Life. Health Insurance. Unemployment Benefits. Pensions. Work Injuries. Disability. David A. Robalino

Transcription

1 Unemployment Benefits Life Health Insurance Pensions Disability Work Injuries David A. Robalino

2 Why is the topic relevant? 2 Society is better off if individuals have insurance: Consumption smoothing and poverty prevention. Adequate income protection can facilitate transitions between jobs (labor mobility). Incentives to engage in higher risk / higher returns activities (innovation). But markets often fail: Myopia, liquidity constraints, failures in capital and insurance markets... There is a justification for government intervention.

3 Policy question 3 How to design SI systems that can be gradually expanded to all workers and meet the following criteria: Provide adequate benefits Are sustainable Are equitable Are incentive friendly (minimize distortions in labor markets)

4 Main messages 4 Need to delink access to SI from the labor contract (Bismarkian systems don t work): Most of the problems/lm distortions of mandatory social insurance result from the way redistribution is designed. The way forward would be to have systems where contributions are linked to benefits and where redistribution is explicit: It can then be better targeted (less costly). Distortions can be better controlled. It can be financed in the most efficient way.

5 Outline 5 Typology of social insurance systems and the problem of coverage. Classic labor market distortions imposed by SI systems. A general policy framework to design and expand SI coverage.

6 6 Typology of SI systems and the problem of coverage

7 Mapping SI systems RISK - PROGRAMS INSTRUMENTS FINANCING MECHANISMS Pensions Old-age Disability Survivors Unemployment benefits Savings Risk-pooling (insurance) Redistribution Pay-roll taxes Individual contributions General revenues Health benefits Explicit Implicit

8 Systems that we observe 8 Pensions Defined Benefit (risk-pooling) (pay-roll and IC) (implicit redistribution) Defined Contributions (savings) (pay-roll and IC) (explicit redistribution) Unemployment benefits Severance Pay (risk-pooling) (employer tax) (implicit redistribution) Unemployment Insurance (risk-pooling) (pay-roll and IC) (implicit redistribution) Savings (risk-pooling) (pay-roll and IC) (explicit redistribution) Health benefits Social H. Insurance (risk-pooling) (pay-roll and IC) (implicit redistribution) National Health Services (risk-pooling) (general revenues) (implicit redistribution) Health Savings Accounts (savings) (pay-roll and IC) (explicit redistribution)

9 Only a minority has access to SI 9 Coverage (active members / labor force) 0 to to to to 100

10 Informality is part of the problem 10 Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Costa Rica Dominican Rep. Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela SSE Formal salaried USE Informal salaried 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Share of Employment

11 Coverage is also correlated with income Paraguay Nicaragua Honduras Dom. Rep. Bolivia 0 Peru Ecuador Guatemala El Salvador Colombia Venezuela Mexico Argentina Panama 0 Brazil Uruguay Costa Rica Chile

12 A few reasons 12 The long-term poor cannot save. Low income individuals with some saving capacity may not be able to save enough and/or have stronger preferences for liquidity and high discount rates. Unskilled workers may be more likely to be in jobs with high turnover and/or in informal firms, and thus be out of the social security most of the time.

13 Dirhams 13 Another issue is the low productivity of some businesses Manufacturing Firms in Morocco Value added per worker Legislated Minimum Wage plus CNSS contributions Legislated Minimum Wage Firms Ranked by Value Added per Worker

14 14 Even those covered are not covered all the time Contribution Density (% of active life) Argentina Chile Uruguay Source: Robalino, Ribe and Walker (2009) Q1 Q5

15 15 Countries have implemented noncontributory systems Pension Coverage by Income quintiles Chile Bolivia Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Costa Rica Non-contributory pensions Both contributory and noncontributory pensions 20 Contributory pensions 0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Source: Robalino, Ribe and Walker (2009)

16 but these can create other problems Health Insurance Coverage by Income Decile Colombia Peru D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 0 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D Chile Non-contributory Health Insurance Both Contributory and Noncontributory Health Insurance 20 Contributory Health Insurance 0 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 Source: Robalino, Ribe and Walker (2009)

17 17 SI and labor markets

18 What are the possible distortions? 18 ON THE SUPPLY SIDE Incentives to search for and keep jobs Unemployment Insurance Lack of access to unemployment benefits Incentives to switch jobs Lack of SI benefits portability Tax component of SS contributions Incentives for informal vs. formal work Subsidies to informal workers Pensions Incentives for participation in the labor force

19 What are the possible distortions? 19 ON THE DEMAND SIDE Unemployment Savings Accounts Incentives to destroy jobs Incentives to create jobs Severance pay Pay-roll tax Incentives for informal vs. formal sector

20 20 Tax-wedges in many countries are already high Egypt Colombia Mexico Hungary Djibouti Romania Lithuania Czech R. Poland Turkey Slovenia Latvia Serbia and Slovak R. Macedonia Estonia Croatia Venezuela Ukraine Bulgaria Armenia Uzbekistan Argentina Algeria Tunisia Peru World Average Tax Wedge

21 21 Morocco Belarus Bosnia Albania Iran Moldova Uruguay Kyrgyz R. Brazil Russian Azerbaijan Tajikistan Costa Rica Kazakhsta Yemen Georgia Jordan Ecuador Paraguay Libya Lebanon Niger Chile Iraq Bahrain World Average Tax Wedge

22 Severance pay can also be costly 22 Colombia Peru Mexico Ecuador Uruguay Guatemala El Salvador Bolivia Argentina Panama Chile Honduras Venezuela Nicaragua Paraguay 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 9.0% Insurance Equivalent Cost of Severance Pay (% wage bill)

23 23 Most of these distortions have a common problem Badly designed redistributive arrangements Redistribution in SI is pervasive because contributions are not linked to benefits: Some individuals systematically receive less than what they put in (a tax) while others receive more (a subsidy). Behaviors are affected; individuals can act to maximize the subsidies and minimize the taxes. And this redistribution is financed, in good part, through pay-roll taxes.

24 Examples of the effect of implicit 24 redistribution Unemployment insurance: If individuals paid the actuarially fair premium the one that reflects their expected cost to the system (no subsidy) there would be less moral hazard. Pensions: If pensions where linked to contributions individuals would have less incentives to evade (no tax on formal work) or retire early (no subsidy for early retirement).

25 25 Health: If people paid a premium that reflects their expected cost to the system young & healthy workers would be more willing to participate (within the classic SI system they are systematically taxed). SI in general: If SI benefits were fully portable (no tax paid for switching jobs) there would be more labor mobility. If all employers contributions were directly linked to benefits it would be easier to combine wages and inkind benefits as a total compensation package.

26 26 Policy Implications

27 Two main proposals 27 Expanding SI coverage requires delinking access from the labor contract All citizens/residents would register in the same social insurance system regardless of where they work. Redistributive arrangements (subsidies) are needed (given individuals with no or limited savings capacity and firms with low productivity) Make them explicit. Targeted if possible (any distortion is then contained and better managed). Finance as much as you can from general revenues.

28 Practical implications 28 Pensions: Move to define contribution systems (no redistribution). Subsidize pensions (ex-post) or contributions (ex-ante) for individuals with no or limited savings capacity. Finance subsidies from general revenues. Health: Move away from contributions based on earnings to contributions based on the cost of the health package. Subsidize contributions for individuals with no or limited savings capacity.

29 29 Unemployment benefits: Move away from insurance arrangements it is difficult or impossible to make them actuarially fair. Rely on savings Use subsidies to top-contributions or benefits for individuals with no or low savings capacity.

30 References 30 Effects of Regulations, Severance Pay and Tax Wedge: Daveri and Tabellini Unemployment Growth and Taxation in Industrial Countries. Discussion Paper Brescia University. Brescia. Italy. de Barros Ricardo Paes and Calso Henrique Corseui The Impact of Regulations on Brazilian Labor Market Performance. (Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada) Research Network Working paper series ; R-427. Inter American Development Bank. Kugler, A. (2000). "The Incidence of Job Security Regulations on Labor Market Flexibility and Compliance in Colombia: Evidence from the 1990 Reform." Research Network Working paper R-393. Washington, D.C., United States: Inter-American Development Bank. Lazear, E.P Job Security Provisions and Employment. Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 105, pp Mondino, G. and Montoya, S. (2002). The Effects of Labor Market Regulations on Employment Decisions by Firms. Empirical Evidence for Argentina, in Law and Employment: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean, James Heckman and Carmen Pagés Eds, forthcoming from The University of Chicago Press. Chicago, IL Montenegro. C. and C. Pagés. (2003). "Who Benefits from Labor Market Regulations? Chile " NBER Working Paper No. w9850. Cambridge, MA. Nicoletti, G. and S. Scarpetta (1999), Product and labour market regulations and performance in the OECD labour markets, OECD, Economics Department Working Paper, forthcoming.

31 31 Orszag, J.M., P.R. Orszag, D. J. Snower, and J.E. Stiglitz The Impact of Individual Accounts: Piecemeal versus Comprehensive Approaches. Paper presented at the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, World Bank, Washington, DC, April 29, Orszag, J.M., and D. Snower From Unemployment Benefits to Unemployment Accounts. IZA Discussion Paper No. 532, Bonn. Pagés, C. and Montenegro. C. (1999). "Job Security and the Age-Composition of Employment: Evidence from Chile." Working Paper 398. Washington, D.C., United States: Inter-American Development Bank. Saavedra, J. and M. Torero. (2004) Labor Market Reforms and their impact over formal labor demand and job market turnover: The case of Peru. In Heckman and Pages eds. Law and Employment, Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean, NBER, Chicago.

32 32 Effects of unemployment benefits: Cunningham,Wendy V Unemployment Insurance in Brazil: Unemployment Duration, Wages and Sectoral Choice, Technical Report, World Bank. de Barros, Ricardo Paes, Carlos.Henrique Corseuil and M. Foguel Os incentivos adversos dos programas de seguro-desemprego e do FGTS no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: IPEA. Mimeographed document. Gonzaga, Gustavo Labor Turnover and Labor Legislation, Economía, Journal of the LACEA, 4 (1). Holmlund B Unemployment Insurance in Theory and Practice. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 100 (1): Hopenhayn, H. and R. Rogerson. (1993). "Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation: A General Equilibrium Analysis." Journal of Political Economy. 101(5). Margolis David N. 2008: The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on Formal and Informal Sector Employment in Brazil. Draft Manuscript. World Bank. Washington DC. Mondino, G. and Montoya, S. (2002). The Effects of Labor Market Regulations on Employment Decisions by Firms. Empirical Evidence for Argentina, in Law and Employment: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean, James Heckman and Carmen Pagés Eds, forthcoming from The University of Chicago Press. Chicago, IL Montenegro. C. and C. Pagés. (2003). "Who Benefits from Labor Market Regulations? Chile " NBER Working Paper No. w9850. Cambridge, MA. Robalino David, Milan Vodopivec, and Andras Bodor. (2009b). Savings for Unemployment in Good and Bad Times: Options for Developing Countries. Social Protection Discussion Papers. World Bank. Washington. DC. World Bank UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: Efficiency Effects and Lessons for Developing Countries. Employment Policy Primer. No. 5. Human Development Network. Washington. DC. Vodopivec, M, J.C. van Ours, and G. Reyes Hartley (2009). Incentive Effects of Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts: Evidence from Chile, World Bank, Social Protection Discussion Paper, forthcoming.

33 33 Effects of pensions: Carvalho-Filho, Irineu Evangelista de "Old-Age Benefits and Retirement Decisions of Rural Elderly in Brazil."Journal of Development Economics. Vol. 86, p , Bodor, Andras; David A. Robalino and Michal Rutkowski How Mandatory Pensions Affect Labor Supply Decisions and Human Capital Accumulation?. Options to Bridge the Gap Between Economic Theory and Policy Analysis. Journal of Banking and Credit. Piggot J., D. Robalino, and S. Jimenez-Martin Incentive Effects of Retirement Income Transfers. World Bank, Washington DC. In Robert Holzmann, David Robalino and Oriyuki Takayama (Eds). Closing the Coverage Gap: The Role of Social Pensions and Other Retirement Income Transfers. World Bank, Washington DC. Robalino David, Eduardo Zylberstajn, Helio Zylberstajn, and Luis Eduardo Afonso An Ex-Ante Evaluation of the Impact of Social Insurance Policies on Labor Supply in Brazil: The Case for Explicit over Implicit Redistribution. Forthcoming. Social Protection Discussion Papers. World Bank. Washington DC. Valdez Prieto, Salvador A theory of contribution density and implications for pension design. Pensions Primer. World Bank, Washington DC.

34 34 Effects of Health Insurance: Levy, S Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes: Social Policy, Informality and Economic Growth in Mexico. Brookings Institution Press. Washington, D.C. Perry, G. E., B. Maloney, O. Arias, P. Fajnzylber, A. Mason, and J. Saavedra Informality: Exit and Exclusion. Washington, DC: World Bank. Parker, S.W. & Scott, J., An Evaluation of the Mexican Seguro Popular program: Work and Formal sector Participation. World Bank. Wagstaff, A., Social Health Insurance Reexamined. World Bank.