C A N A D A WORKERS COMPENSATION APPEAL TRIBUNAL WORKER. and THE WORKERS COMPENSATION BOARD D E C I S I O N. Date of Hearing: December 19, 1997

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1 C A N A D A I PROVINCE OF PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND WORKERS COMPENSATION APPEAL TRIBUNAL BETWEEN: WORKER APPELLANT and THE WORKERS COMPENSATION BOARD RESPONDENT D E C I S I O N Date of Hearing: December 19, 1997 Date of Decision: July 10, 1998 WORKER Appellant JOHN K. MITCHELL, Q.C. Stewart McKelvey Stirling Scales 65 Grafton St. Charlottetown, PEI C1A 8B9 Solicitors for the Respondent

2 THE FACTS The Appellant, [Worker], is a [personal information]. [Personal information] [Personal information] the Appellant states that he began to suffer from insomnia, shaking hands, weight loss, and other stress related symptoms. On June 11, 1997, his physician, Dr. Scott Cameron, recommended a one month sick leave due to work related stress with extreme fatigue, insomnia and depression. On June 17, 1997, the Appellant filed a claim for benefits for work related stress. On June 23, 1997, Jean Tremere, Case Manager-Client Services, denied the Appellant s request for compensation. On July 1, 1997, the Appellant appealed this decision, which was subsequently reviewed by Terry Dunsford. On July 10, 1997, Mr. Dunsford denied the appeal and stated that the condition of work related stress is a result of the many hours put into working on the [personal information] and is not considered to be either an accident or an occupational disease pursuant to the Workers Compensation Act. The Appellant has appealed the decision of Terry Dunsford to this Tribunal. THE ISSUE At issue before this Tribunal is whether or not the Appellant is entitled to compensation for the time he missed from his employment while he was on sick leave. THE DECISION The Appellant has presented the Tribunal with an informative and lengthy review of the circumstances leading to his illness. His position, in essence, is that be began to suffer from the effects of stress related illness due to his involvement with the [personal information]. He argues that his involvement with the [personal information] was promoted and encouraged by his employer. In his appeal submitted to the Tribunal on September 12, 1997, the Appellant states [personal information]. He argues that the provisions of the Workers Compensation Act entitle him to benefits.

3 2 The Appellant argues that the stress he suffered and for which he was put off work was a work related injury within the parameters of the Act. It is, of course, very clear that the intention of the workers compensation legislation is to provide benefits for illness/ injury resulting from work. The process of determining the Appellant s entitlement must begin with a consideration of the scope of the Act. All workers in an industry covered by the Act are entitled to compensation where personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment occurs (section 6). Accident is defined as: (a) accident means a chance event occasioned by a physical or natural cause and includes: (i) a wilful and intentional act that is not the act of the worker, (ii) any (a) event arising out of, and in the course of, employment, or (b) thing that is done and the doing of which arises out of and in the course of employment, and (iii) and occupational disease, and as a result of which a worker is injured. Obviously, the circumstances of the case before this tribunal do not meet the definition of accident, unless the illness of stress may be considered an occupational disease. Certainly, stress is not a chance event, nor was it wilful or intentional. The Appellant testified that the facts resulting in the stress took approximately ten months to build up. Thus, we must consider whether stress could be interpreted as an occupational disease. Occupational disease is defined in Section 1(u) of the Act: 1. (u) occupational disease means a disease arising out of and in the course of employment and resulting from causes and conditions (i) peculiar to or characteristic of a particular trade or occupation, or

4 3 (ii) peculiar to the particular employment, but does not include (iii) an ordinary disease of life, and (iv) stress, other than an acute reaction to a traumatic event. It is clear that the relevant portion of the definition is subparagraph (iv). However, the Act excludes claims for stress, unless it is the result of an acute reaction to a traumatic event. Although the Appellant has testified that his physical reaction to the involvement with the [personal information] was acute, he must also meet the requirements of traumatic event. The Appellant has argued that this was a traumatic event to him and it therefore fulfils the requirements of the legislation for coverage. The Appellant has argued that the Respondent s policy titled Psychological Conditions would permit the Respondent to allow his claim for benefits. The Policy states: 1. The Workers Compensation Board will consider claims for psychological conditions when there is a well-defined psychological problem and when the condition arises directly from the workplace under either of the following circumstances: A. The psychological condition is the direct result of a work-related injury, or B. The psychological condition is the direct result of a psychologically traumatic event in the workplace which is both excessive and unusual. 2. The psychological condition must be included in and meet all the criteria outlined in the D.S.M. IV Psychiatric Manual (most recent edition). The presence of the condition must be confirmed by a qualified physician or psychologist who is familiar with the D.S.M. Manual.

5 4 3. The period of compensation for stress that is brought on by an acute reaction to a traumatic event will generally not exceed five (5) working days. Under the policy, the Appellant would be entitled to compensation for the stress illness, provided the condition arises directly from the workplace or the psychological condition is the direct result of a psychologically traumatic event in the workplace... (Emphasis added). The Appellant argues that the stress did arise directly from the workplace, as he states, the employer supported and encouraged involvement in the [personal information]. The Appellant takes the position that he would not have been involved with the [personal information], and that he continued to be involved at the encouragement of his employer, to such an extent that his involvement began to consume all of his off-duty time, as well as some of his regular shift work. The Appellant also argues that this was a traumatic event to him, resulting in the illness and requiring him to be off work for one month. The Respondent argues that the events giving rise to the stress were not traumatic, as it was a series of events over a period of time, and could not reasonably fall within the meaning of traumatic event. As previously stated, the Appellant testified that the stress was a result of over ten months involvement in the development of the [personal information]. The Respondent also argues that the condition did not arise directly from the workplace, but that it arose from the Appellant s personal choice to be involved in a volunteer activity such as the [personal information]. This Tribunal must decide how broadly the sections of the Act are to be interpreted. The Appellant argues that the Workers Compensation Act should be receptive to claims related to stress and that in particular, it should be interpreted to take into account that the Appellant s involvement with the [personal information] was work-related in that it was supported and encouraged by his employer. The Respondent argues that the Tribunal must not place too broad an interpretation on the relevant sections as that

6 would expand the scope of the Act beyond its intended purpose. 5 While the Tribunal has sympathy for the Appellant s circumstances, the Tribunal must agree with the interpretation of the legislation put forward by the Respondent. To expand the operation of the Act to encompass the facts of this case would result in allowing compensation in situations where it was clearly not intended by the legislation. This Tribunal has concluded that the factors bringing about the Appellant s illness and consequent sick leave, ie. [personal information] on his off-duty time cannot reasonably be said to be work related, even if the activity was encouraged and supported by his employer. This would be tantamount to finding that an employee who was be encouraged by his or her employer to take part in physical fitness with the result that the employee takes up running in his or her spare time and consequently suffers a heart attack would be entitled to compensation pursuant to the Workers Compensation Act. Clearly, this is not the intent of the legislation. The Act sets out a number of restrictions on the coverage for stress related illness. The Respondent has also instituted a policy dealing specifically with stress. And while it may be that many sectors of society and business are providing broader coverage for the illness of stress, as the Appellant argues, the legislation that applies to this case is simply not broad enough to logically cover the situation before us. It may be in the future that the legislation will pass laws providing for compensation of claims on a broader basis than is currently the case. However, whether or not the Tribunal agrees with the position of the Appellant that sick leave due to stress related illness, whether brought on by the workplace or beyond it, should entitle the worker to benefits, is irrelevant. This Tribunal must work with the legislation before it and with the policies as instituted by the Respondent. Section 56(17) of the Act sets this out very clearly. It states: 56. (17) The Appeal Tribunal shall be bound by and shall fully implement the policies of the Board, and the Appeal Tribunal, its chairperson and members are prohibited from enacting or attempting to enact or implement policies with respect to anything within the scope of this Part.

7 6 Volunteer activity with the [personal information] was not a condition of the Appellant s employment. It was, in the end, a personal choice of the Appellant to spend his off-duty time working on the [personal information]. No doubt the Appellant is deserving of much praise for the success of a very worthwhile project, brought about largely by many hours of hard work by the Appellant. However, this Tribunal has no authority to award compensation to the Appellant for the illness that resulted and must, in the circumstances, deny the appeal. Dated this 10 th day of July For the Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal NANCY E. BIRT, Vice-Chair I concur: ALLISON DRAKE I concur: NANCY FITZGERALD

WORKERS COMPENSATION APPEAL TRIBUNAL. Personal Information CASE ID Personal Information. Personal Information DECISION #186

WORKERS COMPENSATION APPEAL TRIBUNAL BETWEEN: Personal Information CASE ID Personal Information AND: APPELLANT Personal Information AND: RESPONDENT WORKERS COMPENSATION BOARD OF PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND RESPONDENT