IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MISSISSIPPI

Transcription

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MISSISSIPPI No.2016-wc cOA 2016-wc COA MELISSA LANGLEY, WIFE OF JOE (JOEY) LANGLEY, DECEASED, DAKOTA LANGLEY, COLTON LANGLEY, AND HARLEY LANGLEY APPELLANTS vs. VS. E-Filed Document May :41: WC COA Pages: 8 WADDLE TRUCKING, LLC AND DALLAS NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. APPELLEES APPEAL FROM THE MISSISSIPPI WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF JOHNP.Fox JOIINP. Fox LAW FIRM 330 EAST MADISON STREET POST OFFICE Box 167 HOUSTON, MISSISSIPPI MSBNo.5456 TEL. (662) TABLE OF CONTENTS 1

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS... 2 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES e e e <I e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e tee e e e e e. e e e e e e e e e e I a e e II e e e e e 3 ARGUMENT IN REPLY I. The Employer-Carrier fail to address the Commission's use of "evidence" appearing no where in the record, nor do they address whether the Langley family is entitled to the statutory "found dead" presumption of compensability... 4 II. Conclusion... 7 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE... "

3 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Cookv. Home Depot, 81 So.3d 1041, 1048,!13 (Miss. 2012)(en bane)... 6 Denman v. Denman, 134 So.2d 457, 242 Miss. 59 (Miss. 1961)... 4, 5 Denman v. Spain, 135 So.2d 195, 242 Miss. 431 (Miss. 1961)... 4, 5 Statutes, Rules, and Other Authorities: Miss. Code Ann (b). "... '... "... "'... '

4 ARGUMENT IN REPLY I. The Employer-Carrier fail to address the Commission's nse of "evidence" appearing no where in the record, nor do they address whether the Langley family is entitled to the statntory "fonnd dead" presnmption of compensability. Curiously, the employer-carrier in this case, Waddle Trucking, LLC and Dallas National Insurance Company (collectively, "Waddle"), fails to address either of the Langley family's arguments, to wit, 1) that the administrative judge and Commission relied on material that does not exist in the Record, and 2) that the Langleys are to be accorded the "found dead" presumption in cases where the employee is found dead at work but neither witnesses nor other evidence exists to explain whether the death was work-related or not. In this case, no evidence exists to explain whether the advent of the accident caused Joe Langley's heart attack or whether the heart attack led to the wreck. Of course, in an ordinary tort case even an innocent plaintiff who cannot prove who caused his or her injuries cannot recover. There are a pair of Mississippi cases that explain why this is so. Known as the "Denman cases" to generations of law students - Denman v. Denman, 134 So.2d 457, 242 Miss. 59 (Miss. 1961) and Denman v. Spain, 135 So.2d 195, 242 Miss. 431 (Miss. 1961) - they involved a two vehicle collision resulting in several deaths and injury to a minor passenger, Betty Denman. Through a next friend, Ms. Denman sued the only two persons who might 4

5 negligently have caused her injuries: the two drivers in the persons of her grandmother's estate and the estate of the other driver. Innocent of any negligence, Ms. Denman could adduce no evidence as to which driver's negligence - or a combination - produced her injuries. However, this is a different species of legal proceeding. All know without citation the great compromise of workers' compensation: employees gave up the right to sue the employer in tort; employers gave up most defenses. Since the adoption of a workers' compensation statute in the immediate post-war period, courts have held that the Act's "beneficent purpose" should guide its interpretation and that it should be liberally construed, even in doubtful cases, in favor of compensating the injured person. Speaking in dissent recently, Chief Justice Waller recently noted that these fine sentiments cannot be cast aside for anyone's convenience. Without putting any more words in the Chief Justice's mouth, he wrote: Vardaman Dunn, in his oft-cited treatise on workers' compensation law, said, "The humanitarian objectives of compensation laws should not be defeated by over-emphasis on technicalities or by putting form above substance." Dunn, Vardaman S., Mississippi Workmen's Compensation 32 (3d ed. 1990). Long ago, this Court expounded on the beneficent purpose of workers' compensation law: [T]he worker's compensation acts should, must, or will be accorded a broad or liberal construction or interpretation, on the various grounds that the acts are remedial in their nature, and that the acts are remedial in their purposes, objects, or operation, that they constitute commendable legislation, or humane, humanitarian, paternal, or social legislation, that they have a beneficent or 5

6 beneficial purpose, that they are enacted for worthy, public, humane, or humanitarian purposes, that they are grounded injustice, and economically sound, affect the public welfare or interest, establish or are founded on a public policy, and are authorized by the police power.... [T]he acts are not to be given a strict construction or application, nor are they to be given a narrow, strained, forced, harsh, rigid, unrealistic, fanciful, or technical construction or interpretation. L.B. Priester & Son, Inc. v. Bynum's Dependents, 244 Miss. 185, 197, 142 So.2d 30, 31 (Miss.1962) (quoting 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation 20b). The Court repeatedly has affirmed the principle that the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act is to be construed liberally in favor of claimants. See, e.g., ABC Mfg. Co. v. Doyle, 749 So.2d 43, 47 (Miss.1999); Harper v. N. Miss. Med. Ctr., 601 So.2d 395, 398 (Miss.1992); Stuart's, Inc. v. Brown, 543 So.2d 649, 652 (Miss.1989); Big" 2" Engine Rebuilders v. Freeman, 379 So.2d 888, 889 (Miss.1980). Cookv. Home Depot, 81 So.3d 1041, 1048,!13 (Miss. 2012)(en bane). One of the ways in which the Act itself expresses this "liberality" is in the "found dead" cases. Where neither party can prove whether the injury was workrelated or not, Section (b) of the Act provides that "except in the case of an employee found dead in the course of employment," an "untoward event or events shall not be presumed to have arisen out of and in the course of employment...." Here, it cannot be known whether the Joe Langley's heart attack precipitated the accident or the reverse. The only "medical evidence" that exists in the record is the acknowledged fact that Langley suffered from heart disease, was overweight, and a smoker. The post-mortem examination demonstrated that he did not die of injuries sustained in the wreck but does not rule out either possibility of how the accident occurred. And that is because the "medical evidence" cannot do such a 6

7 thing. Only an eye-witness sitting next to Joe Langley would potentially be able to provide any evidence about the sequence of events leading to Langley's truck leaving the highway. Il. Conclusion The Court should vacate or reverse the Commission's decision, and remand for further proceedings with an order directing the Commission to find Joe Langley's death is compensable and award compensation to his survivors. Respectfully submitted, MELISSA LANGLEY, WIFE OF JOE (JOEY) LANGLEY, DECEASED, DAKOTA LANGLEY, COLTON LANGLEY, AND HARLEY LANGLEY By: s/ John P. Fox Attorney to the Langleys 7

8 Mr. John P. Fox Fox Law Firm 330 East Madison Street Post Office Box 167 Houston, Mississippi MSB No Tel. (662) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned counsel of record to the Langleys hereby certifies that on this day the above and foregoing Appellants' Reply Brief was filed electronically with the Clerk of the Court using the MEC system which sent notice of the filing to the following: Mr. Leland S. Smith, III SO CERTIFIED, this the 23rd day of May, s/ John P. Fox MEC Registrant 8