Effects of Financial Crisis on Capital Structure of Listed Firms in Vietnam

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1 hp://ijfr.sciedupress.com Inernaional Journal of Financial Research Vol. 7, No. 1; 216 Effecs of Financial Crisis on Capial Srucure of Lised Firms in Vienam Truong Hong Trinh 1 & Nguyen Thao Phuong 1 1 Universiy of Economics, The Universiy of Danang, Vienam Correspondence: Truong Hong Trinh, Faculy of Finance, Universiy of Economics, Danang Ciy, Vienam. Tel: rinh.h@due.edu.vn Received: November 14, 215 Acceped: December 3, 215 Online Published: December 21, 215 doi:1.543/ijfr.v7n1p66 URL: hp://dx.doi.org/1.543/ijfr.v7n1p66 Absrac This paper invesigaes effecs of financial crisis on capial srucure of lised firms in Vienam. Regression models on he relaion beween he leverage and firm size, growh, profiabiliyangibiliyogeher wih crisis dummies is buil based on a sample of 265 firms lised on HNX and HOSE for he period of The empirical resul indicaes ha firm size, profiabiliy, and angibiliy have saisically significan impacs on capial srucure. The growh is no saisically significan in explaining he variance of he leverage. The sudy resul also reveals ha capial srucure of Vienamese lised firms has no changed significanly under he financial crisis. Keywords: capial srucure, leverage, financial crisis, Vienam 1. Inroducion Half a cenury agohe firs paper on capial srucure of Modigliani and Miller (1958) saed ha he capial srucure of firms has no effec on he firms value. Modigliani and Miller s argumen is based on several assumpions, which make he financial marke o be perfec and hus no consisen wih he real marke. In fache global financial crisis (GFC) burss ou in 28, many firms faced difficulies relaed o capial srucure ha influenced heir value (Zarebski & Dimovski, 212). Thus, a big quesion is ha how does he financial crisis affec capial srucure? Effecs of he global financial crisis was differen among counries due o he differen level of developmen in he financial markehe policies of governmen and he sensiiviy of ha counry o exernal incidens. The financial crisis in 28 had hree basic impacs on he economy of Vienam. Firsly, demand power shrinks down due o a srong decrease on supplies as well as he income sources, and economic growh depends on expor ha accoun for 6%-7% GDP. Secondlyhe Foreign Direc Invesmen (FDI) decreases in boh quaniy and size, which affec he domesic businesses ha depend on his fund. Laslyhe financial marke was also srongly affeced. Freezing invesing aciviies and flucuaing ineres rae made he financial marke unpredicable and raised many difficulies for invesors as well as borrowers. In such siuaionhe quesion is ha Vienamese firms change heir capial srucure during he financial crisis or no? In order o find he answer for he above quesionhis paper invesigaes he effecs of he recen financial crisis on he capial srucure of lised firms in Vienam, and he significance of hose deerminans changes in capial srucure (leverage raio). Regression models is buil for relaions beween he leverage and firm size, growh, profiabiliy, angibiliyogeher wih crisis dummies for he period of The empirical resul provides an imporan undersanding on characerisics of Vienamese lised firms in response o he financial crisis. 2. Lieraure Review 2.1 Theories of Capial Srucure In he firs discussion abou he capial srucure, Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed ha he capial srucure had no impac on he value of he firm, wih an assumpion of a perfec capial marke (ha is a marke wih no ransacion coss, no axes and asymmeric informaion, no bankrupcy cos, no agency cos, full compeiion and no arbirage opporuniies). However, since he perfec capial marke canno be obained in realiy, Modigliani and Miller (1963) added corporae axes ino heir model and found ha he firm value increase when he leverage increases, due o he ax-deducibiliy of deb. Miller (1977) himself added personal axes and poined ha he income from deb, which is generally ineres, is axed as personal income, while he income from socks (generally Published by Sciedu Press 66 ISSN E-ISSN

2 hp://ijfr.sciedupress.com Inernaional Journal of Financial Research Vol. 7, No. 1; 216 he dividends and capial gains) is axed a a lower rae and he ax of capial gains can be deferred unil he sock is sold. Therefore, he concluded ha he deducibiliy of ineres favors he use of deb financing, bu he more favorable ax reamen of income from sock favors he use of equiy financing. The rade-off heory was esablished by Kraus and Lizenberger (1973). The rade-off model idenifies he opimal financial leverage in he rade-off beween he benefis from high deb and he business risks, as Myers (1984) said: In he saic rade-off heory, opimal capial srucure is reached when he ax advanage o borrowing is balanced, a he margin, by cos of financial disress. Conrary wih he rade-off heory, which produce an opimal level of deb where he benefi of he las dollar of deb jus offses he cos of bankrupcyhe pecking order heory, developed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), rejecs any opimal deb raio and indicaes an order of sources of financing depends on he cos of such sources. Thushe inernal source (reained earnings) is he firs on he lis, which is basically free o he firm. When he firm has o use exernal fundshe low-risk deb is preferred o he equiy, which is high-risk and hus high-cos. Jensen and Meckling (1976) firs inroduced he concep of agency coss in a financial economic conex. They highlighed ha agency coss arise in any siuaion involving cooperaive effor. In addiionhey argued ha financing decisions are deermined by he exen of conflic beween firm insiders and firm ousiders. The agency cos heory saes ha opimal capial srucure depends on he abiliy o minimize he resuling agency cos originaing in his conflic. 2.2 Deerminans of Capial Srucure There are numerous papers abou he facors ha affec he capial srucure (he deb raio or he leverage). The main deerminans of capial srucure discussed are growh opporuniies, profiabiliy, firm sizeangibiliy, and oher facors. Size: The agency heory indicaes a posiive relaion beween size and agency cos, in which large firms have more agency coss han small firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). When firms issue deb, managers are more moniored by ousiders (Ibrahimo & Barros, 29). I is difficul for managers o aim heir own goals, and he agency problem is less. Thereforehe agency heory suggess also a posiive relaion beween size and leverage. Rajan and Zingales (1995) indicaes ha he size is posiive ralaed o capial srucure, bu Ferri and Jones (1979) suggess ha he size has no a posiive impac on capial srucure. While Kim and Sorensen (1986) reveal ha here is no a relaion a all, he firm size is uncorrelaed wih capial srucure, Timan and Wessels (1998) conclude ha here is a relaion beween size and capial srucure. In addiion, Deesomsak, Paudyal, and Pesceo (24) find ha firm size, non-deb ax shield and liquidiy are significan facors in capial srucure decisions in he Eas Asian financial crisis of Growh: There is a negaive relaion beween growing firms and leverage (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Timan & Wessels, 1988). This resul is suppored by pecking order heory, in which he references o finance a new invesmens is wih inernal funds. According o agency heory, managers have a preference o saisfied firs heir own goal; maximize heir uiliy, and second ha of he sakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Timan & Wessels, 1988). Thus, i suggess a posiive relaion beween growh and leverage. The growh opporuniies can be linked wih he financial crisis. Baily and Ellio (29) suggess ha here is less or no growh for several quarers during he financial crisis period. Profiabiliy: Profiabiliy influences he capial srucure, which is ofen discussed by differen heories and researchers. Ozkan (21) sugges a negaive relaion beween profiabiliy and leverage, wha is explained by he pecking order heory. The pecking order heory suggess ha firms prefer o finance wih inernal funds over ouside finance (Myers, 1984). Empirical sudies of Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Timan and Wessels (1988) repor ha he influence of profiabiliy in he Unied Saes on leverage is mos of he ime negaive relaed. In addiion, financial crisis has influence on economic growh and sock marke, which firms profiabiliy relies on marke demand and sock marke. Tangibiliy: The choice of he ype of he firm s asses affecs he capial srucure. Myers and Majluf (1984) sugges ha coss are relaed wih issuing deb due o he informaion asymmery problem; managers are more informed han he ouside shareholders. These coss can avoid by issuing deb secured by collaeral, because he value is known of he collaeral. Therefore, when firms have he opporuniy o ake his advanage o use asses as collaeral, i may be expeced ha hese firms issue more deb (Myers & Majluf, 1984). The empirical par of he research of Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Timan and Wessels (1988) concludes a posiive relaion beween angibiliy and leverage. Myers and Majluf (1984) also demonsrae a posiive relaion. In addiion, banks suggesed wih a liquidiy and credi risks during financial crisis. Thushey required more securiy when hey issue loans o firms (Berg & Kirschenmann, 21). Published by Sciedu Press 67 ISSN E-ISSN

3 hp://ijfr.sciedupress.com Inernaional Journal of Financial Research Vol. 7, No. 1; 216 Crisis: The recen financial crisis ha sared a he end of year 27 in he subprime credi marke led o a liquidiy crisis in he shor-erm money markes. Many earlier sudies argue ha credi supply condiions are an imporan facor in firms financing decisions. Vousinas and Werner (211) find ha exreme credi supply flucuaions in Japan (asse bubble burs in 1989 and banking crises in 1998) had a significan impac on Japanese firms capial srucure. They find ha a decrease in he supply of credi will affec negaively firm s leverage raios. Balsari and Kirkulak (28) examine he effecs of major financial crisis on capial srucure of firms ha happened in he Turkish economy in 1994 and Their findings sugges ha a negaive impac of 1994 crisis on he leverage raio. The sudies of Paani and Vera (211) and Akbar, Rehman, and Ormrod (213) are given he same resul during financial crisis, in which UK firms held more cash and issue more equiy. In conras, Lim (24) finds ha large Korean firms lef he financial inermediaries and urned o capial markes afer he Korean crisis. This was no he case for profiable small firms which were gaining easier access from he financial inermediaries afer he crisis. Fosberg (212) repors ha global equiy issuance declined during wih he daa provided by Wall Sree Journal. However his rend was reversed in 29 and coninued in 21. A similar rend was observed for deb issuance. The global deb/equiy issuance raio increased in 28 and hen decreased gradually owards he end of 21. Table 1. Deerminans of capial srucure Deerminans Prediced sign by heories Previous empirical evidence Size Growh + (Agency heory) Rajan and Zingales (1995), Timan and Wessels, (1988), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Ibrahimo and Barros (29) - (Pecking order heory) Rajan and Zingales, (1995), Timan and Wessels, (1988) + (Agency heory) Jensen and Meckling (1976), Timan and Wessels, (1988) Profiabiliy - (Pecking order heory) Rajan and Zingales, (1995), Timan and Wessels, (1988) Tangibiliy Crisis + (Signaling heory) + Lim (24), Fosberg (212) - Rajan and Zingales, (1995), Timan and Wessels, (1988), Myers and Majluf, (1984) Vousinas and Werner (211), Balsari and Kirkulak.(28), Paani and Vera (211), Akbar e al. (213) 3. Daa and Mehodology 3.1 Daa The daa is colleced from financial saemens of lised firms in he period of Firms in financial secor are eliminaed from iniial sample of 927 lised firms on HOSE and HNX in Vienam. The sudy chooses 265 lised firms which have financial saemens during Table 2 shows descripive saisics of regression variables. Table 2. Descripive saisics of regression variables Min Max Mean Sd. Dev. erage Size Growh Profiabiliy Tangibiliy Table 2 shows ha he leverage of he sample firms range from.3% o 97.8%, wih he average of abou 5%. I Published by Sciedu Press 68 ISSN E-ISSN

4 hp://ijfr.sciedupress.com Inernaional Journal of Financial Research Vol. 7, No. 1; 216 seems ha lised firms in Vienam have no preference on which source should be used o finance: deb or equiy. The size ranges from o , wih he average of The growh ranges from % o 31.1%, wih he average of %, indicaes ha he growh opporuniies varies much among firms. Profiabiliy (ROA) ranges from -64.6% o 62.7%, wih he average of 7.15%. Tangibiliy ranges from o.939, wih he average of.265. Table 3. The mean and sandard deviaion of he variables Mean Sd erage Size Growh N/A N/A Profiabiliy Tangibiliy The mean leverage of firms declined dramaically in 27. In fachere was an issue in he marke ha forced managers o adjus heir capial srucure: borrow less and depend more on equiy. I noes ha here had been already a shorage of credi in he marke before financial crisis, and ha migh be he reason for his fall. A he end of 21, he leverage increased ogeher wih he recovery of he economy, alhough i could no reach he level of 56.8% a 27. The size of firms gradually increases over he periodogeher wih he increase in is variaion. Inflaion rae is higher in he financial crisis ha migh be a reason for a high value of asses, which is used as a proxy of size in his research. Overime firms also have o expand, so is size should increase also. The mean growh is no sable overime, and is range of flucuaion is quie wide ha makes i difficul o assess he rend. The mean profiabiliy is high in he ime of crisis compare o he oher ime. The raio of fixed asses and oal asses is approximaely he same in he whole period, and is a lile bi higher in crisis period. 3.2 Mehodology The echniques are used o es he condiions of a regression model including auocorrelaion, mulicollineariy, and disribuions. Durbin-Wason es is used o deec he auocorrelaion. Mulicollineariy is esed by a Variance Inflaion Facor (VIF) es. The disribuion of he variables is assessed hrough he hisograms and skewness ess. The correlaion coefficien is found on he leverage of each firm hroughou a period from 26 o 213. The correlaion coefficiens are also esed in wo differen periods: pre-crisis o crisis and crisis o pos-crisis o make clear abou how he leverage adjused during hose periods. The impac of he financial crisis on he firms leverage is examined hrough panel daa regression models. Panel daa ses are generally characerized by a sample of unis observed over a number of periods allowing researchers o apply more complex models han he ones used in cross-secional or ime series analysis. The mos common panel daa esimaion echniques are he fixed effecs model (FEM) and he random effecs model (REM). This sudy includes he dummy variables for crisis period, hence he REM is considered o be he mos suiable echnique o solve he research quesion abou he impac of financial crisis on capial srucure. In his regressionhe independen variables are he size (measured by he naural logarihm of oal asses), growh opporuniies (measures by he percenage change of oal asses), profiabiliy (measured by ROA reurn on asses) and angibiliy (measured by he raio beween fixed asses and oal asses). Observaions are aken in each year for he whole sample o idenify he regression line. The observaions which have leverage raio equal o or greaer Published by Sciedu Press 69 ISSN E-ISSN

5 hp://ijfr.sciedupress.com Inernaional Journal of Financial Research Vol. 7, No. 1; 216 han 1 is eliminaed because i is considered impossible in realiyhus i is a misake in yping in daa. A regression model will be obained by OLS mehod, in form: Model 1: i 1Sizei 2Growhi 3ROAi 4Tangi e (1) i, Models of 2, 3, 4, and 5 include a dummy variable in each which describes he crisis period: i 1Sizei 2Growhi 3ROAi 4Tangi 5DC1 i, ei (2) i 1Sizei, 2Growhi 3ROAi 4Tangi, 5DC2 i, ei, (3) i 1Sizei 2Growhi 3ROAi 4Tangi, 5DC3i ei (4) i 1Sizei 2Growhi 3ROAi 4Tangi, 5DC4i, ei (5) Table 4. Descripion of variables in regression models Variable descripion Noaion Formula The leverage raio of he firm The size of he firm Size The growh opporuniy of he firm Growh Percenage change of Toal asses The profiabiliy of he firm ROA The angibiliy of he firm Tang There was a lag ime for financial crisis influence in some counries as he case of Vienam. Since he definiion of a crisis period in Vienam is sill unclear, i is necessary o compare he hree differen periods o idenify which period has he mos influence on he model. The dummy crisis variable is added in models of 2, 3, 4, and 5 ha represen differen period of crisis. The variable DC1 akes he crisis period o be 27-28, when i akes value of 1 and oherwise. Similarlyhe variable DC2 akes he crisis period of 28-29he variable DC3 akes he crisis period of and he variable DC4 akes he crisis period of The four models are hen compared o idenify he crisis period. In order o invesigae how firms adjus heir leverage beween each periodhe sudy also subsiue he crisis dummy variable wih wo new dummy variables which will define hree periods: he pre-crisis dummy (DCPR) ha akes value of 1 for years before he crisis period and oherwise; and he pos-crisis dummy (DCPO) ha akes value of 1 for years afer he crisis period and oherwise. Hence he sixh model is as follow: Model 6: i 1Sizei 2Growhi 3ROAi 4Tangi, 5DCPRi 6DCPOi e (6) i, 4. Empirical Resuls and Discussion 4.1 Empirical Resuls In order o idenify he righ crisis period, four regression models of 2, 3, 4, and 5 is evaluaed hrough crisis dummy variables. From regression resuls as in Table 5, model 4 has he highes value of R square as well as adjused R square. The crisis dummy variable is also significan a 1% level in model 4. Therefore, i concludes ha he crisis period of Vienam is he period of Mulicollineariy is esed hrough he VIF saisics. All VIF values are approximaely 1, less han 5, so here is no collineariy in he models. Published by Sciedu Press 7 ISSN E-ISSN

6 hp://ijfr.sciedupress.com Inernaional Journal of Financial Research Vol. 7, No. 1; 216 Table 5. Regression resuls for models of 2, 3, 4, 5 Model 2 (7-8) Model 3 (8-9) Model 4 (9-1) Model 5 (1-11) C Size.47**.46**.45**.45** Growh ROA ** ** ** ** Tang -.81** -.82** -.81** -.8** DC1.22* DC2.22* DC3.26** DC4.1 R Adjused R **. Coefficien is significan a he.1 level (2-ailed). *. Coefficien is significan a he.5 level (2-ailed). In order o invesigae how he firm change he leverage during he sudy conducs hree models of 1, 4, and 6. Model 1 has no dummy crisis; model 4 sands for he model wih he dummy variable of crisis period; model 6 has wo dummy variables of pre-crisis period and pos-crisis period. Table 6. Regression resuls for models of 1, 4, 6 Model 1 Model 4 Model 6 C Size.45**.45**.48** Growh.1.1. ROA ** ** -1.21** Tang -.8** -.81** -.83** DC3.26** DCPR.2 DCPO -.38** R Adjused R **. Coefficien is significan a he.1 level (2-ailed). *. Coefficien is significan a he.5 level (2-ailed). The impac of size, growh, profiabiliy, and angibiliy on he leverage is showed in Table 6. Size is significanly correlaed wih he leverage. Is posiive sign indicaes ha larger firms end o borrow more. The growh does no have explanaory power in he models, since is correlaion wih he leverage is no significan in all equaions. Reurn on asses and he raio of fixed asses o oal asses have negaive signs in heir coefficiens, and boh variables are significan in hese models. The negaive sign in he profiabiliy shows ha companies which are beer in generaing profi can borrow deb more easily, while he negaive sign in angibiliy indicaes ha firms wih less fixed asses ends o use more deb in heir financing. Excep for he growh and he angibiliy, all oher resuls coincide wih previous sudies and expecaions. Published by Sciedu Press 71 ISSN E-ISSN

7 hp://ijfr.sciedupress.com Inernaional Journal of Financial Research Vol. 7, No. 1; 216 Table 6 also shows he impac of dummy variables on he leverage. Model 6 has a higher adjused R-Square han model 4, shows ha subsiuing he crisis dummy variable by hese wo new ones helps o describe more he variance in he leverage. In his modelhe dummy variable DCPO are negaively significan a level of.1. I means ha he capial srucure of Vienamese firms significanly lower han he oher period. Howeverhe sudy also found ha he mean leverage ends o increase afer he crisishough i canno reach he level of he years before he crisis. Thereforehis negaive impac implies he consequence of he crisis coninues in laer years, and makes he leverage o be lower han wha i should be. In oher word, if he consequence of he financial crisis is oally diminishedhe level of deb will be recovered fully o wha i was. The dummy variable of pre-crisis (DCPR) is no significan in his model, indicaes ha here is no differen in he leverage beween he wo period: pre-crisis and crisis. This resul is quesionable since i is shown above ha he leverage of firms significanly fall in he crisis period. One possible explanaion for his is ha his decrease no only due o he financial crisis iself, bu also is mosly caused by he changes in oher firms facors (such as profiabiliy and angibiliy). 4.2 Discussion on he Resuls The size has saisically posiive impac on he leverage in all hree models of 1, 4, and 6. The coefficien values are.45,.45 and.48 respecively. This is consisen wih mos of previous lieraure predicions and empirical resuls. Based on Timan and Wessels (1988) argumen, large firms primarily have lower cos of bankrupcy and hus an easily access o low-cos deb, which suppors he rade-off heory. In crisis period, as here is more chance ha companies will go bankrup, banks are more careful o give credi for firms. The size of he firms is hen an imporan facor ha banks consider o make heir decision. Larger firms repuaion and heir low business risk make banks feel safe o give credi. The growh has no relaion o he leverage. This resul is conrac wih many previous sudies ha is suppored boh agency heory and rade-off heory. The agen for shareholders managers ofen chooses o inves in risky projecs o increase reurn for shareholders. This makes he crediors unwilling o give credi unless hey are offered an addiional risk premium a compensaion for heir addiional risk. Because of he exra cos of deb, growing firms are less likely o use deb, and use equiy insead (rade-off heory). Pecking order heory also suppors his relaion by providing ha growing firms have more inernal financial sources o use, so his source will be prioriized. On he oher hand, a growing firm is also more reliable o banksha hey can be offered more deb, so a posiive sign in he relaion beween growh and leverage is also possible. This empirical sudy implies ha managers do no ake he growh ino accoun when making decision abou he capial srucure in Vienam The profiabiliy has a saisically negaive relaion o he leverage. This empirical resul is also coincides wih previous sudies. The coefficiens of his variable are negaive, indicaes ha firms wih high profiabiliy end o borrow less. This relaion is suppored by pecking order heory, which ells ha firms will prioriize he inernal funds before seeking for oher sources. Firms wih high profiabiliy will hen use heir earning firs o financehus reduce he proporion of deb in heir capial srucure. This rend is srenghening during crisis period because of he inaccessible of exernal deb. Togeher wih he difficulies in issuing debs, jus a slighly higher profiabiliy can srongly influence he deb level in he companiesha managers will depend on his source o help heir business overcome he bad condiions. The empirical sudy found no evidence o claim ha he leverage of Vienamese firms change during and afer he financial crisis. The crisis in fac made he leverage of mos firms o go down, bu in recen years i has recovered, alhough no compleely. This resul can be explained ha he financial marke in Vienam has no inegraed much ino he global marke, so he influences from he financial crisis sared in he US marke on he financial marke in Vienam is indirec: hrough he changes in supplies and demands in oher aspecs of he economy, as well as he decrease in impor and expor aciviies. Before and afer he financial crisishe governmen in Vienam sill akes he conrol over he economy. Wih some sric moneary policies and fiscal policies o mainain a low rae of inflaion and keep he rae of developmenhe financial sysem is also well conrolled by he governmen, and he Sae Bank sill has conrol over all commercial banks in Vienam. This makes i easier for he governmen o deal wih he problems arise from he crisis. Howeverhe financial crisis has had an impac on he aciviies of he whole economy, especially companies lised on he sock markes. Managers are aware of he bad condiions ha he economy was facing, so hey are more sensiive o even a iny change ouside. Consider ha he capial srucure decisions are imporan for he companies o overcome he bad period, managers are more careful o choose which sources o finance. In crisis period, credi from banks are limied and very difficul o access, so he qualiy of companies is assessed more carefullyhrough he size, profiabiliy and he abiliy o payback deb. This assessmen affecs much on he abiliy o finance wih deb Published by Sciedu Press 72 ISSN E-ISSN

8 hp://ijfr.sciedupress.com Inernaional Journal of Financial Research Vol. 7, No. 1; 216 of firmshus affecs he leverage of firms. In addiionhe higher leverage before he crisis periodhe leverage of firms on average is higher, proves ha companies can easily be given credi by banks. Howeverhe declining in he leverage when he crisis burs ou coninues alhough here are some signs of recovery in he economy. This parly due o he fac ha he demand for credi is sill low, invenories are sill high ha firms are sill in high risk, while some firms wih he need o borrow do no have sable financial condiions o mee he requiremens for credi. 5. Conclusion This paper has invesigaed he effecs of he financial crisis on he capial srucure wih he size, growh, profiabiliy and angibiliy as deerminans. The empirical resuls sugges ha here is a posiive relaion beween firm size and leverage because large firm are probably more diversified and less likely o go bankrup. Since i is safer for crediors o lend o large firms, size becomes also more imporan in relaion o he leverage during he crisis. Profiabiliy is negaive relaed o leverage. An argumen for his relaion is ha firms prefer o finance wih inernal funds over ouside finance o avoid asymmeric coss. During he crisis, profiabiliy is more imporan associaed wih he leverage because of he lack of available credi from banks. Tangibiliy has a negaive relaion on leverage. Alhough angible asses can secure he deb as collaeralhey also reduce he liquidiy of he firms, which is more imporan in crisis period. The sudy resul also reveals ha growh has no significan relaion o he leverage in empirical models. There is also no evidence o claim ha he leverage of Vienamese lised firm significanly change during he crisis period. These findings provide empirical evidence on relaion of he leverage wih growh and crisis. Vienamese managers have less consrain from shareholders. The growh does no ake ino accoun when Vienamese firms make decisions on capial srucure. In addiion, financial marke in Vienam has no much inegraed ino he global marke, and he financial sysem is well conrolled by governmenhe leverage of Vienamese lised firm has no significanly change during he crisis period. References Akbar, S., Rehman, S., & Ormrod, P. (213). The impac of recen financial shocks on he financing and invesmen policies of UK privae firms. Inernaional Review of Financial Analysis, 26, hp://dx.doi.org/1.116/j.irfa Baily, M. N., & Ellio, D. J. (29). The US financial and economic crisis: Where does i sand and where do we go from here. Brookings Insiuion. Rerieved July 28, 215, from hp:// Balsari, C. K., & Kirkulak, B. (28). Effec of financial crises on he capial srucure choice: Evidence from Isanbul Sock Exchange (ISE). 5h Conference of he Poruguese Finance Nework Proceedings. Combria, Porugal. Berg, G., & Kirschenmann, K. (21). The impac of he US financial crisis on credi availabiliy for small firms in Cenral Asia. Rerieved from hp:// crofinconf211/papers/2a.kirschenmann-berg.pdf Deesomsak, R., Paudyal, K., & Pesceo, G. (24). The deerminans of capial srucure: evidence from he Asia Pacific region. Journal of Mulinaional Financial Managemen, 14(4), hp://dx.doi.org/1.116/j.mulfin Ferri, M. G., & Jones, W. H. (1979). Deerminans of financial srucure: A new mehodological approach. Journal of Finance, 34(3), hp://dx.doi.org/1.1111/j b213.x Fosberg, R. H. (212). Capial srucure and he financial crisis. Journal of Finance and Accounancy, 11, Ibrahimo, M. V., & Barros, C. P. (29). Relevance or irrelevance of capial srucure?. Economic Modelling, 26(2), hp://dx.doi.org/1.116/j.econmod Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of he firm: Managerial behavior, agency coss and ownership srucure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), hp://dx.doi.org/1.116/34-45x(76)926-x Kim, W. S., & Sorensen, E. H. (1986). Evidence on he impac of he agency coss of deb on corporae deb policy. Journal of Financial and Quaniaive Analysis, 21(2), hp://dx.doi.org/1.237/ Kraus, A., & Lizenberger, R. H. (1973). A sae preference model of opimal financial leverage. The Journal of Finance, 28(4), hp://dx.doi.org/1.1111/j b1415.x Lim, Y. (24). Sources of Corporae Financing and Economic Crisis in Korea: Micro-evidence. In Governance, Regulaion, and Privaizaion in he Asia-Pacific Region, NBER Eas Asia Seminar on Economics, Universiy of Published by Sciedu Press 73 ISSN E-ISSN

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