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1 ROSHANLAL S. JAIN & ORS. (AOP) vs. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOMETAX & ANR. HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT D.A. Mehta & Bankim N. Mehta, JJ. Special Civil Appln. No of rd September, 2008 (2008) 220 CTR (Guj) 38 : (2009) 309 ITR 174 : (2009) 176 TAXMAN 95 : (2008) 14 DTR (Guj) 91 D.A. Mehta, J. : Section 140A, 234A, 234B, Art. 14, Asst. Year , Decision in favour of Revenue Counsel appeared : J.P. Shah, for the Petitioners : Manish R. Bhatt & Ketan A. Dave, for the Respondents JUDGMENT The petitioner, an AOP, has preferred this petition challenging : (i) the calculation of interest and the notice of demand for the three assessment years under consideration as bad in law to the extent there is an overcharging of interest; (ii) s. 234A of the IT Act, 1961 (the Act) is ultra vires to the extent the said section provides for charging of interest even after the payment of tax; (iii) ss. 234A and 234B of the Act are ultra vires to the extent both the provisions charge interest for the same period making the petitioner liable to 48 per cent. Assessment years in question are , and , the respective accounting periods being financial years ended on 31st March, 1991, 31st March, 1992 and 31st March, 1993 respectively. Respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as 'the respondent authority') is the AO having jurisdiction over the petitioner assessee. Assessment orders for the three years in question were passed by the AO and while calculating total amount payable by the petitioner assessee interest under ss. 234A, 234B and 234C of the Act was charged by the respondent authority. Pursuant to assessments framed on 14th March, 1995 for the three years under consideration notices of demand at Exhs. E1, E2, and E3 were issued on 28th March, It is these notices of demand which are under challenge on merits apart from the challenge to constitutional validity of provisions of ss. 234A and 234B of the Act. The prayers made in the petition read as under : "12. In the premises aforesaid, the petitioner prays that : this Hon'ble Court be pleased to call for the records of the proceedings, look into them and issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the demand notices at Exhs. E1, E2 and E3; this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondent not to collect the interest as charged in the above demand notices; this Hon'ble Court be pleased to declare that s. 234A is ultra vires to the extent it provides for charging of interest even after the payment of taxes and that both ss. 234A and 234B are ultra vires to the extent both of them charge interest for the same period making the assessee liable to 48 per cent rate of interest for that period; this Hon'ble Court be pleased to instruct the Department to adjust payments made before filing the return first against income-tax payable and not against the interest as has been done by the Department while calculating the interest payable under s. 234B of the Act; that pending the hearing and final disposal of this /about.html Page 1 of 8 /contact.html

2 application this Hon'ble Court be pleased to ask respondent No. 1 to maintain status quo in the matter of recovery of interest calculated and demanded in the demand notices at Exhs. E1, E2 and E3; that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to grant any further or other relief as this Hon'ble Court deems just and proper in the circumstances of the case; 7. that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to allow this petition with costs against the respondent." 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the calculation of interest and notices of demand are bad in law to the extent there is overcharging of interest in each of the years under consideration which is to the extent of following amounts : In regard to the challenge raised, the petitioner has summarised difference of opinion between the petitioner and the respondent in the following words : "(i) Regarding interest under s. 234A, according to the petitioner interest can be charged on tax payable from the due date of filing of the return of income to the date of payment of tax but according to the Department the interest is payable not upto the date of paying off of the tax but even thereafter till the date of filing of the return of income. (ii) In respect of charging of interest under s. 234B, the Department has charged the interest on interest whereas the petitioner contends to the contrary. (iii) According to the Department for some part of common period 48 per cent interest is payable under the Act which means interest becomes chargeable for some part of the period both under s. 234A and under s. 234B whereas according to the petitioner, the interest is not to be charged for any part of the period under both these sections simultaneously, which means no part of the dues will suffer more than 24 per cent of interest." In relation to the challenge to constitutional validity of the two sections the submission, in the alternative, is that in the event the interpretation placed by the petitioner on the provisions of ss. 234A and 234B of the Act is not accepted, then the provision of s. 234A of the Act to the extent the interest runs even after payment of tax falls foul of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India as being irrational, arbitrary and the provision cannot be justified for any imaginable reasons. Similarly in relation to s. 234B of the Act it was submitted by the learned counsel, again in the alternative, that where the interest is payable under both the provisions viz. ss. 234A and 234B of the Act there would be double charging of interest and hence s. 234B of the Act should be read down to save the provision from the very same charge of irrationality and unconstitutionality, or either both the provisions or any one of them be declared as ultra vires the Constitution to the extent the provisions impose liability of paying interest over again for the same period amounting to interest being charged at the rate of 48 per cent. The contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner can be broadly divided into two categories : the first being on the interpretation of provisions and the second being on the basis of validity of the provisions. In relation to the first contention the learned advocate placed great emphasis on Delhi High Court judgment in the case of Dr. Prannoy Roy & Anr. vs. CIT & Anr. (2002) 172 CTR (Del) 465 : (2002) 254 ITR 755 (Del) to contend that interest under s. 234A would be payable only in a case where tax had not been deposited prior to the due date of the filing of the return. It was submitted that the said decision dealt with all the issues relating to operation of s. 234A of the Act and was a complete answer to the stand of the Department. That the Court should therefore hold that insofar as interest charged under s. 234A of the Act is concerned, once it is found that prior to the date of filing of return of income the entire tax had been paid, no interest could be charged. It was submitted that as held by the following two decisions of the apex Court and the decision of Karnataka High Court payment of interest was compensatory in nature and therefore also no interest should be levied and collected in relation to the amount which had already been paid to the Revenue : (i) Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (1986) 58 CTR (SC) 112 : (1986) 160 ITR 961 (SC), with special reference to observations at page No. 966 of the report. (ii) Ganesh Dass Sreeram & Ors. vs. ITO & Ors. (1987) 66 CTR (SC) 135 : (1988) 169 ITR 221 (SC), with special emphasis as to observations at page No. 230 of the report. (iii) Dr. S. Reddappa & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (1998) 149 CTR (Kar) 521 : (1998) 232 ITR 62 (Kar), with special reference to observations at page No. 71 of the report. /about.html Page 2 of 8 /contact.html

3 7.1 It was further submitted that once one High Court had interpreted a provision the said judgment must normally be followed by other High Courts considering that IT Act is an all India statute. For this purpose reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in case of CIT vs. Deepak Family Trust No. 1 & Ors. (1994) 119 CTR (Guj) 150 : (1995) 211 ITR 575 (Guj), wherein earlier decisions of Bombay High Court were referred to. Emphasis was laid on the case of Maneklal Chunilal & Sons Ltd. vs. CIT (1953) 24 ITR 375 (Bom) to contend that so far this principle was consistently followed by this High Court holding that it would be a wise judicial policy and practice not to take a different view even if the High Court is of the opinion that a different view of the matter should be taken. 7.2 In support of the submissions made as to why provisions of ss. 234A and 234B of the Act should be read as contended by the petitioner, following decisions were cited to emphasise the principles of interpretation laid down by the apex Court : (i) R.B. Jodha Mal Kuthiala vs. CIT (1971) 82 ITR 570 (SC); (ii) K.P. Varghese vs. ITO & Anr. (1981) 24 CTR (SC) 358 : (1981) 131 ITR 597 (SC); (iii) CIT vs. Gangadhar Banerjee & Co. (P) Ltd. (1965) 57 ITR 176 (SC); (iv) CIT vs. J.H. Gotla (1985) 48 CTR (SC) 363 : (1985) 156 ITR 323 (SC); (v) CGT vs. Smt. C.D.R. Laxmidevi (1996) 133 CTR (Guj) 270 : (1996) 220 ITR 50 (Guj). The propositions canvassed on basis of the aforesaid decisions were that while interpreting a taxing statute the provision has to be interpreted reasonably and in consonance with justice even though it may be true that equitable considerations are irrelevant in interpreting tax laws. That where required, the Court must construe the statutory provisions so as to avoid absurdity and mischief; where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a manifestly unjust result which could never have been intended by the legislature, the Court is entitled to modify the language used by the legislature or even do some violence so as to achieve the intention of the legislature and produce a rational construction. That attempt should be made to ensure that equity and taxation do not always remain strangers and construction which results in equity rather than injustice, should be preferred to the literal construction. That Court would not adopt such an interpretation which would expose the statute to the vice of being ultra vires the Constitution. 7.3 As regards the contention based on challenge to constitutional validity of the provisions attention was invited to the following decisions : (1) E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1974 SC 555 with special reference to para Nos. 85 and 86 of the judgment. (2) K.P. Varghese vs. ITO & Anr. (supra) with special reference to para No. 56 of the judgment. (3) State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. vs. Ananthiammal & Ors (1) SCC 519 with special reference to para No. 7 of the judgment. (4) Bidhannagar (Saltlake) Welfare Assn. vs. Central Valuation Board & Ors (6) SCC 668 with special reference to para No. 37 and other paras dealing with interpretation of statutes. It was submitted, based on these decisions that even in taxing statutes reasonableness of the provision has to be considered in context of rights of a person vis-a-vis other similarly situated persons and if the provision is found to be arbitrary and/or irrational the same should be either read down or should be held to be ultra vires the Constitution. That in the instant case insofar as s. 234A of the Act is concerned the same be held to be ultra vires the Constitution to the extent the provision requires an assessee to pay interest even after the tax has been paid before filing of the return. Similarly in relation to s. 234B of the Act, it was submitted that when the said provision, as read by respondent authority, charges interest for the same period for which interest had already been charged under s. 234A of the Act, the said provision was unreasonable and had to be struck down. Alternatively, the provision be read down so as to ensure that an assessee is not called upon to pay double interest for the same period. 7.4 It was therefore urged that the interest charged under the two provisions to the extent there was overcharging in each year be held to be bad in law and/or ultra vires the Constitution. 7.5 An incidental contention was also raised based on provisions of ss. 59 to 61 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 to submit that the respondent authority had erred in law in not treating the amount of tax paid as tax and appropriating the same towards interest and thus charging interest on an amount which in fact had already been paid as tax. For this purpose attention was invited to certain challans of payment to point out that the /about.html Page 3 of 8 /contact.html

4 said challans specifically denoted that the amount paid under the said challans was towards tax and not interest. That in fact both the respondent authority and the assessee had understood the said aspect of the matter in same sense as could be seen from the final part of the respective assessment orders where the respondent authority had directed to give credit for prepaid taxes but it was only while calculating interest that such credit was denied. That the said practice adopted by the assessee was in consonance with provisions of s. 139(9) of the Act and the Explanation thereunder which required an assessee to attach proof of payment of taxes before filing return of income as otherwise the return of income would be treated as a defective return. 8. On behalf of the respondent authority learned senior standing counsel submitted that the petitioner could not be given credit for the tax paid after the end of the financial year but before the date of filing of the return considering the statutory scheme commencing from s. 207 of the Act relating to advance tax. For this purpose, reliance was placed on decision of this Court in the case of Life Bond Fabrics (P) Ltd. vs. CIT (1995) 128 CTR (Guj) 19 : (1995) 216 ITR 529 (Guj) to contend that the interest which was leviable had to be calculated in terms of the statutory scheme of the Act and there was no discretion vested in the assessing authority, as well as apex Court decision in case of CIT vs. Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2003) 179 CTR (SC) 362 : (2003) 259 ITR 449/475 (SC) with special reference to observation at page No. 458 of the report. 8.1 Responding to the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner based on consistent practice to follow a judgment of another High Court even in case where the Court was otherwise not agreeable with the view expressed it was submitted that in fact, this High Court had already explained the circumstances in which a different view could be adopted as laid down in the case of N.R. Paper & Board Ltd. & Ors. vs. Dy. CIT (1998) 146 CTR (Guj) 612 : (1998) 234 ITR 733 (Guj). 8.2 As regards the challenge to constitutional validity of the provisions attention was invited to the decision of Karnataka High Court in the case of Dr. S. Reddappa & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (supra) with special reference to observations at page Nos. 70 and 71, as well as judgment of Bombay High Court in the case of Umesh S. Bangara vs. Union of India (2004) 189 CTR (Bom) 319 : (2004) 268 ITR 405 (Bom) with special reference to observations at page Nos. 409, 410 and 411. It was submitted that the provisions of ss. 234A and 234B of the Act being compensatory in nature for breach of civil obligation cannot be termed to be unreasonable as the provisions accord uniform treatment to similarly situated persons and have eliminated the subjective discretion of the taxing authority and thus obviated arbitrariness. That the safeguard provided in the statute itself cannot be termed to be penal in nature and thereby unconstitutional. 8.3 Responding to the contention that interest was being charged for the same period over again, the learned counsel pointed out that both the defaults under ss. 234A and 234B of the Act are in respect of separate civil obligations and therefore cannot be held to be either bad in law or unconstitutional. 8.4 Lastly, it was contended that in absence of any contract between the petitioner and the respondent authority, the provisions of Indian Contract Act cannot be pressed into service by the petitioner and even otherwise as held by the apex Court in the case of I.C.D.S. Ltd. vs. Smithaben H. Patel & Ors. AIR 1999 SC 1036, the provisions can apply only in a case where there are different debts whereas in the present case there are no different debts. 9. For the purpose of appreciating the contentions raised it is necessary to consider the provisions of ss. 234A and 234B of the Act. The relevant extracts relatable to the assessment years in question read as under : "234A. Interest for defaults in furnishing return of income. (1) Where the return of income for any assessment year under sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (4) of s. 139, or in response to a notice under sub-s. (1) of s. 142, is furnished after the due date, or is not furnished, the assessee shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of two per cent for every month or part of a month comprised in the period commencing on the date immediately following the due date, and, (a) where the return is furnished after the due date, ending on the date of furnishing of the return; or (b) where no return has been furnished, ending on the date of completion of the assessment under s. 144, on the amount of the tax on the total income as determined under sub-s. (1) of s. 143 or on regular assessment as reduced by the advance tax, if any, paid and any tax deducted or collected at source.." "234B. Interest for defaults in payment of advance tax. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this section, /about.html Page 4 of 8 /contact.html

5 where, in any financial year, an assessee who is liable to pay advance tax under s. 208 has failed to pay such tax or, where the advance tax paid by such assessee under the provisions of s. 210 is less than ninety per cent of the assessed tax, the assessee shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of two per cent for every month or part of a month comprised in the period from the 1st day of April, next following such financial year to the date of determination of total income under sub-s. (1) of s. 143 or regular assessment, on an amount equal to the assessed tax or, as the case may be, on the amount by which the advance tax paid as aforesaid falls short of the assessed tax." On a plain reading of the aforesaid two provisions, it is apparent that s. 234A of the Act is in relation to liability to pay interest for default in late furnishing of return or non-furnishing of return, while s. 234B of the Act pertains to liability to pay interest for default in payment of advance tax. However, in both the provisions interest is payable on the amount which is the difference between the amount of tax payable on the total income as determined under s. 143(1) of the Act or on regular assessment as reduced by the advance tax paid, deducted at source, or collected at source. Therefore, one has to consider what is the meaning of advance tax, TDS and tax collected at source. The definition of the term 'advance tax' appears in s. 2(1) to mean advance tax payable in accordance with provisions of Chapter XVII-C. Before adverting to Chapter XVII-C of the Act, a look at s. 4 of the Act would be helpful. The said provision deals with charge of income-tax and provides that income-tax shall be charged for any assessment year at the prescribed rates in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the Act in respect of the total income of the previous year of every person. Sub-s. (2) of s. 4 of the Act lays down that in respect of income chargeable under sub-s. (1) income-tax shall be deducted at source or paid in advance, where it is so deductible or payable under any provision of the Act. Therefore, the scheme that emerges is that income-tax is chargeable for any assessment year in relation to total income of the previous year and such income-tax is payable by the mode of deduction at source or by the mode of payment in advance as prescribed. Previous year in relation to any assessment year has been defined under sub-s. (2) of s. 3 to mean the period which begins with the date immediately following the last day of the previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on 1st April and ending on 31st March. Chapter XVII relates to collection and recovery of tax. Under part 'A' s. 190 of the Act provides for deduction at source and advance payment. Under sub-s. (1) of s. 190 of the Act, it is provided that notwithstanding that the regular assessment in respect of any income is to be made in a later assessment year, the tax on such income shall be payable by deduction or collection at source or by advance payment, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVII. Thus s. 190 of the Act provides for the situation where even if the regular assessment is framed subsequently, viz. in later assessment year, even then in respect of any income for which such regular assessment is to be made the tax shall be payable either by deduction or collection at source or by advance payment in the mode and manner prescribed by the provisions of Chapter XVII of the Act. Part 'C' of Chapter XVII deals with advance payment of tax and under s. 207 of the Act the liability for payment of advance tax is prescribed. The said provision stipulates that tax shall be payable in advance during any financial year in accordance with provisions of ss. 208 to 219 in respect of total income of the assessee which would be chargeable to tax for the assessment year immediately following that financial year. Thus on a conjoint reading of s. 4, s. 2(1), s. 190 and s. 207 of the Act the scheme that emerges is that even though assessment of the total income may be made later in point of time the liability to pay income-tax is relatable to the financial year immediately preceding the assessment year in question and such liability has to be discharged either by way of having tax deducted at source or collected at source, or making payment by way of advance tax in accordance with the provisions of ss. 208 to 219 of the Act. Sec. 208 of the Act stipulates that advance tax shall be payable during a financial year in every case where the amount of such tax payable by the assessee during that financial year, as computed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVII of the Act, is one thousand five hundred rupees or more (at the relevant point of time). It is not the case of the petitioner assessee that the tax payable during any of the three years in question was less than one thousand five hundred rupees. Therefore, statutory liability was cast on the petitioner assessee to pay advance tax during the financial year as provided by the legislative scheme considered hereinbefore. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to deal with the mode and manner by which advance tax is to be computed or the point of time when the payment is to be made. However, s. 211 of the Act lays down the limit with the corresponding date on which an instalment of advance tax is due and the amount which is to be paid as advance tax. Even on this count, the petitioner assessee has not stated that any payment as such had been made. In fact in the petition itself there is an indication that interest levied under s. 234C of the Act by the /about.html Page 5 of 8 /contact.html

6 respondent authority is not disputed by the petitioner as averred in para No. 2 of the petition. Sec. 234C of the Act relates to liability to pay interest for deferment of advance tax, viz. where there is shortfall in payment of advance tax considering the prescribed percentage which is payable on each of the due dates commencing from 15th September and ending on 15th March of every financial year. It is in the backdrop of the aforesaid legal position and the facts which have come on record that the contentions raised by the petitioner have to be examined. The petitioner does not dispute that there is default in payment of advance tax. In other words there is a shortfall of advance tax by the stipulated percentage as prescribed by s. 234B of the Act. The petitioner also does not dispute that there is a shortfall in payment of advance tax on the due dates prescribed under s. 211 of the Act. Admittedly, payments of tax on which the petitioner is resting his case are the payments made beyond the financial year. The payments so made are therefore contrary to the legislative scheme. In the circumstances, the question that will have to be posed and answered is whether an assessee who has acted contrary to the legislative scheme can seek equity. In this context the illustrations given by the learned advocate for the petitioner during course of hearing may not be apposite to the issue at hand. Admittedly, CBDT has issued circulars whereby an assessee who is prevented by circumstances beyond his control can seek full or partial waiver of interest levied under any of the provisions [Reference (1997) 225 ITR (St) 101 as modified on 30th Jan., 1997]. Therefore, interpretation of the provisions cannot be based on such hypothetical instances where an assessee, if facts are proved, can seek relief by way of waiver. The petitioner cannot be heard to say that the petitioner has violated the requirements laid down by the statute, considering the scheme of payment of tax in light of the charge fastened on the total income of the previous year under s. 4 of the Act, but should be yet treated differently, i.e., different from other assessees who have complied with the law. As noted hereinbefore even for the purpose of computing interest under s. 234A of the Act, the difference of the amount on which interest becomes payable has to be worked out by deducting the advance tax paid including any tax deducted or collected at source from the tax on the total income determined at the time of assessment. The default of filing of return of income beyond the prescribed date is also admitted. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention of the petitioner assessee that the amount paid beyond the financial year should be deducted from the tax on the total income as determined on regular assessment. This has to be so considering the definition of the term "advance tax" as appearing in s. 2 of the Act which categorically stipulates that "advance tax" means the advance tax payable in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVII-C of the Act. Even if contextual interpretation is adopted considering the opening portion of s. 2 of the Act which states "unless the context otherwise requires", the contention raised by the petitioner does not merit acceptance; the context and setting of the aforesaid provisions do not even prima facie indicate that any other view, like the one canvassed by the petitioner is possible. Coming to s. 234B of the Act, the said provision directly deals with payment of interest for defaults in payment of advance tax. In fact the provision itself fastens liability to pay interest on the basis of liability to pay advance tax under s. 208 of the Act and failure to pay such tax or where the advance tax paid by the assessee under the provisions of s. 210 is less than the prescribed percentage of the assessed tax. Therefore, even for the purpose of s. 234B of the Act the petitioner cannot seek credit for the amounts paid beyond the financial year. Merely because the amounts have been paid before the return of income is filed, the petitioner cannot seek any relief on that count. Sec. 140A of the Act provides for self-assessment. The said section stipulates that where any tax is payable on the basis of any return required to be furnished, after taking into account the amount of tax, if any, already paid under any provision of the Act the assessee shall be liable to pay such tax together with interest payable under any provision of the Act for any delay in furnishing return, or any default or delay in payment of advance tax, before furnishing the return and the return shall be accompanied by proof of payment of such tax and interest. In other words the legislature has specifically provided that once there is default in either furnishing of return or in payment of advance tax, both as regards the amount and the period, interest has to be worked out by the assessee himself, pay the same, and attach proof of having made such payment with the return of income and such payment would be treated as self-assessment tax, which would be inclusive of the amount of tax and the amount of interest payable. Thus there is an inherent indication in the statutory scheme that any payment made beyond the financial year has to be considered but such payment has to be accompanied by the interest payable for the default committed in filing of the return of income or default in payments of advance tax /about.html Page 6 of 8 /contact.html

7 during the financial year. For this purpose, legislature has not equated both defaults, as to furnishing of return beyond the prescribed date and shortfall in advance tax, by providing for computing interest separately for both the defaults. Therefore, merely because some amount is paid beyond the financial year but before the return is filed the assessee cannot plead that the assessee is not liable to pay interest under s. 234A of the Act. Nor can the assessee be given credit for such payment made beyond the financial year for the purpose of computing interest under s. 234B of the Act for the default in payments of advance tax. Thus considering the legislative intent which unfolds on a conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions it is not possible to agree with the petitioner that the petitioner had not incurred any liability to pay interest either under s. 234A or under s. 234B of the Act. The petitioner also cannot contend that there is any overlapping of the period for which the petitioner cannot be made liable for paying interest under both the provisions considering the fact that both the defaults are independent of each other. The doctrine of double jeopardy envisaged by Art. 20(2) of the Constitution of India or s. 300 of the Cr.PC, 1973 can have no application in these proceedings. The defaults, and not offences, are not one : non-filing or late filing of return and non-payment or short payment of advance tax cannot be equated. The period for which the liability to pay interest arises has to be computed in accordance with the termini fixed by each of the provisions viz. ss. 234A and 234B of the Act. The contention that if the statutory provision results in an absurdity or mischief not intended by legislature the Court should import words so as to make sense out of the provisions also does not merit acceptance considering the fact that on a plain reading of the provisions the legislative intent which is discernible cannot be said to result in an absurdity. In fact, when one considers this contention the other contention as to arbitrariness or unreasonableness of the provision is also required to be considered simultaneously. The petitioner states that the provision is arbitrary and unreasonable because the petitioner is not being granted credit for amounts paid beyond the financial year but before the date of filing of the return and hence, the provision is arbitrary, inequitable and unreasonable. Nothing can be farther from truth inasmuch as in light of the legislative scheme considered hereinbefore, majority of the assessees who become liable to pay advance tax after having crossed the threshold limit, are fastened with liability to pay tax in accordance with the charge levied under s. 4 of the Act. Such assessees may be having income from salary, or from profession or business, or income from other sources etc. If they are subjected to payment of tax by any of the prescribed modes viz. tax deducted at source or paid by way of advance tax in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVII-C of the Act, the assessee cannot seek any relief on the ground of being discriminated against. To the contrary, if the plea raised by the petitioner is accepted, not only would it require to give a go-bye to the entire statutory scheme but it would also result in discrimination against majority of the assessees who comply with requirements of the statutory provisions. No person is entitled to seek any relief on basis of inverse discrimination. Thus, no case is made out by the petitioner for equitable relief. The contention based on various judgments cited in support of principles of interpretation also cannot carry the case of the petitioner any further in light of the statutory scheme laid down by the Act. It is true that the Court must interpret the provisions of the statute upon ascertaining the object of the legislation through the medium or authoritative forms in which it is expressed. It is settled law that the Court should, while interpreting provisions of the statute, assign its ordinary meaning. It is also a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. Another salutary principle of construction is that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous then the Court is bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. Applying the aforesaid principles also it is not possible to accept the contentions raised by the petitioner. Insofar as the contention regarding the provisions being ultra vires the Constitution no case is made out by the petitioner. It is true that the nature of the levy is compensatory in character but from that it is not possible to come to the conclusion that there is any arbitrariness or unreasonableness which would warrant striking down the provision. Even otherwise, the position in law is well settled. A taxing statute enjoys a greater latitude. An inference in regard to contravention of Art. 14 of the Constitution would, however, ordinarily be drawn if the provision seeks to impose on the same class of persons similarly situated a burden which leads to inequality. That is not the case here. As already recorded hereinbefore, the petitioner also cannot successfully contend /about.html Page 7 of 8 /contact.html

8 that there is any unreasonable classification considering majority of assessees who comply with the statutory requirements. The other contention that is required to be considered is based on provisions of ss. 59 to 61 of the Indian Contract Act. The same also cannot carry the case of the petitioner any further. As noticed hereinbefore, the statutory scheme provides under s. 140A of the Act to make payment of tax and interest for the stated defaults before the return is filed and therefore, to contend that the respondent authority could not have appropriated the amount paid towards interest does not merit acceptance. The Explanation under sub-s. (1) of s. 140A of the Act specifically provides that where the amount paid by the assessee under the said sub-section falls short of the aggregate of the tax and interest payable under sub-s. (1), the amount so paid shall first be adjusted towards the interest payable as aforesaid and the balance, if any, shall be adjusted towards the tax payable. In light of this specific provision under the Act the general law under the Contract Act cannot be pressed into service by the petitioner. The said contention also therefore does not merit acceptance. The submission based on uniformity of expression of opinion on the ground of wise judicial policy also does not deserve acceptance. There can be no dispute about the proposition that in income-tax matters which are governed by an all India statute, when there is a decision of a High Court interpreting a statutory provision, it would be a wise judicial policy and practice not to take a different view. However, this is not an absolute proposition and there are certain well-known exceptions to it. In cases where a decision is sub silentio, per incuriam, obiter dicta or based on a concession or takes a view which it is impossible to arrive at or there is another view in the field or there is a subsequent amendment of the statute or reversal or implied overruling of the decision by a High Court or some such or similar infirmity is manifestly perceivable in the decision, a different view can be taken by the High Court. This is clearly borne out from the decision of this Court in Arvind Boards & Paper Products Ltd. vs. CIT (1982) 28 CTR (Guj) 322 : (1982) 137 ITR 635 (Guj), which had also taken into consideration the Bombay decision in the case of Maneklal Chunilal & Sons Ltd. (supra) as well as CIT vs. Deepak Family Trust No. 1 & Ors. (supra). Hence, in light of the legislative scheme considered hereinbefore the Court, despite highest esteem and respect, is unable to agree with the opinion expressed by the High Court of Delhi in the case of Dr. Prannoy Roy & Anr. (supra). In the circumstances, on none of the grounds pleaded in the petition or at the time of hearing, the petition merits acceptance. The petition is accordingly rejected. Rule discharged. Interim relief stands vacated. There shall be no order as to costs. /about.html Page 8 of 8 /contact.html