Research Report. The Population of Workers Covered by the Auto IRA: Trends and Characteristics. AARP Public Policy Institute.

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Research Report. The Population of Workers Covered by the Auto IRA: Trends and Characteristics. AARP Public Policy Institute."

Transcription

1 AARP Public Policy Institute C E L E B R A T I N G years The Population of Workers Covered by the Auto IRA: Trends and Characteristics Benjamin H. Harris 1 Ilana Fischer The Brookings Institution 1 Harris is on leave from the Brookings Institution while serving as a senior economist with the Council of Economic Advisers. He was a research economist with the Brookings Institution when this paper was written. Research Report

2

3 The Population of Workers Covered by the Auto IRA: Trends and Characteristics Benjamin H. Harris Ilana Fischer The Brookings Institution AARP s Public Policy Institute informs and stimulates public debate on the issues we face as we age. Through research, analysis and dialogue with the nation s leading experts, PPI promotes development of sound, creative policies to address our common need for economic security, health care, and quality of life. The views expressed herein are for information, debate, and discussion, and do not necessarily represent official policies of AARP. # February , AARP Reprinting with permission only AARP Public Policy Institute 601 E Street, NW, Washington, DC

4 Acknowledgment The authors thank David John, Surachai Khitatrakun, and Gary Koenig for helpful comments. iv

5 Table of Contents Acknowledgment...iv Abstract...vii Executive Summary...1 Results...1 Introduction...3 Previous Research...4 Methodology and Data...5 Results...7 Conclusion...14 List of Tables Summary Table. Workers Eligible for Automatic Enrollment under Various Restrictions... 2 Table 1. Table 2. Workers Eligible for Automatic Enrollment Under Various Restrictions 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances... 8 Workers Eligible for Automatic Enrollment Under Various Restrictions 2009 Current Population Survey (2008 data)... 9 Table 3. Distribution of Workers Eligible for Auto IRA Table 4. Workers Eligible for Automatic Enrollment under Various Restrictions 1998 Current Population Survey (1997 data) v

6

7 AbstrAct This study investigates the claim that the Auto IRA proposal can potentially boost the retirement adequacy of tens of millions of workers. We estimate that between 24 million and 43 million workers approximately one-quarter of the workforce would be eligible for automatic enrollment in the proposals under consideration in Congress. Moreover, we find that the eligible population is heavily skewed toward workers with low and moderate wage levels and that exempting very low-wage workers from the automatic enrollment mandate would have only a modest impact on the number of eligible workers. Lastly, we find that the proportion of Auto IRA eligible workers is increasing over time owing to the shift away from employer-sponsored retirement plans. vii

8

9 Executive Summary Automatic enrollment in individual retirement accounts (IRAs) is an innovative proposal designed to increase retirement saving among millions of Americans. The plan which we refer to as the Auto IRA aims to improve retirement security for workers without employer-provided retirement plans. Under the Auto IRA, eligible workers are automatically enrolled in a private retirement account unless they explicitly elect not to participate ( opt out ). Using employer payroll systems, contributions are automatically withdrawn from workers paychecks as a set percentage of pay, deposited in worker-owned retirement accounts, and invested in low-cost diversified investment vehicles (such as life-cycle funds). Workers have ultimate control over their participation in Auto IRAs and can opt out of any default option, such as changing the amount contributed or the default investment. Since the concept was introduced in 2006, the Auto IRA has gained substantial momentum among policy makers and sparked the introduction of two bills in Congress. The goal of this report is to estimate the population of workers who would be automatically enrolled in an IRA after accounting for the bills various restrictions and exemptions. Results We estimate the population of workers eligible for automatic enrollment given the restrictions in Congress s Auto IRA proposals; this forms our baseline scenario. We also estimate the population of workers subject to the Auto IRA under a scenario where very low-wage workers are exempt from the program, and a scenario where half of small businesses, otherwise exempt because of their size, voluntarily enroll employees. Our estimates of the population of workers eligible for automatic enrollment are presented in the summary table below. Under the baseline scenario, we estimate that between 24.4 million (19.7 percent) and 35.8 million (26.6 percent) workers would be eligible for the Auto IRA. Most of these workers are employed full time. Between 19.3 million and 27.2 million full-time workers and between 5.0 million and 8.5 million part-time workers would be eligible. The population of workers subject to automatic enrollment would shrink if Congress elected to exclude very low-wage workers from the mandate. Under a scenario where workers with low annual wages less than $5,000 were excluded from the Auto IRA program, the number of workers subject to automatic enrollment would drop modestly to between 23.6 million (19.1 percent) and 32.7 million (24.3 percent). The baseline scenario might underestimate the number of eligible workers. The baseline estimates assume that firms will enroll workers only if required to do so, excluding the possibility of voluntary enrollment. We estimate the number of workers subject to the Auto IRA under the condition that half of workers at small firms are automatically enrolled voluntarily by their employer. Under this scenario, the number of workers subject to automatic enrollment increases to between 29.3 million (23.7 percent) and 43.1 million (32.0 percent). Given the experience with automatic enrollment in 401(k)s, the assumption that small firms would elect to voluntarily enroll workers in an IRA is plausible. 1

10 Summary Table Workers Eligible for Automatic Enrollment under Various Restrictions (1) Baseline Eligible Workers Number Worker Characteristic of Workers 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances Percentage of Total Eligible Full-Time Workers 19,358, % Eligible Part-Time Workers 5,049, % (2) Eligible Workers with Wage Restriction Total Eligible Workers 24,407, % Eligible Full-Time Workers 19,214, % Eligible Part-Time Workers 4,363, % (3) Eligible Workers with Voluntary Small Business Participation Total Eligible Workers 23,578, % Eligible Full-Time Workers 23,076, % Eligible Part-Time Workers 6,272, % (1) Baseline Eligible Workers Total Eligible Workers 29,348, % 2009 Current Population Survey (2008 data) Eligible Full-Time Workers 27,239, % Eligible Part-Time Workers 8,517, % (2) Eligible Workers with Wage Restriction Total Eligible Workers 35,756, % Eligible Full-Time Workers 26,281, % Eligible Part-Time Workers 6,387, % (3) Eligible Workers with Voluntary Small Business Participation Total Eligible Workers 32,669, % Eligible Full-Time Workers 32,534, % Eligible Part-Time Workers 10,542, % Total Eligible Workers 43,077, % We further estimate the distribution of eligible workers by wage level and calculate the changes in the proportion of eligible workers over the past decade. We find that automatic enrollment is decidedly progressive in terms of eligible workers, in large part due to the correlation between lower wages and lack of employer-sponsored retirement plans. Survey of Consumer Finance data show that more than 80 percent of the population eligible for automatic enrollment earn less than $50,000 in wages, and more than one-third earn less than $20,000 in wages. Fewer than 5 percent of eligible workers have wages in excess of $100,000. Current Population Survey data show a nearly identical trend. We also find that the proportion of Auto IRA-eligible workers is increasing over time owing to the shift away from employer-sponsored retirement plans. 2

11 Introduction Automatic enrollment in individual retirement accounts (IRAs) is an innovative proposal designed to increase retirement saving among millions of Americans. The plan which we refer to as the Auto IRA aims to improve retirement security for workers without company retirement plans. Under the Auto IRA, eligible workers are automatically enrolled in a private retirement account unless they explicitly elect not to participate ( opt out ). Using employer payroll systems, contributions are automatically withdrawn from workers paychecks as a set percentage of pay, deposited in workerowned retirement accounts, and invested in low-cost diversified investment vehicles (such as life-cycle funds). Workers have ultimate control over their participation in Auto IRAs and can opt out of any default option, such as changing the amount contributed or the default investment. Since the concept was introduced in 2006, the Auto IRA has gained substantial momentum among policy makers. Automatic enrollment in IRAs was included in the Obama administration s fiscal year 2012 budget proposal; 2 the President s Economic Recovery Advisory Board 3 endorsed automatic enrollment in IRAs in its recent report on tax policy. In addition, two Auto IRA bills were recently introduced in Congress, one in each chamber, (S and H.R. 6099) aimed at automatically enrolling a substantial proportion of private sector employees in retirement accounts. Slightly differing legislation was introduced in earlier sessions of Congress. The Senate and House bills are similar but not identical. Both bills would require that firms meeting certain criteria automatically enroll their employees in IRAs; the bills would provide a modest tax credit for the administrative costs of automatic enrollment while using tax enforcement mechanisms to ensure firms compliance. The bills differ in other respects, but differ only slightly in their restrictions on workers who are exempt from automatic enrollment. Under both bills, several classes of workers would be exempt from Auto IRAs. Public sector workers, workers with access to employer-sponsored pensions, employees of church and religious organizations, workers at firms with fewer than 10 employees, workers with fewer than three months tenure, workers employed by firms established for fewer than two years, 5 and workers younger than 18 would all be exempt from the automatic enrollment mandate. 2 U.S. Treasury, General Explanation of the Administration s Fiscal Year 2012 Revenue Proposals (2011 Green Book) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010). 3 President s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, The Report on Tax Reform Options: Simplification, Compliance, and Corporate Taxation (2010), PERAB_Tax_Reform_Report.pdf. 4 On September 14, 2011, Senator Jeff Bingaman reintroduced the Auto IRA bill as S the Automatic IRA Act of Both bills exclude new businesses. New businesses are defined as those not in existence at all times during the calendar year and the preceding calendar year. Thus, it is possible for a firm established for nearly two years to be exempt from the Auto IRA. 3

12 The goal of this paper is to estimate the population of workers who would be automatically enrolled in an IRA after accounting for the bills various restrictions and exemptions. We further estimate the distribution of eligible workers by wage level and calculate the changes in the proportion of workers who would have been eligible over the past decade. We find that between 24 million and 43 million workers approximately one-quarter of the workforce would be eligible for automatic enrollment under the proposals recently introduced in Congress. Moreover, we find that the eligible population is heavily skewed toward workers with low and moderate wage levels, and that the proportion of Auto IRA eligible workers is increasing over time owing to the shift away from employer-sponsored retirement plans. We present a review of the existing literature on automatic enrollment in the next section, followed by a description of our methodology. We then present our findings and conclude with a brief summary and discussion. Previous Research There is a growing literature on the effects of automatic enrollment broadly defined, but little is known about the potential effects of automatic enrollment in IRAs. Perhaps the most well-known study of the effects of automatic enrollment was conducted by Madrian and Shea, 6 who studied the effects of automatic enrollment in the 401(k) plan of a large U.S. corporation. Madrian and Shea found that automatic enrollment substantially boosted employee participation in the company s retirement saving plan. Under automatic enrollment, the average participation rate in the company s 401(k) jumped from 37.4 percent to 85.9 percent. 7 Madrian and Shea also found that employees who were automatically enrolled in a retirement plan tended to maintain the default contribution rate and investment allocation. Other studies report similarly high rates of participation under automatic enrollment. 8 In an important study, Beshears et al. 9 examined the impact of the employer match on opt-out rates under automatic enrollment. They found that the existence of an employer match creates only a modest reduction 5 to 11 percentage points in the proportion of employees who opt out. Such a finding is relevant to automatic enrollment in IRAs, since IRAs usually offer saving incentives similar to an 6 Brigitte C. Madrian and Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, no. 4 (2001): Madrian and Shea control for demographic and economic factors, including gender, race, age, and compensation, and find the regression-adjusted effect of automatic enrollment to be even larger. After controlling for these factors, the difference is 50.4 percentage points, compared to the raw difference of 48.5 percentage points noted above. 8 John Beshears, James J. Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian, The Importance of Default Options for Retirement Savings Outcomes: Evidence from the United States, in Lessons from Pension Reform in the Americas, ed. Stephen J. Kay and Tapen Sinha (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick, For Better or For Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior, in Perspectives in the Economics of Aging, ed. David Wise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 9 John Beshears, James J. Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian, The Impact of Employer Matching on Savings Plan Participation under Automatic Enrollment, in Research Findings in the Economics of Aging, ed. David A. Wise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 4

13 unmatched contribution to a 401(k). Soto and Butrica 10 found a correlation between automatic enrollment and lower employer match rates in retirement plans, but were unable to provide causal evidence that automatic enrollment led to lower match rates. Using a different methodology and alternative sample, VanDerhei 11 found the opposite effect. Geissler and Harris 12 estimated the revenue and distributional effects of automatic enrollment in 401(k)s, finding revenue costs to be modest and the reform to be generally progressive. While the growing literature on automatic enrollment in 401(k)s can inform policy makers about the Auto IRA, the literature s lessons may not translate perfectly owing to differences in populations eligible for the respective programs. Workers who are eligible for employer-sponsored retirement plans tend to be older, better educated, and more highly compensated than workers eligible for the Auto IRA. 13 Since the Auto IRA has yet to be implemented, the few studies that focus on the Auto IRA are speculative. Iwry and John 14 discussed the merits of Automatic IRAs, while also describing some of the practical concerns with the proposal. Harris and Johnson 15 found that Auto IRA benefits would be primarily spread across the middle three quintiles of the income distribution, with small average changes in benefits for those at either end of the income distribution. The study also found that if automatic enrollment is coupled with an expansion of the Saver s Credit, benefits are more concentrated toward lower-income taxpayers, with the largest gains in after-tax income accrued by those in the second and third income quintiles. Methodology and Data To measure the potential universe of employees who might be affected by the Auto IRA, we begin with two related bills introduced in the U.S. Congress. In the Senate, Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) introduced the Automatic IRA Act of 2010 (S. 3760), which would require most private firms without employer-sponsored retirement plans to automatically enroll employees in a Roth IRA, to automatically direct a preset proportion 10 Mauricio Soto and Barbara A. Butrica, Will Automatic Enrollment Reduce Employer Contributions to 401(k) Plans? Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program Discussion Paper (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2009). 11 Jack VanDerhei, The Impact of Automatic Enrollment in 401(k) Plans on Future Retirement Accumulations: A Simulation Study Based on Plan Design Modifications of Large Plan Sponsors, Employee Benefit Research Institute Issue Brief 341 (Washington, DC: Employee Benefit Research Institute, April 2010). 12 Christopher Geissler and Benjamin H. Harris, The Automatic 401(K): Revenue and Distributional Estimates, in Automatic: Changing the Way America Saves, ed. William G. Gale, J. Mark Iwry, David John, and Lina Walker (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009). 13 Investment Company Institute, Who Gets Retirement Plans and Why, Research Perspective 14, no. 2 (2008). 14 J. Mark Iwry and David C. John, Pursuing Universal Retirement Security Through Automatic IRAs, Retirement Security Project Discussion Paper (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2009). 15 Benjamin H. Harris and Rachel M. Johnson, Automatic Enrollment in IRAs: Costs and Benefits, Tax Notes 124, no. 9 (2009):

14 of the employees wages to the IRA on behalf of the employees, and to automatically invest these contributions in a designated low-cost investment. The Senate version of the legislation does not require all workers to be automatically enrolled in an IRA. Firms that offer retirement plans are generally exempt from the requirement, but firms that exempt particular divisions from the retirement plan are required to automatically enroll ineligible workers in an IRA. Other classes of exempt workers include those who have not satisfied the minimum age and job tenure requirements, government workers and church employees, employees with fewer than three months of service at a company, employees of newly established firms, and workers under 18 years of age. In the first year of enactment, firms with fewer than 100 employees are exempt from the requirement; this exemption is gradually phased down over four years to firms with fewer than 10 employees. For these purposes, an employee is counted as a worker earning more than $5,000 in annual wages. A nearly identical companion bill with the same title (H.R. 6099) was introduced in the House by Rep. Richard Neal (D-MA). With respect to automatic enrollment, the primary difference between the bills is the threshold for the size of company subject to the provisions. While the Senate bill gradually reduces the minimum size of the firm subject to the requirement from 100 to 10, the House bill immediately requires firms with 10 or more employees to enroll workers in an Auto IRA. 16 We use data from two large-scale government surveys to estimate the number of workers who would be eligible for the Auto IRA under the congressional proposals. One of the surveys is the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF is a triennial cross-sectional survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Board. The SCF contains a wealth of data on household finances, as well as substantial data on demographics, employment, and participation in employer-sponsored retirement accounts. The 2007 SCF contains 4,422 family-level observations. The other data source is the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a monthly survey of labor force participation conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics within the U.S. Census Bureau; it is a primary data source for U.S. labor market data. The CPS also contains an Annual Social and Economic Supplement administered in March. The March Supplement collects additional data on income, demographics, and labor market activity not captured in the monthly survey. In addition, the CPS administers a Displaced Worker, Employee Tenure, and Occupational Mobility Supplement in January. We primarily use labor force, demographic, and pension data from the 1998 and 2009 March Supplements in our estimates, but also use the job tenure data in the January Supplement to impute data on job tenure. Since the March CPS Supplements ask respondents about their behavior in the prior year, our data correspond to 1997 and 2008, respectively. Neither data source can perfectly estimate the population of workers who would be subject to automatic enrollment under the congressional bills. From the SCF, we can identify workers who are employed in the private sector, work at firms with 10 or more employees, and do not have a pension plan and are not eligible to receive one; these 16 For the purposes of measuring the proportion of workers exempt from automatic enrollment, we ignore the phase-in provision in the Senate bill. 6

15 workers are subject to the Auto IRA. We exclude workers who are currently ineligible to receive a pension but expect to be eligible in the future. 17 The SCF allows the identification of employees with less than one year of job tenure. To approximate private sector workers employed fewer than three months, we impute short-term job tenure based on data from the Displaced Worker/Job Tenure Supplement to the CPS. Among private sector workers employed less than a year, 27.6 percent were employed fewer than three months in 2008; a similar proportion was employed fewer than three months in Based on these estimates, we randomly assign short-term job tenure among private sector employees reporting job tenure of less than one year. 18 Due to survey design, our CPS estimates are slightly less precise. We use the same approach applied to SCF data, estimating the number of private sector workers, workers without a pension who are ineligible to receive one, and employees of firms with more than 10 workers. Unlike the SCF, the CPS does not report employees who expect to eventually become eligible for a pension. We also cannot determine job tenure using CPS data and consequently do not exempt workers under this criterion. 19 We make two adjustments to the baseline calculations. First, we calculate the number of workers who would be covered under the automatic IRA if the proposal exempts workers with very low wages to increase administrative ease. For purposes of this calculation, we define very low-wage workers as those with earnings less than $5,000 annually. While neither congressional bill includes this exemption, it might be considered in response to criticism that the administrative costs associated with the Auto IRA exceed the benefits for very low-wage workers. Second, we estimate the number of workers eligible for the Auto IRA if 50 percent of small business employees are automatically enrolled despite their exemption. To achieve this estimate, we randomly assign participation to half of the small business employees who would otherwise be exempt. Results The population of workers eligible for automatic enrollment are presented in table 1 (SCF) and table 2 (CPS). Under the baseline scenario, we estimate that between 24.4 million (19.7 percent) and 35.8 million (26.6 percent) workers would be eligible for the Auto IRA. Most of these workers are employed full time. Between 19.3 million and 27.2 million full-time workers and between 5.0 million and 8.5 million part-time workers would be eligible. 17 These workers most likely do not meet the minimum age and service requirements under the employer s plan guidelines. 18 Firms without employer-sponsored retirement plans are more likely to have short-term workers. A survey of small employers found that in 2000, 34 percent of employees in small businesses without retirement plans had fewer than three years job tenure, compared to just 13 percent among small firms with retirement plans. Dallas L. Salisbury, Hearing on H.R. 10, The Comprehensive Retirement Security & Pension Reform (2001), 19 Both surveys also allow us to identify self-employed workers. While the Auto IRA proposals do not exempt self-employed workers, it seems unlikely that the financial inertia that makes automatic enrollment effective would apply to self-employed workers; establishing an IRA would likely require more administrative effort than would opting out. Consequently, we assume that self-employed workers will not enroll in retirement plans under the Auto IRA. 7

16 Table 1 Workers Eligible for Automatic Enrollment Under Various Restrictions 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (1) Baseline Eligible Workers Worker Characteristic Number of Workers Percent of Total Eligible Full-Time Workers 19,358, % Eligible Part-Time Workers 5,049, % (2) Eligible Workers with Wage Restriction Total Eligible Workers 24,407, % Eligible Full-Time Workers 19,214, % Eligible Part-Time Workers 4,363, % (3) Eligible Workers with Voluntary Small Business Participation Total Eligible Workers 23,578, % Eligible Full-Time Workers 23,076, % Eligible Part-Time Workers 6,272, % Incremental Calculation of Total Baseline Eligible Workers Total Eligible Workers 29,348, % Full-Time Workers 107,692, % Part-Time Workers 16,052, % Total Workers 123,745, % Public-Sector Workers 7,797, % Self-Employed Private Sector Workers 17,031, % Private-Sector Workers Employed by a Firm 98,916, % Workers with a Pension 56,295, % Eligible Workers without a Pension 35,807, % Workers without Pension Eligibility 14,610, % Self-Employed Private Sector Workers 17,031, % Subtotal: Private Sector Workers (non self-employed) without Pension Eligibility 35,271, % Workers at a Firm with 10 or More Employees 97,880, % Workers at a Firm with Less than 10 Employees 25,865, % Subtotal: Private Sector Workers (non self-employed) without Pension Eligibility at Firms with 10 or More Employees 25,124, % Employees with Three Months or Less of Job Tenure 2,813, % Employees with Greater than Three Months of Job Tenure 120,931, % Employees with Less than $5,000 in Wages 11,804, % Employees with At Least $5,000 in Wages 111,941, % Total Eligible Workers 24,407, % 8

17 Table 2 Workers Eligible for Automatic Enrollment Under Various Restrictions 2009 Current Population Survey (2008 data) (1) Baseline Eligible Workers Worker Characteristic Number of Workers Percent of Total Eligible Full-Time Workers 27,239, % Eligible Part-Time Workers 8,517, % (2) Eligible Workers with Wage Restriction Total Eligible Workers 35,756, % Eligible Full-Time Workers 26,281, % Eligible Part-Time Workers 6,387, % (3) Eligible Workers with Voluntary Small Business Participation Total Eligible Workers 32,669, % Eligible Full-Time Workers 32,534, % Eligible Part-Time Workers 10,542, % Incremental Calculation of Total Baseline Eligible Workers Total Eligible Workers 43,077, % Full-Time Workers 110,606, % Part-Time Workers 23,918, % Total Workers 134,525, % Public-Sector Workers 20,648, % Self-Employed Private Sector Workers 9,060, % Private-Sector Workers Employed by a Firm 104,816, % Workers with a Pension 59,598, % Workers without a Pension, Employer Offers Pension 12,756, % Workers without a Pension, No Pension Offered 62,169, % Subtotal: Private Sector Workers (non self-employed) without Pension Eligibility 61,386, % Workers at a Firm with 10 or More Employees 107,294, % Workers at a Firm with Less than 10 Employees 27,230, % Subtotal: Private Sector Workers (non self-employed) without Pension Eligibility at Firms with 10 or More Employees 46,039, % Employees with Less than $5,000 in Wages 14,981, % Employees with At Least $5,000 in Wages 119,543, % Total Eligible Workers 35,756, % 9

18 The population of workers subject to automatic enrollment would shrink if Congress elected to exclude very low-wage workers from the mandate. Under a scenario where workers with annual wages less than $5,000 were excluded from the Auto IRA program, the number of workers subject to automatic enrollment would drop modestly to between 23.6 million (19.1 percent) and 32.7 million (24.3 percent). In table 1 and table 2, this scenario is referred to as Eligible Workers with Wage Restriction. The baseline scenario might underestimate the number of eligible workers. The baseline estimates assume that firms will enroll workers only if required to do so, excluding the possibility of voluntary enrollment. The growing trend of automatic enrollment in 401(k)s 20 has shown that many employers will automatically enroll workers in retirement plans even though not required to do; such a trend would likely be stronger for the Auto IRA, which will generally cost employers less than 401(k)s. We estimate the number of workers subject to the Auto IRA under the condition that half of workers at small firms are automatically enrolled voluntarily by their employer. Under this scenario, the number of workers subject to automatic enrollment increases to between 29.3 million (23.7 percent) and 43.1 million (32.0 percent). In table 1 and table 2, this scenario is referred to as Eligible Workers with Voluntary Small Business Participation. Tables 1 and 2 also show the effects of individual restrictions on the potential pool of Auto IRA eligible workers. The number of U.S. workers in our data amounts to between million and million; the higher estimate corresponds to the CPS data. Of these, between 35.2 million (28.5 percent) and 61.4 million (45.6 percent) are private sector workers employed by a firm (i.e., not self-employed) who are ineligible to receive retirement benefits through their employer. The small business exemption reduces this pool of eligible workers to between 25.1 million (20.3 percent) and 46.0 million (34.2 percent). Automatic enrollment is decidedly progressive in terms of eligible workers, in large part owing to the correlation between lower wages and lack of an employer-sponsored retirement plan. SCF data show that more than 80 percent of the population eligible for automatic enrollment earn less than $50,000 in wages, and more than one-third earn less than $20,000 (table 3). Fewer than 5 percent of eligible workers have wages in excess of $100,000. CPS data show a nearly identical trend. The population of workers eligible for automatic enrollment is gradually increasing over time (table 4). Using the CPS, we find that in million workers (23.4 percent) were eligible under the baseline scenario, 24.8 million (19.9 percent) were eligible under a wage restriction, and 35.3 million (28.3 percent) were eligible assuming some small businesses voluntarily enroll workers in IRAs. 20 The percentage of firms with 401(k)s offering automatic enrollment has steadily risen from 4.2 percent in 1999 to 23.6 percent in Large firms are much more likely than smaller firms to offer automatic enrollment. In 2006, 41.3 percent of plans offered by large firms (more than 5,000 employees) included automatic enrollment, compared to just 6.8 percent of those offered by small firms (49 or fewer employees); however, the proportion of small firms offering automatic enrollment is growing over time. Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America, Annual Survey of Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plans (Chicago: Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America, 1999); Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America, Annual Survey of Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plans (Chicago: Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America, 2006). 10

19 Table 3 Distribution of Workers Eligible for Auto IRA Baseline Eligible Workers Millions of Eligible Workers Percent of Eligible Workers Eligible Workers with Wage Restriction Eligible Workers with Voluntary Small Business Participation SCF Baseline Eligible Workers Eligible Workers with Wage Restriction Eligible Workers with Voluntary Small Business Participation Millions of Eligible Workers Percent of Eligible Workers Wages Less than $20,000 9,141,101 8,311,870 11,355, % 35.3% 38.7% $20,001 - $50,000 10,833,941 10,833,941 13,140, % 45.9% 44.8% $50,001-$100,000 3,479,545 3,479,545 3,890, % 14.8% 13.3% $100, , , , % 4.0% 3.3% Total 24,407,925 23,578,694 29,348, % 100.0% 100.0% CPS Millions of Eligible Workers Percent of Eligible Workers Wages Less than $20,000 14,037,195 10,949,787 16,985, % 33.5% 39.4% $20,001 - $50,000 14,692,374 14,692,374 17,682, % 45.0% 41.0% $50,001-$100,000 5,379,996 5,379,996 6,351, % 16.5% 14.7% $100,000+ 1,647,019 1,647,019 2,057, % 5.0% 4.8% Total 35,756,584 32,669,176 43,077, % 100.0% 100.0% 11

20 Table 4 Workers Eligible for Automatic Enrollment under Various Restrictions 1998 Current Population Survey (1997 data) Baseline Eligible Workers Worker Characteristic Number of Workers Percent of Total Change from 1997 to 2008 Number of Workers Percent of Total Percentage Point Change Eligible Full-Time Workers 22,938, % 4,300, % Eligible Part-Time Workers 6,197, % 2,319, % Eligible Workers with Wage Restriction Total Eligible Workers 29,136, % 6,620, % Eligible Full-Time Workers 21,139, % 5,141, % Eligible Part-Time Workers 3,640, % 2,747, % Eligible Workers with Voluntary Small Business Participation Total Eligible Workers 24,780, % 7,888, % Eligible Full-Time Workers 27,605, % 4,929, % Eligible Part-Time Workers 7,727, % 2,814, % Incremental Calculation of Total Baseline Eligible Workers Total Eligible Workers 35,332, % 7,744, % Full-Time Workers 104,831, % 5,775, % Part-Time Workers 19,843, % 4,074, % Total Workers 124,675, % 9,849, % Public-Sector Workers 17,975, % 2,673, % Self-Employed Private Sector Workers 9,248, % -188, % Private-Sector Workers Employed by a Firm 97,451, % 7,364, % Workers with a Pension 57,345, % 2,253, % Workers without a Pension, Employer Offers Pension 14,651, % -1,895, % Workers without a Pension, No Pension Offered 52,678, % 9,491, % Subtotal: Private Sector Workers (non self-employed) without Pension Eligibility 54,555, % 6,831, % Workers at a Firm with 10 or More Employees 99,868, % 7,425, % Workers at a Firm with Less than 10 Employees 24,806, % 2,424, % Subtotal: Private Sector Workers (non self-employed) without Pension Eligibility at Firms with 10 or More Employees 40,956, % 5,083, % Employees with Less than $5,000 in Wages 18,558, % -3,576, % Employees with At Least $5,000 in Wages 106,117, % 13,426, % Total Eligible Workers 29,136, % 6,620, % 12

21 Comparing CPS data between 1997 and 2008, the number of eligible workers increases by 6.6 million (or from 23.4 to 26.6 percent of total workers a 3.2 percentage point increase) under the baseline scenario, 7.9 million (or from 19.9 to 24.3 percent of total workers a 4.4 percentage point increase) under the wage restricted scenario, and 7.7 million (or from 28.3 to 32 percent of total workers a 3.7 percentage point increase) under the voluntary small business participation scenario. The proportion of part- and full-time workers increased in each scenario. The increase in the number of workers eligible for the Automatic IRA is driven by both a growing labor force and the growing proportion of workers without access to employer-sponsored pension coverage. The size of the workforce increased by 9.8 million between 1997 and 2008; the increase boosted the number of workers eligible for the Auto IRA. The shift away from employersponsored retirement plans also increased the proportion of workers eligible for the Auto IRA. Between 1997 and 2008, the percentage of workers ineligible for an employer retirement plan rose from 42.3 percent to 46.2 percent, an increase of 4.0 percentage points (table 4). The difference in estimates between the CPS and SCF is substantial. We attribute these differences to three primary factors. First, we attribute differences in estimated number of eligible workers (as opposed to proportion of eligible workers) to differences in total population of U.S. workers indicated in the two data sets; the SCF estimates U.S. workers at million, compared to million in the CPS. Second, as discussed above, the SCF offers more extensive data on worker characteristics relevant to this study, which allows for a more comprehensive measurement of eligible workers. Third, the survey questionnaires differ in their wording among comparable questions, and can thus produce different estimates of a given population. For example, the CPS asks respondents if they have worked at all in the previous year, while the SCF asks respondents whether they are working at the present time. Differences in questionnaires can lead to moderate differences in estimates of the same population. 21 One noteworthy comparison is that the number of Auto IRA eligible workers is substantially larger than the potential pool of Auto 401(k) eligible workers. Using the 2007 SCF, we estimate that approximately 10.6 million workers (8.5 percent of workers) would be eligible for automatic enrollment in 401(k)s if it were universally applied to all existing 401(k) plans, 22 less than half the number eligible for the Auto IRA. While opt-out rates would likely be higher for the Auto IRA than for automatic enrollment in 401(k)s, the significantly higher proportion of Auto IRA eligible workers illustrates the potential for the program to affect saving behavior for a large number of workers. Moreover, a combined policy of automatic enrollment in IRAs and 401(k)s has the potential to affect nearly one-third of American workers. We conclude this section with two important points. First, we emphasize that our estimates calculate the number of American workers who will be eligible for the Auto IRA, not those who will actually enroll in an IRA after being given the option to opt 21 For example, Sanzenbacher shows that pension coverage estimates vary across major surveys. Geoffrey Sanzenbacher, Estimating Pension Coverage Using Different Data Sets, Center for Retirement Research Issue Brief, No. 51 (Chestnut Hill, MA: Center for Retirement Research, 2006). 22 This estimate is not shown in the tables. The calculation is based on the number of employees eligible for, but not enrolled in, an employer-sponsored plan. Several of the Auto 401(k) proposals in Congress would exempt small businesses and particular classes of employees from the automatic 401(k) mandate; these restrictions would reduce the number and proportion of eligible workers. 13

22 out. Second, we note that the data are based on snapshots of employee characteristics at a given point in time. Employee turnover, which may be higher for the population of workers most likely to be subject to the Auto IRA, will increase the number of workers eligible for the program over the course of a year. Data limitations preclude us from estimating the impact of employee turnover on Auto IRA eligibility. Conclusion Auto IRA proposals continue to gain momentum in Congress. The bills sponsors and other supporters of automatic enrollment claim the Auto IRA will put millions of workers on the path toward better saving and will particularly help low- and moderate-income workers. The limited number of studies focusing on the Auto IRA s potential has made it difficult to either support or reject these claims. This study reinforces the claim that the Auto IRA can potentially boost the retirement adequacy of tens of millions of workers. We estimate that between 24 million and 43 million workers approximately one-quarter of the workforce would be eligible for automatic enrollment in the proposals recently introduced in Congress. Moreover, we find that the eligible population is heavily skewed toward workers with low and moderate wage levels, and that exempting very low-wage workers from the automatic enrollment mandate would have only a modest impact on the number of eligible workers, while potentially reducing administrative burdens. Lastly, we find that the proportion of eligible workers is increasing over time and that this trend is due, in large part, to the shift away from employer-sponsored retirement plans. These results reflect some uncertainty. Due to data limitations, it is difficult to determine precisely which workers would be exempt from automatic enrollment on the basis of job tenure, although the effect of this requirement on firms behavior is unclear. Firms might, for example, opt to automatically enroll workers on or near their hire date, rather than wait three months. In addition, small firms that are exempt from the automatic enrollment mandate may opt to participate anyway once the infrastructure is established; this scenario would be consistent with the recent trend of large corporations adopting automatic enrollment voluntarily. Data limitations also make it impossible to identify workers at new firms; these firms would also be exempt from automatic enrollment. Like the exemption for small firms, it is unclear whether this exemption would be binding. Despite these limitations, the estimates presented here indicate that the Auto IRA can have a widespread impact on worker participation in retirement saving accounts, especially for workers with low or moderate wage levels. The economic effects of automatic enrollment remain somewhat of a mystery: More research is needed to determine the effects of automatic enrollment generally, and the Auto IRA in particular, on net saving, labor supply, and retirement adequacy. 14

HOW DOES 401(K) AUTO-ENROLLMENT RELATE TO THE EMPLOYER MATCH AND TOTAL COMPENSATION?

HOW DOES 401(K) AUTO-ENROLLMENT RELATE TO THE EMPLOYER MATCH AND TOTAL COMPENSATION? October 2013, Number 13-14 RETIREMENT RESEARCH HOW DOES 401(K) AUTO-ENROLLMENT RELATE TO THE EMPLOYER MATCH AND TOTAL COMPENSATION? By Barbara A. Butrica and Nadia S. Karamcheva* Introduction Many workers

More information

DO INDIVIDUALS KNOW WHEN THEY SHOULD BE SAVING FOR A SPOUSE?

DO INDIVIDUALS KNOW WHEN THEY SHOULD BE SAVING FOR A SPOUSE? March 2019, Number 19-5 RETIREMENT RESEARCH DO INDIVIDUALS KNOW WHEN THEY SHOULD BE SAVING FOR A SPOUSE? By Geoffrey T. Sanzenbacher and Wenliang Hou* Introduction Households save for retirement to help

More information

Do Defaults Have Spillover Effects? The Effect of the Default Asset on Retirement Plan Contributions

Do Defaults Have Spillover Effects? The Effect of the Default Asset on Retirement Plan Contributions Do Defaults Have Spillover Effects? The Effect of the Default Asset on Retirement Plan Contributions Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University and NBER Matthew R. Levy, London School of Economics Colleen F.

More information

CRS Report for Congress

CRS Report for Congress CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Order Code RS21954 October 14, 2004 Automatic Enrollment in Section 401(k) Plans Summary Patrick Purcell Specialist in Social Legislation Domestic Social

More information

OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES THERE HAS BEEN

OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES THERE HAS BEEN RUNNING 401(k): KEEPING PACE FROM ACCUMULATION TO DISTRIBUTION* Sarah Holden and Michael Bogdan, Investment Company Institute INTRODUCTION OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES THERE HAS BEEN a shift in private-sector

More information

Tax Reform Options: Promoting Retirement Security. Testimony Submitted to United States Senate Committee on Finance. September 15, 2011

Tax Reform Options: Promoting Retirement Security. Testimony Submitted to United States Senate Committee on Finance. September 15, 2011 Tax Reform Options: Promoting Retirement Security Testimony Submitted to United States Senate Committee on Finance September 15, 2011 William G. Gale 1 Brookings Institution Codirector, Urban-Brookings

More information

WikiLeaks Document Release

WikiLeaks Document Release WikiLeaks Document Release February 2, 2009 Congressional Research Service Report RS21954 Automatic Enrollment in Section 401(k) Plans Patrick Purcell, Domestic Social Policy Division Updated January 16,

More information

A NUDGE ISN T ALWAYS ENOUGH

A NUDGE ISN T ALWAYS ENOUGH December 2012, Number 12-21 RETIREMENT RESEARCH A NUDGE ISN T ALWAYS ENOUGH By Erin Todd Bronchetti, Thomas S. Dee, David B. Huffman, and Ellen Magenheim* Introduction Over the past decade, researchers

More information

IS PENSION INEQUALITY GROWING?

IS PENSION INEQUALITY GROWING? January 2010, Number 10-1 IS PENSION INEQUALITY GROWING? By Nadia Karamcheva and Geoffrey Sanzenbacher* Introduction Employer-sponsored pensions are an important source of retirement income and often make

More information

Automatic enrollment: The power of the default

Automatic enrollment: The power of the default Automatic enrollment: The power of the default Vanguard Research February 2018 Jeffrey W. Clark, Jean A. Young The default decisions made by defined contribution (DC) plan sponsors under automatic enrollment

More information

Written. Before the. Regarding. September 2009

Written. Before the. Regarding. September 2009 Written Statementt of Larry H. Goldbrum, Esq. General Counsel, The SPARK Institute Before the UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ERISA ADVISORY COUNCIL Regarding Retirement Security September 2009 The SPARK

More information

July 17, Summary

July 17, Summary 820 First Street NE, Suite 510 Washington, DC 20002 Tel: 202-408-1080 Fax: 202-408-1056 center@cbpp.org www.cbpp.org July 17, 2006 PENSION BILL CONFERENCE REPORT MAY MAKE SOME 2001 TAX CUTS PERMANENT WITHOUT

More information

401(k) PLANS ARE STILL COMING UP SHORT

401(k) PLANS ARE STILL COMING UP SHORT MARCH 2006, NUMBER 43 401(k) PLANS ARE STILL COMING UP SHORT BY ALICIA H. MUNNELL AND ANNIKA SUNDÉN* Introduction The release of the Federal Reserve's 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is a wonderful

More information

U.S. Household Savings for Retirement in 2010

U.S. Household Savings for Retirement in 2010 U.S. Household Savings for Retirement in 2010 John J. Topoleski Analyst in Income Security April 30, 2013 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Congressional Research

More information

Retirement Savings: How Much Will Workers Have When They Retire?

Retirement Savings: How Much Will Workers Have When They Retire? Order Code RL33845 Retirement Savings: How Much Will Workers Have When They Retire? January 29, 2007 Patrick Purcell Specialist in Social Legislation Domestic Social Policy Division Debra B. Whitman Specialist

More information

Tax Alliance for Economic Mobility: Asset Building Tax Policy Reform Proposals Original April 2014, with updates April 2015

Tax Alliance for Economic Mobility: Asset Building Tax Policy Reform Proposals Original April 2014, with updates April 2015 Tax Alliance for Economic Mobility: Asset Building Tax Policy Reform Proposals Original April 2014, with updates April 2015 PROPOSAL BACKGROUND RESOURCES Child Savings Universal savings accounts at birth

More information

Does Borrowing Undo Automatic Enrollment s Effect on Savings?

Does Borrowing Undo Automatic Enrollment s Effect on Savings? Does Borrowing Undo Automatic Enrollment s Effect on Savings? John Beshears Harvard University and NBER James J. Choi Yale University and NBER David Laibson Harvard University and NBER Brigitte C. Madrian

More information

Potential vs. realized savings under automatic enrollment

Potential vs. realized savings under automatic enrollment Trends and Issues July 2018 Potential vs. realized savings under automatic enrollment John Beshears, Harvard University and NBER James J. Choi, Yale University and NBER David Laibson, Harvard University

More information

Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Differentials in Employer-Sponsored Pensions

Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Differentials in Employer-Sponsored Pensions Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Differentials in Employer-Sponsored Pensions Statement of Barbara A. Butrica and Richard W. Johnson The Urban Institute Before the ERISA Advisory Council U.S. Department of Labor

More information

Retirement Savings 2.0: Updating Savings Policy for the Modern Economy

Retirement Savings 2.0: Updating Savings Policy for the Modern Economy T-181 United States Senate Committee on Finance Hearing on: Retirement Savings 2.0: Updating Savings Policy for the Modern Economy Tuesday, September 16, 2014, 10:00 AM 215 Dirksen Senate Office Building

More information

Revised January 6, 2006

Revised January 6, 2006 820 First Street NE, Suite 510 Washington, DC 20002 Tel: 202-408-1080 Fax: 202-408-1056 center@cbpp.org www.cbpp.org Revised January 6, 2006 HOUSE PENSION BILL WOULD MAKE SOME 2001 TAX CUTS PERMANENT FOR

More information

Summary Preparing for financial security in retirement continues to be a concern of working Americans and policymakers. Although most Americans partic

Summary Preparing for financial security in retirement continues to be a concern of working Americans and policymakers. Although most Americans partic Ownership of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and Policy Options for Congress John J. Topoleski Analyst in Income Security January 7, 2011 Congressional Research Service CRS Report for Congress Prepared

More information

HOW DO INHERITANCES AFFECT THE NATIONAL RETIREMENT RISK INDEX?

HOW DO INHERITANCES AFFECT THE NATIONAL RETIREMENT RISK INDEX? September 2015, Number 15-15 RETIREMENT RESEARCH HOW DO INHERITANCES AFFECT THE NATIONAL RETIREMENT RISK INDEX? By Alicia H. Munnell, Wenliang Hou, and Anthony Webb* Introduction Today s working-age households,

More information

Curriculum Vitae Benjamin H. Harris December 2013

Curriculum Vitae Benjamin H. Harris December 2013 Curriculum Vitae Benjamin H. Harris December 2013 Contact Information Address: 1775 Mass. Ave, NW Washington, DC Telephone: (202) 540-7739 Email: bharris@brookings.edu Current Positions 2013 Policy Director,

More information

PPI Briefing Note Number 99 (PhD Series No 2) Page 1

PPI Briefing Note Number 99 (PhD Series No 2) Page 1 Briefing Note Number 99 (PhD Series No 2) Page 1 The Pensions Policy Institute () funds and supports a number of PhD students researching into areas of distinct policy relevance to pensions in the UK.

More information

Some Considerations for Empirical Research on Tax-Preferred Savings Accounts.

Some Considerations for Empirical Research on Tax-Preferred Savings Accounts. Some Considerations for Empirical Research on Tax-Preferred Savings Accounts. Kevin Milligan Department of Economics University of British Columbia Prepared for: Frontiers of Public Finance National Tax

More information

WHY DON T LOWER-INCOME INDIVIDUALS HAVE PENSIONS?

WHY DON T LOWER-INCOME INDIVIDUALS HAVE PENSIONS? April 2014, Number 14-8 RETIREMENT RESEARCH WHY DON T LOWER-INCOME INDIVIDUALS HAVE PENSIONS? By April Yanyuan Wu, Matthew S. Rutledge, and Jacob Penglase* Introduction About half of U.S. private sector

More information

WRITTEN TESTIMONY SUBMITTED BY LORI LUCAS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT CALLAN ASSOCIATES

WRITTEN TESTIMONY SUBMITTED BY LORI LUCAS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT CALLAN ASSOCIATES WRITTEN TESTIMONY SUBMITTED BY LORI LUCAS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT CALLAN ASSOCIATES ON BEHALF OF THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION (DCIIA) FOR THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON

More information

State Sponsored Retirement Savings Plans: New Approaches to Boost Retirement Plan Coverage

State Sponsored Retirement Savings Plans: New Approaches to Boost Retirement Plan Coverage State Sponsored Retirement Savings Plans: New Approaches to Boost Retirement Plan Coverage By William G. Gale and David C. John March 7, 2017 Prepared for presentation at the Pension Research Council Symposium,

More information

PENSION COVERAGE AND RETIREMENT SECURITY

PENSION COVERAGE AND RETIREMENT SECURITY December 2009, Number 9-26 PENSION COVERAGE AND RETIREMENT SECURITY By Alicia H. Munnell and Laura Quinby* Introduction Much attention has focused on the shift in the private sector from defined benefit

More information

USING PARTICIPANT DATA TO IMPROVE 401(k) ASSET ALLOCATION

USING PARTICIPANT DATA TO IMPROVE 401(k) ASSET ALLOCATION September 2012, Number 12-17 RETIREMENT RESEARCH USING PARTICIPANT DATA TO IMPROVE 401(k) ASSET ALLOCATION By Zhenyu Li and Anthony Webb* Introduction Economic theory says that participants in 401(k) plans

More information

WINNERS AND LOSERS AFTER PAYING FOR THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT

WINNERS AND LOSERS AFTER PAYING FOR THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT WINNERS AND LOSERS AFTER PAYING FOR THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT William Gale, Surachai Khitatrakun, and Aaron Krupkin December 8, 2017 ABSTRACT Tax cuts often look like free lunches for taxpayers, but they

More information

ESTIMATING PENSION COVERAGE USING DIFFERENT DATA SETS

ESTIMATING PENSION COVERAGE USING DIFFERENT DATA SETS August 2006, Number 51 ESTIMATING PENSION COVERAGE USING DIFFERENT DATA SETS By Geoffrey Sanzenbacher* Introduction Employer-provided pensions are an essential piece of the U.S. retirement income system.

More information

The Distribution of Federal Taxes, Jeffrey Rohaly

The Distribution of Federal Taxes, Jeffrey Rohaly www.taxpolicycenter.org The Distribution of Federal Taxes, 2008 11 Jeffrey Rohaly Overall, the federal tax system is highly progressive. On average, households with higher incomes pay taxes that are a

More information

EBRI Retirement Security Projection Model (RSPM) Analyzing Policy and Design Proposals

EBRI Retirement Security Projection Model (RSPM) Analyzing Policy and Design Proposals May 31, 2018 No. 451 EBRI Retirement Security Projection Model (RSPM) Analyzing Policy and Design Proposals By Jack VanDerhei, Ph.D., Employee Benefit Research Institute A T A G L A N C E At various times,

More information

Are Today s Young Workers Better Able to Save for Retirement?

Are Today s Young Workers Better Able to Save for Retirement? A chartbook from May 2018 Getty Images Are Today s Young Workers Better Able to Save for Retirement? Some but not all have seen improvements in retirement plan access and participation in past 14 years

More information

I S S U E B R I E F PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE PPI PRESIDENT BUSH S TAX PLAN: IMPACTS ON AGE AND INCOME GROUPS

I S S U E B R I E F PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE PPI PRESIDENT BUSH S TAX PLAN: IMPACTS ON AGE AND INCOME GROUPS PPI PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE PRESIDENT BUSH S TAX PLAN: IMPACTS ON AGE AND INCOME GROUPS I S S U E B R I E F Introduction President George W. Bush fulfilled a 2000 campaign promise by signing the $1.35

More information

The Impact of Employer Matching on Savings Plan Participation under Automatic Enrollment

The Impact of Employer Matching on Savings Plan Participation under Automatic Enrollment The Impact of Employer Matching on Savings Plan Participation under Automatic Enrollment John Beshears Harvard University James J. Choi Yale University and NBER David Laibson Harvard University and NBER

More information

Retirement Savings and Household Wealth in 2007

Retirement Savings and Household Wealth in 2007 Retirement Savings and Household Wealth in 2007 Patrick Purcell Specialist in Income Security April 8, 2009 Congressional Research Service CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of

More information

MODERNIZING SOCIAL SECURITY: HELPING THE OLDEST OLD

MODERNIZING SOCIAL SECURITY: HELPING THE OLDEST OLD October 2018, Number 18-18 RETIREMENT RESEARCH MODERNIZING SOCIAL SECURITY: HELPING THE OLDEST OLD By Alicia H. Munnell and Andrew D. Eschtruth* Introduction People become more financially vulnerable the

More information

The Current State of Retirement Security in the United States. April 5, 2017

The Current State of Retirement Security in the United States. April 5, 2017 Hearing Statement The Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, & Urban Development Subcommittee on Economic Policy The Current State of Retirement Security in the United States April 5, 2017

More information

Will Automatic Enrollment Reduce Employer Contributions to 401(k) Plans? Mauricio Soto and Barbara A. Butrica

Will Automatic Enrollment Reduce Employer Contributions to 401(k) Plans? Mauricio Soto and Barbara A. Butrica Will Automatic Enrollment Reduce Employer Contributions to 401(k) Plans? Mauricio Soto and Barbara A. Butrica December 2009 The Retirement Policy Program Discussion Paper 09 04 Will Automatic Enrollment

More information

HOW HAVE WORKERS RESPONDED TO OREGON S AUTO-IRA?

HOW HAVE WORKERS RESPONDED TO OREGON S AUTO-IRA? December 2018, Number 18-22 RETIREMENT RESEARCH HOW HAVE WORKERS RESPONDED TO OREGON S AUTO-IRA? By Anek Belbase and Geoffrey T. Sanzenbacher* Introduction Only about half of private sector workers are

More information

Older Workers: Employment and Retirement Trends

Older Workers: Employment and Retirement Trends Cornell University ILR School DigitalCommons@ILR Federal Publications Key Workplace Documents September 2005 Older Workers: Employment and Retirement Trends Patrick Purcell Congressional Research Service

More information

Prepared remarks for testimony before the Maryland Joint Committee on Pensions

Prepared remarks for testimony before the Maryland Joint Committee on Pensions Prepared remarks for testimony before the Maryland Joint Committee on Pensions David Madland, Director, American Worker Project, Center for American Progress Action Fund October 23, 2013 Thank you for

More information

Beyond the Storm: New Reforms for 401(k) Plans

Beyond the Storm: New Reforms for 401(k) Plans Broadly speaking, the short words are the best, and the old words when short are best of all. Winston Churchill, Former British Prime Minister J. Epilogue Main Street, Wall Street, and both ends of Pennsylvania

More information

A Look at the End-of-Life Financial Situation in America, p. 2

A Look at the End-of-Life Financial Situation in America, p. 2 April 2015 Vol. 36, No. 4 A Look at the End-of-Life Financial Situation in America, p. 2 A T A G L A N C E A Look at the End-of-Life Financial Situation in America, by Sudipto Banerjee, Ph.D., EBRI This

More information

RETIREMENT PLAN COVERAGE AND SAVING TRENDS OF BABY BOOMER COHORTS BY SEX: ANALYSIS OF THE 1989 AND 1998 SCF

RETIREMENT PLAN COVERAGE AND SAVING TRENDS OF BABY BOOMER COHORTS BY SEX: ANALYSIS OF THE 1989 AND 1998 SCF PPI PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE RETIREMENT PLAN COVERAGE AND SAVING TRENDS OF BABY BOOMER COHORTS BY SEX: ANALYSIS OF THE AND SCF D A T A D I G E S T Introduction Over the next three decades, the retirement

More information

D A T A D I G E S T PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE PPI. Extending Preferences for Dividends and Capital Gains: Who Gains the Most?

D A T A D I G E S T PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE PPI. Extending Preferences for Dividends and Capital Gains: Who Gains the Most? PPI PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE Extending Preferences for Dividends and Capital Gains: Who Gains the Most? D A T A D I G E S T Introduction In 2003, the president proposed legislation to exclude all dividend

More information

HOW LONG DO UNEMPLOYED OLDER WORKERS SEARCH FOR A JOB?

HOW LONG DO UNEMPLOYED OLDER WORKERS SEARCH FOR A JOB? February 2014, Number 14-3 RETIREMENT RESEARCH HOW LONG DO UNEMPLOYED OLDER WORKERS SEARCH FOR A JOB? By Matthew S. Rutledge* Introduction The labor force participation of older workers has been rising

More information

Retirements At Risk: The Outlook for the United States

Retirements At Risk: The Outlook for the United States Retirements At Risk: The Outlook for the United States Alicia H. Munnell Peter F. Drucker Professor, Boston College Carroll School of Management Director, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College

More information

HEALTH COVERAGE AMONG YEAR-OLDS in 2003

HEALTH COVERAGE AMONG YEAR-OLDS in 2003 HEALTH COVERAGE AMONG 50-64 YEAR-OLDS in 2003 The aging of the population focuses attention on how those in midlife get health insurance. Because medical problems and health costs commonly increase with

More information

Who Uses the Roth 401(k), and How Do They Use It?

Who Uses the Roth 401(k), and How Do They Use It? Who Uses the Roth 401(k), and How Do They Use It? John Beshears Stanford University and NBER James J. Choi Yale University and NBER David Laibson Harvard University and NBER Brigitte C. Madrian Harvard

More information

POLICY BRIEF: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN IRAS AND 401(K) PLANS IN SAVERS PORTFOLIOS

POLICY BRIEF: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN IRAS AND 401(K) PLANS IN SAVERS PORTFOLIOS POLICY BRIEF: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN IRAS AND 401(K) PLANS IN SAVERS PORTFOLIOS William Gale, Aaron Krupkin, and Shanthi Ramnath October 25, 2017 The opinions represent those of the authors and are not

More information

WOULD RAISING IRA CONTRIBUTION LIMITS BOLSTER RETIREMENT SECURITY FOR LOWER AND MIDDLE-INCOME FAMILIES? by Peter Orszag and Jonathan Orszag 1

WOULD RAISING IRA CONTRIBUTION LIMITS BOLSTER RETIREMENT SECURITY FOR LOWER AND MIDDLE-INCOME FAMILIES? by Peter Orszag and Jonathan Orszag 1 820 First Street, NE, Suite 510, Washington, DC 20002 Tel: 202-408-1080 Fax: 202-408-1056 center@cbpp.org http://www.cbpp.org April 2, 2001 WOULD RAISING IRA CONTRIBUTION LIMITS BOLSTER RETIREMENT SECURITY

More information

Research fundamentals

Research fundamentals Research fundamentals 1401 H Street, NW, Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20005 202/326-5800 www.ici.org January 2008 Vol. 17, No. 1 The Role of IRAs in U.S. Households Saving for Retirement Key Findings Four

More information

The Potential Effects of Retirement. Security Project. Proposals on Private and National Saving: Exploratory Calculations

The Potential Effects of Retirement. Security Project. Proposals on Private and National Saving: Exploratory Calculations The Retirement Security Project The Potential Effects of Retirement Security Project Proposals on Private and National Saving: Exploratory Calculations J. Mark Iwry, William G. Gale, and Peter R. Orszag

More information

Economic Effects of a New York Minimum Wage Increase: An Econometric Scoring of S6413

Economic Effects of a New York Minimum Wage Increase: An Econometric Scoring of S6413 Michael J. Chow NFIB Research Foundation Washington, DC November 1, 2012 Economic Effects of a New York Increase: An Econometric Scoring of S6413 This report analyzes the potential economic impact of implementing

More information

Automatic enrollment, employer match rates, and employee compensation in 401(k) plans

Automatic enrollment, employer match rates, and employee compensation in 401(k) plans ARTICLE MAY 2015 Automatic enrollment, employer match rates, and employee compensation in 401(k) plans This article uses restricted-access employer-level microdata from the National Compensation Survey

More information

Volume Title: Social Security Policy in a Changing Environment. Volume Author/Editor: Jeffrey Brown, Jeffrey Liebman and David A.

Volume Title: Social Security Policy in a Changing Environment. Volume Author/Editor: Jeffrey Brown, Jeffrey Liebman and David A. This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Social Security Policy in a Changing Environment Volume Author/Editor: Jeffrey Brown, Jeffrey

More information

Universal Savings Account Proposal in New Republican Tax Bill Is Ill-Conceived

Universal Savings Account Proposal in New Republican Tax Bill Is Ill-Conceived 820 First Street NE, Suite 510 Washington, DC 20002 Tel: 202-408-1080 Fax: 202-408-1056 center@cbpp.org www.cbpp.org Updated September 19, 2018 Universal Savings Account Proposal in New Republican Tax

More information

Public Policy and Saving for Retirement: The Autosave Features of the Pension Protection Act of 2006

Public Policy and Saving for Retirement: The Autosave Features of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 Public Policy and Saving for Retirement: The Autosave Features of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 John Beshears, Harvard University James J. Choi, Yale University and NBER David Laibson, Harvard University

More information

Ready or Not... The Impact of Retirement-Plan Design

Ready or Not... The Impact of Retirement-Plan Design Ready or Not... The Impact of Retirement-Plan Design Some 10,000 baby boomers a day are heading into retirement. Will they have enough income to finance retirements that, for some, may last as long as

More information

WHY ARE OLDER WORKERS AT GREATER RISK OF DISPLACEMENT?

WHY ARE OLDER WORKERS AT GREATER RISK OF DISPLACEMENT? May 2009, Number 9-10 WHY ARE OLDER WORKERS AT GREATER RISK OF DISPLACEMENT? By Alicia H. Munnell, Steven A. Sass, and Natalia A. Zhivan* Introduction The conventional wisdom says that older workers are

More information

CAN EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT EXPLAIN THE RISE IN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AT OLDER AGES?

CAN EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT EXPLAIN THE RISE IN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AT OLDER AGES? September 2013, Number 13-13 RETIREMENT RESEARCH CAN EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT EXPLAIN THE RISE IN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AT OLDER AGES? By Gary Burtless* Introduction The labor force participation of

More information

center for retirement research

center for retirement research SAVING FOR RETIREMENT: TAXES MATTER By James M. Poterba * Introduction To encourage individuals to save for retirement, federal tax policy provides various tax advantages for investments in self-directed

More information

Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the Minnesota Long-Term Care Industry:

Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the Minnesota Long-Term Care Industry: Minnesota Department of Health Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the Minnesota Long-Term Care Industry: Status of Coverage and Policy Options Report to the Minnesota Legislature January, 2002 Health

More information

If You Offer It, Participants Will Use It

If You Offer It, Participants Will Use It If You Offer It, Participants Will Use It Roth Usage in Defined Contribution Plans May 2016 Risk. Reinsurance. Human Resources. If You Offer It, Participants Will Use It: Roth Usage in Defined Contribution

More information

HOW MUCH TO SAVE FOR A SECURE

HOW MUCH TO SAVE FOR A SECURE November 2011, Number 11-13 RETIREMENT RESEARCH HOW MUCH TO SAVE FOR A SECURE RETIREMENT By Alicia H. Munnell, Francesca Golub-Sass, and Anthony Webb* Introduction One of the major challenges facing Americans

More information

The Limitations of Defaults

The Limitations of Defaults The Limitations of Defaults John Beshears Stanford University and NBER James J. Choi Yale University and NBER David Laibson Harvard University and NBER Brigitte C. Madrian Harvard University and NBER Prepared

More information

HOW WILL UNINSURED CHILDREN BE AFFECTED BY HEALTH REFORM?

HOW WILL UNINSURED CHILDREN BE AFFECTED BY HEALTH REFORM? I S S U E kaiser commission on medicaid and the uninsured AUGUST 2009 P A P E R HOW WILL UNINSURED CHILDREN BE AFFECTED BY HEALTH REFORM? By Lisa Dubay, Allison Cook, Bowen Garrett SUMMARY Children make

More information

CRS Report for Congress

CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL33116 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Retirement Plan Participation and Contributions: Trends from 1998 to 2003 October 12, 2005 Patrick Purcell Specialist in Social Legislation

More information

THE IMPACT OF LEAKAGES ON 401(K)/IRA ASSETS

THE IMPACT OF LEAKAGES ON 401(K)/IRA ASSETS February 2015, Number 15-2 RETIREMENT RESEARCH THE IMPACT OF LEAKAGES ON 401(K)/IRA ASSETS By Alicia H. Munnell and Anthony Webb* Introduction 401(k) plans are now the main way that private sector workers

More information

1102 Longworth House Office Building 1106 Longworth House Office Building Washington, DC Washington, DC 20515

1102 Longworth House Office Building 1106 Longworth House Office Building Washington, DC Washington, DC 20515 February 23, 2017 The Honorable Kevin Brady The Honorable Richard Neal Chairman Ranking Member Committee on Ways and Means Committee on Ways and Means U.S. House of Representatives U.S. House of Representatives

More information

Health Care Spending Under Reform: Less Uncompensated Care and Lower Costs to Small Employers

Health Care Spending Under Reform: Less Uncompensated Care and Lower Costs to Small Employers Health Care Spending Under Reform: Less Uncompensated Care and Lower Costs to Small Employers Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues January 2010 Lisa Clemans-Cope, Bowen Garrett, and Matthew

More information

There are several types of tax-favored retirement

There are several types of tax-favored retirement Tax-Favored Retirement Plans Steve Rosenthal April 20, 2017 There are several types of tax-favored retirement plans. They differ mainly on the type of sponsor and the tax treatment of contributions and

More information

Medicare Beneficiaries and Their Assets: Implications for Low-Income Programs

Medicare Beneficiaries and Their Assets: Implications for Low-Income Programs The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation Medicare Beneficiaries and Their Assets: Implications for Low-Income Programs by Marilyn Moon The Urban Institute Robert Friedland and Lee Shirey Center on an Aging

More information

Older Workers: Employment and Retirement Trends

Older Workers: Employment and Retirement Trends Cornell University ILR School DigitalCommons@ILR Federal Publications Key Workplace Documents 9-15-2008 Older Workers: Employment and Retirement Trends Patrick Purcell Congressional Research Service; Domestic

More information

Retirement Benefits for Members of Congress

Retirement Benefits for Members of Congress Katelin P. Isaacs Analyst in Income Security July 31, 2015 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL30631 Summary Prior to 1984, neither federal civil service employees nor Members of Congress

More information

Matching Private Saving with Federal Dollars: USA Accounts and Other Subsidies for Saving

Matching Private Saving with Federal Dollars: USA Accounts and Other Subsidies for Saving URBAN INSTITUTE Brief Series No. 8 November 1999 Matching Private Saving with Federal Dollars: USA Accounts and Other Subsidies for Saving Pamela Perun PRESIDENT CLINTON PROPOSES SPENDING about $540 billion

More information

IMPACT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY RETIREMENT EARNINGS TEST ON YEAR-OLDS

IMPACT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY RETIREMENT EARNINGS TEST ON YEAR-OLDS #2003-15 December 2003 IMPACT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY RETIREMENT EARNINGS TEST ON 62-64-YEAR-OLDS Caroline Ratcliffe Jillian Berk Kevin Perese Eric Toder Alison M. Shelton Project Manager The Public Policy

More information

New ICI Research on Mutual Fund Ownership and on the U.S. Retirement Market

New ICI Research on Mutual Fund Ownership and on the U.S. Retirement Market New ICI Research on Mutual Fund Ownership and on the U.S. Retirement Market IDC Webinar November 29, 2012 Sarah Holden Senior Director, Retirement & Investor Research Copyright 2012 by the Investment Company

More information

ESTATE TAXES, DEFICITS and BUDGET IMPLICATIONS

ESTATE TAXES, DEFICITS and BUDGET IMPLICATIONS ESTATE TAXES, DEFICITS and BUDGET IMPLICATIONS Stephen J. Entin American Family Business Foundation October 2011 INTRODUCTION The future of the Federal Estate Tax is still uncertain. Over the summer, Congress

More information

HOW MUCH DOES HOUSING AFFECT RETIREMENT SECURITY? AN NRRI UPDATE

HOW MUCH DOES HOUSING AFFECT RETIREMENT SECURITY? AN NRRI UPDATE September 2016, Number 16-16 RETIREMENT RESEARCH HOW MUCH DOES HOUSING AFFECT RETIREMENT SECURITY? AN NRRI UPDATE By Alicia H. Munnell, Wenliang Hou, and Geoffrey T. Sanzenbacher* Introduction Housing

More information

Retirement Plan Coverage of Baby Boomers: Analysis of 1998 SIPP Data. Satyendra K. Verma

Retirement Plan Coverage of Baby Boomers: Analysis of 1998 SIPP Data. Satyendra K. Verma A Data and Chart Book by Satyendra K. Verma August 2005 Retirement Plan Coverage of Baby Boomers: Analysis of 1998 SIPP Data by Satyendra K. Verma August 2005 Components Retirement Plan Coverage in 1998:

More information

BORROWING TO SAVE? UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT

BORROWING TO SAVE? UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT BORROWING TO SAVE? UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT John Beshears, Harvard James J. Choi, Yale David Laibson, Harvard Brigitte C. Madrian, Harvard William L. Skimmyhorn, West Point October

More information

ICI RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE

ICI RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE ICI RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE 1401 H STREET, NW, SUITE 1200 WASHINGTON, DC 20005 202-326-5800 WWW.ICI.ORG JULY 2017 VOL. 23, NO. 5 WHAT S INSIDE 2 Introduction 4 Which Workers Would Be Expected to Participate

More information

A report from July Employer Reactions to Leading Retirement Policy Ideas. Insights from Pew s national survey of small businesses

A report from July Employer Reactions to Leading Retirement Policy Ideas. Insights from Pew s national survey of small businesses A report from July 2017 Employer Reactions to Leading Retirement Policy Ideas Insights from Pew s national survey of small businesses Contents 1 Overview 2 Policy choices 4 General reactions to the auto-ira

More information

Extension of Saving and Investment Incentives

Extension of Saving and Investment Incentives Extension of Saving and Investment Incentives Testimony Submitted to Subcommittee on Taxation and IRS Oversight of the Committee on Finance United States Senate June 30, 2005 Eric J. Toder The Urban Institute

More information

PENSION WEALTH AND INCOME: 1992,

PENSION WEALTH AND INCOME: 1992, January 2008, Number 8-1 PENSION WEALTH AND INCOME: 1992, 1998, AND 2004 By Olga Sorokina, Anthony Webb, and Dan Muldoon* Introduction What is the impact of the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution

More information

Getting Beyond Ordinary MANAGING PLAN COSTS IN AUTOMATIC PROGRAMS

Getting Beyond Ordinary MANAGING PLAN COSTS IN AUTOMATIC PROGRAMS PRICE PERSPECTIVE In-depth analysis and insights to inform your decision-making. Getting Beyond Ordinary MANAGING PLAN COSTS IN AUTOMATIC PROGRAMS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Plan sponsors today are faced with unprecedented

More information

Opting out of Retirement Plan Default Settings

Opting out of Retirement Plan Default Settings WORKING PAPER Opting out of Retirement Plan Default Settings Jeremy Burke, Angela A. Hung, and Jill E. Luoto RAND Labor & Population WR-1162 January 2017 This paper series made possible by the NIA funded

More information

Worker Participation in Employer-Sponsored Pensions: A Fact Sheet

Worker Participation in Employer-Sponsored Pensions: A Fact Sheet Worker Participation in Employer-Sponsored Pensions: A Fact Sheet John J. Topoleski Analyst in Income Security February 2, 2015 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R43439 Worker Participation

More information

Retirement Benefits for Members of Congress

Retirement Benefits for Members of Congress Cornell University ILR School DigitalCommons@ILR Federal Publications Key Workplace Documents 3-19-2014 Retirement Benefits for Members of Congress Katelin P. Isaacs Congressional Research Service Follow

More information

The Economic Effects of Canceling Scheduled Changes to Overtime Regulations

The Economic Effects of Canceling Scheduled Changes to Overtime Regulations Cornell University ILR School DigitalCommons@ILR Federal Publications Key Workplace Documents 11-2016 The Economic Effects of Canceling Scheduled Changes to Overtime Regulations Congressional Budget Office

More information

Federal Employees Retirement System: Budget and Trust Fund Issues

Federal Employees Retirement System: Budget and Trust Fund Issues Federal Employees Retirement System: Budget and Trust Fund Issues Katelin P. Isaacs Analyst in Income Security September 27, 2012 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

More information

Household finance and libertarian paternalism

Household finance and libertarian paternalism Household finance and libertarian paternalism James J. Choi Yale Summer School in Behavioral Finance 2009 What determines consumption growth and asset allocations? The classic Euler equation u'( c 1) t+

More information

Federal Employees Retirement System: Budget and Trust Fund Issues

Federal Employees Retirement System: Budget and Trust Fund Issues Federal Employees Retirement System: Budget and Trust Fund Issues Katelin P. Isaacs Analyst in Income Security June 13, 2013 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Congressional

More information

The Cost of Failure to Enact Health Reform: Implications for States. Bowen Garrett, John Holahan, Lan Doan, and Irene Headen

The Cost of Failure to Enact Health Reform: Implications for States. Bowen Garrett, John Holahan, Lan Doan, and Irene Headen The Cost of Failure to Enact Health Reform: Implications for States Bowen Garrett, John Holahan, Lan Doan, and Irene Headen Overview What would happen to trends in health coverage and costs if health reforms

More information

Six Tax Laws Later How Individuals' Marginal Federal Income Tax Rates Changed Between 1980 and 1995 Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, David Weiner

Six Tax Laws Later How Individuals' Marginal Federal Income Tax Rates Changed Between 1980 and 1995 Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, David Weiner Six Tax Laws Later How Individuals' Marginal Federal Income Tax Rates Changed Between 1980 and 1995 Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, David Weiner Reprinted with permission of the National Tax Journal.

More information