi; Habibeh Hasani Fard (2010), The relaionship beween real financial evens and earnings managemen in firms lised in he Tehran Sock Exchange, Journal of Accouning and Audiing, 2 nd year, Issue 6, Summer Chung K. H, Zheng H. (2009). Corporae Governance and insiuional Ownership. Journal of Financial and Quaniaive Analysis; forhcoming. 3. Ding, Y., Hua,Y.,&Junxi,Y.,(2007). Privae vs Sae Ownership and Earnings Managemen: Evidence from Chinese Lised Companies. Corporae Governance: An Inernaional Review. 15(2), Eslahi, Azim (2006), Corporae governance and financing pracice of he companies lised in Tehran Sock Exchange, Maser s hesis research universiy 5. Hanway, K.&Vance, S. (2010). Accouning Mehod Changes and Elecions o Increase Taxable Income, In Wha s New in Tax, edied by L. KPMG 6. Hasan A. S. and Bu, A. (2009), Impac of Ownership Srucure and Corporae Governance on Capial Srucure of Pakisani Lised Companies. Inernaional Journal of Business and Managemen, Vol. 4, pp Hasas Yeghaneh, Yahya; Raeisi, Zohreh and Hosseini, Seyyed Mojaba (2009), «The relaionship beween he qualiy of corporae governance and performance of lised companies in Tehran Sock Exchange, Journal of Managemen Sciences in Iran, 4 h ear, Issue 13, pp Hasas Yeghaneh, Yahya; Shahriyari, Ali Reza (2009), The relaionship beween concenraion of ownership and conservaism in Tehran Sock Exchange, Journal of Financial Accouning,2 nd year, Issue II, pp Hashemi, Ali Reza (2010), Tax efficien managemen, The world economy Newspapers - No Krisina, Minnick. and Tracy, Noga.(2010). Do corporae governance characerisics influence ax managemen. Journal of Corporae Finance, Legge, D., Parsons, L. and A. Reienga.(2009). Real Earnings Managemen and Subsequen Operaing Performance.working paper 12. Li, X.(2010). Real Earnings Managemen and Subsequen Sock Reurns. Working paper 13. Lin, Z. J.; and M. Liu (2009), The Impac of Corporae Governance on Audior Choice: Evidence from China, Journal of Inernaional Accouning, Audiing and Taxaion, pp Lopez Iurriaga, Felix and Vecene Crisosomo (2010), Do Leverage, Dividend Payou, and Ownership Concenraion Influence Firms Value Creaion? Emerging Markes Finance & Trade/May June 2010, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp Rezaee, Farzin, Mousaviyan, Khadijeh (2011), The relaionship beween abnormal accruals and concenraion of ownership as corporae governance mechanisms wih enerprise feaures, Journal of Financial Accouning, 3 rd year, Issue 9, Pages Sarori, Nicola. (2008). «effecs of sraegic ax behaviors on corporae governance». Sepember 1, universiy of Michigan How o cie his aricle: Azadeh A, Miraskari SR, Kheradyar S. Examine he Relaionship beween Corporae Governance and Dividend Taxaion (Company Lised On he Tehran Sock Exchange). In J Sci Sud 2017;5(4): Source of Suppor: Nil, Conflic of Ineres: None declared. 335 Inernaional Journal of Scienific Sudy July 2017 Vol 5 Issue 4