APPEARANCES: Leonard R. Jordan, Jr. Esquire For Petitioner. Bradley T. Farrar, Esquire For Respondent

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1 STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DIVISION L.J. Investments, Petitioner, vs. Richland County Assessor, Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )) FINAL ORDER AND DECISION DOCKET NO. 99-ALJ CC APPEARANCES: Leonard R. Jordan, Jr. Esquire For Petitioner Bradley T. Farrar, Esquire For Respondent STATEMENT OF THE CASE This matter comes before me pursuant to S.C. Code Ann (Supp. 1998). Petitioner L.J. Investments (Taxpayer) seeks a contested case hearing against the Richland County Assessor (Assessor) concerning a 1999 property tax appraisal and assessment. The property is located at 1406 Arborwood Condominiums (Tax Map No. R ). The pivotal issue is whether the Taxpayer's Notice of Objection (Notice) to the 1999 property tax assessment was timely. Under section (A)(3) and Rule 6(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (SCRCP), the Taxpayer's Notice of Objection was timely, and, consequently, the Assessor should have addressed the issues contained therein. By failing to do so, the Assessor did not allow the Taxpayer to exhaust all prehearing remedies with respect to those issues. See S.C. Code Ann Accordingly, this matter is remanded to the Assessor.FINDINGS OF FACT Having carefully considered all testimony, exhibits, and arguments presented at the hearing of this case, and taking into account the credibility and accuracy of the evidence, I make the following findings of fact by a preponderance of the evidence. On August 20, 1999, the Richland County Board of Assessment Appeals issued a written decision denying as untimely the Taxpayer's Notice of Objection for the assessment of its property located at 1406 Arborwood Condominiums, otherwise identified as Tax Map Number R The Taxpayer appealed the Board's decision to this tribunal on September 15, 1999 and was granted a de novo contested case hearing on December 15, The Assessor appraised the subject property at a market value of $43,600 and mailed the Notice Of Classification, Appraisal And Assessment (Assessor's Notice) to the Taxpayer on January 29, 1999 in a batch-mailing.(1) The Assessor's Notice expressly stated that the "Date of Notice" of the property tax assessment was "02/01/99." The Notice further stated that the deadline by which the Taxpayer was to file any written objection concerning the Notice was as follows: IF YOU DISAGREE WITH THE APPRAISAL AND ASSESSMENT, YOU MUST FILE WRITTEN OBJECTION WITH THE ASSESSOR WITHIN 30 DAYS OR BEFORE 03/03/99.

2 (emphasis added). The Taxpayer hand-delivered its Notice of Objection to the Assessor's office on March 3, The Taxpayer was unaware of the actual mailing date of the Assessor's Notice until sometime after submitting the Notice of Objection to the Assessor's office. The Assessor contends that the Taxpayer's Notice was untimely because it was not filed before March 3, but rather was filed on that date. Conversely, the Taxpayer argues that its Notice of Objection was timely filed within 30 days of the Date of Notice, which was the only fixed point in time referenced in the Assessor's Notice from which to measure the expiration of the 30-day period. DISCUSSION In adjudicating this matter, the first point which must be noted is that the Assessor has a statutory obligation to advise a taxpayer of the appeal procedure in the property tax assessment notice. S.C. Code Ann (A)(1)(h) (Supp. 1998). It is further implicit that a taxpayer should be expected to rely on the accuracy of information so provided as to the appeal procedure. Such an interpretation is consistent with the intent of the General Assembly "to provide the people of this State with a straightforward procedure to determine any disputed revenue liability. The South Carolina Revenue Procedures Act must be interpreted and construed in accordance with, and in furtherance of, that intent." S.C. Code Ann (Supp. 1998). In this case, the Richland County Assessor's Office sent to Taxpayer the Assesssor's Notice concerning property located at 1406 Arborwood Condominium (Tax Map No. R ). The Assessor's Notice expressly stated that the "Date of Notice" of the property tax assessment was "02/01/99." The Assessor's Notice further stated that the deadline by which the Taxpayer was to file any written objection concerning the Notice was as follows: IF YOU DISAGREE WITH THE APPRAISAL AND ASSESSMENT, YOU MUST FILE WRITTEN OBJECTION WITH THE ASSESSOR WITHIN 30 DAYS OR BEFORE 03/03/99. Taxpayer delivered its written objection to the Richland County Assessor's Office on March 3, The above quoted language is contradictory, or at best ambiguous, where the expiration of the 30 days does not occur "before March 3." In such a case, it would be ambiguous whether the taxpayer would be required to submit such Notice "before March 3" or, in the alternative, whether the taxpayer would be allowed additional time as long as the Notice was submitted "within 30 days." Thus, under these circumstances, there are competing options available to the Taxpayer. In order to determine when the 30-day period expired, the appropriate fixed point in time from which to measure or compute the 30-day period must first be ascertained. Section (A)(3) provides the time in which a taxpayer must

3 file a written objection to a property tax assessment. See S.C. Code Ann (A)(3) (Supp. 1998). Section (A)(3) states that: In years when there is a notice of property tax assessment, the property taxpayer must, within thirty days after the assessor mails the property tax assessment notice, give the assessor written notice of objection to one or more of the following: the fair market value, the special use value, the assessment ratio, and the property tax assessment. S.C. Code Ann (3) (emphasis added). To compute the thirty-day period, Rule 6(a) of the SCRCP provides as follows: In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday or a State or Federal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday, nor such holiday.... Rule 6(a), SCRCP (emphasis added). Applying section (A)(3) and Rule 6(a) together, it appears that the Taxpayer was required to file its Notice of Objection within 30 days of January 29 (the mailing date). See S.C. Code Ann (A)(3); Rule 6(a), SCRCP. Section , however, intimates a presumption that a taxpayer is apprised of the "mailing date" so as to comply with the 30-day time period. One might argue that the U.S. postmark on the envelope containing the Assessor's Notice would inform the Taxpayer of the mailing date. The question then arises: Is this the "straightforward approach" the General Assembly intended? This tribunal does not believe so. While a postmark is credible evidence of a mailing date where timely service by mail is at issue, it is not dispositive of the issue. See Green v. Green, 320 S.C. 347, 465 S.E.2d 130 (Ct. App. 1995). It is conceivable that a postmark may not reflect the date it was actually deposited into a U.S. mail receptacle, as one would have to otherwise assume the infallibility of the U.S. Postal Service. Id. Thus, the postmark alone is not determinative in this case. Ostensibly, the most informative and compelling notice to a taxpayer of the mailing date would be expressly and clearly contained within the "four corners" of the Assessor's Notice. See S.C. Code Ann & (A)(3). For example, case law from other jurisdictions consistently states that notice must "give the necessary information, and must apprise the person whose rights are to be affected of what is required of him... a notice must be clear, definite, and explicit, and not ambiguous. The notice is not clear unless its meaning can be comprehended without explanation." Frantz Equipment Co. v. Anderson, 37 N.J. 420, 430, 181 A.2d 499,

4 505 (1962) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see Farmers Bank of State of Delaware v. Odom, 246 A.2d 85 (Del. Super. Ct. 1968) (same); see also Kansas and Missouri Railway and Terminal Co. v. Beal, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1362, 1369 (D. Kan. 1972) (notice must be adequate and effective); Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 P.2d 794, 797 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987) (notice must afford interested persons opportunity to present objections). Notice is ambiguous if it misleads the person being notified. E.g., Dep't of Natural Resources of State of Washington v. Marr, 54 Wash.App. 589, , 774 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Ct. App. 1989). In providing notice, administrative agencies, in particular, should "observe the basic rules of fairness as to parties appearing before them." Ottenheimer Publishers, Inc. v. Employment Security Administration, 275 Md. 514, 519, 340 A.2d 701, 704 (Ct. App. 1975). Moreover, "[i]f there is any ambiguity in the terms of a notice, rendering its meaning doubtful, the doubt must be resolved against the person giving the notice." 66 C.J.S. Notice 33 (1998). Under the facts of this case, and in light of the intent of the General Assembly that the South Carolina Revenue Procedures Act be interpreted to further a straightforward approach for citizens of the State to determine disputed revenue liability, the date from which the 30-day period must be calculated should be gleaned from information provided by the Assessor to the Taxpayer. In this case, the Assessor's Notice should be the source of this information. The Assessor's Notice expressly stated that the "Date of Notice" was February 1. Based on the Assessor's Notice, the only date of which the Taxpayer had "clear, definite, and explicit" notice for which to compute the 30-day period was February 1.(2) Accordingly, the computation of the 30 days must begin with February 2 because February 1 was the "the day of the act [or] event... after which the designated period of time begins to run [and] is not included." Rule 6(a), SCRCP; see Lindsey v. S.C. Tax Comm'n., 323 S.C. 57, 448 S.E.2d 577 (Ct. App. 1994). Thus, the thirtieth day is March 3. Importantly, the "last day of the period so computed is to be included" as a day in which the Taxpayer may respond. Rule 6(a); SCRCP; see Creech v. N.D.T. Industries, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 165, 171 (D.S.C. 1993). Therefore, the Taxpayer was entitled to file its written objection up to and including March 3. Since the Taxpayer's Notice of Objection was delivered by hand to the Assessor on March 3, the Taxpayer's Notice of Objection was timely. Accordingly, the Assessor must allow the Taxpayer to pursue its prehearing remedies. ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case be REMANDED to the Richland County Assessor's Office to consider the issues raised in the Taxpayer's Notice of Objection for the 1999 tax year for the property located at 1406 Arborwood Condominiums (Tax Map No. R ). AND IT IS SO ORDERED. JOHN D. GEATHERS Administrative Law Judge

5 January 12, 2000 Columbia, South Carolina 1. While the Assessor stated in a subsequent letter of explanation to Taxpayer, dated March 22, 1999, that the Assessor's Notice was mailed on February 1, 1999, the more credible evidence indicates that it was actually mailed on January 29, See Respondent's Exhibit 1 (document indicating charges for mass-mailing on January 29). 2. This tribunal appreciates that it may be onerous for the Assessor to put the actual mailing date on a Notice when there is a mass mailing of these Notices over several days. Nonetheless, the Assessor's Notice should not be ambiguous so as to mislead or prejudice a taxpayer. Certainly, the instructions on the Assessor's Notice can be rewritten with more "straightforeward" procedures for a taxpayer to follow.