Income Redistribution. Inequality, reasons for intervention, and social welfare programs

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1 Income Redistribution Inequality, reasons for intervention, and social welfare programs

2 Inequality and Poverty Income redistribution is justified on a number of different grounds Some want to lessen income inequality (gap between rich and poor) Others are more concerned about eliminating or reducing poverty. These people would say it s not inequality per se, that s the problem but everybody should have enough to live reasonably. Worth considering some data on both of these issues. 2

3 Inequality and Poverty Some background on income inequality in Canada The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of zero represents perfect equality and 100, perfect inequality. Source: detail.asp?id=4842 3

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5 Inequality Inequality has increased in Canada in spite of increased redistribution by government Could suggest redistribution is ineffective or even makes things worse (disrupting work incentives) Or could suggest that in absence of redistribution, inequality would have become even worse. Possible factors driving inequality Globalization Increasing returns to higher education (skillsbiased technological change) Welfare cutbacks since 1990s 5

6 Issues in Measuring Inequality Usually use annual income data to construct inequality measures; but this ignores lifecycle issues Young, old tend to earn less than middle-aged people Some argue that we should be more interested in inequality of consumption than in inequality of income. Permanent income matters more than transitory income, yet we don t have good data on permanent income Some measures of inequality don t take into account household size 6

7 Poverty The Low Income Cut-Off line (LICO) is often referred to as the Poverty line in Canada. Stats Canada defines family income level at which families spend 63% or more of income on food, shelter, clothing Varies by family size and whether family lives in urban or rural region Bigger families will have higher cutoff Urban areas will have higher cutoff, because cost of living is higher there Next table shows how LICO is found. 7

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11 Problem with Poverty Line Measure People disagree over how poverty should be defined. Also, severity of poverty difficult to ascertain from a raw count of families below LICO A family of three in 2007 with $3000 income looks the same (i.e. below LICO ) as one with $27,242 income; Clearly first family is in much worse shape 11

12 Why Redistribute Income? There is substantial debate over whether/how much income redistribution is a good idea Redistribution often involves policy that could distort behavior--may involve reducing social welfare (focusing on narrow efficiency criterion) Inequality, and especially poverty, are disturbing to some people==>implies that redistribution could make society better off (in other words, maybe more than narrow efficiency matters) Long been a quest of philosophers to answer such questions 12

13 Are There Efficiency Arguments for Redistribution? In general, redistribution is inefficient Alters incentives to work by both rich and poor, etc. But can think of cases where redistribution could redress inefficiency Externalities associated with poverty Crime, political instability, communicable disease Equity in income distribution may be a public good People may have a taste for equality (though others might have taste for inequality!) 13

14 Efficiency Arguments for Redistribution Arguably there is a missing market for income insurance For some, poverty is caused by a bit of bad luck (lose a job, get sick, etc.) Can t buy insurance against such outcomes (due to adverse selection, moral hazard) Social safety net replaces this missing market 14

15 Efficiency Arguments for Redistribution Redistribution addresses credit market failures I may be poor today, but know I ll be better off tomorrow. But will a bank lend to me on this basis? (again moral hazard, adverse selection cause missing market) Taxes that force the rich to pay more than the poor for public goods both redistribute, and solve problems of underprovision (missing market problems) 15

16 Program Design--Optimal Redistribution Cash transfers vs other mechanisms Suppose we want to redistribute; does it matter what types of benefits we give? Perhaps we re worried about the ability of lowincome individuals to buy good quality education 1) Could give cash transfer 2) Could subsidize education 3) Could provide a voucher that can be spent on education only 4) Could provide education in public schools 16

17 Analyzing Different Redistribution Methods Advantage: Cash transfers will give the greatest utility increase to recipients compared to any other govt. program of equal cost. Disadvantage: Expenditure on education may not increase much Cash Transfer Other Goods New BC Old BC Education 17

18 Analyzing Different Redistribution Methods A voucher for education gives a poor household education, rather than cash Note that voucher gives less utility increase than cash for some Leads to more consumption of education for some Leads to same utility and same choices as cash transfer for some In-kind transfers Other Goods Optimal choice with ed voucher Old BC Optimal choice with cash transfer New BC Education 18

19 Analyzing Different Redistribution Methods Other Goods Optimal choice with subsidy and size of subsidy Optimal choice with subsidy Other Goods Comparison to cash transfer equal to size of subsidy Optimal choice with cash transfer Optimal choice with subsidy Size of subsidy Old BC Education Old BC Education 19

20 Subsidizing education For the same expenditure by the government, subsidy gives less utility increase than cash Note optimal choice w/subsidy places person on lower indifference curve than cash Other Goods Old BC Optimal choice with cash transfer Optimal choice with subsidy BC w/subsidy Education 20

21 Analyzing Different Redistribution Methods Publicly-provided education gives a fixed amount of education to people for free If they want to consume more, have to opt out of public system In this case, public ed leads to more education; but gives lower utility gain than cash transfer. Can you imagine a case where public ed would lead to less education? Publicly Provided Education Other Goods Optimal choice with cash transfer Old BC Optimal choice with public education New BC Education 21

22 Advantages of Cash Transfers Cash transfers give the most bang for the government s buck, in terms of utility increases. They only create an income effect, no substitution effect. Administrative costs of cash transfers also tend to be lower 22

23 Advantages of In-Kind Transfers In-kind transfers (vouchers, subsidies, publicly providing the good) generally give more bang for the buck in terms of getting people to consume the targeted good. Paternalism: Might want people to consume more education, even if they don t want to, because it s good for them (or their kids) Addressing externality: Might want people to consume more ed, because there s a positive externality involved 23

24 Advantages of In-kind Transfers Political considerations Sometimes benefits of the in-kind transfer go to producers of the good This can increase support for the redistributive program Teachers unions are big proponents of public education Farmers are big supporters of school lunch programs and food stamps in the US Housing industry generally supports housing subsidies 24

25 Advantages of In-Kind Transfers In-kind transfers are often easier to target than cash transfers Suppose you want to redistribute wealth Could take wealth from a bunch of people and give it to others Creates an incentive to accumulate less wealth or to hide wealth (pretend you re poor) It s relatively easy to hide income/wealth An alternative way to redistribute wealth is to (for example) educate poor children well Less easy to pretend to have poor children Rich are unlikely to pretend to be poor in order to get education vouchers (same is true with housing provided to poor) 25

26 Universal vs. Targetted Programs Universal programs are available to everyone (e.g. CPP); targeted programs are only available to certain subgroups (e.g. Canada Child Tax Benefit) Methods of targeting Means test (provide to those with low measured incomes--note incentive to change one s real or apparent income) Categorical aid. Targets a group whose members are likely to be poor (single moms, etc.) Subsidize inferior goods (public housing, etc.) that rich don t want to buy Queues, welfare for work, stigma 26

27 Universal vs. Targetted programs Universal programs are administratively easier (no need to identify rich vs. poor) More political support Less effective at redistribution! Very expensive 27

28 Welfare Programs in Canada Provincial governments are mainly responsible for social welfare programs Provinces maintain significant control over design and delivery of welfare programs Substantial cross-provincial variation in benefit levels Differences due to differences in cost-of-living, differences in fiscal capacity, and difference in political environment 28

29 Province/ Territory Total Welfare Income 2011 by Household Type Single Employable 1 Parent, 1 Child 2 Parents 2 Children Alberta 7,248 15,849 22,292 British Columbia 7,947 17,402 22,005 Manitoba 6,922 14,932 21,662 New Brunswick 6,696 16,274 20,062 Newf & Labr 9,821 19,673 22,822 Northwest Terr. 17,326 26,502 33,614 Nova Scotia 6,954 15,588 21,919 Nunavut 41,818 49,507 55,207 Ontario ,069 24,010 PEI 7,152 17,674 25,892 Quebec 7,560 18,041 23,271 Saskatchewan 8,735 17,889 24,809 Yukon 15,697 25,953 36,647 29

30 Welfare Programs in Canada Welfare assistance payments are needbased Families assessed on basis of income, assets Assistance is difference between assessed needs and available resources Creates potential incentives for households to alter income or asset holdings on basis of assistance rules 30

31 Do Welfare Payments Eliminate Poverty? Most welfare payments are too low to single-handedly pull a family above the LICO In many cases, they bring households up above bare subsistence levels Especially HHs with children Single employable persons tend to fare pretty poorly. 31

32 Welfare and Incentives to Work Can analyze effect of policy on work by considering effect of policy on wage Then think about how workers respond to changes in wage Use consumption-leisure model. 32

33 Analyzing Effect of Welfare Program The typical welfare program has effects on both wage and income Tend to lower the implicit wage, by taxing away benefits Tend to increase income, by providing lump-sum benefits Together, these effects tend to reduce worker hours supplied, and decrease labour force participation 33

34 Simple Welfare with Clawback Suppose a person receives a certain amount of cash transfer every month. For every $ earned income, cash transfer is reduced by $1. This is known as a 100% clawback. This implies that person is looking at a 100% tax rate on the first dollars earned until earnings are above the amount of the cash transfer. After tax wage is zero! 34

35 Welfare Program with 100% Clawback This provides particularly strong work disincentives y It doesn t make sense for a person to work less than T-L* hours but not zero hours. Either work more than A T-L* hours and don t go on welfare or leave labour force entirely L* T C Leisure 35

36 Welfare Program with 100% Clawback Effect is either people on welfare working zero hours Or people work and do not receive any assistance (working poor). Decreasing the clawback rate increases incentives to work. 36

37 Alternatives to Welfare--Negative Income Tax Suppose program offers a cash grant to eligible individuals -- say $1000 per month if not working. Welfare recipients can work but the cash grant is reduced in proportion to the income earned in the labour market. Let s suppose the government takes away 50 cents for every dollar earned, i.e. there is a 50% clawback. e.g., Individual works 2 hours for $10 an hour labour income is $20 but grant is reduced by $10 Total Income = $1010. Like a tax on the wage of 50%. 37

38 Negative Income Tax (NIT) Slope=-10 Slope=-5 A C Increases non-labour income Reduces the net wage $1000 B If leisure normal, both of these things should reduce labour supplied se ie With preferences as drawn the individual opts for the NIT program and chooses bundle C over A. NIT has a disincentive effect but less so than simple welfare. 38

39 Advantages of NIT Reduces incentives to work, but less so than welfare. The working poor receive some income support if they earn less than the breakeven earnings. Those unable to work, receive some basic income. Introduction of universal NIT simplifies administration of welfare system. Just put it in federal income tax schedule. 39

40 Problems with NIT Very costly, if NIT should provide reasonable incentives to work and at the same time cover basic needs for those who are unable to work. While it would give an incentive to work to those currently on welfare, it would give the currently working poor an incentive to reduce their hours of work. Requires coordination of federal and provincial govts 40

41 Workfare Able-bodied individuals receive transfer payments only if they agree to participate in a work-related activity and accept employment, if offered. Proponents of workfare argue More public support b/c recipients work. Makes going on welfare less attractive. Gives people the opportunity to gain work experience and skills 41

42 Questions about Workfare Is such a system an affront to the dignity of the poor? Can useful jobs be found for recipients? Can welfare administrators differentiate between people who are able-bodied and who are not? Administrative costs? 42

43 Welfare Programs with Better Incentives? A wage subsidy might increase labour supplied, while helping poor Recall that theoretical effect of a wage increase is ambiguous (see problem set) But if start with someone who doesn t work much, income effect should be small. Wage subsidies are expensive (especially if universally applied) A welfare program with no clawback would have no work-reducing substitution effect Again, expensive to give this to everyone. Exercise: Draw each of these cases. 43

44 Some evidence on welfare programs, labour supply, and earnings Chetty, Friedman, and Saez 2012

45 Some evidence on welfare programs, labour supply, and earnings Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in US gives aid to poor families with a wage subsidy phase in One goal is to encourage LF participation Phase out at higher incomes (positive clawback high implied marginal tax rate) Saez (2002) argues this may be optimal if LS elasticity is higher on extensive margin (LF participation) than intensive (hours worked) 45

46 EITC and Labour Supply Incentives EITC provides a wage subsidy at low earnings levels Then no clawback for a range of higher earnings Then positive clawback (high implied MTR) In theory, the policy will cause some to work more, some less EITC Budg. Constr. cons positive clawback BC without policy zero clawback wage subsidy leisure 46

47 Chetty, Friedman, Saez (2012) 47

48 Key Empirical Questions Does EITC induce non-workers to start working? How much? Does EITC induce some workers to increase hours? How much? Does EITC induce some workers to reduce hours? How much? Which of these effects dominates? Does the policy increase work overall? How much does the policy help poor families? 48

49 Empirical Challenge If we could conduct an experiment, we would toss a coin to offer EITC to some people (treatment group), while not offering it to others (control group) Want treatment and control groups to be identical (on average) in all ways except whether they are offered EITC Compare labour supply across the two groups (treatment vs. control) In the case of EITC, the policy is available to anyone who qualifies, so it appears that 49 we re left with no control group.

50 Empirical Challenge To use empirical economics lingo, we need a counterfactual (a world without EITC to compare to our factual world) Everyone has access to EITC. Want a group in the population that is poor but is as if it doesn t have access to EITC. Chetty, et al., come up with a clever idea: Many poor people don t know about EITC for them, it s as if the program doesn t exist. If we can compare people who know about EITC to those who don t, this is kind 50 of like having treatment and control groups.

51 Empirical Challenge Really what we want are people with access to information about EITC vs. people lacking access to information about EITC. Chetty, et al., argue that information spreads through local social networks. If you live in an area where your neighbours know about EITC, you have more access to information than if you live in an area where your neighbours don t know about EITC. 51

52 Identifying Areas With High Degree of Knowledge of EITC Chetty et al., look for evidence of people gaming the system with EITC Self-employed workers have a lot of latitude to fudge their earnings in a way to maximize payouts from EITC Chetty looks for evidence of gaming behaviour amongst self employed sharp bunching (SB) Argues that areas with lots of sharp bunching are areas with a high degree of knowledge of EITC. 52

53 Chetty, Friedman, Saez (2012) 53

54 Chetty, Friedman, Saez (2012) SB measure of local knowledge of EITC comes from self-employed, but analysis focuses on wage workers Earnings reported on W2 form hard to manipulate (other than directly changing LS) So can interpret any effects as real labour supply effects. 54

55 Chetty, Friedman, Saez (2012) Knowledge of social programs spreads through individuals Use differential knowledge of policy by geography as a proxy for treatment intensity, in order to assess effect of Earned Income Tax Credit Look for frequency of sharp bunching among self-employed workers as indication of local knowledge of EITC. Self-employed have a lot of control over their earnings, relative to wage and salary employed 55 workers

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59 Chetty, Friedman, Saez (2012) Find that people who move from low SB areas to high SB areas increase their rate of sharp bunching; reverse moves do not lead to such changes Not the area that matters, but information. People who have a child engage in increased sharp bunching if they live in areas with lots of SB Doesn t happen in areas with low SB, even though incentive to engage in SB rises sharply when you have a child. Suggests lack of knowledge of EITC policy in low-knowledge (low SB) neighbourhoods 59

60 Chetty, Friedman, Saez (2012) Use low SB areas as counterfactual for EITC Treat people in low SB areas as if they re not exposed to EITC Look at effects of EITC on wage earnings, EITC refunds (focus on intensive margin) Key question: Do increases in EITC refunds result from people working more (moving to the right in the income distribution?) or working less (moving to the left in the income distribution. 60

61 Chetty, Friedman, Saez (2012) Might worry that people in different areas face different labour markets and hence different earnings potential So instead of just comparing across areas, they compare response of people who go from having no kids to having 1, in high vs. low SB areas Find substantial elasticity of earnings on intensive margin, but more at low end than at high end of EITC-relevant range Implies that EITC increases LS among low earners more than it decreases LS among moderate earners 61

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