The Industrial Organization of Banking

Transcription

1 The Industrial Organization of Banking

2 David VanHoose The Industrial Organization of Banking Bank Behavior, Market Structure, and Regulation Second Edition

3 David VanHoose Waco, Texas USA ISBN ISBN (ebook) DOI / Library of Congress Control Number: Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2010, 2017 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Printed on acid-free paper This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany The registered company address is: Heidelberger Platz 3, Berlin, Germany

4 1 Introduction: The Banking Environment... 1 Three Fundamental Areas Within the Industrial Organization of Banking Objectives Bank Behavior and the Structure of Banking Markets Bank Competition and Public Policy... 3 Assessing Bank Regulation... 3 The Bank Balance Sheet... 4 Bank Assets Loans... 5 Securities Cash Assets... 6 Trends in U.S. Bank Asset Allocations Bank Liabilities and Equity Capital Large-Denomination Time Deposits Transactions Deposits, Savings Deposits, and Small-Denomination Time Deposits... 8 Purchased Funds and Subordinated Notes and Debentures Bank Capital Trends in Bank Liabilities and Equity Capital... 9 The Bank Income Statement Interest Income Noninterest Income Interest Expenses Expenses for Loan Loss Provisions Real Resource Expenses Bank Profitability Measures Asymmetric Information and Risks in Banking Adverse Selection Moral Hazard v

5 vi Risks on the Balance Sheet Credit Risk Market Risks Liquidity Risk Systemic Risk Trends in U.S. Banking Industry Structure The Number of Commercial Banks Mergers, Acquisitions, and Concentration References Alternative Perspectives on Bank Behavior Identifying the Outputs and Inputs of a Bank What Banks Do: Alternative Perspectives on Bank Production Assessing the Economic Outputs and Inputs of Banks Banks as Portfolio Managers The Basic Bank Portfolio-Management Model Limitations of Portfolio Management Models Banks as Firms A Perfectly Competitive Banking Industry A Static Banking Model Fundamental Dynamics in a Perfectly Competitive Banking Model and Implications for Portfolio Separation Imperfectly Competitive Banking Markets Monopolistic and Monopsonistic Interest Rate Determination in Bank Loan and Deposit Markets Social Losses Due to Imperfect Competition in Banking Alternative Modes of Behavior Between Perfect Competition and Monopoly and Monopsony References The Industrial Economics of Banking The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm in Banking The SCP Hypothesis with Identical Banks Structural Asymmetry, Dominant Banks, and the SCP Paradigm A Dominant-Bank Model Strategic Entry Deterrence Evaluating the Applicability of the SCP Paradigm to the Banking Industry Traditional SCP Evidence from Cross-Sectional Banking Data Evidence from Cross-Country Studies Dynamic Interest Rate Responses: Competition and Pass-Through Effects The Conduct and Relative Performances of Large and Small Banks... 55

6 vii Market Structure and Bank-Customer Relationships Basic Market-Structure Implications of Bank-Customer Relationships Evidence on Bank-Customer Relationships Determinants and Impacts of Bank-Customer Relationships Competition and Relationship Lending The Efficient Structure Theory and Banking Costs The Efficient Structure Challenge to the SCP Paradigm Banking Efficiency and Costs Efficient Structure Theory and Bank Performance Endogenous Sunk Fixed Costs and Banking Industry Structure Endogenous Sunk Costs and Concentration Non-Price Competition in Banking: Implicit Deposit Rates Versus Quality Rivalry Evidence on Advertising Outlays in the Banking Industry Endogenous Sunk Costs and the Banking Industry References The Economics of International Banking The Growth of Global Banking The First Big Wave of Banking Globalization: The Colonial Period The Second Globalization Wave: The Most Recent Decades Fundamental Elements Influencing Cross-Border Banking Distance Competitive Structure and Effects of Entry in Host-Country Banking Markets Bank Size and Entry Costs Idiosyncratic Elements and Prior Experience The Industrial Organization of Multinational Banking Determinants of the Overall Scope of Foreign Direct Investment in Banking Greenfield Investment Versus Acquisitions of Host Nations Banks Real-Resource-Based Analyses of Cross-Border Trade in Banking Services Differences in Nation s Capital-Labor Ratios and Efficiencies as Determinants of Cross-Border Banking The Structure of Niepmann s Framework for a Closed Economy Extending Niepmann s Setup to a Two-Country Environment An Intra-industry Model of International Trade in Banking Services A Closed-Economy Setting with Differentiated Banking Services A Two-Economy Environment with Traded Banking Services Evidence on the Empirical Relevance of Trade-Based Theories of International Banking References

7 viii 5 The Economics of Banking Antitrust Why Banks Merge Profit Enhancements from Mergers Diversification Benefits of Bank Mergers Assessing Loan and Deposit Market Effects of Bank Consolidation Mergers in Initially Perfectly Competitive Banking Markets Mergers in Initially Imperfectly Competitive Banking Markets Evidence on the Consequences of Banking Consolidation Mergers and Market Power Evidence on Efficiency Gains from Banking Consolidation Banking Antitrust in Practice U.S. Bank Merger Guidelines The Relevant Market Merger Screening Evaluating the U.S. Bank Merger Guidelines Is the Official Relevant Banking Market Really Relevant? Do the Formal Guidelines Mis-Measure Market Power? Implications of Endogenous Sunk Fixed Costs Do Banking Consolidations Preclude Entry and Reduce Consumer Welfare? Rethinking Bank Merger Analysis References Bank Competition, Stability, and Regulation Banks as Issuers of Demandable Debt The Diamond-Dybvig Model An Optimal Risk-Sharing Contract The Diamond-Dybvig Intermediation Solution and the Problem ofruns Evaluating the Diamond-Dybvig Analysis Banks as Screeners and Monitors Evidence on Bank Monitoring Activities Evidence from Announcement Effects Evidence from Firm Investment and Bond Yields Evidence from Syndicated Loans and Loan Sales Direct Evidence of Bank Monitoring Activities A Monitoring Model with Heterogeneous Banks Behavior of Monitoring and Nonmonitoring Banks Loan Market Equilibrium and Equilibrium Monitoring The Relationship Between Banking Competition and Risks Perfect Competition and Bank Risks The Excessive Deposit Competition Argument The Competition-Illiquidity Argument The Competition-Asset Risk Argument

8 ix Market Power and Bank Risks: Theory and Evidence Competition and Risk: Theory Bank Size, Competition, and Risk: Evidence Deposit Insurance, Too Big to Fail Doctrine, and the Basel Standards The Distorting Effects of Deposit Insurance The Impact of the Too-Big-to-Fail Doctrine Capital Regulation and the Three Pillars of the Basel Framework References Capital Regulation, Bank Behavior, and Market Structure The Portfolio Management Perspective on Capital Regulation The Bank as a Competitive, Mean-Variance Portfolio Manager Facing Capital-Constrained Asset Portfolios Taking Deposit Insurance Distortions into Account Explaining the Mixed Implications of Portfolio Management Models Asset-Liability Management Under Capital Regulation An Incentive-Based Perspective on Capital Regulation Incentives and Capital Requirements Perfect Competition Models of Bank Capital Regulation Monopolistic Competition Models of Capital Regulation Demandable Debt, Bank Risks, and Capital Regulation Capital Regulation and Fragile Deposits Moral Hazard, Bank Lending and Monitoring, and Capital Regulation Capital Regulation and Bank Heterogeneities Adverse Selection and Capital Regulation Capital Requirements, Heterogeneous Banks, and Industry Structure Capital, Shocks and Procyclicality, and Bank Performance Does Toughening Capital Requirements Boost Bank Capital Ratios and Create Credit Shocks? Procycical Features of a Capital-Regulated Banking Industry Empirical Evidence on Procyclical Effects of Capital Regulation Do Tougher Capital Regulations Yield Better Outcomes? Empirical Evidence References Market Discipline and the Banking Industry The Basel Framework s Market Discipline Pillar The Channels of Market Discipline Motivations of Agents Who Discipline Banks Conditions for Market Signals to Effectively Discipline Banks

9 x Potential Benefits and Costs of Market Discipline in Banking Evaluating Incentives for Information Disclosure Ways to Enhance Bank Market Discipline Industry Structure and Market Discipline Market Discipline in a Basic Banking Model Market Power, Information Disclosure, and Market Discipline Evidence on Market Discipline s Effectiveness Information Content of Market Prices and Bond Yield Spreads Market Discipline Versus Regulation Regulatory Crowding Out of Market Discipline? Additional Evidence on Interactions between Regulation and Market Discipline Evidence on Bank Information Disclosure Evaluating the Market Discipline Pillar vis- a-vis the Other Pillars of the Basel Framework The Limitations of Market Discipline under the Basel Framework Theory Versus Reality Under the Basel Market Discipline Pillar References Regulation and the Structure of the Banking Industry Public Interest Versus Public Choice Perspectives on Bank Regulation Public Interest and the Alleged Need for Bank Regulation Public Choice Motivations for Bank Regulation Applying the Economic Theory of Regulation to the Banking Industry Assessing the Implications of the Economic Theory of Regulation A Generalized Perspective on Evaluating Bank Regulation The Political Economy of Banking Supervision Conducted by Multiple Regulators: Is a Race to the Bottom Unavoidable? Regulatory Preferences and Bank Closure Policies Competition Among Bank Regulators A Theory of Optimal Supervisory Choices of a Single Bank Regulator The Case of Competing Regulators A Supervisory Race to the Bottom? Is Greater Centralization of Regulatory Functions the Answer? The Supervisory Review Process Pillar of the Basel Standards The Supervisory Review Process Pillar: Conceptual Issues Discretion Versus Rules How Tough Should a Supervisory Policy Rule Really Be? Is There Really a Basel Supervisory Review Process? Regulatory Compliance Costs and Industry Structure

10 xi Assessing Banks Costs of Basel Compliance: Economies of Regulation? Rule-of-Thumb Estimates Estimates of Basel Compliance Costs Based on Survey Data Economies-of-Basel Scale Advantages in Basel Compliance? To What Extent Do Basel Compliance Costs Matter? Bank Regulation and Endogenous Fixed Costs Regulatory Compliance Costs: A Missing Component? Regulatory Sunk Fixed Costs References Macroprudential Regulation and International Policy Coordination Systemic Risk Defining Systemic Risk Measuring Systemic Risk Doing Something About Systemic Risk: Macroprudential Policy Implementation of Macroprudential Policy Structuring Macroprudential Regulation Additional Macroprudential Policy Instruments Pitfalls of Macroprudential Regulation International Regulatory Policy Coordination Essentials of the Regulatory Policy Coordination Problem Recent Research on International Coordination of Financial Regulatory Policies Can Impediments to International Bank Regulatory Coordination Be Surmounted? References