NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P

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Jerome Burns
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1 J-A NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P ROY H. LOMAS, SR., D/B/A ROY LOMAS CARPET CONTRACTOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. JAMES B. KRAVITZ, ANDORRA SPRINGS DEVELOPMENT, INC., CHERRYDALE CONSTRUCTION CO., EASTERN DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISES, INC. AND KRAVMAR, INC., Appellants No EDA 2011 Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 16, 2011 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at No(s): BEFORE: BENDER, J., GANTMAN, J., and PANELLA, J. MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, J. FILED MARCH 06, 2014 James B. Kravitz, Andorra Springs Development, Inc., Cherrydale Construction Co., Eastern Development Enterprises, Inc. and Kravar, Inc., (the Kravitz Entities ) appeal from the judgment entered on August 16, 2011, in favor of Roy H. Lomas, Sr., d/b/a/ Roy Lomas Carpet Contractor in the amount of $1,688, We affirm. 1 Appellants filed their appeal on August 26, 2011, from the denial of their post-trial motions on August 4, An order denying post-trial motions is interlocutory and generally not appealable. See Levitt v. Patrick, 976 A.2d 581, 584 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2009) (stating that appeal properly lies from the entry of judgment, not from order denying post-trial motions). However, (Footnote Continued Next Page)

2 J-A The basis for this litigation began in November of 1994, when Cherrydale and Lomas entered into a contract for Lomas to supply and install flooring in homes being built by Cherrydale. One month later, Lomas stopped working due to Cherrydale s failure to pay for completed work, which at that point amounted to $30, In January of 1995, Lomas demanded submission to binding arbitration, which resulted in an interim award for Lomas. The arbitrators final award was issued in September of 1998 and held that Lomas was due $200, in accordance with the Contractor Subcontractor Payment Act ( CSPA ), 73 P.S. 501 et seq. Judgment was entered on September 10, After unsuccessfully securing payment on the judgment, Lomas filed the instant action on March 31, 2000, in order to execute on the judgment. It is now 2013 and the matter is presently before this Court. The time from January 1995 until the present appeal was filed on September 15, 2011, covers a sixteen year period. This length of time, due significantly to the Kravitz Entities delaying tactics, is almost incomprehensible, considering that this case began over a thirty-thousand dollar debt and has now resulted in a judgment assessing damages for $1,688, (Footnote Continued) since judgment was entered on August 16, 2011, we consider the appeal as taken from the entry of judgment

3 J-A When the Kravitz Entities filed their Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal, they set forth 24 separate claims of error. The trial court wrote a fifty-page opinion responding to each claim raised by the Kravitz Entities. Now, in their brief to this Court, the Kravitz Entities raise seven issues, which essentially encompass most of the issues raised in the Rule 1925(b) statement submitted to the trial court. The Kravitz Entities state these issues as follows: Whether, as a matter of law, the entire bench of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas should have been recused, and/or full, complete, and required discovery permitted, because of the irreparable appearance of impropriety created by the ongoing participation and financial interest in the litigation by a sitting member of that Court? Whether, as a matter of law, the testimony of Appellee's expert should have been discredited and/or stricken, because Appellee's attorneys and a sitting member of the Montgomery County bench improperly altered, edited, and influenced the content of the expert's report[?] Whether, as a matter of law, the corporate veil can be pierced to find James B. Kravitz individually liable, and all Appellants liable for fraudulent transfers, based on non-cash accounting adjustments and bookkeeping entries made by licensed professional accountants in the ordinary course of business pursuant to generally accepted accounting practices for the lawful purpose of minimizing tax liabilities[?] Whether, as a matter of law, punitive damages may be awarded where the underlying arbitration award was based on the Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act, which includes a provision authorizing the award of a statutory punitive penalty[?] Whether, as a matter of law, punitive damages may be awarded where Appellants' conduct was motivated by generally accepted accounting and tax planning principles and was not outrageous, willful, wanton, or reckless, and where Appellants' conduct in - 3 -

4 J-A defending the litigation was within its due process rights and was not dilatory, obdurate, and/or vexatious? Whether, as matter of law, a punitive damages award far exceeding a 1:1 ratio with the compensatory damages award violates Appellants' rights to due process under the United States Constitution? Whether, as a matter of law, the trial court could award Lomas attorney's fees, interest, and penalties under the Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act ("CASPA") when Lomas did not bring a claim under CASPA, the trial court was precluded from altering or adjusting the underlying arbitration award which did award certain damages under CASPA, and the trial court misapplied CASPA in its award of damages? Kravitz Entities brief at 2-3. We have reviewed the certified record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and Judge Rogers thorough and well-crafted opinion, dated January 15, We conclude that Judge Rogers extensive, well-reasoned opinion accurately disposes of the issues presented by the Kravitz Entities. Accordingly, we adopt his opinion as our own and affirm the judgment in Lomas favor on that basis. 2 Judgment affirmed Judge Gantman notes her dissent. 2 We are compelled to comment on the Honorable Judge Thomas C. Branca s involvement in this case. Although we conclude that the Honorable Judge Thomas P. Rogers properly resolved the issues concerning Judge Branca s actions, we suggest that this type of situation should be avoided in the future

5 J-A Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 3/6/

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P Appellant No EDA 2012

J-S70010-13 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA v. RICHARD JARMON Appellant No. 3275 EDA 2012 Appeal