Unemployment and Business Cycles. Lawrence J. Christiano Martin Eichenbaum Mathias Trabandt
|
|
- Stanley Garrett
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Unemployment and Business Cycles Lawrence J. Christiano Martin Eichenbaum Mathias Trabandt
2 Background Key challenge for business cycle models. How to account for observed volatility of labor market variables? Standard diagnosis For plausibly parameterized models, in a boom, wages rise too rapidly, limiting expansion of employment. Classic RBC models (Chetty), standard effi ciency wage models (Alexopoulos), standard DMP models (Shimer).
3 Sticky Wages... New Keynesian DSGE models successful in matching time series data, including hours worked, employment and real wages. but, they assume the result by positing that wages are exogenously sticky. model provides no rationale for wage stickiness. approach criticized on micro data grounds good macro fit requires wage indexation, so that all wages change all the time. but, in micro data individual wages constant for lengthy spells. underlying monopoly power theory of unemployment on questionable empirical grounds (Christiano (2)) does not contribute to contemporary policy discussions (e.g., effects of extending unemployment benefits).
4 Outline Describe variants of DMP labor market environments, define the problem, and several proposed solutions. Standard DMP model: Shimer critique (AER) Early solutions: Hagedorn and Manovskii (AER), Ljungqvist-Sargent (working paper). Current solutions: Hiring versus search costs (see Pissarides (P), Christiano-Trabandt-Walentin (CTW), Christiano-Eichenbaum-Trabandt (CET)). Hall-Milgrom (28, HM). Steady State Properties. Integrate framework into New Keynesian model.
5 Simple model Households have large numbers of workers, provide consumption insurance to each one. Consumption Euler equation: = E t m t+ R t+ workers Value function of unemployed worker (D unemployment benefits, f t+ job finding rate): ) ] U t = D + E t m t+ [f t+ V t+ + ( f t+ U t+ Employed worker (w t wage rate) V t = w t + E t m t+ [ρv t+ + ( ρ) ( ) ) f t+ V t+ + ( f t+ U t+ Actually, only the difference, S w,t, matters in the model: S w,t V t U t = w t D + ρe t m t+ ( f t+ ) S w,t+.
6 Simple Model, cnt d A firm that wants to meet worker must first post a vacancy, at cost c. Probably that a vacancy is filled is denoted q t. After meeting a worker, the firm must pay a fixed cost, κ, before bargaining. Free entry condition: c = q t (J t κ). Value of a worker to the firm, J t : J t = ϑ t w t + ρe t m t+ J t+
7 Simple Model, cnt d Determination of job filling rate and vacancy filling rate matching function: x t l t {}}{ new meetings t = σ m v t l t {}}{ vacancies t σ ( ρ)l t + l t = ρl t {}}{ people searching for jobs t σ. Job finding rate: f t = x tl t ρl t = σ m labor market tightness Γ t {}}{ v t l t ρl t σ = σ m Γ σ t
8 Vacancy filling rate: Simple Model, cnt d q t = x tl t v t l t = σ m Law of motion of labor force Resource constraint: Nash sharing rule: ( ρlt v t l t l t = (ρ + x t ) l t C t + x t l t ( κ + c q t ) = ϑ t l t ) σ = σ m Γ σ t J t = η η S w,t, η share of total surplus, J t + S w,t, given to workers
9 Collecting Equilibrium Conditions equations and unknowns J t, w t, m t, S w,t, l t, f t, q t, x t, C t, R t, Γ t : J t = ϑ t w t + ρe t m t+ J t+ J t = c q t + κ S w,t = w t D + ρe t m t+ ( f t+ ) S w,t+ l t = (ρ + x t ) l t, f t = x tl t ρl t f t = σ m Γ σ t, q t = σ m Γt σ ( ϑ t l t = C t + x t l t κ + c ) q t J t = η η S w,t = E t m t+ R t+, m t+ = β u (C t+ ) u (C t )
10 Analysis Dynamics of the system hard to analyze analytically. Steady state much easier, and surprisingly (as we ll see later) informative about dynamics. Can ignore some equations, (*) J = ϑ w ρβ, J = c q + κ S w = w D ρβ ( f ) = ( ρ) l ρ + x, f = ρl f = σ m Γ σ, q = σ m Γ σ ( ϑl = C + xl κ + c ) ( ) q J = η η S w, = β R ( ), m = β
11 Core Steady State Equations Two equations in two unknowns, Γ and w understood, that f = σ m Γ σ, q = σ m Γ σ ( wage equation ) c q + κ = ϑ w ρβ ( ) c w = ϑ ( ρβ) q + κ ( bargaining equation ) ϑ w ρβ = η w D η ρβ ( f ) w = η ϑ ( ρβ ( f )) + ( ρβ) η D ( ρβ) η η + ρβ ( f ) Alternatively, think of these as two equations in two unknowns, l and w : ( ) ( ρ) l f (l) α f (l) =, Γ (l) =, q (l) = σm Γ (l) σ ρl σ m
12 Simple Characterization of Steady State Equilibrium
13 Comparative Static on Steady State
14 Steady State Properties of the Model Consider the long run (steady state) impact of a permanent shock to ϑ. Steady state effects (sort of) correspond, in dynamic setting, to medium run effects of persistent shock to ϑ t. We are interested in the effects of all sorts of shocks. In broader model, the primary avenue by which other shocks affect labor market is via their impact on ϑ t, which is endogenous in those models. Evaluate the effect of ϑ on market tightness, Γ : ɛ Γ,ϑ d log Γ d log ϑ All other labor market variables are a monotone transform on Γ.
15 Elasticity of Labor Market Tightness with Respect to Technology Shock ϑ ɛ Γ,ϑ = Υ ϑ D τ κ κ, Υ = ηρβf + ( ρβ) ηρβf + σ ( ρβ) τ κ = Υσ [ηρβf + ( ρβ)] η
16 Shimer Puzzle Shimer (AER 25) puzzle: "for any reasonable parameterization of the model, can t get ɛ Γ,ϑ close to what it is in the data." Shimer estimates ɛ Γ,ϑ by ratio of standard deviation of market tightness (from JOLTS data) to standard deviation of labor productivity. Later, we will display stochastic simulations of the model that provide some support for Shimer s approach to estimating ɛ Γ,ϑ. Pissarides (29, p. 35), Mortensen-Nagypal (RED, 27,p.333): argue that Shimer s estimate is too high. Reports that in a regression of log tightness on log labor productivity, coeffi cient is 7.56 Argue that 7.56 is a better estimate of ɛ Γ,ϑ.
17 Hagedorn-Manovskii (AER 28) HM examine elasticity in standard DMP model: ɛ Γ,ϑ = Υ ϑ ϑ D, Υ = ηρβf + ( ρβ) ηρβf + σ ( ρβ). HM argue that to get elasticity up and solve Shimer puzzle, have two choices, given that in practice the data do not permit much playing around with ρ, β, f. Reduce responsiveness of wage to ϑ by increasing share of surplus going to labor, η (w D as η ) But, η has relatively small impact. When η =, Υ = /σ, and σ conventionally in neighborhood of /2. So, Υ bounded between (when η = ) and 2 (when η = ). Raising D has potentially huge impact via effect on ϑ/ (ϑ D). Hagedorn and Manovskii conclude that only way to solve Shimer puzzle is to increase D.
18 Costain-Reiter Two objections to HM solution: In practice, D is not very high. Costain-Reiter: Solutions to Shimer puzzle tend to imply unreasonably high values of du/d log D, where u = l is the unemployment rate - Pissarides (29, p. 365): du d log D = ( ρl) l ( σ) D ϑ ɛ Γ,ϑ Argues that in the data, du/d log D. : "A ten percent increase in unemployment benefits results in a. percentage point increase in unemployment."
19 Numerical Properties of Elasticity Formula Following graph varies η from.26 to.55 (results are only reported for parameterizations that imply q, f (, )) first row: c =, κ =.86, σ m =.664, σ =.52, ϑ =, ρ =.9, β =.3 /4, D =.365. second row (standard DMP): same as first row, except c =.57, κ =. Findings Shifting meeting costs to fixed portion (first row) substantially boosts ɛ Γ,ϑ. Consistent with HM, increasing η has tiny impact on ɛ Γ,ϑ and presumably achieves this via the (tiny or no, in case of first row) reduction in wage response. With fixed costs of hiring labor, ɛ Γ,ϑ is bigger. Increased wage inertia (reducing dw/dϑ) plays no role in this. Consistent with Shimer, no parameterization comes close to solving the Shimer puzzle.
20 5.6 GAM elasticity dw/dvartheta vacancy posting cost share.4 du/dlogd dlog(w)/dlogd eta eta eta eta eta.95 GAM elasticity.92 dw/dvartheta vacancy posting cost share 2.54 du/dlogd.65 dlog(w)/dlogd eta eta eta eta eta
21 Elasticity of Labor Market Tightness with Respect to Technology Shock Formula: ϑ ɛ Γ,ϑ = Υ ϑ D τ κ κ Increase in D raises elasticity, illustrates Hagedorn and Manovskii (28, AER) Increase in κ raises elasticity, illustrates Pissarides (P, Econometrica, Vol. 77, No. 5, September, 29, pp ), and Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (CTW, Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, vol. 35, 2, pages ). Formula similar to the one in Ljungqvist and Sargent ("The Fundamental Surplus in Matching Models", manuscript)
22 More Numerical Properties of Elasticity Formula To establish baseline parameter values: set: β =.3.25, η =.9, ρ =.9, σ =.52, ϑ =, κ =.. select values of D, σ m and c so that l =.945, q =.7, D/w =.4. In following graph, First row: vary value of κ, holding β, η, ρ, σ, ϑ, D fixed at baseline and setting σ m and c so that l =.945, q =.7. Second row: vary D/w, holding β, η, ρ, σ, ϑ fixed at baseline, c =, and setting σ m, κ and D so that l =.945, q =.7, D/w takes on specified value. Of course, the elasticity is the change in market tightness with respect to ϑ, holding all other structural parameters constant.
23 GAM elasticity 2.5. kappa dw/dvartheta.5. kappa vacancy posting cost share kappa du/dlogd kappa x 3 dlog(w)/dlogd.5. kappa 3 GAM elasticity dw/dvartheta vacancy posting cost share.8 du/dlogd dlog(w)/ddw Dw Dw Dw Dw Dw
24 Messages from the Formula As κ increases and share of costs to meet worker due to vacancy costs declines, ɛ Γ,ϑ increases (P,CTW,CET). As D/w increases, ɛ Γ,ϑ increases. Response of wage to ϑ shows little variation across experiments. Response even moves in the wrong direction in response to κ Hall-Shimer intuition, that key to resolving Shimer puzzle lies in reducing responsiveness of wage, is called into question by the results (see Hagedorn and Manovskii (28, AER) and Ljungqvist and Sargent for further discussion). Perturbations which work towards resolution of Shimer puzzle, simultaneously imply a big response of unemployment to unemployment benefits, D (see Costain and Reiter, JEDC 28). For intuition, see below.
25 Alternating Offer Bargaining Hall-Milgrom intuition (later, called into question) With alternating offer bargaining, wage rate in part reflects costs and benefits of bargaining, detaching wage a little from broader economic conditions. Result: with reduced sensitivity of wage to general conditions, when a shock launches an expansion, firms enjoy a larger share of the rents from a match and therefore have a greater incentive to expand employment. Hall-Milgrom suggested that this is how alternating offer bargaining may contribute to resolution of Shimer puzzle. To resolve puzzle, still need to reduce c and raise κ. Baseline specification: Each worker-firm pair bargains each period. Bargain over current wage rate, taking outcome of future wage bargains given. Period-by-Period Bargaining.
26 Alternating Offers Each quarter is divided into M equal subperiods, m =,.., M. Firm makes an opening wage offer in m =. Worker may reject and make a counter offer in m = 2. Firm may reject worker s wage offer and make a new offer in next sub-period,... If there is a whole sequence of rejections, worker makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer in last subperiod M. If an offer is accepted in any sub period m, production begins immediately. Value of production in any subperiod is ϑ t /M. Solution to the bargaining problem: w t ( w t ), w 2 t,..., w M t.
27 Firm s Offer: round Firm offers w t as low as possible subject to worker not rejecting it: utility of worker who accepts firm offer and goes to work {}}{ V t = utility of worker who rejects firm offer and intends to make counteroffer {}}( ){ D δut + ( δ) M + V2 t where, V t w t + E t m t+ [ρv t+ + ( ρ) (f t+ V t+ + ( f t+ ) U t+ )]
28 Worker Offer: round 2 Worker proposes highest possible wage w 2 t subject to firm not rejecting it: value of firm that accepts worker offer {}}{ J 2 t = value of firm that rejects worker offer and intends to make counteroffer {}} [ ]{ δ + ( δ) γ + Jt 3 The firm incurs cost γ to make a counter offer. Firm value: J 2 t value of worker output in subperiods 2 to M {}}{ M ϑ t w 2 t + ρe t m t+ J t+ M
29 Alternating Offers, Final Round Each bargaining round requires the wage for the next round. If they go to last round with no agreement, the worker makes a final, take-it-or-leave-it-offer: value of firm that accepts worker offer in last round {}}{ J M t = value of firm that rejects worker s take-it-or-leave-it offer {}}{ or or J M t M ϑ t w M t + ρe t m t+ J t+ =, w M t = M ϑ t + ρe t m t+ =κ {}}{ J t+
30 Calculations To determine w t w t, firm first solves wm t, w M t, w M 2 t,..., w 2 t. M equilibrium conditions for the M unknowns. Linearity of bargaining equilibrium conditions implies: simple equation determines spot wage, w t.
31 Alternating Offer Sharing Rule Wage satisfies: where =S w,t {}}{ J t = β (V t U t ) β 2 γ + β 3 (ϑ t D), α = δ + ( δ) M, α 2 = ( δ) M, δ α 3 = α 2 α, α 4 = δ α 2 δ 2 δ M + α 2, and β i = α i+ /α, i =, 2, 3.
32 Alternative Bargaining Arrangements Alternative arrangement has workers and firms bargaining just once, when they first meet. Equilibrium allocations always the same. negotiate over wage rates in each date and state of nature associated with the duration of their match. they do not care about the precise pattern of wage payments, only the present discounted value (PV). many patterns are possible, including the pattern in the period-by-period bargaining assumed in the paper. one pattern: worker receives fixed nominal wage as long as she s with firm. Wages of new hires more volatile than wages of incumbents. Key issue associated with PV bargaining: commitment. no need to address these issues in period-by-period bargaining.
33 Effect of Alternating Offer Bargaining on Equilibrium Conditions Replace Nash Sharing rule: J t = η η S w,t with alternating offer sharing rule: J t = β S w,t β 2 γ + β 3 (ϑ t D). With this sharing rule, the steady state elasticity, d log Γ/d log ϑ is altered.
34 Elasticity of Market Tightness with Respect to Productivity elasticity formula now has γ in there...higher γ, higher elasticity... ϑ ɛ Γ,ϑ = Υ ϑ D τ κ κ τ γ γ
35 Elasticity formula: the pieces ψ ρβf + σ ( ρβ) ( + β ) ρβf + ( βρ) ( + β ), Υ = β + β 3 τ κ = ( + β τ γ = ( ρβ ( f )) ψa ρβf (σ ) ) ( ρβ) + ρβf + ψ a ( βρ ( f ) + ) ρβf (σ ) ψ β 2 ( a ) ρβf (σ ) a = β + β 3 βρ ( f ) + ψ,
36 Following Figure Top and bottom rows constructed as in earlier figure which is reproduced here.
37 Two things in top row: (i) Nash (star) to AOB has big effect on market tightness elasticity (ii) Search (kappa = ) to hiring (kappa > ) has big effect, but has bigger impact on AOB than Nash Bottom row: (i) rise in D/w has huge effect on labor market volatility but also raises impact of benefits (ii) going from Nash to AOB involves a (small) rise in wage inertia GAM elasticity dw/dvartheta vacancy posting cost share du/dlogd x 3 dlog(w)/dlogd kappa kappa kappa.2.5. kappa kappa 3 GAM elasticity dw/dvartheta vacancy posting cost share.8 du/dlogd dlog(w)/ddw Dw Dw Dw Dw Dw
38 Message of Formula Parameter values: β =.3.25, σ =.52, ρ =.9, ε = 6, ρ a =.95, Nash {}}{ η =.9, Alternating offer bargaining {}}{ γ =., δ =.5, M = 6, Going to alternating offer bargaining (AOB) increases elasticity of tightness with respect to ϑ. However, it simultaneously increases the impact of permanent changes in unemployment benefits. Wage inertia plays quantitatively little or no (second row) role in results (in first row, moves in wrong direction with κ).
39 Some Intuition About Elasticity Formula The wage equation with q expressed in terms of Γ : Differentiate: c σ m Γ σ + κ = ϑ w ρβ. ɛ Γ,ϑ = σ ϑ ( dw/dϑ) ϑ w κ ( ρβ). Two ways to raise ɛ Γ,ϑ : Numerator: wage inertia (reduce dw/dϑ), but this exhibits too little variation to play an appreciable role Denominator: reduce steady state profits, net of amortized fixed cost of meeting worker. Reducing profits: Rise in κ directly reduces (relevant measure of) profits. Rise in D or γ shifts bargaining equation (i.e., sharing rule) up and, given downward-sloped wage equation with c >, w rises, reducing profits.
40 Impact of Bargaining Parameters Baseline model parameters: set: β =.3.25, ρ =.9, σ =.52, ϑ =, κ =.98, δ =.5, γ =., M = 6, D =.396. select values of σ m and c so that l =.945, q =.7. Change γ (top row) and δ (bottom row) always adjust σ m, c to fix q, l, but keep all other parameters at baseline. Results: Reducing δ and/or raising γ raises ɛ Γ,ϑ. Change in wage inertia very small, but, significantly, moves in wrong direction. du/d log (D) is mirror image of ɛ Γ,ϑ (Costain-Reiter).
41 GAM elasticity dw/dvartheta vacancy posting cost share du/dlogd dlog(w)/dlogd x 3 gamma delta x 3 gamma delta x 3 x 3 x 3 gamma delta x 3 x 3 gamma x 3 x 3 gamma GAM elasticity dw/dvartheta vacancy posting cost share du/dlogd x dlog(w)/dlogd delta delta x 3
42 Why Wage Inertia Seems to Move in Wrong Direction with Market Tightness Note from the previous slide that dw/dϑ appears to comove with ɛ Γ,ϑ. This is a complete contradiction to the Hall-Shimer intuition that to get volatility up you need to have wage inertia. Following is the analytic formula for dw/dϑ : dw dϑ = β (w D)βρ( σ)f ϑ( βρ+βρf ) 2 ɛ Γ,ϑ + ρβ β 3 β βρ+βρf + ρβ Note that, for given f and w, this is an increasing function of ɛ Γ,ϑ. It was verified numerically, that an increase in γ or decrease in δ raises w, reinforcing positive association between dw/dϑ and ɛ Γ,ϑ.
43 Role of Wage Inertia and Effects of Alternating Offer Bargaining Conventional intuition: rise in γ or reduction in δ insulates wage from business cycle with greater wage inertia, labor market variables respond more to shocks. Conventional wisdom contradicted in previous numerical results. Could the results reflect the calibration of c and σ m in previous results? Next Figure: vary γ and δ holding all other structural paramerers fixed at baseline. Bottom row: results unaffected; top row: impact of γ on ɛ Γ,ϑ reversed.
44 GAM elasticity x 3 gamma dw/dvartheta x 3 gamma GAM elasticity dw/dvartheta vacancy posting cost share du/dlogd x 3 gamma delta x 3 delta x delta x 3 x 3 gamma vacancy posting cost share du/dlogd delta x 3 x dlog(w)/dlogd gamma x 3 x dlog(w)/dlogd delta x 3
45 Understanding Previous Results Following graph repeats: ɛ Γ,ϑ = σ from the previous graph. In addition, display "ɛ Γ,ϑ due to wage inertia"= σ ϑ ( dw/dϑ) ϑ w κ ( ρβ), ϑ ( dw/dϑ) [ϑ w κ ( ρβ)] baseline, where [ϑ w κ ( ρβ)] baseline represents profits in the baseline parameterization. Also, display "ɛ Γ,ϑ due to profits"= σ ϑ [( dw/dϑ)] baseline ϑ w κ ( ρβ). The figure shows how the numerator and denominator contribute to the previous results.
46 Elasticity of Market Tightness w.r.t. vartheta elasticity elasticity, due to wage inertia elasticity, due to profits gam x 3 Elasticity of Market Tightness w.r.t. vartheta elasticity elasticity, due to wage inertia elasticity, due to profits delta x 3
47 Previous Results Results for increase in γ : Rise in γ reduces ɛ Γ,ϑ. Consistent with earlier intuition, focusing on profits alone leads to implication that ɛ Γ,ϑ rises. Elasticity actually falls because rise in dw/dϑ dominates ɛ Γ,ϑ. Hall-Milgrom focus on wage inertia justified, but their intuition that an increase in γ reduces dw/dϑ is contradicted. Results for decrease in δ : Leads to increase in ɛ Γ,ϑ. Hagedorn-Manovskii intuition that focuses on level effect on profits is vindicated. Hall-Milgrom intuition that focuses on wage inertia is contradicted.
48 Role of Wage Inertia and Effects of Alternating Offer Bargaining Baseline parameter values in previous computations: set: β =.3.25, ρ =.9, σ =.52, ϑ =, κ =.98, δ =.5, γ =.82, M = 6, D =.396. select values of σ m and c so that l =.945, q =.7 (c =.4, σ m =.6638). υ c =.2. Conventional wisdom about role of wage inertia in getting ɛ Γ,ϑ up contradicted in previous numerical results. Is this due to low value of υ c? new baseline: set κ, l, q so that l =.945, q =.7, υ c =.98 (κ =.2, c =.69, σ m =.6638). Next figure: vary γ and δ holding all other structural paramerers fixed at baseline. Results unaffected.
49 GAM elasticity dw/dvartheta vacancy posting cost share du/dlogd dlog(w)/dlogd x 3 gamma delta x 3 x 3 gamma delta x 3 x 3 gamma delta x 3 x 3 gamma x 3 x 3 gamma GAM elasticity dw/dvartheta vacancy posting cost share du/dlogd dlog(w)/dlogd delta delta x 3
50 Analysis of Dynamics Must use computer to do model simulation (e.g., perturbation, projection, extended path) When κ large compared to c, steady state equilibrium is indeterminate. Can be shown analytically for the case, m t+ = β, c = (see below). With price setting frictions (and η large enough, in the Nash sharing case), steady state equilibrium determinate. Do the analysis with sticky prices. With c = and alternating offer bargaining, model performs well relative to data. No Shimer puzzle. This is so, despite the absence of exogenous stickiness in wages.
51 Indeterminacy of Steady State with Hiring Costs Equilibrium conditions (sum of firm and worker surplus value functions; law of motion of labor; job finding rate; sharing rule): S w,t + κ = ϑ t D + ρβ [( f t+ ) S w,t+ + κ] l t = (ρ + x t ) l t, f t = x t l t, ρl t κ = η η S w,t, for t =,, 2,... (m t+ = β, for analytical convenience). Steady state equilibrium: constant values of S w,t, l t, x t, f t, that satisfy equilibrium conditions for ϑ t = ϑ, all t. Steady state equilibrium is unique, and corresponds to S w,t = S w, l t = l, x t = x, f t = f for all t, l = l.
52 Indeterminacy of Steady State Equilibrium Let m t+ = β, c =. The steady state equilibrium is indeterminate: given l = l, one can find another sequence of values of S w,t, l t, x t, f t, t =,, 2,..., that satisfy the equilibrium conditions and which remain arbitrarily close to the steady state equilibrium. Sharing rule implies S w,t = S w for all t. Total surplus equation implies f t+ = f for t =,, 2,... Choose a value for x = x, and set f = x l/ ( ρl) = f, l = f + ρ ( f ) l = l. Set l t = f + ρ ( f ) l t, t. Note that all these x t, f t, l t paths: converge to steady state (because < ρ ( f ) < ) satisfy the equilibrium conditions, can be made arbitrarily close to steady state equilibrium by setting x arbitrarily close to x.
53 Outline Integrate bargaining model into sticky price NK model. Evaluate the model in two ways: Shimer style comparison to unconditional moments. Impulse response matching. Conclude Alternating offer bargaining and c = solve Shimer puzzle.
54 Households and Final Good Firms Household intertemporal condition: X t = E t X t+ R t+ R t π t+, R t+ β exp (a t+ a t ) X t C t exp (a t ), π t = + π t. Final good firms solve [ max P t Y t P i,t Y i,t dj, s.t. Y t = ] Y ε ε ε ε i,t dj. Demand curve for i th monopolist ( sticky price retailers ) ( ) ε Pt Y i,t = Y t. P i,t
55 Intermediate Good Firms Production function: Y i,t = exp (a t ) h i,t, a t = ρ a a t + ε a t, where h i,t is a homogeneous input (not labor!) with after-subsidy nominal price, ( ν) ϑ t P t. Calvo Price-Setting Friction: { P i,t = P t with probability θ with probability θ P i,t.
56 Price-setting equilibrium conditions p t = K t, p t P t, F t = Y t + βθe t π F t P t C t+ ε F t+ t ε Y t K t = p t = ε s t + βθe t π t+ ε C K t+ t [ ] θ π t ε [ ε K t = θ F t ] θ π t ε ε θ s t = ( ν) ϑ t exp (a t ) ( pt θ π (ε ) ) ε ε t = ( θ) + θ πε t θ p t
57 Resource Constraint and Monetary Policy Resource constraint: C t + ( ) c + κ x t l t = Y t q t p t l t exp (a t ) = Y t. Clearing in demand and supply, input good to intermediate good producers: h t = l t. Taylor rule: R t R = exp {φ π ( π t )}, φ π =.5.
58 Labor Market Equations Value of worker to firm; firm free entry condition; recursive representation of household surplus, S w,t ; law of motion of l t ; labor market tightness, Γ t ; finding rate; vacancy filling rate and sharing rule: J t = ϑ t w t + ρe t m t+ J t+ J t = c q t + κ S w,t = w t D + ρe t m t+ ( f t+ ) S w,t+ l t = (ρ + x t ) l t, Γ t = x tl t ρl t f t = σ m Γ σ t, q t = σ m Γt σ J t = β S w,t β 2 γ + β 3 (ϑ t D)
59 Usefulness in Steady State Elasticity Formula for Understanding Dynamics Surprisingly good at predicting model dynamics (θ =.75). d log Γ d log ϑ std(log Γ) std(a) Nash Sharing κ = ( pure search costs ).8.8 c = ( pure hiring costs ) Alternating Offer Bargaining κ = c = c =, δ =
60 Calibration/Parameterization Parameter Value Description Panel A: Parameters β Discount factor ξ.66 Calvo price stickiness λ f.2 Price markup parameter ρ R.7 Taylor rule: interest rate smoothing r π.7 Taylor rule: inflation coeffi cient r y. Taylor rule: employment coeffi cient ρ.9 Job survival probability δ.5 Prob. of bargaining session break-up M 6 Max bargaining rounds per quarter ρ a.95 Roots for AR() technology Panel B: Steady State Values 4(π ) Annual net inflation rate l.945 Employment κxl/y. Hiring cost to output ratio D/w.4 Replacement ratio
61
62 Intuition Policy shock drives real interest rate down. Induces increase in demand for output of final good producers and therefore output of sticky price retailers. Latter must satisfy demand, so retailers purchase more of wholesale good driving up its relative price. Marginal revenue product (ϑ t ) associated with worker rises. Wholesalers hire more workers, raising probability that unemployed worker finds a job. Workers disagreement payoffs rise. Increase in workers bargaining power generates rise in real wage. Alternating offer bargaining mutes rise in real wage. Allows for large increase in employment, substantial decline in unemployment, small rise in inflation.
63 Medium-Sized DSGE Model Standard empirical NK model (e.g., CEE, ACEL, SW). Calvo price setting frictions, but no indexation Habit persistence in preferences. Variable capital utilization. Investment adjustment costs. Our labor market structure
64 Estimated Medium-Sized DSGE Model Estimate VAR impulse responses of aggregate variables to a monetary policy shock and two types of technology shocks. variables considered: Macro variables and real wage, hours worked, unemployment, job finding rate, vacancies. Estimate model using Bayesian variant of CEE (25) strategy: Minimizes distance between dynamic response to three shocks in model, analog objects in the data. Particular Bayesian strategy developed in Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2).
65 Posterior Mode of Key Parameters Prices change on average every 2.5 quarters. δ : roughly.26% chance of a breakup after rejection. γ : cost to firm of preparing counteroffer is /4 of a day s worth of production. Posterior mode of hiring cost as a percent of output (depends on κ):.54% of GDP.
66 Posterior Mode of Key Parameters Replacement ratio is.62. Defensible based on micro data (Gertler-Sala-Trigari, Aguiar-Hurst-Karabarbounis). Gertler, Sala and Trigari (28) : plausible range for replacement ratio is.4 to.7. Lower bound based on studies of unemployment insurance benefits Upper boundary takes into account informal sources of insurance.
67 Medium Sized Model Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock VAR 95% VAR Mean Alternating Offer Bargaining Model.4.2 GDP Unemployment Rate Inflation Federal Funds Rate.8 5 Hours Real Wage Consumption Rel. Price Investment Investment Capacity Utilization Job Finding Rate Vacancies Notes: x axis: quarters, y axis: percent 2 5
68 Medium Sized Model Impulse Responses to a Neutral Technology Shock VAR 95% VAR Mean Alternating Offer Bargaining Model GDP Unemployment Rate Inflation Federal Funds Rate Hours.8 Real Wage.8 Consumption Rel. Price Investment Investment 2 Capacity Utilization 2 Job Finding Rate 4 Vacancies Notes: x axis: quarters, y axis: percent 5
69 Medium Sized Model Responses to an Investment specific Technology Shock VAR 95% VAR Mean Alternating Offer Bargaining Model GDP Unemployment Rate Inflation Federal Funds Rate.4 5 Hours Real Wage Consumption Rel. Price Investment 5 2 Investment 2 Capacity Utilization 2 Job Finding Rate 4 Vacancies Notes: x axis: quarters, y axis: percent 5
70 Comparison With Two Other Models Standard DMP setup: Firms post vacancies and meet workers probabilistically (c >, κ = ). Workers and firms split surplus using a Nash-sharing rule. Standard New Keynesian sticky wage model following Erceg-Henderson-Levin (2). No wage indexation. Embed labor market models in CEE-style empirical model. Calvo price rigidities, but no price indexation.
71 Model Comparisons Marginal likelihood: strongly prefers our model over standard DMP and NK sticky wage models by about 24 and 54 log points, respectively. Also, other models have relatively extreme parameter estimates. For example, standard DMP formulation (Nash-sharing plus search), posterior mode of replacement ratio is.97.
72 Cyclicality of Unemployment and Vacancies Similar to Shimer (25), we simulate our model subject to a stationary neutral technology shock only. Fixed parameter values. Standard Deviations of Data vs. Models σ(labor market tightness) σ(labor productivity) Data 27.6 Standard DMP Model 3.6 Our Model 33.5 Estimated DMP models also do well here.
73 Conclusion We constructed a model that accounts for the economy s response to various business cycle shocks. Our model implies that nominal and real wages are inertial. Allows to account for weak response of inflation and strong responses of quantity variables to business cycle shocks. Model outperforms sticky wage (no-indexation) NK in terms of statistical fit. Given limitations of sticky wage model, there s simply no need to work with it.
1 Introduction. is finer than the data sampling interval, it does involve some complications.
Christiano Economics 416 Advanced Macroeconomics Take home final exam, due Friday evening, December 12. Instructions: I would like each person to do the exam on their own. Each question asks for computational
More information1 Explaining Labor Market Volatility
Christiano Economics 416 Advanced Macroeconomics Take home midterm exam. 1 Explaining Labor Market Volatility The purpose of this question is to explore a labor market puzzle that has bedeviled business
More informationUnderstanding the Great Recession
Understanding the Great Recession Lawrence Christiano Martin Eichenbaum Mathias Trabandt Ortigia 13-14 June 214. Background Background GDP appears to have suffered a permanent (1%?) fall since 28. Background
More informationUnemployment and Business Cycles
Unemployment and Business Cycles Lawrence J. Christiano Martin S. Eichenbaum Mathias Trabandt January 24, 213 Abstract We develop and estimate a general equilibrium model that accounts for key business
More informationLecture Notes. Petrosky-Nadeau, Zhang, and Kuehn (2015, Endogenous Disasters) Lu Zhang 1. BUSFIN 8210 The Ohio State University
Lecture Notes Petrosky-Nadeau, Zhang, and Kuehn (2015, Endogenous Disasters) Lu Zhang 1 1 The Ohio State University BUSFIN 8210 The Ohio State University Insight The textbook Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides
More informationWORKING PAPER NO THE ELASTICITY OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE WITH RESPECT TO BENEFITS. Kai Christoffel European Central Bank Frankfurt
WORKING PAPER NO. 08-15 THE ELASTICITY OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE WITH RESPECT TO BENEFITS Kai Christoffel European Central Bank Frankfurt Keith Kuester Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Final version
More informationAnalysis of DSGE Models. Lawrence Christiano
Specification, Estimation and Analysis of DSGE Models Lawrence Christiano Overview A consensus model has emerged as a device for forecasting, analysis, and as a platform for additional analysis of financial
More informationState-Dependent Fiscal Multipliers: Calvo vs. Rotemberg *
State-Dependent Fiscal Multipliers: Calvo vs. Rotemberg * Eric Sims University of Notre Dame & NBER Jonathan Wolff Miami University May 31, 2017 Abstract This paper studies the properties of the fiscal
More informationAggregate Demand and the Dynamics of Unemployment
Aggregate Demand and the Dynamics of Unemployment Edouard Schaal 1 Mathieu Taschereau-Dumouchel 2 1 New York University and CREI 2 The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania 1/34 Introduction
More informationTFP Persistence and Monetary Policy. NBS, April 27, / 44
TFP Persistence and Monetary Policy Roberto Pancrazi Toulouse School of Economics Marija Vukotić Banque de France NBS, April 27, 2012 NBS, April 27, 2012 1 / 44 Motivation 1 Well Known Facts about the
More informationThe Fundamental Surplus in Matching Models. European Summer Symposium in International Macroeconomics, May 2015 Tarragona, Spain
The Fundamental Surplus in Matching Models Lars Ljungqvist Stockholm School of Economics New York University Thomas J. Sargent New York University Hoover Institution European Summer Symposium in International
More informationExamining the Bond Premium Puzzle in a DSGE Model
Examining the Bond Premium Puzzle in a DSGE Model Glenn D. Rudebusch Eric T. Swanson Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco John Taylor s Contributions to Monetary Theory and Policy Federal
More informationMonetary Policy and a Stock Market Boom-Bust Cycle
Monetary Policy and a Stock Market Boom-Bust Cycle Lawrence Christiano, Cosmin Ilut, Roberto Motto, and Massimo Rostagno Asset markets have been volatile Should monetary policy react to the volatility?
More informationTechnology shocks and Monetary Policy: Assessing the Fed s performance
Technology shocks and Monetary Policy: Assessing the Fed s performance (J.Gali et al., JME 2003) Miguel Angel Alcobendas, Laura Desplans, Dong Hee Joe March 5, 2010 M.A.Alcobendas, L. Desplans, D.H.Joe
More informationStaggered Wages, Sticky Prices, and Labor Market Dynamics in Matching Models. by Janett Neugebauer and Dennis Wesselbaum
Staggered Wages, Sticky Prices, and Labor Market Dynamics in Matching Models by Janett Neugebauer and Dennis Wesselbaum No. 168 March 21 Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Düsternbrooker Weg 12, 2415
More informationDiscussion of DSGE Models for Monetary Policy. Discussion of
ECB Conference Key developments in monetary economics Frankfurt, October 29-30, 2009 Discussion of DSGE Models for Monetary Policy by L. L. Christiano, M. Trabandt & K. Walentin Volker Wieland Goethe University
More informationUnemployment Fluctuations and Nominal GDP Targeting
Unemployment Fluctuations and Nominal GDP Targeting Roberto M. Billi Sveriges Riksbank 3 January 219 Abstract I evaluate the welfare performance of a target for the level of nominal GDP in the context
More informationHabit Formation in State-Dependent Pricing Models: Implications for the Dynamics of Output and Prices
Habit Formation in State-Dependent Pricing Models: Implications for the Dynamics of Output and Prices Phuong V. Ngo,a a Department of Economics, Cleveland State University, 22 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland,
More informationSimple Analytics of the Government Expenditure Multiplier
Simple Analytics of the Government Expenditure Multiplier Michael Woodford Columbia University New Approaches to Fiscal Policy FRB Atlanta, January 8-9, 2010 Woodford (Columbia) Analytics of Multiplier
More informationA DSGE model with unemployment and the role of institutions
A DSGE model with unemployment and the role of institutions Andrea Rollin* Abstract During the last years, after the outburst of the global financial crisis and the troubles with EU sovereign debts followed
More informationLabor-market Volatility in a Matching Model with Worker Heterogeneity and Endogenous Separations
Labor-market Volatility in a Matching Model with Worker Heterogeneity and Endogenous Separations Andri Chassamboulli April 15, 2010 Abstract This paper studies the business-cycle behavior of a matching
More informationInvoluntary (Unlucky) Unemployment and the Business Cycle. Lawrence Christiano Mathias Trabandt Karl Walentin
Involuntary (Unlucky) Unemployment and the Business Cycle Lawrence Christiano Mathias Trabandt Karl Walentin Background New Keynesian (NK) models receive lots of attention ti in central lbanks. People
More informationThe Risky Steady State and the Interest Rate Lower Bound
The Risky Steady State and the Interest Rate Lower Bound Timothy Hills Taisuke Nakata Sebastian Schmidt New York University Federal Reserve Board European Central Bank 1 September 2016 1 The views expressed
More informationPart A: Questions on ECN 200D (Rendahl)
University of California, Davis Date: September 1, 2011 Department of Economics Time: 5 hours Macroeconomics Reading Time: 20 minutes PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION FOR THE Ph.D. DEGREE Directions: Answer all
More informationMonetary Economics Final Exam
316-466 Monetary Economics Final Exam 1. Flexible-price monetary economics (90 marks). Consider a stochastic flexibleprice money in the utility function model. Time is discrete and denoted t =0, 1,...
More information0. Finish the Auberbach/Obsfeld model (last lecture s slides, 13 March, pp. 13 )
Monetary Policy, 16/3 2017 Henrik Jensen Department of Economics University of Copenhagen 0. Finish the Auberbach/Obsfeld model (last lecture s slides, 13 March, pp. 13 ) 1. Money in the short run: Incomplete
More informationThe Transmission of Monetary Policy through Redistributions and Durable Purchases
The Transmission of Monetary Policy through Redistributions and Durable Purchases Vincent Sterk and Silvana Tenreyro UCL, LSE September 2015 Sterk and Tenreyro (UCL, LSE) OMO September 2015 1 / 28 The
More informationOn the Merits of Conventional vs Unconventional Fiscal Policy
On the Merits of Conventional vs Unconventional Fiscal Policy Matthieu Lemoine and Jesper Lindé Banque de France and Sveriges Riksbank The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those
More informationSTATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY Department of Economics. Ph. D. Preliminary Examination: Macroeconomics Fall, 2009
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY Department of Economics Ph. D. Preliminary Examination: Macroeconomics Fall, 2009 Instructions: Read the questions carefully and make sure to show your work. You
More informationBATH ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPERS
Search, Shirking and Labor Market Volatility Chris Martin and Bingsong Wang No. 56 /16 BATH ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPERS Department of Economics Search, Shirking and Labor Market Volatility Chris Martin University
More informationNew Business Start-ups and the Business Cycle
New Business Start-ups and the Business Cycle Ali Moghaddasi Kelishomi (Joint with Melvyn Coles, University of Essex) The 22nd Annual Conference on Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies Banking Supervision
More informationDiscussion of The Cyclicality of the Opportunity Cost of Employment by Gabriel Chodorow-Reich and Loukas Karabarbounis
Discussion of The Cyclicality of the Opportunity Cost of Employment by Gabriel Chodorow-Reich and Loukas Karabarbounis Robert E. Hall Hoover Institution and Department of Economics Stanford University
More informationEstimating Output Gap in the Czech Republic: DSGE Approach
Estimating Output Gap in the Czech Republic: DSGE Approach Pavel Herber 1 and Daniel Němec 2 1 Masaryk University, Faculty of Economics and Administrations Department of Economics Lipová 41a, 602 00 Brno,
More informationUnemployment and Business Cycles
Unemployment and Business Cycles Lawrence J. Christiano y Martin S. Eichenbaum z Mathias Trabandt x April 1, 213 Abstract We develop and estimate a general equilibrium model that accounts for key business
More informationFiscal Multipliers in Recessions
Fiscal Multipliers in Recessions Matthew Canzoneri Fabrice Collard Harris Dellas Behzad Diba March 10, 2015 Matthew Canzoneri Fabrice Collard Harris Dellas Fiscal Behzad Multipliers Diba (University in
More informationHousehold income risk, nominal frictions, and incomplete markets 1
Household income risk, nominal frictions, and incomplete markets 1 2013 North American Summer Meeting Ralph Lütticke 13.06.2013 1 Joint-work with Christian Bayer, Lien Pham, and Volker Tjaden 1 / 30 Research
More informationMonetary Policy in a New Keyneisan Model Walsh Chapter 8 (cont)
Monetary Policy in a New Keyneisan Model Walsh Chapter 8 (cont) 1 New Keynesian Model Demand is an Euler equation x t = E t x t+1 ( ) 1 σ (i t E t π t+1 ) + u t Supply is New Keynesian Phillips Curve π
More informationMacroeconomic Effects of Financial Shocks: Comment
Macroeconomic Effects of Financial Shocks: Comment Johannes Pfeifer (University of Cologne) 1st Research Conference of the CEPR Network on Macroeconomic Modelling and Model Comparison (MMCN) June 2, 217
More informationCalvo Wages in a Search Unemployment Model
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 2521 Calvo Wages in a Search Unemployment Model Vincent Bodart Olivier Pierrard Henri R. Sneessens December 2006 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for
More informationMacroeconomics 2. Lecture 6 - New Keynesian Business Cycles March. Sciences Po
Macroeconomics 2 Lecture 6 - New Keynesian Business Cycles 2. Zsófia L. Bárány Sciences Po 2014 March Main idea: introduce nominal rigidities Why? in classical monetary models the price level ensures money
More informationMonetary Policy and the Predictability of Nominal Exchange Rates
Monetary Policy and the Predictability of Nominal Exchange Rates Martin Eichenbaum Ben Johannsen Sergio Rebelo Disclaimer: The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
More informationThe Search and matching Model
The Search and matching Model THE GREAT RECESSION AND OTHER BUSINESS CYCLES April 2018 The DMP search and matching model An equilibrium model of unemployment Firms and workers have to spend time and resources
More informationCredit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy
Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy Vasco Cúrdia FRB New York Michael Woodford Columbia University Conference on Monetary Policy and Financial Frictions Cúrdia and Woodford () Credit Frictions
More informationKeynesian Views On The Fiscal Multiplier
Faculty of Social Sciences Jeppe Druedahl (Ph.d. Student) Department of Economics 16th of December 2013 Slide 1/29 Outline 1 2 3 4 5 16th of December 2013 Slide 2/29 The For Today 1 Some 2 A Benchmark
More informationUsing VARs to Estimate a DSGE Model. Lawrence Christiano
Using VARs to Estimate a DSGE Model Lawrence Christiano Objectives Describe and motivate key features of standard monetary DSGE models. Estimate a DSGE model using VAR impulse responses reported in Eichenbaum
More informationWage formation, unemployment and business cycle in Latvia
Wage formation, unemployment and business cycle in Latvia Ginters Buss (Latvijas Banka) Full paper at Ginters Buss @ IDEAS 1 of 14 1. Taylor or Calvo-type wage frictions unsuitable for Latvia 45 4 35 3
More informationOn the new Keynesian model
Department of Economics University of Bern April 7, 26 The new Keynesian model is [... ] the closest thing there is to a standard specification... (McCallum). But it has many important limitations. It
More informationMonetary Policy Implications of State-Dependent Prices and Wages
Monetary Policy Implications of State-Dependent Prices and Wages James Costain, Anton Nakov, Borja Petit Bank of Spain, ECB and CEPR, CEMFI The views expressed here are personal and do not necessarily
More informationUNCERTAINTY SHOCKS ARE AGGREGATE DEMAND SHOCKS. I. Introduction
UNCERTAINTY SHOCKS ARE AGGREGATE DEMAND SHOCKS SYLVAIN LEDUC AND ZHENG LIU Abstract. We study the macroeconomic effects of diverse uncertainty shocks in a DSGE model with labor search frictions and sticky
More informationThe Stolper-Samuelson Theorem when the Labor Market Structure Matters
The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem when the Labor Market Structure Matters A. Kerem Coşar Davide Suverato kerem.cosar@chicagobooth.edu davide.suverato@econ.lmu.de University of Chicago Booth School of Business
More informationProduct Cycles and Prices: Search Foundation
Product Cycles and Prices: Search Foundation Mei Dong 1 Yuki Teranishi 2 1 University of Melbourne 2 Keio University and CAMA, ANU April 2018 1 / 59 In this paper, we Show a fact for product cycles and
More informationComprehensive Exam. August 19, 2013
Comprehensive Exam August 19, 2013 You have a total of 180 minutes to complete the exam. If a question seems ambiguous, state why, sharpen it up and answer the sharpened-up question. Good luck! 1 1 Menu
More informationNot All Oil Price Shocks Are Alike: A Neoclassical Perspective
Not All Oil Price Shocks Are Alike: A Neoclassical Perspective Vipin Arora Pedro Gomis-Porqueras Junsang Lee U.S. EIA Deakin Univ. SKKU December 16, 2013 GRIPS Junsang Lee (SKKU) Oil Price Dynamics in
More informationFiscal Consolidations in Currency Unions: Spending Cuts Vs. Tax Hikes
Fiscal Consolidations in Currency Unions: Spending Cuts Vs. Tax Hikes Christopher J. Erceg and Jesper Lindé Federal Reserve Board June, 2011 Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations
More informationEstimating Macroeconomic Models of Financial Crises: An Endogenous Regime-Switching Approach
Estimating Macroeconomic Models of Financial Crises: An Endogenous Regime-Switching Approach Gianluca Benigno 1 Andrew Foerster 2 Christopher Otrok 3 Alessandro Rebucci 4 1 London School of Economics and
More informationWage formation, unemployment and business cycle in Latvia
Wage formation, unemployment and business cycle in Latvia Ginters Buss Latvijas Banka June 7, 7 Abstract This paper integrates the alternating-offer wage bargaining (AOB) mechanism in a fully fledged New
More informationComment. The New Keynesian Model and Excess Inflation Volatility
Comment Martín Uribe, Columbia University and NBER This paper represents the latest installment in a highly influential series of papers in which Paul Beaudry and Franck Portier shed light on the empirics
More informationLecture 23 The New Keynesian Model Labor Flows and Unemployment. Noah Williams
Lecture 23 The New Keynesian Model Labor Flows and Unemployment Noah Williams University of Wisconsin - Madison Economics 312/702 Basic New Keynesian Model of Transmission Can be derived from primitives:
More informationSDP Macroeconomics Final exam, 2014 Professor Ricardo Reis
SDP Macroeconomics Final exam, 2014 Professor Ricardo Reis Answer each question in three or four sentences and perhaps one equation or graph. Remember that the explanation determines the grade. 1. Question
More informationON INTEREST RATE POLICY AND EQUILIBRIUM STABILITY UNDER INCREASING RETURNS: A NOTE
Macroeconomic Dynamics, (9), 55 55. Printed in the United States of America. doi:.7/s6559895 ON INTEREST RATE POLICY AND EQUILIBRIUM STABILITY UNDER INCREASING RETURNS: A NOTE KEVIN X.D. HUANG Vanderbilt
More informationFinancial Risk and Unemployment
Financial Risk and Unemployment Zvi Eckstein Tel Aviv University and The Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya Ofer Setty Tel Aviv University David Weiss Tel Aviv University PRELIMINARY DRAFT: February 2014
More informationDSGE model with collateral constraint: estimation on Czech data
Proceedings of 3th International Conference Mathematical Methods in Economics DSGE model with collateral constraint: estimation on Czech data Introduction Miroslav Hloušek Abstract. Czech data shows positive
More informationThe Role of Real Wage Rigidity and Labor Market Frictions for Inflation Persistence
The Role of Real Wage Rigidity and Labor Market Frictions for Inflation Persistence Kai Christoffel European Central Bank February 11, 2010 Tobias Linzert European Central Bank Abstract We analyze the
More informationWorking Capital Requirement and the Unemployment Volatility Puzzle
Economics Faculty Publications Economics 5 Working Capital Requirement and the Unemployment Volatility Puzzle Tsu-ting Tim Lin Gettysburg College Follow this and additional works at: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/econfac
More informationUnemployment Fluctuations in a SOE model with Segmented Labour Markets: the case of Canada
Unemployment Fluctuations in a SOE model with Segmented Labour Markets: the case of Canada Yahong Zhang March 17, 213 Abstract A distinct feature of recent financial crisis in Canada is that the job loss
More informationSelf-fulfilling Recessions at the ZLB
Self-fulfilling Recessions at the ZLB Charles Brendon (Cambridge) Matthias Paustian (Board of Governors) Tony Yates (Birmingham) August 2016 Introduction This paper is about recession dynamics at the ZLB
More informationDual Wage Rigidities: Theory and Some Evidence
MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Dual Wage Rigidities: Theory and Some Evidence Insu Kim University of California, Riverside October 29 Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18345/ MPRA Paper No.
More informationThe Costs of Losing Monetary Independence: The Case of Mexico
The Costs of Losing Monetary Independence: The Case of Mexico Thomas F. Cooley New York University Vincenzo Quadrini Duke University and CEPR May 2, 2000 Abstract This paper develops a two-country monetary
More informationAsset purchase policy at the effective lower bound for interest rates
at the effective lower bound for interest rates Bank of England 12 March 2010 Plan Introduction The model The policy problem Results Summary & conclusions Plan Introduction Motivation Aims and scope The
More informationEXAMINING MACROECONOMIC MODELS
1 / 24 EXAMINING MACROECONOMIC MODELS WITH FINANCE CONSTRAINTS THROUGH THE LENS OF ASSET PRICING Lars Peter Hansen Benheim Lectures, Princeton University EXAMINING MACROECONOMIC MODELS WITH FINANCING CONSTRAINTS
More informationFinancial intermediaries in an estimated DSGE model for the UK
Financial intermediaries in an estimated DSGE model for the UK Stefania Villa a Jing Yang b a Birkbeck College b Bank of England Cambridge Conference - New Instruments of Monetary Policy: The Challenges
More informationIdiosyncratic risk, insurance, and aggregate consumption dynamics: a likelihood perspective
Idiosyncratic risk, insurance, and aggregate consumption dynamics: a likelihood perspective Alisdair McKay Boston University June 2013 Microeconomic evidence on insurance - Consumption responds to idiosyncratic
More informationUCLA Department of Economics Ph.D. Preliminary Exam Industrial Organization Field Exam (Spring 2010) Use SEPARATE booklets to answer each question
Wednesday, June 23 2010 Instructions: UCLA Department of Economics Ph.D. Preliminary Exam Industrial Organization Field Exam (Spring 2010) You have 4 hours for the exam. Answer any 5 out 6 questions. All
More informationProbably Too Little, Certainly Too Late. An Assessment of the Juncker Investment Plan
Probably Too Little, Certainly Too Late. An Assessment of the Juncker Investment Plan Mathilde Le Moigne 1 Francesco Saraceno 2,3 Sébastien Villemot 2 1 École Normale Supérieure 2 OFCE Sciences Po 3 LUISS-SEP
More informationHousehold Debt, Financial Intermediation, and Monetary Policy
Household Debt, Financial Intermediation, and Monetary Policy Shutao Cao 1 Yahong Zhang 2 1 Bank of Canada 2 Western University October 21, 2014 Motivation The US experience suggests that the collapse
More informationLabor market search, sticky prices, and interest rate policies
Review of Economic Dynamics 8 (2005) 829 849 www.elsevier.com/locate/red Labor market search, sticky prices, and interest rate policies Carl E. Walsh Department of Economics, University of California,
More informationAsymmetric Labor Market Fluctuations in an Estimated Model of Equilibrium Unemployment
Asymmetric Labor Market Fluctuations in an Estimated Model of Equilibrium Unemployment Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau FRB San Francisco Benjamin Tengelsen CMU - Tepper Tsinghua - St.-Louis Fed Conference May
More informationThe Effects of Monetary Policy on Asset Price Bubbles: Some Evidence
The Effects of Monetary Policy on Asset Price Bubbles: Some Evidence Jordi Galí Luca Gambetti September 2013 Jordi Galí, Luca Gambetti () Monetary Policy and Bubbles September 2013 1 / 17 Monetary Policy
More informationA Model with Costly-State Verification
A Model with Costly-State Verification Jesús Fernández-Villaverde University of Pennsylvania December 19, 2012 Jesús Fernández-Villaverde (PENN) Costly-State December 19, 2012 1 / 47 A Model with Costly-State
More informationDistortionary Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy Goals
Distortionary Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy Goals Klaus Adam and Roberto M. Billi Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series No. xxx October 213 Abstract We reconsider the role of an inflation conservative
More informationPolitical Lobbying in a Recurring Environment
Political Lobbying in a Recurring Environment Avihai Lifschitz Tel Aviv University This Draft: October 2015 Abstract This paper develops a dynamic model of the labor market, in which the employed workers,
More informationMonetary Policy and Resource Mobility
Monetary Policy and Resource Mobility 2th Anniversary of the Bank of Finland Carl E. Walsh University of California, Santa Cruz May 5-6, 211 C. E. Walsh (UCSC) Bank of Finland 2th Anniversary May 5-6,
More informationGeneral Examination in Macroeconomic Theory SPRING 2016
HARVARD UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS General Examination in Macroeconomic Theory SPRING 2016 You have FOUR hours. Answer all questions Part A (Prof. Laibson): 60 minutes Part B (Prof. Barro): 60
More informationOn Quality Bias and Inflation Targets: Supplementary Material
On Quality Bias and Inflation Targets: Supplementary Material Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé Martín Uribe August 2 211 This document contains supplementary material to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (211). 1 A Two Sector
More informationNew Ideas about the Long-Lasting Collapse of Employment after the Financial Crisis
New Ideas about the Long-Lasting Collapse of Employment after the Financial Crisis Robert E. Hall Hoover Institution and Department of Economics Stanford University Woytinsky Lecture, University of Michigan
More informationFiscal Consolidation in a Currency Union: Spending Cuts Vs. Tax Hikes
Fiscal Consolidation in a Currency Union: Spending Cuts Vs. Tax Hikes Christopher J. Erceg and Jesper Lindé Federal Reserve Board October, 2012 Erceg and Lindé (Federal Reserve Board) Fiscal Consolidations
More informationThe Measurement Procedure of AB2017 in a Simplified Version of McGrattan 2017
The Measurement Procedure of AB2017 in a Simplified Version of McGrattan 2017 Andrew Atkeson and Ariel Burstein 1 Introduction In this document we derive the main results Atkeson Burstein (Aggregate Implications
More informationThe Eurozone Debt Crisis: A New-Keynesian DSGE model with default risk
The Eurozone Debt Crisis: A New-Keynesian DSGE model with default risk Daniel Cohen 1,2 Mathilde Viennot 1 Sébastien Villemot 3 1 Paris School of Economics 2 CEPR 3 OFCE Sciences Po PANORisk workshop 7
More informationFiscal Shocks, Job Creation, and Countercyclical Labor Markups
Fiscal Shocks, Job Creation, and Countercyclical Labor Markups David M Arseneau Sanjay K Chugh Federal Reserve Board Preliminary and Incomplete October 27, 2005 Abstract Changes in government spending
More informationCredit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy. Vasco Curdia (FRB New York) Michael Woodford (Columbia University)
MACRO-LINKAGES, OIL PRICES AND DEFLATION WORKSHOP JANUARY 6 9, 2009 Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy Vasco Curdia (FRB New York) Michael Woodford (Columbia University) Credit Frictions and
More informationIntroduction to DSGE Models
Introduction to DSGE Models Luca Brugnolini January 2015 Luca Brugnolini Introduction to DSGE Models January 2015 1 / 23 Introduction to DSGE Models Program DSGE Introductory course (6h) Object: deriving
More informationTFP Decline and Japanese Unemployment in the 1990s
TFP Decline and Japanese Unemployment in the 1990s Julen Esteban-Pretel Ryo Nakajima Ryuichi Tanaka GRIPS Tokyo, June 27, 2008 Japan in the 1990s The performance of the Japanese economy in the 1990s was
More information1 Dynamic programming
1 Dynamic programming A country has just discovered a natural resource which yields an income per period R measured in terms of traded goods. The cost of exploitation is negligible. The government wants
More informationState-Dependent Pricing and the Paradox of Flexibility
State-Dependent Pricing and the Paradox of Flexibility Luca Dedola and Anton Nakov ECB and CEPR May 24 Dedola and Nakov (ECB and CEPR) SDP and the Paradox of Flexibility 5/4 / 28 Policy rates in major
More informationUnderstanding Unemployment through the Lens of Search and Growth Theory:
Understanding Unemployment through the Lens of Search and Growth Theory: Shirking and Unemployment Fluctuations 1 Norikau Tawara 2 August 2008 Preliminary Please do not cite without permission Abstract
More informationMacroprudential Policies in a Low Interest-Rate Environment
Macroprudential Policies in a Low Interest-Rate Environment Margarita Rubio 1 Fang Yao 2 1 University of Nottingham 2 Reserve Bank of New Zealand. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect
More informationReturn to Capital in a Real Business Cycle Model
Return to Capital in a Real Business Cycle Model Paul Gomme, B. Ravikumar, and Peter Rupert Can the neoclassical growth model generate fluctuations in the return to capital similar to those observed in
More informationFinancial Factors and Labor Market Fluctuations
Financial Factors and Labor Market Fluctuations Yahong Zhang January 25, 215 Abstract What are the effects of financial market imperfections on fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies for the US economy?
More informationFrequency of Price Adjustment and Pass-through
Frequency of Price Adjustment and Pass-through Gita Gopinath Harvard and NBER Oleg Itskhoki Harvard CEFIR/NES March 11, 2009 1 / 39 Motivation Micro-level studies document significant heterogeneity in
More informationMonetary Policy and Resource Mobility
Monetary Policy and Resource Mobility 2th Anniversary of the Bank of Finland Carl E. Walsh University of California, Santa Cruz May 5-6, 211 C. E. Walsh (UCSC) Bank of Finland 2th Anniversary May 5-6,
More information