OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) FINAL ORDER

Transcription

1 STATE o ~.o ~. o. o / o OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA LLOYD ENTERPRISES, VS. Petitioner, INC., DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Respondent FINAL ORDER Case Number 'DoR q3~ ~ - f:'of This case is being considered based on a Recommended Order issued by a Hearing Officer assigned by the Division of Administrative Hearings. A copy of that Order is attached to this Final Order and is specifically incorporated by reference as if fully set forth. The Department of Revenue hereby adopts and inc~rporates by reference the attached Recommended Order as if fully set forth. The Department has considered the Hearing Officer's recommendation that the assessment be reduced by prior taxes paid during the audit period by Petitioner's predecessor in interest Ruich, Taxpayer I.D.Nos. and.., and finding that such.9.redit was previously afforded to Petitioner during the audit for Taxpayer I.D. No. and that insufficient evidence exists to attribute taxes paid under Taxpayer I.D. No. / or

2 , 1 to the beach locations covered by the Department's assessment, the Department hereby sustains the assessment in full. Any party to this Order has the right to seek judicial review of the Order pursuant to section , F.S., by the filing of a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, with the Clerk of the Department in the Office of the General Counsel, Post Office Box 6668, Tallahassee, Florida , and by filing a copy of the Notice of Appeal accompanied by the applicable filing fees with the appropriate District Court of Appeal. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days from the date this Order is filed with the Clerk of the Department. c~ DON~ AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida this ;q2~day of May, 1993.! STATE OF FLORIDA DEPART N 0 REVENUE I / /

3 ." I HEREBY CERTIFY that been filed in the official Revenue, this 21st day of CERTIFICATE OF FILING the foregoing Final Order has records of the Department of "fyc4.f ' 19 q~. ~~~ JDYON AGENC Cr.; copies: Ella Jane P. Davis Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL Michael Brewer, Esquire 500 Canal Street New Smyrna Beach, FL Lealand L. McCharen, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax section, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida I I Linda Lettera General Counsel Lisa Echeverri Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Room 204, Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL (J / /,. i i ~

4 ,,, ". STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS LLOYD ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, STATE OF FLORIDA" Respondent CASE NO RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon due notice, this cause came on for formal hearing on October 12, 1992, in Daytona Beach, Florida, before Ella Jane P. Davis, a duly assigned Hearing Officer of the Division of A~inistrative Hearings. APPEARANCES For Petitioner: Michael L. Brewer, E~quire 500 Canal Street New Smyrna Beach, Florida I For Respondent: Leland L. McCharen, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Tax Section Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES (1 Whether or,not' Petitioner's failure to comply with the provisions of Section (1 F.S. makes Petitioner liable for all sales tax due from prior owner.s of concessionaire "spots" purchased or acquired by Petitioner during the audit_.period. (2 Whether or not the charges made by Volusia County for the right to operate a concession at a specific location and to

5 ------_.--- transfer those rights constitute taxable licenses to use real property. - (3 Whether or not the Respondent Department of Revenue projected Petitioner's tax owed based on the best.information available as the agency is required to do by statute when a taxpayer's records are inadequate. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The Department of Revenue audited the business records of the Petitioner and determined that additional sales tax, plus penalties and interest, was due with respect to the Petitioner's business activities. The Petitioner paid the amount of tax it agreed was owing to the Department of Revenue and contested the amount of additional liability asserted by the Department. There are three basic elements to the contested portion of the asserted liability. The Department of Revenue asserted that the Petitioner is liable for all unpaid sales tax due from the prior owners of the businesses during the audit period pursuant to Ii Seclion (1 F.S. and that its "projection" method of audit and assessment was correct. The Department of Revenue asserted that the license fee and transfer fees paid by Petitioner to the county of Volusia are subject to state sales tax as a rent for the use of real property. The assessment is deemed prima facie correct. The burden of proof herein was upon Petitioner.-_. Petitioner Lloyd Enterprises, Inc. presented the oral (J testimony of Jaime Seaman, John Bowes, Richard Ruich, Sheila 2

6 , ~ -- --~-~~~~,., ' Lloyd, and Harold S. Lloyd, and had four exhibits admitted in evidence. Respondent Department of Revenue presented the oral testimony of Albert E. Seyforth and Samuel B. Eckhardt, Jr. and had twenty exhibits admitted in evidence. Official recognition was taken of Volusia County Ordinance 87-36, as amended, and of Unified Beach Code Section 8, governing beach concessions. Petitioner raised constitutional issues which cannot be resolved in this forum. See the Conclusions of Law, infra. A transcript was filed in due course, and all timely proposed findings of fact have been ruled upon in the appendix to this recommended order pursuant to Section (2 F.S. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Petitioner corporation came into existence in April From that time until the present, Petitioner corporation has had possession or control of several beach concessionaire s~pts in volusia County. 2. Respondent Department of Revenue audited Petitioner for the five year period of November I, 1985 through December 31, Petitioner had never obtained the certificate or receipt contemplated by Section (1 F.S., so Respondent's audit and assessment held Petitioner liable for all sales tax due from all predecessor owners. 4. In response to the Notice of Intent to Audit, Petitioner made available for inspection all of its business 3

7 records. Petitioner's records were ~ound by the auditor to be both adequate and accurate for the period of time that Petitioner -. corporation had been in existence, with certain exceptions which included assigning the wrong tax rate on certain items. Respondent's auditor pointed out errors in collection and remittance of the tax by Petitioner during the period of April 1989 to the end of the audit period and Petitioner remitted the tax due with respect to each subject of the error. Respondent reviewed Petitioner's records and used such records to arrive at its estimate of Petitioner's tax liability. 5. In assessing Petitioner's tax liability, Respondent~s auditor, Albert E. Seyforth, projected backwards using all. records provided by Petition~r to reach an estimate or projection (~ of what the predecessor owners / sellers should have been paying in.~..-/ tax. To make this backwards projection, he worked from the Petitioner's current figures substantiated by their records which he dlf:lemed adequate and accurate for the period of April 1989 to II the end of the audit period. Petitioner's records already indicated that two of the spots acquired by Petitioner we~e no longe~ actively utilized. He treated the Volusia County transfer fee and license fee as taxable rights in real estate pursuant to Rule 12A-l.070 F.A.C. He made allowance for Petitioner's misapplication of a sales tax rate. He calculated a 24-month projection =ather than an ls-month projection to give Petitioner taxpayer the benefit of the doubt. He then applied an adjustment by allowing an arbitrary percentage reduction on compensable 4

8 versus noncompensable units and allowing for market conditions, differences in inventory, or pricing. In applying this percentage reduction factor, he accepted Petitioner's oral unquantified anecdotal representations that (1 beach business overall had gotten progressively worse over the five-year audit period (which would lower sales figures and (2 that Petitioner's current corporate operation which had eliminated business at c~rtain spots and which was otherwise more efficient, was more profitable than prior businesses. (This latter assumption would raise sale figures. The percentage reduction factor the auditor devised was an arbitrary 25 percent because Petitioner did not provide any quantifiable way to measure its anecdotal oral representations on the foregoing business trends. The auditor did not accept or consider Petitioner's oral " ~.'-?' (=: representations as to how many units Petitioner acquired from each seller because Petitioner produced no adequate "paper trail" to back up their oral representations as to what was acquired and be,~ause all concerned considered the concession business one in which physical inventory at each "spot" changed from day to day. 6~ Upon presentation of prior ~axpayer identification numbers, Respondent gave Petitioner credit against the figure obtained' by the foregoing methodology for prior taxes paid under those prior taxpayer identification numbers during the audit period. 7. The foregoing assessment methodology, including (J credits, which was devised by Mr. Seyforth, was accepted as 5

9 "reasonable" by Mr. Seyforth's superior auditor, Mr. Samuel B. I \ / Eckhardt, Jr. 8. In approving Mr. Seyforth's methodology, Mr. Eckhardt considered two other standard methods of assessing business trends which could have b~en used instead of using an arbitrary 25 percent reduction factor. One alternative method would have been.to assemble and apply information concerning the ramp toll census to the beach in each of the audit years. The other alternative method would have been to somehow devise a hotel/motel occupancy census and apply that information. Nonetheless, Mr. Eckhardt determined that the methodology applied by Mr. Seyforth and described in Finding of Fact 5 and the c= deduction of taxes actually paid as described in Finding of Fact 6 was appropriate and reasonable. 9. At formal hearing, Petitioner did not affirmatively demonstrate how a formula for business trends on the beach could be more accurately derived from either the toll ramp census or i I the hotel/motel occupancy rate method. Specifically, it was not shown how the toll ramp census would relate number of cars to number of people to number of purchasers of concession products or how the hotel/motel occupancy rate would accurately reflect number of purchasers of concession products. While the 25 percent reduction figure.utilized by the auditor might be "arbitrary," Petitioner did not affirmatively demonstrate how CJ either of the alternative methods would be either more accurate or would lower the assessment figure. 6 II I..,I

10 10. Petitioner presented evidence that Volusia County has always regarded the County's charge of seven percent of the purchase price on the transfer of a concession as an administrative fee. This fee was a negotiated charge agreed upon by the concessionaires, as a group. It was based on earlier such fees. However, Messrs. Seyforth and Eckhardt, on behalf of the Respondent state agency regarded this fee as a "lease or license of real property," pursuant to agency interpretation of Rule 12A F.A.C. and treated'it as such. 11. Petitioner presented evidence that the license fee paid annually to Volusia County by each concessionaire in the amount of ten percent of gross sales or $1,000.00, whichever is greater, has always been regarded by Volusia County as a regulatory fee for use of a certain beach location and is utilized byvolusia County in lieu of occupational license fees,. garbage disposal cha~ges, and charges for other goods and services provided to the concessionaire. These services included l~ensed concessionaires having the right to ask Beach Rangers to move trespassing concessionaires out of the respective licenseholders' assigned territories. Messrs. Seyforth and Eckhardt, on behalf of Respondent state agency regarded this fee as a "lease or license of real property" pursuant to agency interpretation of Rule 12A-l.070 F.A.C. and treated it as such..12. Petitioner piesented evidence that it had acquired beach spots 128 and 130 and paid the Volusia County annual license fee on each but did not operate them in order to render 7 ".'"

11 -----~ ~~~--~- Petitioner's entire "multi-spot operation" more efficient and (J profitable. Any physical business assets acquired at these locations were transferred to other spots. The license fee continued to be paid for these spots' respective locations, so as to eliminate competition. This factor was built into the agency's calculations, but Petitioner contended that the auditor's using a backward projection on these spots was unreasonable because it assigned a 75 percent profit to them which had never existed. Contrary to Petitioner~s assertion, it is found that the auditor's 25 percent reduction figure lumped the unquantified increased efficiency of the whole of Petitioner's operation in with the unquantified decrease in beach traffic and thus made a reasonable adjustment for these ( unoperated"spots. " ~- 13. Pe~itioner also contended that when it acquired beach concession spots 128 and 130 no "stock of goods" was also acqutred, but Petitioner produced no "paper trail" to prove no goods were acquired. Petitioner also admitted to paying to acquire the "business" at each location and that in so doing Petitioner either directly or indirectly acquired the license to operate (or not operate each of these spots. Section F.S. is phrased in the disjunctive, "business or stock of goods." 14. Petitioner produced certain books and records at deposition which were derived from the preincorporation C proprietorship of Petitioner corporation's principals, and, presumably, the proprietorship/spot acquired from Mr. Harold S. 8 I //..'

12 Lloyd's parents, and the auditors dismissed these as inadequate. 1\ \ These particular records were not introduced at formal hearing. The only records of any prior owners of beach spots acquired b-y Petitioner which were introduced at formal hearing were certain documents from John Bowes and Richard Ruich. IS. Mr. Bowes' records (Petitioner's Exhibit 2 are merely totals for various types of rentals and sales and are not adequate for the agency's detailed acc6unting prcicedures. They do not comply with the Unified Beach Code, and Mr. Bowes own accountant found them inadequate for federal income tax purposes. I No expert witness credibly stated that they were adequate for assessment purposes. Mr. Bowes' records do not contain any prior taxpayer identification number which potentially could be linked C- to prior taxes paid so as to offset the assessment against Petitioner. 16. y~. Ruich's records (Petitioner's Exhibits 3 and 4 consisted only of monthly sales tax reports, called "DR-IS's." I Nq expert witness credibly stated that they were adequate for assessment purposes. The agency does not accept DR-IS's as proof of tax liability, but u. Ruich's DR-IS's do contain Mr. Ruich's taxpayer identification numbers, and_ The record is not clear whether Petitioner was given credit for the taxes actually paid by Mr. Ruich under these taxpayer identification numbers. Since Respondent has established the precedent in this case for giving credit to C Petitioner for taxes actually paid under predecessor taxpayer ~. _

13 . ' numbers' during the a~dit period, Mr" 'Rufch I s taxes actually paid (-. during the audit period should be 'calculated and deducted from the. assessment against Petitioner, if that has not already been - done. 17. Richard Ruich executed a sales agreement and an indemnification agreement in the sale of his business to Petitioner. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 18. The Division of. Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this cause pursuant to Section (1, ~ 19. The operative statutes involved in this cause are ( Sections , (5 and (6(b and (c, F.S. 20. These statutes underwent numerous minor am' ndments during the audit period. Except as discussed infra.~these amendments are not material. 21. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of seclions and , F.S. The undersigned has neither the power, authority, nor jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of statutes and will not do so. Also, liability, if any, of Mr. Ruich to Petitioner under their sale and indemnity agreements is not within the jurisdiction of this forum. 22. Petitioner contended that_.section ( 1, I...:..h [1985, imposed liability upon a transferee for the tax due with respect to the predecessor's Final Return, together with interest 10 / I I! I! ~ ~._~~ '

14 and penalties accruing thereon, but not for an entire audit ( period of five years, but the Department's interpretation of Section (1 F.S. has, of long standing, been that the purchaser of a business is liable for all taxes owed by the seller unless the requirements of Section (1 F.S. have been satisfied (receipt and escrow. compliance lies with the purchaser. The responsibility for See, City Ice & Cold Storage Co., Inc., James Howard Cochran and Mary Ann Cochran v. State of Florida, Department of Revenue, DOAH Case No (Recommended Order of G. Steven Pfeiffer entered November 5, 1976; Final Order, labelled "Notice," entered January 12, This section imposes upon the purchaser of a business the responsibility of obtaining assurance from the seller that all taxes due under Chapter 212 F.S. are paid or the purchaser is obliged to withhold sufficient funds to pay all taxes until such assurance (receipt or payments is given. If the purchaser fails in that obligation the purchaser becomes liable for the taxes. ff 24. The operative language of Section (1, F.S., was in effect during the entire audit period. Although Petitioner plead good faith ignorance of the existence of Section (1, F.S., that is no excuse at law. To paraphrase the late Senator Sam Ervin, "It is one of the great myths that the courts presume that every layman knows all the law all the time when, as a practical matter, everybody knows that trained lawyers orily know some of the law, some of the time, after careful study." The C presumption exists, however, and Petitioner is bound thereby. 11 l /,.'

15 25. That being the case, since neither Petitioner nor any entity from whom Petitioner obtained these businesses obtained the necessary tax receipt/certificate and since funds were not -. escrowed for tax purposes, Petitioner is liable for all taxes owed by the sellers, not just those taxes owed upon a "Final Return". See, City Ice & Cold Storage co., Inc. v. Revenue, supra. Peripherally, see, Section (6(a F.S. on the record-keeping period required. 26. Petitioner contended that because Section F.S., does not specifically require that the purchaser of.a busines~ procure and maintain the business records of the prior owner and because Petitioner made available for inspection "his ( records" within the meaning of Section (5 (b 1 F,S' I Respondent was not authorized to make an assessment from an estimate based upon the best information available to it. Petitioner also contended that the items upon which Respondent made its backward projection were not the "best evidence," that I. I Respondent should be required to search out all records of prior owners based only upon matching names provided by Petitioner against names in a telephone book instead of- based upon tax identification numbers, and that Respondent should have used census calculations based on bridge tolls and/or motel occupan6y to come up with more accurate business trend figures than it did using an arbitrary 25 percent reduction figure. 27. These arguments are ill-founded for all the reasons set out in the Findings of Fact. Also, when the agency set out 12 / I / /.../

16 to make its audit in' 1990, it was charged, pursuant to Section (5(b, F.S. [1989], to make an estimate of Petitioner's tax liability based on the best information available to it. Faced with Petitioner's clear liability for any taxes owed by prior owners of businesses acquired by Petitioner, Respondent sought to locate and utilize any and all records made available to it by Petitioner. In this case, these records were only those of the Petitioner since the date of its incorporation, While Petitioner has argued that the records of other businesses were unavailable to Petitioner, it is equally clear that the records of businesses operated by the Lloyds or family members which were acquired by Petitioner could have been submitted to Respondent during the audit. They were not. Such records_were Cj found them inadequate at that point. These records were not only offered in discovery at deposition. Respondent examined and offered again at the formal hearing. The records of John Bowes and Richard Ruich, which were offered at formal hearing, were c~~arly inadequate for audit purposes. Moreover, in ( consideration of the presumption of prima facie correctness of the assessment, a finding that these records were adequate would only be possible upon credible qualified expert"testimony to that effect, which expert testimony was not presented here. See, St. Petersburg Steel Corp. v. State of Florida, Department of Revenue, 4 FALR. 2018A,(1982. Thus/ the only adequate records were those of Petitioner. 28. Respondent made its estimate based on Petitioner's /-" \ records. Those records had already taken into consideration that./' 13 1/ Ii ".'

17 two spots were no longer being operated. A projection of tax liability for each "beach spot" was prepared using rational methods. Further, the substantial revisions made by Respondent in the course of the audit in response to further information and discussions with Petitio~er show that Respondent made every effort to utilize all information made available by Petitioner. The final reduction in the percentage of the full estimate which was projected by Respondent was a rational effort to take into account Respondent's judgment with regard to anecdotal business trend variables which Petitioner's records were unable to quantify. If such reduction was an error/it was an error in favor of the taxpayer. C-'j 29. Petitioner contended that Vdlusia County's seven percent transfer fee and the annual license fees are_.pot sales taxable rents for the use of real property as conten~ed by the agency. However, in making its assessment, the agency has relied on ifs interpretation of agency Rule 12A-1.070, F.A.C. An agency's interpretation of its own rules and the statutes which it is charged to administer is to be given great deference. See, Griffith v. Department of Business Regulation, Pari-Mutual Wagering 18 FLW D445 (3d DCA January 26, 1993; Maclen Rehabilitation 'Center v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 588 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991; Department of Business Reaulation v. Martin County Liguors, Inc., 574 So.2d 170 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991; Island Harbor Beach Club v. Department of Natural Resources, 495 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986; Goldring v. 14,. J

18 Department of Environmental Regulation, 477 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1985; Public Employees Relations Commission v. Dade County police Benevolent Association, 467 So.2d 987 (Fla Petitioner also contended that state tax on the transfer fee and annual license fees also constitutes "pyramiding" of a tax but Petitioner has not submitted statute, rule, or case law precluding such a result. Accordingly, there is no authority for invalidating the audit and assessment on that ground. In so ruling, the undersigned has considered suggestions made by both counsel and several witnesses that these questions are either "in litigation" or "soon to be in litigation" in Article V courts. That being the case, it would seem probable that to date no case law has determined these issues contrary to the agency's interpretation and application. 30. Petitioner further contended that when it acquired beach concession spot numbers 128 and 130 without subsequently operating the licensed locations and without acquiring the eqpipment of the previous operation, Petitioner did not acquire a "business or stock of goods," within the meaning of Section F.S. Petitioner provided no "paper trail" to show that no goods were acquired. Petitioner has always conceded that the "business" was purchased at each spot and has never contended that a "sale" did not occur. Since the statute states "business" or "stock of goods" in 'the dis junctive, acquisition of the business was sufficient to activate the statute. Also, at the ( very least, a license was acquired by Petitioner or relinquished 15 /; / -~~--~-~---~-- --'-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--'

19 for transfer to Petitioner at each of these two spots.~~ A license \ to operate is a business asset. The license had extrinsic and (,. intrinsic business value" as demonstrated by Petitioner's current more efficient operation. The sale of a "business" or a license falls within the contemplation of Section F.S. See, Nicholas Cozzo.d/b/a Nick's Deli v. Department of Revenue, (Recommended Order entered by K. N. Ayers July 14, 1988, and Jacobs v. Kirk 223 So.2d 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969.' 31. Petitioner has the burden to show that the assessment at issue was incorrect. In view of the inadequacy of Petitioner's records, Respondent's methodology to assess the taxes owed was reasonable. See, Section (5(b F.S. Petitioner failed to sustain its burden. See, St. Petersburg (~ Steel Corp. v. State of Florida, Department of Revenue. 2081A ( FALR 32. The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any error in the assessment, with one possible exception. I '/ has,~in Since the agency this single audit, given Petitioner a credit for any tax actually paid, it should credit Petitioner with any tax actually paid by Yrr. Ruich, if it has not already done so. RECOMMENDATION Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining the subject audit and assessment against Petitioner, less credit to Petitioner for prior tax paid, if any, during the audit period by predecessor in interest Ruich, (~ Taxpayer I.D. Nos. and, if credit therefore has hot previously been afforded to Petitioner. 16 II /1.. (./ --_.~-----"

20 -A--- I Florida. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of April, 1993, at Tallahassee, EL JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Div~sion of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida ( Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, If II 17 I,I ~!

21 - APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 92~2348, The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to (2, F.5., upon the parties' re~pective proposed findings of fact (PFOF Petitioner's PFOF: 1 Accepted so far as it goes. Findings of Facts 4, 14. Covered in ,25,27-28 Accepted but not dispositive, ultimate, or material, Covered in Findings of Facts 4-6, Accepted. Covered in Findings of Facts 5-12, Accepted but subordinate. of Fact Covered in Findings CJ 6-7, ,14, ,10,24,26 u il Rejected as stated because as stated it does not reflect the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. Covere~ in Findings of Facts 5-9. ~ Rejected as out of context and misleading. Not supported by the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole. Rejected as stated because as stated it does not reflect the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole, and because it attempts to state a Conclusion of Law. Covered in Findings of Fact 5-11, 14-17, and Conclusions of Law ,19-20,29-30 Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. ResDondent's PFOF: 1-11 Accepted except where subordinate unnecessary, or cumulative. Copies furnished: o Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida ,,/,/

22 'Ill"'!..,.1, ",~ Linda Lettera, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida Michael L. Brewer, Esquire 500 Canal Street New Smy~na Beach, Florida Leland L. McCharen, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Tax Section Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS: All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed!-~ with the agency that will issue the final order in this' case. U 1/ Ii CJ 19