BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD OF THE ILLINOIS ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION RESPONDENT STEPHEN THOMAS FIEWEGER'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

Transcription

1 BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD OF THE ILLINOIS ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION In the Matter of: STEPHEN THOMAS FIEWEGER, Attorney-Respondent, Commission No.: 2015PR00111 No FILED-January 7, 2016 RESPONDENT STEPHEN THOMAS FIEWEGER'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT Now comes Respondent, Stephen Thomas Fieweger ("Respondent"), by Elizabeth A. Granoff admits that he was licensed to practice law in Illinois on November 5, 1987, but denies the conclusory portions of the remaining allegations of the prefatory paragraph and answers as follows: Allegations common to all counts 1. Between 1989 and October 2014, Respondent was an associate and then a partner in the law firm Katz Nowinski P.C, f/k/a Katz, Huntoon and Fieweger, P.C. ("Katz Nowinski") based in Moline, Illinois. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations of Paragraph One and states that between November 1987 and October 2014 Respondent was a lawyer with the firm and its predecessor firm. 2. Respondent was licensed to practice law in the State of Iowa as well as Illinois. FILED JAN ATTY REG &DISC COMM CHICAGO

2 COUNT I (Conversion ofrobertswanson's settlementfunds) 3. On March 22, 2011, Respondent agreed on behalf of Katz Nowinski to represent Robert E. Swanson ("Swanson") in a claim for damages against the Scott County Family YMCA ("YMCA") in Davenport, Iowa, arising from injuries that Swanson sustained when he slipped and fell on a wet floor in a YMCA building. Respondent and Swanson agreed that Respondent's fee would be contingent upon recovery in the amount of one-third of any recovery, and they executed a written fee agreement reflecting those terms. 4. On September 30, 2011, Respondent filed a lawsuit for Swanson in the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Iowa, titled Robert E. Swanson v. Scott County Family YMCA, a not-for-profit corporation, case number LACE In November 2013, Swanson and the YMCA agreed to a settlement of Swanson's claims wherein the YMCA agreed to pay Swanson a total amountof $60, Respondent and Swanson agreed that the settlement proceeds of $60,000 would be disbursed as follows: $25,000 to Swanson; $2, to Respondent and Katz Nowinski for reimbursement of costs advanced; $8, to Respondent and Katz Nowinski for attorney fees; and $23, to be held in a Katz Nowinski client trust account for the satisfaction ofa lien for that amount that Medicare perfected against the settlement proceeds. 7. The agreed disbursements described above left an unpaid balance of $11, toward Respondent's one-third fee of$20,000 ($20,000 - $8, = $11,635.95). Respondent

3 and Swanson agreed that the balance of Respondent's fee only would be paid on the condition that Medicare agreed to reduce its lien, and it would be paid from the balance that remained of the $23, after the satisfaction of the lien. Respondent and Swanson agreed that if Medicare did not reduce its lien, Respondent would receive no further legal fee. Respondent and Swanson agreed that if Medicare reduced its lien by an amount less than $11,635.95, Respondent would waive his fee by the amount of the shortfall. Respondent and Swanson agreed that if Medicare reduced its lien by more than $11,635.95, the surplus after the completion of Respondent's fee amount would be disbursed to Swanson. ANSWER: Respondent denies the first sentence of paragraph 7. Respondent denies the second sentence of paragraph 7. Respondent denies the third sentence of paragraph 7. Respondent admits the fourth sentence of paragraph 7, but states that the fee was not Respondent's but rather the fee of the law firm of Katz Nowinski. 8. On November 18, 2013, Swanson executed a written settlement and release of his claims against the YMCA, and Respondent received check number from Redwoods Group, the YMCA's insurance carrier, payable Katz Nowinski as attorneys for Swanson, in the amount of $60,000, pursuant to the settlement terms. At Respondent's direction, Katz Nowinski bookkeeper Barb Knobloch ("Knobloch") deposited check number into the Katz Nowinski client trust account bearing an account number ending in 7541 ("account number 7541") at Quad City Bank and Trust. Account number 7541 was used by Respondent and Katz Nowinski as a depository of funds belonging to clients or third parties and, potentially, to Respondent or the law firm. ANSWER: Admits the first sentence of paragraph 8. Respondent admits that account number 7541 was used to deposit funds with client's or third parties, and denies

4 that the funds potentially belonged to the Respondent but admits that the funds belonged to the law firm. prejudice. 9. On November 20, 2013, case number LACE was dismissed with 10. On November 22, 2013, at Respondent's direction, Knobloch issued check number 2182 drawn on account number 7541 and made payable to Swanson in the amount of $25,000, pursuant to the agreement between Respondent and Swanson described in paragraphs six and seven, above. Swanson received and negotiated the check shortly afterward. 11. On November 30, 2013, at Respondent's direction, Knobloch, issued check number 2183 drawn on account number 7541 and made payable to KatzNowinski in the amount of $11, for its expenses and partial attorney fees, pursuant to the agreement between Respondent and Swanson described in paragraphs six and seven, above ($2, $8, = $11,006.77). 12. Following the issuance of check numbers 2182 and 2183 as described above, Respondent held $23, of Swanson's settlement funds in trust account number 7541 pending the satisfaction of the lien for that amount asserted by Medicare, pursuant to the agreement between Respondent and Swanson described in paragraphs six and seven, above.

5 13. Before February 2015, Medicare did not, at any time, agree to reduce its lien. ANSWER: Respondent neither admits nor denies for lack of information since Respondent was no longer employed as a lawyer at Katz Huntoon & Fieweger, P.C. on October 15, Respondent affirmatively states that in November 2013 Respondent sent a letter to Medicare's authorized agent requesting that Medicare accept a reduction of its lien from $23, to $12,357.28, a reduction of $11,635.95, the amount of fees due under the written contingent fee agreement with Swanson. 14. Before February 2015, Swanson did not, at any time, authorize Respondent or Katz Nowinski to use any portion of his remaining $23, in the Katz Nowinski trust account for attorney fees, Respondent's or Respondent's law firm's business purposes, or any purpose. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 14 and demands strict 15. On December 30, 2013, Respondent directed Knobloch to immediately take $11,635 from Swanson's trust funds, so as to complete the payment of his one-third fee ($11,635 + $8, = $19,999.05). Pursuant to Respondent's direction, on December 31, 2013, Knobloch issued check number 2193 drawn on account number 7541 and made payable to Katz Nowinski in the amount of $11,635. Knobloch deposited the check into the Katz Nowinski general business account. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 15 and demands strict

6 16. When Respondent directed Knobloch to take Swanson's funds as attorney fees on December 30, 2013, Respondent did not have authority to do so. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 16 and demands strict 17. When Respondent directed Knobloch to take Swanson's funds as attorney fees on December 30, 2013, Respondent knew that he did not have authority to do so. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 17 and demands strict proofthereof. 18. The Katz Nowinski general business account was used by Respondent and Katz Nowinski as a repository for their own funds including earned attorney fees and funds received as reimbursements for advanced expenses, and it was used to pay the law firm's general business expenses including attorneys' and employees' compensation. Following the deposit of check number 2193 into the general business account, the funds were expended for the law firm's general business purposes. 19. Katz Nowinski's system for determining a partner's annual compensation included consideration of the amount of attorney fees attributable to that partner which the firm received in the preceding calendar year. By transferring Swanson's $11,635 to the firm as earned fees by December 31, 2013, Respondent increased the total of earned fees that were attributed to him for Respondent thereby influenced, or he attempted to influence, the compensation that the firm would award him in ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 19 and demands strict

7 20. Respondent's conduct, described above, constituted conversion of $11,635 of Swanson's settlement funds. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 20 and demands strict 21. In October 2014, Respondent left Katz Nowinski and opened his own law office. Swanson's file remained with Katz Nowinski. 22. In January and February, 2015, Katz Nowinski attorney John F. Doak ("Doak") reviewed Swanson's file and related trust account records. Doak discovered that Medicare had asserted a lien for $23, against Swanson's settlement proceeds, that $23, of the settlement proceeds had been left in trust in November 2013 for the purpose ofresolving the lien, that the lien had never been resolved or reduced, and that Respondent had wrongly directed the law firm to take $11,635 of those funds in December 2013, all as set forth above. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 22 and demands strict 23. On or about February 13, 2015, Medicare offered to accept $15, in satisfaction ofits lien. Swanson agreed to the offer. ANSWER: Respondent neither admits nor denies for lack of information. 24. On February 16, 2015, Doak directed the law firm to deposit $11,635 into trust account number 7541 in replacement of the funds that Respondent had caused to be taken, thereby restoring the balance ofswanson's funds in trust to $23, ANSWER: Respondent neither admits nor denies for lack of information.

8 25. On February 19, 2015, Katz Nowinski issued check number 2320 drawn on account number 7541 and made payable to Medicare in the amount of $15, and mailed it to Medicare's representative, pursuant to the above-described settlement of the lien. ANSWER: Respondent neitheradmits nor denies for lack ofinformation. 26. On February 27, 2015, at Doak's direction, the law firm refunded to Swanson the full remaining balance of his funds, inthe amount of$8,257.62, and waived any further legal fee. ANSWER: Respondent neither admits nor denies for lack of information. By further answer Respondent states that if Katz Nowinski decided to waive the $8, fee that it was entitled to from Swanson, it was a business decision over which Respondent had no discretion or decision making authority as Respondent was no longer a partner at the law firm. 27. By reason of the conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct: a. failing to hold $11,635 of Swanson's settlement funds, which was property of a client or third person that was in Respondent's possession in connection with a representation, separate from Respondent's and Respondent's law firm's own property, by conduct including conversion of the funds by removing the funds from trust and using them for Respondent's and his law firm's own purposes as an alleged earned fee without Swanson's authority, in violation of Rule 1.15(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010); and b. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, by conduct including conversion of $11,635 of Swanson's settlement funds by removing the funds from trust and using them for Respondent's and his law firm's own purposes as an alleged earned fee without Swanson's authority, in violation ofrule 8.4(c) ofthe Illinois Rules ofprofessional Conduct (2010). ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 27 and demands strict

9 By way ofaffirmative matter Respondent states as follows: 1. That upon settlement of the Swanson matter, under the written one-third contingent fee agreement, Katz Nowinski had earned an attorney fee of $20, That the transferred funds of $11, were the fees earned by Katz Nowinski upon settlement in November That Respondent in the past had Medicare the reductions of its liens in past personal injury claims that he had resolved and had never had Medicare reject his proposed reduction amount in the past. 4. That the proposed reduction in Swanson's case allowed Robert Swanson to collect a settlement recovery of $20,000.00, rather than $13, if your Respondent had paid the $23, That on May 22, 2015 Katz Nowinski, P.C. and Respondent entered into a written settlement agreement, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1, which resolved any claims that Katz Nowinski had regarding the Swanson matter. COUNT II (Conversion ofken McCool's security retainer) 28. On March 1, 2012, Respondent agreed on behalf of Katz Nowinski to represent Ken McCool ("McCool") and his son, Austin McCool, to research the viability of a legal action for Austin on the basis of defamation of character as a result of derogatory internet postings about Austin. Respondent and McCool agreed that McCool would pay Respondent a $1,000 security retainer and that Respondent would bill against the retainer at a rate of $225 per hour. On March 7, 2012, McCool paid Respondent the $1,000 security retainer. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in sentence 1 as Respondent soley represented Austin McCool and never represented Ken McCool. Respondent denies the allegations in sentence 2 stating that this was a flat fee agreement for the legal performed. Respondent admits the allegations in sentence 3.

10 29. McCool's security retainer constituted funds to secure payment of legal fees to be withdrawn by Respondent only as fees were earned and expenses incurred. As such, those funds remained the property of McCool until earned, and were required to be deposited and held in one or more separate and identifiable interest- or dividend-bearing client trust accounts, pursuant to Rule 1.15 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, and maintained therein until earned by Respondent. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 29 and demands strict proofthereof. Respondent affirmatively states that this was a flat fee agreement. 30. On March 7, 2012, Respondent, or a Katz Nowinski employee acting at his direction, deposited McCool's security retainer into the Katz Nowinski client trust account bearing an account number ending in the four digits 7525 ("account number 7525") at Quad City Bank and Trust. Account number 7525 was used by Respondent and Katz Nowinski as a depository of funds belonging to clients or third parties and, potentially, to Respondent or the law firm. 31. Between March 1 and March 30, 2012, Respondent expended 2.9 hours on McCool's matter. ANSWER: Admitted with respect to client Austin McCool. Denies as to Ken McCool. 32. On March 30, 2012, Respondent approved and directed the mailing of an itemized billing invoice to McCool. The invoice reflected that as of that date, Respondent had earned $ (2.9 hours x $225) and stated that he would draw that amount from McCool's security retainer, and that a balance of$ ofthe retainer would remain in trust for McCool. 10

11 ANSWER: Admitted allegations in sentence 1, and denies the remaining allegations and contends that the invoice speaks for itself. 33. Subsequently, at Respondent's direction, Katz Nowinski withdrew $ of McCool's retainer funds from trust account number 7525 as earned fees for Respondent's services. Thereafter, a balance of $ ofmccool's funds remained in the account. ANSWER: Admits the allegations in sentence 1 and denies the remaining allegations due to the fact that the payment was for a flat fee. 34. McCool did not, at any time, authorize Respondent to use, prior to earning it, any portion of his remaining $ in the Katz Nowinski trust account for attorney fees or for Respondent's or Respondent's law firm's business purposes. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 34 and demands strict 35. After March 30, 2012, Respondent expended no further time and incurred no further expenses inrelation to McCool's matter beyond the time and expenses listed inhis March 30 invoice. Respondent earned no further fees in the matter. ANSWER: Admits the allegations in sentence 1, and denies the remaining allegations as this was a flat fee. 36. On January 31, 2014, Respondent informed Barb Knobloch ("Knobloch"), who was the bookkeeper for Katz Nowinski, that McCool's funds on deposit were part ofa "flat fee" that McCool had paid, and he directed her to apply McCool's trust account balance to attorney fees. Pursuant to Respondent's direction, Knobloch transferred the remaining $ of McCool's funds from account number 7525 into the Katz Nowinski general business account. 11

12 ANSWER: Admits with respect to client Austin McCool. Denies remaining allegations as to Ken McCool. 37. The Katz Nowinski general business account was used by Respondent and Katz Nowinski as a repository for their own funds including earned attorney fees and funds received as reimbursements for advanced expenses, and it was used to pay the law firm's general business expenses including attorneys' and employees' compensation. Following the transfer of McCool's funds into the general business account, the funds were expended for the law firm's general business purposes. 38. Katz Nowinski's system for determining a partner's annual compensation included consideration of the amount of attorney fees attributable to that partner which the firm received in the preceding calendar year. By transferring McCool's $ to the firm as an earned fee, Respondent increased the total of earned fees that were attributed to him for Respondent thereby influenced, or he attempted to influence, the compensation that the firm would award him in ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 38 and demands strict 39. Respondent's conduct, described above, constituted conversion of funds received in connectionwith his representation of the McCool's. proofthereof. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 39 and demands strict 12

13 40. Respondent's representation to Knobloch that McCool's funds in account number 7525 were part of a flat fee was false. The funds were the unearned portion of a $1,000 security retainerthat McCool had given to Respondent in March 2012, and, as such, belonged to McCool. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 40 and demands strict 41. At the time that Respondent represented to Knobloch that McCool's funds in account number 7525 were part of a flat fee, Respondent knew that his representation was false. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 41 and demands strict 42. By reason of the conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct: a. failing to hold $ of McCool's security retainer payment, which was property of a client or third person that was in Respondent's possession in connection with a representation, separate from Respondent's law firm's own property, by conduct including conversion of the funds by directing the removal the funds from trust and using them for Respondent's and his law firm's own purposes as an alleged flat fee without McCool's authority, in violation of Rule 1.15(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010); b. withdrawing funds received to secure payment of legal fees from a client funds account, when such funds have not yet been earned, and the client has not yet authorized their withdrawal, by conduct including conversion of McCool's funds for Respondent's own purposes, in violation of Rule 1.15(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010); and 13

14 c. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, by conduct including converting an unearned portion of McCool's security retainer to Respondent's and Respondent's law firm's own uses, without authorization, and by falsely representing that the funds were part of a flat fee, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules ofprofessional Conduct (2010). strict ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 42 and demands By way offurther answer Respondent states as follows: 1. When Katz Nowinski notified the ARDC ofthe alleged conversion, it had failed to communicate with the Respondent regarding the allegation as the Respondent no longer worked at the firm and the parties were involved in a legal dispute. 2. Upon learning of the allegation, in March 2015 Respondent paid to Katz Nowinski the sum of $ for reimbursementof the amounts that Katz Nowinski paid back to Ken McCool. COUNT III (False letters andforgeries ofelizabeth George's signature) 43. In 2012, Respondent and Stacie L. Ballard ("Stacie") began a personal relationship. Stacie had two minor children from a previous marriage to Jason A. Ballard ("Jason"). ANSWER: Admits in September 2012 Respondent began a personal relationship. 44. Between 2012 and 2014, Stacie received child support from Jason in the amount of 28% of Jason's net income pursuant to the terms of a post-decree order entered on June 22, 2012, in their dissolution case (number 08 D 576 in the Circuit Court for Rock Island County, Illinois, titled In re Stacie L. Ballard, Petitioner, and Jason A. Ballard, Respondent). Jason was employed by Stuller, Inc. ("Stuller"). Jason paid the child support obligation by means ofwage 14

15 deductions that Stuller remitted to the Illinois State Disbursement Unit pursuant to a wage deduction order. 45. In April 2014, Stacie did not receive two consecutive child support payments. In response, on April 28, 2014, Respondent prepared a subpoena to Stuller captioned under case number 08 D 576, and a cover letter addressed to Stuller using the letterhead and name of attorney Elizabeth A. George ("George"), who was a first-year associate employed by Katz Nowinski. The subpoena and letter requested that Stuller produce relevant payroll information about Jason. Respondent asked George to sign the documents, George complied, and Respondent caused the subpoena and letter to be delivered to Stuller. 46. Subsequently, Respondent learned that Stuller did not comply with the subpoena, but, instead, requested proof ofa current child support order. Respondent and Stacie also learned that Jason's-employment with Stuller would soon terminate and Jason would receive a severance payment from the company. Respondent and Stacie were unaware of the amount of the severance payment and were concerned that Stuller might not deduct and remit child support from the payment. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in sentence 1. Respondent denies that Respondent learned in April 2014 that Jason's employment was terminated. Respondent admits that Respondent was inquiring whether Stuller would pay severance pay. 47. On August 5, 2014, Respondent prepared another letter addressed to Stuller using George's letterhead and name. In the letter, George (purportedly) stated that she understood that Jason was to receive a severance package and that Stuller should deduct and remit 28% ofthe net 15

16 severance pay for child support. The letter referred to an enclosed copy of the June 2012 order for child support in case number 08 D 576. At the end of the letter, Respondent signed "Elizabeth George" in a signature space above George's typed name. The letter appeared to be authored and signed by George. ANSWER: Respondent admits and affirmatively states that Respondent informed Elizabeth George of this letter, informed her of its purpose and she did not object to its transmittal. 48. When he prepared the above-described letter, Respondent knew and intended that it appeared to be authored and signed by George. ANSWER: Respondent Admits, and affirmatively states that Respondent informed Ms. George of this letter. 49. On August 5, 2014, Respondent, or a person acting upon Respondent's direction, faxed the above-described signed letter to Stuller, along with the June 2012 child support order. 50. At the time that Respondent sent the above-described letter, George had not reviewed or authorized it. At no time did George authorize the letter, and at no time did Respondent ask her to review or authorize it. At no time did Respondent ask George for permission to sign her name, and at no time did George give Respondent such permission. Respondent did not inform George ofthe letter, and George had no knowledge ofit until August 15, 2014, or later, as set forth below. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 50 and demands strict 16

17 51. Respondent's above-described letter to Stuller was false because, in fact, it was not written, authorized or signed by George. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 51 and demands strict Respondent affirmatively states that the content of the letter were true and correct, and the information contained therein was accurate. 52. At the time that Respondent sent the above-descried letter to Stuller, Respondent knew that it was false. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 52 and demands strict 53. Subsequently, Stuller made no response to the above-described letter. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 53 and demands strict 54. On August 15, 2014, Respondent prepared a third letter addressed to Stuller using George's letterhead and name. In the letter, George (purportedly) asked to be informed of whether Jason received a severance payment, the amount of the payment, and whether the company deducted and remitted 28%) ofthe net sum in accordance with the child support order. At the end of the letter, Respondent signed "Elizabeth George" in the signature space above George's typed name. The letter appeared to beauthored and signed by George. 55. When he prepared the above-described letter, Respondent knew and intended that the letter appeared to be authored and signed by George. 17

18 56. On August 15, 2014, at approximately 11:31 a.m., Respondent, or a person acting upon Respondent's direction, faxed the above-described signed letter to Stuller. 57. At the time that Respondent sent the above-described letter, George had not reviewed or authorized it. At no time did George authorize the letter, and at no time did Respondent ask her to review or authorize it. At no time did Respondent ask George for permission to sign her name, and at no time did George give Respondent such permission. Respondent did not inform George of theletter, and George had no knowledge of it until later, as set forth below. ANSWER: Admits that with respect to the August 15, 2014 letter Respondent had not shown Ms. George the letter. 58. Respondent's above-described letter to Stuller was false because, in fact, it was not written, authorized or signed by George. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 58 and demands strict 59. At the time that Respondent sent the above-descried letter to Stuller, Respondent knew that it was false. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 59 and demands strict Respondent affirmatively states that the contents of the letter were true and accurate. 60. On August 15, 2014, at approximately 1:52 p.m., Stuller employee Nancy R. Comeaux ("Comeaux") sent an to George that responded to her purported fax sent earlier 18

19 that day. In the , Comeaux told George that Stuller had made a severance payment to Jason from which the company had deducted and would remit 28% for child support. 61. Following her receipt of Comeaux's , George learned for the first time that Respondent had used her identity in the letters to Stulleron August 5 and August 15, 2014, as set forth in the paragraphs above. ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 61 and demands strict 62. By reason of the conduct described above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct: a. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, by conduct including creating and sending letters on August 5 and August 15, 2014, that falsely purported to be written, authorized and signed by Elizabeth George, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules ofprofessional Conduct (2010). ANSWER: Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 62 and demands strict By way of affirmative matter Respondent states as follows: 1. That in July 2014, Nancy Comeaux telephoned the Respondent, informed him that Stuller had terminated Jason and asked Respondent what to do with the income withholding order. She also indicated that Jason may be paid a severance pay and inquired whether the income withholding order applied to severance pay. 2. Respondent informed Ms. Comeaux that the income withholding order should be mailed to him as an attorney for the child support recipient and that Stuller should notify Respondent in writing that Jason was no longer employed by Stuller. He also asked Ms. Comeaux to advise him or Ms. George whether in fact severance pay was going to be made to Jason, and if so to withhold 28 percent ofthe net amount and pay it to the State Disbursement Unit. 19

20 3. That Jason's last day of employment at Stuller was on or before July 26, That the August 5, 2014 and August 14, 2014 letters were sent to ensure compliance with the existing child support order, and with no intent to defraud its recipiant, Stuller. prejudice. WHEREFORE, Respondent requests that Counts I through III be dismissed with Respectfully submitted, Elizabeth A. Granoff 617 W.Fulton Chicago, IL Elizabethagranoff@gmail.com Copy to: Gary S. Rapaport Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission 3161 West White Oaks Drive, Suite 301 Springfield, Illinois Telephone: (217) MAINLIB #663177vlNow 20