Baseline U.S. Economic Outlook, Summary Table*

Transcription

1 July 218 Gus Faucher Stuart Hoffman William Adams Kurt Rankin Chief Economist Senior Economic Advisor Senior Economist Economist Executive Summary Economy Continues to Expand in Mid-218, But Trade Remains a Downside Risk The U.S. economy added 213, jobs in June, above the consensus expectation for an increase of 195,. The private sector added 22, jobs over the month, with government employment up by 11,. May job growth was revised up 21, to 244,, while April growth was revised up by 16, to 175,, for a combined upward revision to job growth over the two months of 37,. The U.S. economy has added an average of 215, jobs per month so far in 218, above last year s pace of 182, per month. The unemployment rate rose.2 percentage point in June to percent; this was the first increase in the unemployment rate since August 217. Outside of April and May, this is the lowest the unemployment rate has been since the end of 2. The unemployment rate rose for a good reason. More than 6, people entered the labor force in June, encouraged by the tight job market. The labor force participation rate (share of adults working or looking for work) rose by.2 percentage point over the month to 62.9 percent; since the beginning of 216 it has been in a narrow range between 62.6 and 63. percent. The number of people employed in the household survey (different from the survey of employers) rose by an unspectacular 1, in June, but growth has averaged almost 26, per month so far this year. Average hourly earnings rose.2 percent in June, a slowing from.3 percent growth in May. Year-over-year growth in wages was 2.7 percent in June, unchanged from May. The U.S. and the European Union reopened negotiations to reduce tariffs on July 25, but disagree on what they are discussing: E.U. President Jean-Claude Juncker said it was zero tariffs on industrial goods, while President Trump said zero tariffs on non-auto industrial goods. Even so, both sides are refraining from adding tariffs during the negotiations, including on imported cars. The U.S., Canada, and Mexico resumed NAFTA renegotiations after Mexico s July election. The U.S. imposed 25 percent incremental tariffs on $34 billion of Chinese imports on July 6, and China retaliated with equivalent tariffs on U.S. exports. China s yuan has depreciated 8 percent from its year-to-date peak in April, and the U.S. is pursuing tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars of other Chinese imports. Further escalation of trade barriers is a major downside risk to U.S. economic growth. Baseline U.S. Economic Outlook, Summary Table* 1Q'18p 2Q'18f 3Q'18f 4Q'18f 1Q'19f 2Q'19f 3Q'19f 4Q'19f 217a 218f 219f 22f Output & Prices Real GDP (Chained 29 Billions $ ) Percent Change Annualized CPI ( = 1 ) Percent Change Annualized Labor Markets Payroll Jobs (Millions ) Percent Change Annualized Unemployment Rate (Percent ) Interest Rates (Percent) Federal Funds Treasury Note, 1-year a = actual f = forecast p = preliminary * Please see the Expanded Table for more forecast series.

2 Chart 2: Another Month of Great Job Growth in June 6 5 Establishment Survey Household Survey Monthly Change in Employment (3-month MA, ths.) -3 '13 '14 '15 '16 '17 '18 Flattening Yield Curve Bears Watching, But Likely Not Signaling Near-Term Recession What economists call an inverted yield curve, when short-term interest rates move above long-term interest rates, has traditionally been a signal of coming recession. Right now short-term rates remain below long-term rates, but the yield spread, or difference, has narrowed dramatically over the past several years. This has raised concerns about the potential of a recession in the next year or two. The yield curve may narrow further but is unlikely to invert, and even if it does, that may not be an indication that a recession is coming. But the flattening yield curve certainly bears watching. Lending for longer periods of time is riskier than lending for shorter periods, for a number of reasons. The lender is less likely to be paid back with a longer loan, and the lender is also exposed to changing economic conditions, such as higher inflation, that makes a fixed interest rate loan less valuable. Because of this interest rates generally increase with the length of the loan. For example, in the United States the interest rate on a 1-year Treasury bond (a 1-year loan to the federal government) is almost always higher than the interest rate on a 1-year Treasury bill (a 1-year loan). But under some conditions short-term interest rates move above long-term interest rates, and the yield curve is said to invert. (The difference in interest rates between 1-year and 1-year Treasurys is the one of the most widely cited spreads). According to research from the San Francisco Fed, since 1955 every recession has been preceded by an inverted yield curve in the previous 6 to 24 months. There has only been one false positive time during that time, when the yield curve inverted but a recession did not follow, in the mid-196s (see Chart 1). An inverted yield curve occurs when short-term rates are rising quickly, most often because the Federal Reserve is raising short-term interest rates to cool off an economy at risk of overheating. At the same time long-term rates are rising much more slowly, or perhaps even falling, because they reflect longer-term concerns about economic growth. In that respect in an inverted yield curve may signal recession, but does not cause it. But an inverted yield curve may also making lending less profitable, and thus lead banks to pull back on extending credit, contributing to a recession. The 1-year to 1-year Treasury spread has narrowed from 2.8 percentage points in late 213 to around percentage point in mid- 218 as short-term rates have increased much more than long-term rates, raising concerns that the yield curve could soon invert. PNC s baseline forecast is for the yield curve to narrow somewhat through this year and next as the Fed continues to raise the fed funds rate, but not invert. However, even if the yield curve does invert, that does not mean that a recession is inevitable. There are a number of factors that have brought long-term rates well below their long-run historical averages, including slower expected U.S. and global economic growth; lower expected inflation; and quantitative easing from the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of Japan. Thus the yield curve may not be as powerful a predictor of recession in the future as it has been in the past. However, because the yield curve is a forward-looking indicator of recession, economists will not know if its predictive power has declined until well after the next inversion. The yield curve will likely not invert in the near term, and the U.S. economic expansion should continue at least through mid-219. Real U.S. GDP growth will accelerate to above 3 percent on a year-over-year basis by late 218. Business investment and consumer spending will both get boosts from the tax cuts, and the housing market will gradually improve despite higher mortgage rates. A large increase in federal government spending will also be a near-term positive. Assuming no significant disruptions trade will be a slight negative as growth in imports is stronger than growth in exports. Growth will slow in 219 as fiscal stimulus wears off. Job growth this year will be 19,, slightly above last year s pace, and the unemployment rate will move lower, to around percent by the end of the year. The tighter job market will lead to faster wage growth, providing additional support to consumer spending and offsetting the drag from higher energy prices. The Federal Open Market Committee will raise the federal funds rate one more time this year, in September, to a range of to 2.25 percent. 2

3 Chart 3: June Increase in Unemployment Rate Nothing to Worry About Unemployment rate, % (R) Chart 4: Rising Utilization Rate Giving Manufacturers More Pricing Power Capacity utilization, % (R) Industrial production, % change (L) Avg. hourly earnings, % change year ago (L) '8 '9 '1 '11 ' '13 '14 '15 '16 '17 ' '14 A J O '15 A J O '16 A J O '17 A J O '18 A Chart 5: Manufacturing Job Growth Continues to Accelerate in Employment, % change year ago Construction Manufacturing Services, ex-government ' '13 '14 '15 '16 '17 ' Chart 6: Housing Affordability Is Falling With Continued Price Gains, Higher Mortgage Rates % change year ago Case-Shiller (2-city) -6 FHFA purchase-only -8 '1 '11 ' '13 '14 '15 '16 '17 '18 5,2 5, 4,8 4,6 4,4 4,2 4, 3,8 3,6 Chart 7: With More Inventory, Home Sales Set to Pick Up in Second Half of 218 3,4 Existing single-family home sales, annual rate, ths. (L) 3,2 New single-family home sales, 3, annual rate, ths. (R) '1 '11 ' '13 '14 '15 '16 '17 ' Chart 8: Lull in Housing Starts Unlikely to Persist 1,45 Seasonally adjusted annualized rate, ths. 1,4 Permits Starts Completions 1,35 1,3 1,25 1,2 1,15 1,1 1,5 1, '14 '15 '16 '17 '18 3

4 Chart 9: It Is Not Just Energy That Has Pushed Inflation Higher in 218 Finished goods PPI CPI Core CPI % change year ago '14 '15 '16 '17 '18 Chart 1: Gasoline Prices Continue to Increase in Brent Crude Oil, $/BBL (L) Unleaded Gasoline, $/gal (R) 3 '6 '7 '8 '9 '1 '11 ' '13 '14 '15 '16 '17 ' % change Chart 11: After Soft First Quarter, Better Consumer Spending Growth Chart : Weaker Retail Sales in June, But Fundamentals Still Solid Retail sales, % change Real after-tax income Real pers. consumption expenditure '15 A J O '16 A J O '17 A J O '18 A Total Ex-auto Ex-auto, gasoline '15 '16 '17 ' Chart 13: Potential Tariffs a Big Downside Risk for Vehicle Sales Auto and light truck sales (domestic & foreign) Auto and light truck assemblies (domestic only) Mil., annualized rate Chart 14: Household Economic Stress Remains Near Its Long-Run Average Household Economic Stress Index HESI = Unemployment rate + CPI inflation house price growth '15 '16 '17 '18-3 Note: PNC calculates HESI with the Case-Shiller 2- City Composite HPI -6 '1 '11 ' '13 '14 '15 '16 '17 '18 Disclaimer: The material presented is of a general nature and does not constitute the provision of investment or economic advice to any person, or a recommendation to buy or sell any security or adopt any investment strategy. Opinions and forecasts expressed herein are subject to change without notice. Relevant information was obtained from sources deemed reliable. Such information is not guaranteed as to its accuracy. You should seek the advice of an investment professional to tailor a financial plan to your particular needs. 218 The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. All rights reserved. 4

5 1Q'18p 2Q'18f 3Q'18f 4Q'18f 1Q'19f 2Q'19f 3Q'19f 4Q'19f 217a 218f 219f 22f Output Nominal GDP (Billions $ ) Percent Change Annualized Real GDP (Chained 29 Billions $ ) Percent Change Annualized Pers. Consumption Expenditures Percent Change Annualized Nonresidential Fixed Investment Percent Change Annualized Residential Investment Percent Change Annualized Change in Private Inventories Net Exports Government Expenditures Percent Change Annualized Industrial Prod. Index (2 = 1 ) Percent Change Annualized Capacity Utilization (Percent ) Prices CPI ( = 1 ) Percent Change Annualized Core CPI Index ( = 1) Percent Change Annualized PCE Price Index (29 = 1 ) Percent Change Annualized Core PCE Price Index (29 = 1 ) Percent Change Annualized GDP Price Index (29 = 1 ) Percent Change Annualized Crude Oil, WTI ($/Barrel ) Labor Markets Payroll Jobs (Millions ) Percent Change Annualized Unemployment Rate (Percent ) Average Weekly Hours, Prod. Works Personal Income Average Hourly Earnings ($ ) Percent Change Annualized Real Disp. Income (29 Billions $ ) Percent Change Annualized Housing Housing Starts (Ths., Ann. Rate ) Ext. Home Sales (Ths., Ann Rate ) New SF Home Sales (Ths., Ann Rate ) Case/Shiller HPI (Jan. 2 = 1 ) Percent Change Year Ago Consumer Household Economic Stress Index Auto Sales (Millions ) Consumer Credit (Billions $ ) Percent Change Annualized Interest Rates (Percent) Prime Rate Federal Funds Month Treasury Bill Year Treasury Note Year Fixed Mortgage a = actual f = forecast p = preliminary Baseline U.S. Economic Outlook, Expanded Table Disclaimer: The material presented is of a general nature and does not constitute the provision of investment or economic advice to any person, or a recommendation to buy or sell any security or adopt any investment strategy. Opinions and forecasts expressed herein are subject to change without notice. Relevant information was obtained from sources deemed reliable. Such information is not guaranteed as to its accuracy. You should seek the advice of an investment professional to tailor a financial plan to your particular needs. 218 The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. All rights reserved. PNC Economics Group July, 218