Stephen Hutton ECONOMICS 600 August 2005 Office: Tyd 5128c Mathematical Economics: Problem Set One Solutions
|
|
- Frederick Dorsey
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 COLLEGE PARK THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND MD Stephen Hutton ECONOMICS 600 August 2005 Office: Tyd 5128c Mathematical Economics: Problem Set One Solutions 1. The point of this problem is to help you visualize the fact that logical arguments, set theoretic arguments, and arguments using necessary and sufficient conditions are essentially the same. i) C T F. ii) Concavity is sufficient for continuity since C T means that anything that is concave is also continuous. Continuity is necessary for concavity since C T means that anything that if a function is not continuous it cannot be concave. This type of proof uses what is known as the contrapositive if A implies B then (not B) implies (not A). iii) Use the above argument to note that since g is clearly not continuous, it cannot be concave. Diagramatically, F g 1 (x) C T C g 2(x) C
2 Since g 1 (x) lies outside the T set, it must lie outside the C set. iv) In this case, g 2 (x) is in fact concave, but we cannot use the argument above to prove it. I drew in a possible configuration where a nonconcave but continuous g 2 (x) could lie. 2. Consider the following market. There are two firms, 1 and 2 who sell the same product. The firms charge prices p 1,p 2 respectively. Total market demand curve is given by Q = A - B p where p = min{p 1,p 2 }. The demand for each firm s product is given by q i = 0, if p i > p j, q i = Q/2, if p i = p j, q i = Q, if p i < p j,. That is, if a firm prices strictly below its rival, it captures all the market, if it prices the same as its rival, they share the market. The firms have identical constant marginal costs, c. In this question, suppose that firm 2's price is fixed and known at some level, p 2. [Note that this setup is typical of Bertrand competition.] i) Characterize firm 1's profit maximization problem. The problem is max p1 q 1 (p 1,p 2 )(p-c) where q 1 (p,p 2 ) is given in the problem. Note that q 1 (p,p 2 ) is not a continuous function so the objective function is not continuous. ii) Show that there exists a number, M such that if p 2 > M, there is a unique solution to firm 1's profit maximization problem. Suppose that firm 2 was not around. The firm s problem would be simply like that of a monopolist. max p (A-Bp)(p-c) The derivative of the objective function is da/dp = A+Bc-2Bp This is decreasing in p (so the objective function is concave.) It is equal to zero at p=(a+bc)/(2b). The profit function looks like
3 c (A+Bc)/(2B) p Notice profits are increasing in p until p=p*=(a+bc)/(2b) then decreasing. That is, if the firm selected a price strictly below p* it would want to raise the price. If it selected a price strictly above, it would want to lower price. Now suppose that firm 2 is present. Suppose that p 2 > p*. The profit function looks like this: Observe that the firm s optimal solution stays the same. Thus a candidate for M is (A+Bc)/(2B). iii) Show that there exists a number, m such that if p 2 m, there is a solution to firm 1's profit maximization problem. Is it unique?
4 Suppose p 2 c, then if the firm makes any sales, it can only be if p 1 p 2 c which implies nonpositive profits. However, setting p 1 = c now IS a solution to the problem. If p 2 < c, then any p 1 > p 2 is also a solution since it yields zero sales and zero profits. You should be able to argue that the profit function is upper semicontinuous for p 2 < c. Why? iv) Show that if m < p 2 < M, there is no solution to firm 1 s profit-maximization problem. For p 2 (c,(a+bc)/(2b)], the profit function is strictly increasing for p 1 < p 2 but strictly falls at p 1 = p 2 so the objective function is not continuous. v) What is the mathematical issue that is responsible for the lack of a solution? See above answer. 3. Consider a monopolist luxury auto market. The monopolist produces cars at a constant marginal cost of $20,000. Inverse market demand is given by P c = 50,000 - Q where P c is the price paid by consumers. (Not necessarily the price received by the monopolist which is P M.) i) Suppose there is no tax so P c =P M. Compute the profit-maximizing price. The objective function is (50,000-20,000-Q)Q. This is strictly concave in Q (and in P) and its derivative is 30,000-2Q which gives a solution at zero of Q*=15,000 or P M = 35,000. ii) Suppose (as has happened in the U.S.) there is a luxury tax. For any car sold at a consumer price above $30,000, a tax of t is imposed on the amount above $30,000. a) Determine the relationship between P c and P M. P M =P c if P c < 30,000 P M =30,000+ (1-t)*(P c -30,000) if P c 30,000. =t30,000+ (1-t)*P c if P c 30,000. b) Use this to determine the inverse demand curve as a function of P M and the profit-maximizing price at t=.5.
5 P 50K Demand with no tax 30K Demand with tax And see below. Q c) Why can t you use the same approach as in i)? The profit function is continuous but not everywhere differentiable. The function is given by so A(P C ) = (P C -20K)(50K-P C ) if P C < 30K = ((1-t)P C +t30k-20k)(50k-p C ) if P C > 30K da/dp C =70K-2P C if P C < 30K = -(1-t)P C -t30k -20K)+(1-t)(50K-P C ) if P C > 30K = (1-t)50K -t30k +20K -2(1-t)P C if P C > 30K = 70K -t80k -2(1-t)P C if P C > 30K = 30K - P C if P C > 30K This function is positive for P C < 30K and strictly negative for P C > 30K. This means the solution is at P C = 30K but the derivative is not zero. iii) Now suppose there is no luxury tax. In addition to the inverse market demand given above (generated by overpaid lawyers), there is another component of demand (generated by poor economists) that is given by
6 P c = 32,000 - Q e. a) Graph the market demand curve and compute the profit maximizing price. P For P > 32000, the demand is as before. For P < we need to add in the demand of the economists. Q e = P, Q S = P, adding the two together gives total market demand which is Q = P or an inverse demand curve of P= Q for P < If P is restricted to be above 30000, we already know the optimal price is If P is restricted to be below 32000, the optimal price solves max P (41K-.5Q-20K)Q I get a solution of Q = 21 so P = 30.5K < 32K. Now we just compare profits at the two levels. The high price gives profits of 225. The low price gives profits of so it looks like the high price does better. Who gets shut out of the market? b) What sort of problems arise using the calculus approach here? Q
7 Here the issue is not really the non-differentiability but the fact that there are two local maxima to the profit function. 4.Suppose that x=(1,0,0). i) Find a vector which is orthogonal to x. Both (0,1,0) and (0,0,1) are orthogonal. ii) Find a vector which forms an acute angle with x. Try the vector (1,1,1). iii) Show that if y is orthogonal to x, then ay is also orthogonal to x. (ay) x=a(y) x=0. iv) Show that there are two linearly independent vectors which are orthogonal to x.see i) above. 5. Some standard problems relating calculus to economics: i) Let C(x) be the cost of producing output x. Suppose it is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing. a) What is the marginal cost of producing x? Marginal cost is the cost of producing one extra (small) unit so MC(x)=C (x). b) What is the average cost of producing x? AC(x)=C(x)/x. c) Show that the average cost of producing x is increasing if and only if the marginal cost exceeds the average cost. Using the quotient rule, d(ac(x))/dx=(c (x)x-c(x))/x 2 =(C (x)- C(x)/x)/x= (MC(x)-AC(x))/x. The conclusion follows. d) Show that the marginal cost of producing x is increasing if and only if the cost function is concave. From a), MC(x) is increasing if C (x) is increasing or if C (x) is positive which implies C(x) is concave. ii) The demand curve for a monopolist is Q(P), a decreasing function. The elasticity of demand at price P is defined as η(p)=-q (P)*P/Q(P) a) Prove that a necessary condition for P to maximize profits is η(p) >1. Note that monopolist profits are Q(P)*P-C(Q(P)) and we can assume that C is non-decreasing. Consider the revenue part of this term. d(q(p)*p)/dp = Q (P)P+Q(P)=(Q (P)P/Q(P)+1)Q(P)=(- η(p)+1)q(p). This is positive if and only if η(p) < 1 so revenue is increasing in P if and only if η(p) < 1. Suppose that η(p) < 1. Then by raising P, revenue rises and costs fall (why?) so profits must go up. b) When is this sufficient? Suppose C (x)=0. Then maximizing profits is the same as maximizing revenues.
1 Economical Applications
WEEK 4 Reading [SB], 3.6, pp. 58-69 1 Economical Applications 1.1 Production Function A production function y f(q) assigns to amount q of input the corresponding output y. Usually f is - increasing, that
More information2 Maximizing pro ts when marginal costs are increasing
BEE14 { Basic Mathematics for Economists BEE15 { Introduction to Mathematical Economics Week 1, Lecture 1, Notes: Optimization II 3/12/21 Dieter Balkenborg Department of Economics University of Exeter
More informationNotes on a Basic Business Problem MATH 104 and MATH 184 Mark Mac Lean (with assistance from Patrick Chan) 2011W
Notes on a Basic Business Problem MATH 104 and MATH 184 Mark Mac Lean (with assistance from Patrick Chan) 2011W This simple problem will introduce you to the basic ideas of revenue, cost, profit, and demand.
More information1 Maximizing profits when marginal costs are increasing
BEE12 Basic Mathematical Economics Week 1, Lecture Tuesday 9.12.3 Profit maximization / Elasticity Dieter Balkenborg Department of Economics University of Exeter 1 Maximizing profits when marginal costs
More informationDepartment of Economics The Ohio State University Midterm Questions and Answers Econ 8712
Prof. James Peck Fall 06 Department of Economics The Ohio State University Midterm Questions and Answers Econ 87. (30 points) A decision maker (DM) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximizer.
More informationFundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics
Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics Ram Singh October 4, 015 This Write-up is available at photocopy shop. Not for circulation. In this write-up we provide intuition behind the two fundamental theorems
More informationLab 10: Optimizing Revenue and Profits (Including Elasticity of Demand)
Lab 10: Optimizing Revenue and Profits (Including Elasticity of Demand) There's no doubt that the "bottom line" is the maximization of profit, at least to the CEO and shareholders. However, the sales director
More informationI. More Fundamental Concepts and Definitions from Mathematics
An Introduction to Optimization The core of modern economics is the notion that individuals optimize. That is to say, individuals use the resources available to them to advance their own personal objectives
More informationUniversity of Toronto Department of Economics ECO 204 Summer 2013 Ajaz Hussain TEST 2 SOLUTIONS GOOD LUCK!
University of Toronto Department of Economics ECO 204 Summer 2013 Ajaz Hussain TEST 2 SOLUTIONS TIME: 1 HOUR AND 50 MINUTES DO NOT HAVE A CELL PHONE ON YOUR DESK OR ON YOUR PERSON. ONLY AID ALLOWED: A
More informationTEST 1 SOLUTIONS MATH 1002
October 17, 2014 1 TEST 1 SOLUTIONS MATH 1002 1. Indicate whether each it below exists or does not exist. If the it exists then write what it is. No proofs are required. For example, 1 n exists and is
More informationWeek #7 - Maxima and Minima, Concavity, Applications Section 4.4
Week #7 - Maxima and Minima, Concavity, Applications Section 4.4 From Calculus, Single Variable by Hughes-Hallett, Gleason, McCallum et. al. Copyright 2005 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. This material is used
More informationEconS Micro Theory I 1 Recitation #9 - Monopoly
EconS 50 - Micro Theory I Recitation #9 - Monopoly Exercise A monopolist faces a market demand curve given by: Q = 70 p. (a) If the monopolist can produce at constant average and marginal costs of AC =
More informationSYLLABUS AND SAMPLE QUESTIONS FOR MS(QE) Syllabus for ME I (Mathematics), 2012
SYLLABUS AND SAMPLE QUESTIONS FOR MS(QE) 2012 Syllabus for ME I (Mathematics), 2012 Algebra: Binomial Theorem, AP, GP, HP, Exponential, Logarithmic Series, Sequence, Permutations and Combinations, Theory
More informationMath 103: The Mean Value Theorem and How Derivatives Shape a Graph
Math 03: The Mean Value Theorem and How Derivatives Shape a Graph Ryan Blair University of Pennsylvania Thursday October 27, 20 Math 03: The Mean Value Theorem and How Derivatives Thursday October Shape
More informationTheory of Consumer Behavior First, we need to define the agents' goals and limitations (if any) in their ability to achieve those goals.
Theory of Consumer Behavior First, we need to define the agents' goals and limitations (if any) in their ability to achieve those goals. We will deal with a particular set of assumptions, but we can modify
More informationOnline Shopping Intermediaries: The Strategic Design of Search Environments
Online Supplemental Appendix to Online Shopping Intermediaries: The Strategic Design of Search Environments Anthony Dukes University of Southern California Lin Liu University of Central Florida February
More informationMONOPOLY (2) Second Degree Price Discrimination
1/22 MONOPOLY (2) Second Degree Price Discrimination May 4, 2014 2/22 Problem The monopolist has one customer who is either type 1 or type 2, with equal probability. How to price discriminate between the
More informationOligopoly Games and Voting Games. Cournot s Model of Quantity Competition:
Oligopoly Games and Voting Games Cournot s Model of Quantity Competition: Supposetherearetwofirms, producing an identical good. (In his 1838 book, Cournot thought of firms filling bottles with mineral
More informationYou are responsible for upholding the University of Maryland Honor Code while taking this exam.
Econ 300 Spring 013 First Midterm Exam version W Answers This exam consists of 5 multiple choice questions. The maximum duration of the exam is 50 minutes. 1. In the spaces provided on the scantron, write
More informationECO410H: Practice Questions 2 SOLUTIONS
ECO410H: Practice Questions SOLUTIONS 1. (a) The unique Nash equilibrium strategy profile is s = (M, M). (b) The unique Nash equilibrium strategy profile is s = (R4, C3). (c) The two Nash equilibria are
More informationHomework #1 Microeconomics (I), Fall 2010 Due day: 7 th Oct., 2010
組別 姓名與學號 Homework #1 Microeconomics (I), Fall 2010 Due day: 7 th Oct., 2010 Part I. Multiple Choices: 60% (5% each) Please fill your answers in below blanks. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 B A B C B C A D
More informationLecture 2: Marginal Functions, Average Functions, Elasticity, the Marginal Principle, and
Lecture 2: Marginal Functions, Average Functions, Elasticity, the Marginal Principle, and Constrained Optimization The marginal or derivative function and optimization-basic principles The average function
More informationClass Notes on Chaney (2008)
Class Notes on Chaney (2008) (With Krugman and Melitz along the Way) Econ 840-T.Holmes Model of Chaney AER (2008) As a first step, let s write down the elements of the Chaney model. asymmetric countries
More informationGS/ECON 5010 Answers to Assignment 3 November 2005
GS/ECON 5010 Answers to Assignment November 005 Q1. What are the market price, and aggregate quantity sold, in long run equilibrium in a perfectly competitive market for which the demand function has the
More informationEcon 101A Final exam May 14, 2013.
Econ 101A Final exam May 14, 2013. Do not turn the page until instructed to. Do not forget to write Problems 1 in the first Blue Book and Problems 2, 3 and 4 in the second Blue Book. 1 Econ 101A Final
More information25 Increasing and Decreasing Functions
- 25 Increasing and Decreasing Functions It is useful in mathematics to define whether a function is increasing or decreasing. In this section we will use the differential of a function to determine this
More informationEconomics 335 Problem Set 6 Spring 1998
Economics 335 Problem Set 6 Spring 1998 February 17, 1999 1. Consider a monopolist with the following cost and demand functions: q ö D(p) ö 120 p C(q) ö 900 ø 0.5q 2 a. What is the marginal cost function?
More informationExercises Solutions: Oligopoly
Exercises Solutions: Oligopoly Exercise - Quantity competition 1 Take firm 1 s perspective Total revenue is R(q 1 = (4 q 1 q q 1 and, hence, marginal revenue is MR 1 (q 1 = 4 q 1 q Marginal cost is MC
More informationECON/MGMT 115. Industrial Organization
ECON/MGMT 115 Industrial Organization 1. Cournot Model, reprised 2. Bertrand Model of Oligopoly 3. Cournot & Bertrand First Hour Reviewing the Cournot Duopoloy Equilibria Cournot vs. competitive markets
More informationLecture Note 3. Oligopoly
Lecture Note 3. Oligopoly 1. Competition by Quantity? Or by Price? By what do firms compete with each other? Competition by price seems more reasonable. However, the Bertrand model (by price) does not
More informationPortfolios that Contain Risky Assets 10: Limited Portfolios with Risk-Free Assets
Portfolios that Contain Risky Assets 10: Limited Portfolios with Risk-Free Assets C. David Levermore University of Maryland, College Park, MD Math 420: Mathematical Modeling March 21, 2018 version c 2018
More informationDUOPOLY MODELS. Dr. Sumon Bhaumik (http://www.sumonbhaumik.net) December 29, 2008
DUOPOLY MODELS Dr. Sumon Bhaumik (http://www.sumonbhaumik.net) December 29, 2008 Contents 1. Collusion in Duopoly 2. Cournot Competition 3. Cournot Competition when One Firm is Subsidized 4. Stackelberg
More informationEconomics 101. Lecture 3 - Consumer Demand
Economics 101 Lecture 3 - Consumer Demand 1 Intro First, a note on wealth and endowment. Varian generally uses wealth (m) instead of endowment. Ultimately, these two are equivalent. Given prices p, if
More informationThese notes essentially correspond to chapter 13 of the text.
These notes essentially correspond to chapter 13 of the text. 1 Oligopoly The key feature of the oligopoly (and to some extent, the monopolistically competitive market) market structure is that one rm
More informationECO 426 (Market Design) - Lecture 8
ECO 426 (Market Design) - Lecture 8 Ettore Damiano November 23, 2015 Revenue equivalence Model: N bidders Bidder i has valuation v i Each v i is drawn independently from the same distribution F (e.g. U[0,
More informationNoncooperative Market Games in Normal Form
Chapter 6 Noncooperative Market Games in Normal Form 1 Market game: one seller and one buyer 2 players, a buyer and a seller Buyer receives red card Ace=11, King = Queen = Jack = 10, 9,, 2 Number represents
More informationMonotone, Convex and Extrema
Monotone Functions Function f is called monotonically increasing, if Chapter 8 Monotone, Convex and Extrema x x 2 f (x ) f (x 2 ) It is called strictly monotonically increasing, if f (x 2) f (x ) x < x
More informationAnswers to Microeconomics Prelim of August 24, In practice, firms often price their products by marking up a fixed percentage over (average)
Answers to Microeconomics Prelim of August 24, 2016 1. In practice, firms often price their products by marking up a fixed percentage over (average) cost. To investigate the consequences of markup pricing,
More informationLecture 9: Basic Oligopoly Models
Lecture 9: Basic Oligopoly Models Managerial Economics November 16, 2012 Prof. Dr. Sebastian Rausch Centre for Energy Policy and Economics Department of Management, Technology and Economics ETH Zürich
More informationGame Theory with Applications to Finance and Marketing, I
Game Theory with Applications to Finance and Marketing, I Homework 1, due in recitation on 10/18/2018. 1. Consider the following strategic game: player 1/player 2 L R U 1,1 0,0 D 0,0 3,2 Any NE can be
More informationProbability and Stochastics for finance-ii Prof. Joydeep Dutta Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur
Probability and Stochastics for finance-ii Prof. Joydeep Dutta Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur Lecture - 07 Mean-Variance Portfolio Optimization (Part-II)
More information3/1/2016. Intermediate Microeconomics W3211. Lecture 4: Solving the Consumer s Problem. The Story So Far. Today s Aims. Solving the Consumer s Problem
1 Intermediate Microeconomics W3211 Lecture 4: Introduction Columbia University, Spring 2016 Mark Dean: mark.dean@columbia.edu 2 The Story So Far. 3 Today s Aims 4 We have now (exhaustively) described
More informationModel Question Paper Economics - I (MSF1A3)
Model Question Paper Economics - I (MSF1A3) Answer all 7 questions. Marks are indicated against each question. 1. Which of the following statements is/are not correct? I. The rationality on the part of
More informationChapter 1 Microeconomics of Consumer Theory
Chapter Microeconomics of Consumer Theory The two broad categories of decision-makers in an economy are consumers and firms. Each individual in each of these groups makes its decisions in order to achieve
More informationThe monopolist solves. maxp(q,a)q C(q) yielding FONCs and SOSCs. p(q (a),a)+p q (q (a),a)q (a) C (q (a)) = 0
Problem Set : The implicit function and envelope theorems. (i) A monopolist faces inverse demand curve p(, a), where a is advertising expenditure, and has costs C(). Solve for the monopolist s optimal
More informationCharacterization of the Optimum
ECO 317 Economics of Uncertainty Fall Term 2009 Notes for lectures 5. Portfolio Allocation with One Riskless, One Risky Asset Characterization of the Optimum Consider a risk-averse, expected-utility-maximizing
More informationStatic Games and Cournot. Competition
Static Games and Cournot Competition Lecture 3: Static Games and Cournot Competition 1 Introduction In the majority of markets firms interact with few competitors oligopoly market Each firm has to consider
More informationChapter 7 Pricing with Market Power SOLUTIONS TO EXERCISES
Firms, Prices & Markets Timothy Van Zandt August 2012 Chapter 7 Pricing with Market Power SOLUTIONS TO EXERCISES Exercise 7.1. Suppose you produce minivans at a constant marginal cost of $15K and your
More informationThe Neoclassical Growth Model
The Neoclassical Growth Model 1 Setup Three goods: Final output Capital Labour One household, with preferences β t u (c t ) (Later we will introduce preferences with respect to labour/leisure) Endowment
More informationThe supply function is Q S (P)=. 10 points
MID-TERM I ECON500, :00 (WHITE) October, Name: E-mail: @uiuc.edu All questions must be answered on this test form! For each question you must show your work and (or) provide a clear argument. All graphs
More informationFirm s Problem. Simon Board. This Version: September 20, 2009 First Version: December, 2009.
Firm s Problem This Version: September 20, 2009 First Version: December, 2009. In these notes we address the firm s problem. questions. We can break the firm s problem into three 1. Which combinations
More informationFinal Exam - Solutions
Econ 303 - Intermediate Microeconomic Theory College of William and Mary December 12, 2012 John Parman Final Exam - Solutions You have until 3:30pm to complete the exam, be certain to use your time wisely.
More informationInstantaneous rate of change (IRC) at the point x Slope of tangent
CHAPTER 2: Differentiation Do not study Sections 2.1 to 2.3. 2.4 Rates of change Rate of change (RC) = Two types Average rate of change (ARC) over the interval [, ] Slope of the line segment Instantaneous
More informationUnit 1 : Principles of Optimizing Behavior
Unit 1 : Principles of Optimizing Behavior Prof. Antonio Rangel January 2, 2016 1 Introduction Most models in economics are based on the assumption that economic agents optimize some objective function.
More informationDo Not Write Below Question Maximum Possible Points Score Total Points = 100
University of Toronto Department of Economics ECO 204 Summer 2012 Ajaz Hussain TEST 2 SOLUTIONS TIME: 1 HOUR AND 50 MINUTES YOU CANNOT LEAVE THE EXAM ROOM DURING THE LAST 10 MINUTES OF THE TEST. PLEASE
More informationMacroeconomics and finance
Macroeconomics and finance 1 1. Temporary equilibrium and the price level [Lectures 11 and 12] 2. Overlapping generations and learning [Lectures 13 and 14] 2.1 The overlapping generations model 2.2 Expectations
More informationElements of Economic Analysis II Lecture II: Production Function and Profit Maximization
Elements of Economic Analysis II Lecture II: Production Function and Profit Maximization Kai Hao Yang 09/26/2017 1 Production Function Just as consumer theory uses utility function a function that assign
More informationPublic Schemes for Efficiency in Oligopolistic Markets
経済研究 ( 明治学院大学 ) 第 155 号 2018 年 Public Schemes for Efficiency in Oligopolistic Markets Jinryo TAKASAKI I Introduction Many governments have been attempting to make public sectors more efficient. Some socialistic
More informationEco 300 Intermediate Micro
Eco 300 Intermediate Micro Instructor: Amalia Jerison Office Hours: T 12:00-1:00, Th 12:00-1:00, and by appointment BA 127A, aj4575@albany.edu A. Jerison (BA 127A) Eco 300 Spring 2010 1 / 27 Review of
More informationFoundations of Economics for International Business Supplementary Exercises 2
Foundations of Economics for International Business Supplementary Exercises 2 INSTRUCTOR: XIN TANG Department of World Economics Economics and Management School Wuhan University Fall 205 These tests are
More informationGame Theory and Economics Prof. Dr. Debarshi Das Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati
Game Theory and Economics Prof. Dr. Debarshi Das Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati Module No. # 03 Illustrations of Nash Equilibrium Lecture No. # 04
More information5. COMPETITIVE MARKETS
5. COMPETITIVE MARKETS We studied how individual consumers and rms behave in Part I of the book. In Part II of the book, we studied how individual economic agents make decisions when there are strategic
More informationThe rm can buy as many units of capital and labour as it wants at constant factor prices r and w. p = q. p = q
10 Homework Assignment 10 [1] Suppose a perfectly competitive, prot maximizing rm has only two inputs, capital and labour. The rm can buy as many units of capital and labour as it wants at constant factor
More informationComparative statics of monopoly pricing
Economic Theory 16, 465 469 (2) Comparative statics of monopoly pricing Tim Baldenius 1 Stefan Reichelstein 2 1 Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, New York, NY 127, USA (e-mail: tb171@columbia.edu)
More informationMS&E HW #1 Solutions
MS&E 341 - HW #1 Solutions 1) a) Because supply and demand are smooth, the supply curve for one competitive firm is determined by equality between marginal production costs and price. Hence, C y p y p.
More informationChapter 9 The IS LM FE Model: A General Framework for Macroeconomic Analysis
Chapter 9 The IS LM FE Model: A General Framework for Macroeconomic Analysis The main goal of Chapter 8 was to describe business cycles by presenting the business cycle facts. This and the following three
More informationExercise Chapter 10
Exercise 10.8.1 Where the isoprofit curves touch the gradients of the profits of Alice and Bob point in the opposite directions. Thus, increasing one agent s profit will necessarily decrease the other
More informationEconomics 230a, Fall 2017 Lecture Note 6: Basic Tax Incidence
Economics 230a, Fall 2017 Lecture Note 6: Basic Tax Incidence Tax incidence refers to where the burden of taxation actually falls, as distinguished from who has the legal liability to pay taxes. As with
More informationLecture 2 Consumer theory (continued)
Lecture 2 Consumer theory (continued) Topics 1.4 : Indirect Utility function and Expenditure function. Relation between these two functions. mf620 1/2007 1 1.4.1 Indirect Utility Function The level of
More informationECONOMICS QUALIFYING EXAMINATION IN ELEMENTARY MATHEMATICS
ECONOMICS QUALIFYING EXAMINATION IN ELEMENTARY MATHEMATICS Friday 2 October 1998 9 to 12 This exam comprises two sections. Each carries 50% of the total marks for the paper. You should attempt all questions
More informationGame Theory and Economics Prof. Dr. Debarshi Das Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati
Game Theory and Economics Prof. Dr. Debarshi Das Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati Module No. # 03 Illustrations of Nash Equilibrium Lecture No. # 02
More informationExercise 1. Jan Abrell Centre for Energy Policy and Economics (CEPE) D-MTEC, ETH Zurich. Exercise
Exercise 1 Jan Abrell Centre for Energy Policy and Economics (CEPE) D-MTEC, ETH Zurich Exercise 1 06.03.2018 1 Outline Reminder: Constraint Maximization Minimization Example: Electricity Dispatch Exercise
More informationMicroeconomics, IB and IBP
Microeconomics, IB and IBP Question 1 (25%) RETAKE EXAM, January 2007 Open book, 4 hours Page 1 of 2 1.1 What is an externality and how can we correct it? Mention examples from both negative and positive
More informationTHE TRAVELING SALESMAN PROBLEM FOR MOVING POINTS ON A LINE
THE TRAVELING SALESMAN PROBLEM FOR MOVING POINTS ON A LINE GÜNTER ROTE Abstract. A salesperson wants to visit each of n objects that move on a line at given constant speeds in the shortest possible time,
More informationChoice. A. Optimal choice 1. move along the budget line until preferred set doesn t cross the budget set. Figure 5.1.
Choice 34 Choice A. Optimal choice 1. move along the budget line until preferred set doesn t cross the budget set. Figure 5.1. Optimal choice x* 2 x* x 1 1 Figure 5.1 2. note that tangency occurs at optimal
More information1 Appendix A: Definition of equilibrium
Online Appendix to Partnerships versus Corporations: Moral Hazard, Sorting and Ownership Structure Ayca Kaya and Galina Vereshchagina Appendix A formally defines an equilibrium in our model, Appendix B
More informationProblem Set 2 Answers
Problem Set 2 Answers BPH8- February, 27. Note that the unique Nash Equilibrium of the simultaneous Bertrand duopoly model with a continuous price space has each rm playing a wealy dominated strategy.
More informationPractice Exam Questions 2
Practice Exam Questions 2 1. There is a household who maximizes discounted utility u(c 1 )+δu(c 2 ) and faces budget constraints, w = L+s+c 1 and rl+s = c 2, where c 1 is consumption in period 1 and c
More informationPortfolios that Contain Risky Assets Portfolio Models 9. Long Portfolios with a Safe Investment
Portfolios that Contain Risky Assets Portfolio Models 9. Long Portfolios with a Safe Investment C. David Levermore University of Maryland, College Park Math 420: Mathematical Modeling March 21, 2016 version
More informationPercentage Change and Elasticity
ucsc supplementary notes math 105a Percentage Change and Elasticity 1. Relative and percentage rates of change The derivative of a differentiable function y = fx) describes how the function changes. The
More informationECON 200 EXERCISES. (b) Appeal to any propositions you wish to confirm that the production set is convex.
ECON 00 EXERCISES 3. ROBINSON CRUSOE ECONOMY 3.1 Production set and profit maximization. A firm has a production set Y { y 18 y y 0, y 0, y 0}. 1 1 (a) What is the production function of the firm? HINT:
More informationSYLLABUS AND SAMPLE QUESTIONS FOR MSQE (Program Code: MQEK and MQED) Syllabus for PEA (Mathematics), 2013
SYLLABUS AND SAMPLE QUESTIONS FOR MSQE (Program Code: MQEK and MQED) 2013 Syllabus for PEA (Mathematics), 2013 Algebra: Binomial Theorem, AP, GP, HP, Exponential, Logarithmic Series, Sequence, Permutations
More informationElasticity. The Concept of Elasticity
Elasticity 1 The Concept of Elasticity Elasticity is a measure of the responsiveness of one variable to another. The greater the elasticity, the greater the responsiveness. 2 1 Types of Elasticity Price
More informationDepartment of Economics The Ohio State University Final Exam Answers Econ 8712
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Final Exam Answers Econ 8712 Prof. Peck Fall 2015 1. (5 points) The following economy has two consumers, two firms, and two goods. Good 2 is leisure/labor.
More informationUniversity of Toronto Department of Economics ECO 204 Summer 2013 Ajaz Hussain TEST 1 SOLUTIONS GOOD LUCK!
University of Toronto Department of Economics ECO 204 Summer 2013 Ajaz Hussain TEST 1 SOLUTIONS TIME: 1 HOUR AND 50 MINUTES DO NOT HAVE A CELL PHONE ON YOUR DESK OR ON YOUR PERSON. ONLY AID ALLOWED: A
More informationLecture 2: The Neoclassical Growth Model
Lecture 2: The Neoclassical Growth Model Florian Scheuer 1 Plan Introduce production technology, storage multiple goods 2 The Neoclassical Model Three goods: Final output Capital Labor One household, with
More informationProblem Set 1 Answer Key. I. Short Problems 1. Check whether the following three functions represent the same underlying preferences
Problem Set Answer Key I. Short Problems. Check whether the following three functions represent the same underlying preferences u (q ; q ) = q = + q = u (q ; q ) = q + q u (q ; q ) = ln q + ln q All three
More informationMathematical Economics dr Wioletta Nowak. Lecture 2
Mathematical Economics dr Wioletta Nowak Lecture 2 The Utility Function, Examples of Utility Functions: Normal Good, Perfect Substitutes, Perfect Complements, The Quasilinear and Homothetic Utility Functions,
More informationPractice Problems: First-Year M. Phil Microeconomics, Consumer and Producer Theory Vincent P. Crawford, University of Oxford Michaelmas Term 2010
Practice Problems: First-Year M. Phil Microeconomics, Consumer and Producer Theory Vincent P. Crawford, University of Oxford Michaelmas Term 2010 Problems from Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, Microeconomic
More informationMA 162: Finite Mathematics - Chapter 1
MA 162: Finite Mathematics - Chapter 1 Fall 2014 Ray Kremer University of Kentucky Linear Equations Linear equations are usually represented in one of three ways: 1 Slope-intercept form: y = mx + b 2 Point-Slope
More informationx f(x) D.N.E
Limits Consider the function f(x) x2 x. This function is not defined for x, but if we examine the value of f for numbers close to, we can observe something interesting: x 0 0.5 0.9 0.999.00..5 2 f(x).5.9.999
More informationUniversity of Toronto Department of Economics ECO 204 Summer 2013 Ajaz Hussain TEST 2 GOOD LUCK! 9-DIGIT STUDENT ID # (AS IT APPEARS IN ROSI)
University of Toronto Department of Economics ECO 204 Summer 2013 Ajaz Hussain TEST 2 TIME: 1 HOUR AND 50 MINUTES DO NOT HAVE A CELL PHONE ON YOUR DESK OR ON YOUR PERSON. ONLY AID ALLOWED: A CALCULATOR
More informationLecture 11. The firm s problem. Randall Romero Aguilar, PhD II Semestre 2017 Last updated: October 16, 2017
Lecture 11 The firm s problem Randall Romero Aguilar, PhD II Semestre 2017 Last updated: October 16, 2017 Universidad de Costa Rica EC3201 - Teoría Macroeconómica 2 Table of contents 1. The representative
More informationPh.D. Preliminary Examination MICROECONOMIC THEORY Applied Economics Graduate Program June 2017
Ph.D. Preliminary Examination MICROECONOMIC THEORY Applied Economics Graduate Program June 2017 The time limit for this exam is four hours. The exam has four sections. Each section includes two questions.
More information9.13 Use Crammer s rule to solve the following two systems of equations.
Curtis Kephart Econ 2B Mathematics for Economists Problem Set 2 Problem 9. Use Crammer s Rule to Invert the following 3 matrices. a) 4 3 3, 4 3 4 2 3 b) 5 6, 8 The (very long) method of computing adj A
More informationChapter 9. The Instruments of Trade Policy
Chapter 9 The Instruments of Trade Policy Introduction So far we learned that: 1. Tariffs always lead to deadweight losses for small open economies 2. A large country can increase its welfare by using
More informationMicroeconomics 2nd Period Exam Solution Topics
Microeconomics 2nd Period Exam Solution Topics Group I Suppose a representative firm in a perfectly competitive, constant-cost industry has a cost function: T C(q) = 2q 2 + 100q + 100 (a) If market demand
More information1 Answers to the Sept 08 macro prelim - Long Questions
Answers to the Sept 08 macro prelim - Long Questions. Suppose that a representative consumer receives an endowment of a non-storable consumption good. The endowment evolves exogenously according to ln
More informationMath Spring 2017 Mathematical Models in Economics
2017 - Steven Tschantz Math 3660 - Spring 2017 Mathematical Models in Economics Steven Tschantz 1/17/17 Profit maximizing firms A monopolist Problem A firm has a unique product it will sell to consumers
More informationFinancial Market Models. Lecture 1. One-period model of financial markets & hedging problems. Imperial College Business School
Financial Market Models Lecture One-period model of financial markets & hedging problems One-period model of financial markets a 4 2a 3 3a 3 a 3 -a 4 2 Aims of section Introduce one-period model with finite
More information