Logic and Artificial Intelligence Lecture 24

Transcription

1 Logic and Artificial Intelligence Lecture 24 Eric Pacuit Currently Visiting the Center for Formal Epistemology, CMU Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg University ai.stanford.edu/ epacuit November 30, 2011 Logic and Artificial Intelligence 1/36

2 Merging Logics of Rational Agency Entangling Knowledge/Beliefs and Preferences Epistemizing Logics of Action and Ability BDI (Belief + Desires + Intentions) Logics Logic and Artificial Intelligence 2/36

3 Logic and Game Theory Game theory is full of deep puzzles, and there is often disagreement about proposed solutions to them. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 3/36

4 Logic and Game Theory Game theory is full of deep puzzles, and there is often disagreement about proposed solutions to them. The puzzlement and disagreement are neither empirical nor mathematical but, rather, concern the meanings of fundamental concepts ( solution, rational, complete information ) and the soundness of certain arguments... Logic and Artificial Intelligence 3/36

5 Logic and Game Theory Game theory is full of deep puzzles, and there is often disagreement about proposed solutions to them. The puzzlement and disagreement are neither empirical nor mathematical but, rather, concern the meanings of fundamental concepts ( solution, rational, complete information ) and the soundness of certain arguments...logic appears to be an appropriate tool for game theory both because these conceptual obscurities involve notions such as reasoning, knowledge and counter-factuality which are part of the stock-in-trade of logic, and because it is a prime function of logic to establish the validity or invalidity of disputed arguments. M.O.L. Bacharach. Logic and the Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory Logic and Artificial Intelligence 3/36

6 (Modal) Logic in Games M. Pauly and W. van der Hoek. Modal Logic for Games and Information. Handbook of Modal Logic (2006). G. Bonanno. Modal Logic and Game Theory: Two Alternative Approaches. Risk Decision and Policy 7 (2002). J. van Benthem. Extensive Games as Process Models. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 11 (2002). J. Halpern. A Computer Scientist Looks at Game Theory. Games and Economic Behavior 45:1 (2003). R. Parikh. Social Software. Synthese 132: 3 (2002). Logic and Artificial Intelligence 4/36

7 Many topics... Social Procedures: Fair-Division Algorithms, Voting Procedures, Cake-Cutting Algorithms Logics of rational agency Logics of rational interaction Game Logics When are two games the same? Epistemic program in game theory Social Choice Theory and Logic (Formally) Verifying that a social procedure is correct Develop ( well-behaved ) logical languages that can express game theoretic concepts, such as the Nash equilibrium Logic and Artificial Intelligence 5/36

8 Games for Logic Logic and Artificial Intelligence 6/36

9 Games for Logic A E p E A A q r p q p r A can force {p}, {q, r}, E can force {p, q}, {p, r} Logic and Artificial Intelligence 6/36

10 Games for Logic A E p E A A q r p q p r A can force {p}, {q, r}, E can force {p, q}, {p, r} Logic and Artificial Intelligence 6/36

11 Games for Logic A E p E A A q r p q p r A can force {p}, {q, r}, E can force {p, q}, {p, r} Logic and Artificial Intelligence 6/36

12 Games for Logic A E p E A A q r p q p r A can force {p}, {q, r}, E can force {p, q}, {p, r} Logic and Artificial Intelligence 6/36

13 Games for Logic A E p E A A q r p q p r A can force {p}, {q, r}, E can force {p, q}, {p, r} Logic and Artificial Intelligence 6/36

14 Games for Logic A E p E A A q r p q p r A can force {p}, {q, r}, E can force {p, q}, {p, r} Logic and Artificial Intelligence 6/36

15 Games for Logic A E p E A A q r p q p r p (q r) (p q) (p r) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 6/36

16 A primer on game theoretic models (extensive/normal form games) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 7/36

17 Game Situations Bob U L R Ann U 1,1 0,0 U D 0,0 1,1 U 1. a group of self-interested agents (players) involved in some interdependent decision problem, and the players recognize that they are engaged in a game situation Logic and Artificial Intelligence 8/36

18 Game Situations Bob U L R Ann U 1,1 0,0 U D 0,0 1,1 U 1. a group of self-interested agents (players) involved in some interdependent decision problem, and the players recognize that they are engaged in a game situation Logic and Artificial Intelligence 8/36

19 Game Situations Bob U L R Ann U 1,1 0,0 U D 0,0 1,1 U 1. a group of self-interested agents (players) involved in some interdependent decision problem, and the players recognize that they are engaged in a game situation Logic and Artificial Intelligence 8/36

20 Game Situations Bob U L R Ann U 1,1 0,0 U D 0,0 1,1 U 1. a group of self-interested agents (players) involved in some interdependent decision problem, and the players recognize that they are engaged in a game situation Logic and Artificial Intelligence 8/36

21 Game Situations Bob U L R Ann U 1,1 0,0 U D 0,0 1,1 U 1. a group of self-interested agents (players) involved in some interdependent decision problem, and the players recognize that they are engaged in a game situation Logic and Artificial Intelligence 8/36

22 Game Situations Bob U L R Ann U 1,1 0,0 U D 0,0 1,1 U 1. a group of self-interested agents (players) involved in some interdependent decision problem, and the players recognize that they are engaged in a game situation Logic and Artificial Intelligence 8/36

23 Game Situations Bob U L R Ann U 1,1 0,0 U D 0,0 1,1 U 1. a group of self-interested agents (players) involved in some interdependent decision problem, and 2. the players recognize that they are engaged in a game situation Logic and Artificial Intelligence 8/36

24 Game Situations Bob U L R Ann U 1,1 0,0 U D 0,0 1,1 U What should Ann (Bob) do? asdfasdf asdf asdfjasdfasd f asdf asd f asd fasd It depends on what she expects Bob to do, but this depends on what she thinks Bob expects her to do, and so on... Logic and Artificial Intelligence 8/36

25 Game Situations Bob U L R Ann U 1,1 0,0 U D 0,0 1,1 U What should Ann (Bob) do? asdfasdf asdf asdfjasdfasd f asdf asd f asd fasd It depends on what she expects Bob to do, but this depends on what she thinks Bob expects her to do, and so on... Logic and Artificial Intelligence 8/36

26 Just Enough Game Theory Osborne and Rubinstein. Introduction to Game Theory. MIT Press. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 9/36

27 Just Enough Game Theory Osborne and Rubinstein. Introduction to Game Theory. MIT Press. A game is a description of strategic interaction that includes actions the players can take description of the players interests (i.e., preferences), description of the structure of the decision problem Logic and Artificial Intelligence 9/36

28 Just Enough Game Theory Osborne and Rubinstein. Introduction to Game Theory. MIT Press. A game is a description of strategic interaction that includes actions the players can take description of the players interests (i.e., preferences), description of the structure of the decision problem It does not specify the actions that the players do take. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 9/36

29 Solution Concepts A solution concept is a systematic description of the outcomes that may emerge in a family of games. This is the starting point for most of game theory and includes many variants: Nash equilibrium, backwards inductions, or iterated dominance of various kinds. These are usually thought of as the embodiment of rational behavior in some way and used to analyze game situations. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 10/36

30 Strategic Games A strategic games is a tuple N, {A i } i N, { i } i N where N is a finite set of players Logic and Artificial Intelligence 11/36

31 Strategic Games A strategic games is a tuple N, {A i } i N, { i } i N where N is a finite set of players for each i N, A i is a nonempty set of actions Logic and Artificial Intelligence 11/36

32 Strategic Games A strategic games is a tuple N, {A i } i N, { i } i N where N is a finite set of players for each i N, A i is a nonempty set of actions for each i N, i is a preference relation on A = Π i N A i (Often i are represented by utility functions u i : A R) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 11/36

33 Strategic Games: Comments on Preferences Preferences may be over a set of consequences C. Assume g : A C and { i i N} a set of preferences on C. Then for a, b A, a i b iff g(a) i g(b) Consequences may be affected by exogenous random variable whose realization is not known before choosing actions. Let Ω be a set of states, then define g : A Ω C. Where g(a ) is interpreted as a lottery. Often i are represented by utility functions u i : A R Logic and Artificial Intelligence 12/36

34 Strategic Games: Example Row N = {Row, Column} r Column u (2,2) (0,0) d (0,0) (1,1) A Row = {u, d}, A Column = {r, l} (u, r) Row (d, l) Row (u, l) Row (d, r) (u, r) Column (d, l) Column (u, l) Column (d, r) l Logic and Artificial Intelligence 13/36

35 Strategic Games: Example Row r Column u (2,2) (0,0) d (0,0) (1,1) N = {Row, Column} A Row = {u, d}, A Column = {r, l} u Row : A Row A Column {0, 1, 2}, u Column : A Row A Column {0, 1, 2} with u Row (u, r) = u Column (u, r) = 2, u Row (d, l) = u Column (d, l) = 2, and u x (u, l) = u x (d, r) = 0 for x N. l Logic and Artificial Intelligence 13/36

36 Nash Equilibrium Let N, {A i } i N, { i } i N be a strategic game For a i A i, let B i (a i ) = {a i A i (a i, a i ) i (a i, a i) a i A i } B i is the best-response function. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 14/36

37 Nash Equilibrium Let N, {A i } i N, { i } i N be a strategic game For a i A i, let B i (a i ) = {a i A i (a i, a i ) i (a i, a i) a i A i } B i is the best-response function. a A is a Nash equilibrium iff ai B i (a i ) for all i N. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 14/36

38 Strategic Games Example: Bach or Stravinsky? b c s c b r 2,1 0,0 s r 0,0 1,2 N = {r, c} A r = {b r, s r }, A c = {b c, s c } B r (b c ) = {b r } B r (s c ) = {s r } B c (b r ) = {b c } B c (s r ) = {s c } (b r, b c ) is a Nash Equilibrium (s r, s c ) is a Nash Equilibrium Logic and Artificial Intelligence 15/36

39 Strategic Games Example: Bach or Stravinsky? b c s c b r 2,1 0,0 s r 0,0 1,2 N = {r, c} A r = {b r, s r }, A c = {b c, s c } B r (b c ) = {b r } B r (s c ) = {s r } B c (b r ) = {b c } B c (s r ) = {s c } (b r, b c ) is a Nash Equilibrium (s r, s c ) is a Nash Equilibrium Logic and Artificial Intelligence 15/36

40 Strategic Games Example: Bach or Stravinsky? b c s c b r 2,1 0,0 s r 0,0 1,2 N = {r, c} A r = {b r, s r }, A c = {b c, s c } B r (b c ) = {b r } B r (s c ) = {s r } B c (b r ) = {b c } B c (s r ) = {s c } (b r, b c ) is a Nash Equilibrium (s r, s c ) is a Nash Equilibrium Logic and Artificial Intelligence 15/36

41 Strategic Games Example: Bach or Stravinsky? b c s c b r 2,1 0,0 s r 0,0 1,2 N = {r, c} A r = {b r, s r }, A c = {b c, s c } B r (b c ) = {b r } B r (s c ) = {s r } B c (b r ) = {b c } B c (s r ) = {s c } (b r, b c ) is a Nash Equilibrium (s r, s c ) is a Nash Equilibrium Logic and Artificial Intelligence 15/36

42 Strategic Games Example: Bach or Stravinsky? b c s c b r 2,1 0,0 s r 0,0 1,2 N = {r, c} A r = {b r, s r }, A c = {b c, s c } B r (b c ) = {b r } B r (s c ) = {s r } B c (b r ) = {b c } B c (s r ) = {s c } (b r, b c ) is a Nash Equilibrium (s r, s c ) is a Nash Equilibrium Logic and Artificial Intelligence 15/36

43 Another Example: Pure Coordination Bob U L R Ann U 1,1 0,0 U D 0,0 1,1 U Logic and Artificial Intelligence 16/36

44 Another Example: Hi-Low Bob U L R Ann U 3,3 0,0 U D 0,0 1,1 U Logic and Artificial Intelligence 17/36

45 Reasoning about (strategic) games Logic and Artificial Intelligence 18/36

46 Reasoning about (strategic) games There is Kripke structure built in a strategic game. W = {σ σ is a strategy profile: σ Π i N S i } (d, a) (d, b) (d, c) a b c d (2,3) (2,2) (1,1) e (0,2) (4,0) (1,0) f (0,1) (1,4) (2,0) (e, a) (e, b) (e, c) (f, a) (f, b) (f, c) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 18/36

47 Reasoning about (strategic) games σ i σ iff σ i = σ i : this epistemic relation represents player i s view of the game at the ex interim stage where i s choice is fixed but the choices of the other players are unknown (d, a) (d, b) (d, c) a b c d (2,3) (2,2) (1,1) e (0,2) (4,0) (1,0) f (0,1) (1,4) (2,0) (e, a) (e, b) (e, c) (f, a) (f, b) (f, c) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 18/36

48 Reasoning about (strategic) games σ i σ iff σ i = σ i : this relation of action freedom gives the alternative choices for player i when the other players choices are fixed. (d, a) (d, b) (d, c) a b c d (2,3) (2,2) (1,1) e (0,2) (4,0) (1,0) f (0,1) (1,4) (2,0) (e, a) (e, b) (e, c) (f, a) (f, b) (f, c) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 18/36

49 Reasoning about (strategic) games σ i σ iff player i prefers the outcome σ at least as much as outcome σ (e, a) (f, a) a b c d (2,3) (2,2) (1,1) e (0,2) (4,0) (1,0) f (0,1) (1,4) (2,0) (f, b) (d, c) (e, c) (d, a) (d, b) (f, c) (e, b) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 18/36

50 Reasoning about strategic games M = W, { i } i N, { i } i N, { i } i N σ = [ i ]ϕ iff for all σ, if σ i σ then σ = ϕ. σ = [ i ]ϕ iff for all σ, if σ i σ then σ = ϕ. σ = i ϕ iff there exists σ such that σ i σ and σ = ϕ. σ = i ϕ iff there is a σ with σ i σ, σ i σ, and σ = ϕ the equivalence [ i ][ i ]ϕ [ i ][ i ]ϕ is valid Logic and Artificial Intelligence 19/36

51 Reasoning about strategic games M = W, { i } i N, { i } i N, { i } i N σ = [ i ]ϕ iff for all σ, if σ i σ then σ = ϕ. σ = [ i ]ϕ iff for all σ, if σ i σ then σ = ϕ. σ = i ϕ iff there exists σ such that σ i σ and σ = ϕ. σ = i ϕ iff there is a σ with σ i σ, σ i σ, and σ = ϕ What is the complete logic of finite games? Logic and Artificial Intelligence 19/36

52 Reasoning about strategic games M = W, { i } i N, { i } i N, { i } i N σ = [ i ]ϕ iff for all σ, if σ i σ then σ = ϕ. σ = [ i ]ϕ iff for all σ, if σ i σ then σ = ϕ. σ = i ϕ iff there exists σ such that σ i σ and σ = ϕ. σ = i ϕ iff there is a σ with σ i σ, σ i σ, and σ = ϕ the equivalence [ i ][ i ]ϕ [ i ][ i ]ϕ is valid on full games Logic and Artificial Intelligence 19/36

53 Reasoning about strategic games M = W, { i } i N, { i } i N, { i } i N σ = [ i ]ϕ iff for all σ, if σ i σ then σ = ϕ. σ = [ i ]ϕ iff for all σ, if σ i σ then σ = ϕ. σ = i ϕ iff there exists σ such that σ i σ and σ = ϕ. σ = i ϕ iff there is a σ with σ i σ, σ i σ, and σ = ϕ Can we modally define the Nash Equilibrium? Logic and Artificial Intelligence 19/36

54 Reasoning about strategic games M = W, { i } i N, { i } i N, { i } i N σ = [ i ]ϕ iff for all σ, if σ i σ then σ = ϕ. σ = [ i ]ϕ iff for all σ, if σ i σ then σ = ϕ. σ = i ϕ iff there exists σ such that σ i σ and σ = ϕ. σ = i ϕ iff there is a σ with σ i σ, σ i σ, and σ = ϕ Can we modally define the Nash Equilibrium? Nash := i N Br i Logic and Artificial Intelligence 19/36

55 Reasoning about strategic games M = W, { i } i N, { i } i N, { i } i N σ = [ i ]ϕ iff for all σ, if σ i σ then σ = ϕ. σ = [ i ]ϕ iff for all σ, if σ i σ then σ = ϕ. σ = i ϕ iff there exists σ such that σ i σ and σ = ϕ. σ = i ϕ iff there is a σ with σ i σ, σ i σ, and σ = ϕ Can we modally define the best response for i? Logic and Artificial Intelligence 19/36

56 Reasoning about strategic games a b c d (2,3) (2,2) (1,1) e (0,2) (4,0) (1,0) f (0,1) (1,4) (2,0) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 19/36

57 Reasoning about strategic games (e, a) (f, a) (d, a) (d, b) (d, c) (f, b) (d, c) (e, c) (e, a) (e, b) (e, c) (d, a) (d, b) (f, c) (f, a) (f, b) (f, c) (e, b) σ = i : there is no outcome at least as good as σ Logic and Artificial Intelligence 19/36

58 Reasoning about strategic games (e, a) (f, a) (d, a) (d, b) (d, c) (f, b) (d, c) (e, c) (e, a) (e, b) (e, c) (d, a) (d, b) (f, c) (f, a) (f, b) (f, c) (e, b) σ = i : there is no outcome at least as good as σ Logic and Artificial Intelligence 19/36

59 Reasoning about strategic games (e, a) (f, a) (d, a) (d, b) (d, c) (f, b) (d, c) (e, c) (e, a) (e, b) (e, c) (d, a) (d, b) (f, c) (f, a) (f, b) (f, c) (e, b) (d, a) = i : there is no outcome at least as good as σ Logic and Artificial Intelligence 19/36

60 Reasoning about strategic games (e, a) (f, a) (d, a) (d, b) (d, c) (f, b) (d, c) (e, c) (e, a) (e, b) (e, c) (d, a) (d, b) (f, c) (f, a) (f, b) (f, c) (e, b) there is no outcome which i can choose that is at least as good Logic and Artificial Intelligence 19/36

61 Reasoning about strategic games (e, a) (f, a) (d, a) (d, b) (d, c) (f, b) (d, c) (e, c) (e, a) (e, b) (e, c) (d, a) (d, b) (f, c) (f, a) (f, b) (f, c) (e, b) σ = i i ϕ iff there is σ such that σ( i i )σ and σ = ϕ Logic and Artificial Intelligence 19/36

62 Reasoning about strategic games (e, a) (f, a) (d, a) (d, b) (d, c) (f, b) (d, c) (e, c) (e, a) (e, b) (e, c) (d, a) (d, b) (f, c) (f, a) (f, b) (f, c) (e, b) the best response for player i is defined as i i Logic and Artificial Intelligence 19/36

63 Reasoning about extensive games Logic and Artificial Intelligence 20/36

64 Reasoning about extensive games A B B (1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A (3, 1) (4, 4) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 20/36

65 Reasoning about extensive games Invented by Zermelo, Backwards Induction is an iterative algorithm for solving and extensive game. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 20/36

66 Reasoning about extensive games A B B (1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A (3, 1) (4, 4) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 20/36

67 Reasoning about extensive games A B B (1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4) (3, 1) (4, 4) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 20/36

68 Reasoning about extensive games A B B (1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4) (3, 1) (4, 4) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 20/36

69 Reasoning about extensive games A (2, 3) B (1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4) (3, 1) (4, 4) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 20/36

70 Reasoning about extensive games A (2, 3) B (1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4) (3, 1) (4, 4) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 20/36

71 Reasoning about extensive games A (2, 3) (1, 5) (1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4) (3, 1) (4, 4) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 20/36

72 Reasoning about extensive games A (2, 3) (1, 5) (1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4) (3, 1) (4, 4) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 20/36

73 Reasoning about extensive games (2, 3) (2, 3) (1, 5) (1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4) (3, 1) (4, 4) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 20/36

74 Reasoning about extensive games A B B (1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A (3, 1) (4, 4) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 20/36

75 Reasoning about extensive games A B B (1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A (3, 1) (4, 4) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 20/36

76 Characterizing Backwards Induction For each extensive game form, the strategy profile σ is a backward induction solution iff σ is played at the root of a tree satisfying the following modal axiom for all propositions p and players i: (turn i σ (end p)) [move i ] σ (end i p) move i = a is an i-move a, turn i is a propositional variable saying that it is i s turn to move, and end is a propositional variable true at only end nodes J. van Benthem, S. van Otterloo and O. Roy. Preference Logic, Conditionals, and Solution Concepts in Games. In Modality Matters: Twenty-Five Essays in Honour of Krister Segerberg, Logic and Artificial Intelligence 21/36

77 Characterizing Backwards Induction σ x y z via σ u via σ v Logic and Artificial Intelligence 21/36

78 Modal Languages for Games [a b] c d p: for each choice between a or b there is a choice between c or d ending in a p-state. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 22/36

79 Modal Languages for Games [a b] c d p: for each choice between a or b there is a choice between c or d ending in a p-state. Strategies as programs: [((turn E )?; σ) (turn A?; τ)) ](end p) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 22/36

80 Modal Languages for Games [a b] c d p: for each choice between a or b there is a choice between c or d ending in a p-state. Strategies as programs: [((turn E )?; σ) (turn A?; τ)) ](end p) A ϕ: A has a strategy to ensure that ϕ is true Logic and Artificial Intelligence 22/36

81 Modal Languages for Games [a b] c d p: for each choice between a or b there is a choice between c or d ending in a p-state. Strategies as programs: [((turn E )?; σ) (turn A?; τ)) ](end p) A ϕ: A has a strategy to ensure that ϕ is true Knowledge/beliefs: Logic and Artificial Intelligence 22/36

82 Modal Languages for Games [a b] c d p: for each choice between a or b there is a choice between c or d ending in a p-state. Strategies as programs: [((turn E )?; σ) (turn A?; τ)) ](end p) A ϕ: A has a strategy to ensure that ϕ is true Knowledge/beliefs: K E ( a p b p), K E a p K E b p Logic and Artificial Intelligence 22/36

83 Modal Languages for Games [a b] c d p: for each choice between a or b there is a choice between c or d ending in a p-state. Strategies as programs: [((turn E )?; σ) (turn A?; τ)) ](end p) A ϕ: A has a strategy to ensure that ϕ is true Knowledge/beliefs: K E ( a p b p), K E a p K E b p K A E ϕ vs. E K A ϕ Logic and Artificial Intelligence 22/36

84 Modal Languages for Games [a b] c d p: for each choice between a or b there is a choice between c or d ending in a p-state. Strategies as programs: [((turn E )?; σ) (turn A?; τ)) ](end p) A ϕ: A has a strategy to ensure that ϕ is true Knowledge/beliefs: K E ( a p b p), K E a p K E b p K A E ϕ vs. E K A ϕ preferences,... Logic and Artificial Intelligence 22/36

85 Reasoning with games Logic and Artificial Intelligence 23/36

86 Background: Propositional Dynamic Logic Let P be a set of atomic programs and At a set of atomic propositions. Formulas of PDL have the following syntactic form: where p At and a P. ϕ := p ϕ ϕ ψ [α]ϕ α := a α β α; β α ϕ? [α]ϕ is intended to mean after executing the program α, ϕ is true Logic and Artificial Intelligence 24/36

87 Background: Propositional Dynamic Logic Semantics: M = W, {R a a P}, V where for each a P, R a W W and V : At (W ) R α β := R α R β R α;β := R α R β R α := n 0 R n α R ϕ? = {(w, w) M, w = ϕ} M, w = [α]ϕ iff for each v, if wr α v then M, v = ϕ Logic and Artificial Intelligence 25/36

88 Background: Propositional Dynamic Logic 1. Axioms of propositional logic 2. [α](ϕ ψ) ([α]ϕ [α]ψ) 3. [α β]ϕ [α]ϕ [β]ϕ 4. [α; β]ϕ [α][β]ϕ 5. [ψ?]ϕ (ψ ϕ) 6. ϕ [α][α ]ϕ [α ]ϕ 7. ϕ [α ](ϕ [α]ϕ) [α ]ϕ 8. Modus Ponens and Necessitation (for each program α) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 26/36

89 Background: Propositional Dynamic Logic 1. Axioms of propositional logic 2. [α](ϕ ψ) ([α]ϕ [α]ψ) 3. [α β]ϕ [α]ϕ [β]ϕ 4. [α; β]ϕ [α][β]ϕ 5. [ψ?]ϕ (ψ ϕ) 6. ϕ [α][α ]ϕ [α ]ϕ (Fixed-Point Axiom) 7. ϕ [α ](ϕ [α]ϕ) [α ]ϕ (Induction Axiom) 8. Modus Ponens and Necessitation (for each program α) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 27/36

90 From PDL to Game Logic R. Parikh. The Logic of Games and its Applications.. Annals of Discrete Mathematics. (1985). Logic and Artificial Intelligence 28/36

91 From PDL to Game Logic R. Parikh. The Logic of Games and its Applications.. Annals of Discrete Mathematics. (1985). Main Idea: In PDL: w = π ϕ: there is a run of the program π starting in state w that ends in a state where ϕ is true. The programs in PDL can be thought of as single player games. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 28/36

92 From PDL to Game Logic R. Parikh. The Logic of Games and its Applications.. Annals of Discrete Mathematics. (1985). Main Idea: In PDL: w = π ϕ: there is a run of the program π starting in state w that ends in a state where ϕ is true. The programs in PDL can be thought of as single player games. Game Logic generalized PDL by considering two players: In GL: w = γ ϕ: Angel has a strategy in the game γ to ensure that the game ends in a state where ϕ is true. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 28/36

93 From PDL to Game Logic Consequences of two players: Logic and Artificial Intelligence 29/36

94 From PDL to Game Logic Consequences of two players: γ ϕ: Angel has a strategy in γ to ensure ϕ is true [γ]ϕ: Demon has a strategy in γ to ensure ϕ is true Logic and Artificial Intelligence 29/36

95 From PDL to Game Logic Consequences of two players: γ ϕ: Angel has a strategy in γ to ensure ϕ is true [γ]ϕ: Demon has a strategy in γ to ensure ϕ is true Either Angel or Demon can win: γ ϕ [γ] ϕ Logic and Artificial Intelligence 29/36

96 From PDL to Game Logic Consequences of two players: γ ϕ: Angel has a strategy in γ to ensure ϕ is true [γ]ϕ: Demon has a strategy in γ to ensure ϕ is true Either Angel or Demon can win: γ ϕ [γ] ϕ But not both: ( γ ϕ [γ] ϕ) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 29/36

97 From PDL to Game Logic Consequences of two players: γ ϕ: Angel has a strategy in γ to ensure ϕ is true [γ]ϕ: Demon has a strategy in γ to ensure ϕ is true Either Angel or Demon can win: γ ϕ [γ] ϕ But not both: ( γ ϕ [γ] ϕ) Thus, [γ]ϕ γ ϕ is a valid principle Logic and Artificial Intelligence 29/36

98 From PDL to Game Logic Consequences of two players: γ ϕ: Angel has a strategy in γ to ensure ϕ is true [γ]ϕ: Demon has a strategy in γ to ensure ϕ is true Either Angel or Demon can win: γ ϕ [γ] ϕ But not both: ( γ ϕ [γ] ϕ) Thus, [γ]ϕ γ ϕ is a valid principle However, [γ]ϕ [γ]ψ [γ](ϕ ψ) is not a valid principle Logic and Artificial Intelligence 29/36

99 From PDL to Game Logic Reinterpret operations and invent new ones:?ϕ: Check whether ϕ currently holds γ 1 ; γ 2 : First play γ 1 then γ 2 γ 1 γ 2 : Angel choose between γ 1 and γ 2 γ : Angel can choose how often to play γ (possibly not at all); each time she has played γ, she can decide whether to play it again or not. γ d : Switch roles, then play γ γ 1 γ 2 := (γ d 1 γd 2 )d : Demon chooses between γ 1 and γ 2 γ x := ((γ d ) ) d : Demon can choose how often to play γ (possibly not at all); each time he has played γ, he can decide whether to play it again or not. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 30/36

100 From PDL to Game Logic Reinterpret operations and invent new ones:?ϕ: Check whether ϕ currently holds γ 1 ; γ 2 : First play γ 1 then γ 2 γ 1 γ 2 : Angel choose between γ 1 and γ 2 γ : Angel can choose how often to play γ (possibly not at all); each time she has played γ, she can decide whether to play it again or not. γ d : Switch roles, then play γ γ 1 γ 2 := (γ d 1 γd 2 )d : Demon chooses between γ 1 and γ 2 γ x := ((γ d ) ) d : Demon can choose how often to play γ (possibly not at all); each time he has played γ, he can decide whether to play it again or not. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 30/36

101 From PDL to Game Logic Reinterpret operations and invent new ones:?ϕ: Check whether ϕ currently holds γ 1 ; γ 2 : First play γ 1 then γ 2 γ 1 γ 2 : Angel choose between γ 1 and γ 2 γ : Angel can choose how often to play γ (possibly not at all); each time she has played γ, she can decide whether to play it again or not. γ d : Switch roles, then play γ γ 1 γ 2 := (γ d 1 γd 2 )d : Demon chooses between γ 1 and γ 2 γ x := ((γ d ) ) d : Demon can choose how often to play γ (possibly not at all); each time he has played γ, he can decide whether to play it again or not. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 30/36

102 From PDL to Game Logic Reinterpret operations and invent new ones:?ϕ: Check whether ϕ currently holds γ 1 ; γ 2 : First play γ 1 then γ 2 γ 1 γ 2 : Angel choose between γ 1 and γ 2 γ : Angel can choose how often to play γ (possibly not at all); each time she has played γ, she can decide whether to play it again or not. γ d : Switch roles, then play γ γ 1 γ 2 := (γ d 1 γd 2 )d : Demon chooses between γ 1 and γ 2 γ x := ((γ d ) ) d : Demon can choose how often to play γ (possibly not at all); each time he has played γ, he can decide whether to play it again or not. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 30/36

103 From PDL to Game Logic Reinterpret operations and invent new ones:?ϕ: Check whether ϕ currently holds γ 1 ; γ 2 : First play γ 1 then γ 2 γ 1 γ 2 : Angel choose between γ 1 and γ 2 γ : Angel can choose how often to play γ (possibly not at all); each time she has played γ, she can decide whether to play it again or not. γ d : Switch roles, then play γ γ 1 γ 2 := (γ d 1 γd 2 )d : Demon chooses between γ 1 and γ 2 γ x := ((γ d ) ) d : Demon can choose how often to play γ (possibly not at all); each time he has played γ, he can decide whether to play it again or not. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 30/36

104 From PDL to Game Logic Reinterpret operations and invent new ones:?ϕ: Check whether ϕ currently holds γ 1 ; γ 2 : First play γ 1 then γ 2 γ 1 γ 2 : Angel choose between γ 1 and γ 2 γ : Angel can choose how often to play γ (possibly not at all); each time she has played γ, she can decide whether to play it again or not. γ d : Switch roles, then play γ γ 1 γ 2 := (γ d 1 γd 2 )d : Demon chooses between γ 1 and γ 2 γ x := ((γ d ) ) d : Demon can choose how often to play γ (possibly not at all); each time he has played γ, he can decide whether to play it again or not. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 30/36

105 From PDL to Game Logic Reinterpret operations and invent new ones:?ϕ: Check whether ϕ currently holds γ 1 ; γ 2 : First play γ 1 then γ 2 γ 1 γ 2 : Angel choose between γ 1 and γ 2 γ : Angel can choose how often to play γ (possibly not at all); each time she has played γ, she can decide whether to play it again or not. γ d : Switch roles, then play γ γ 1 γ 2 := (γ d 1 γd 2 )d : Demon chooses between γ 1 and γ 2 γ x := ((γ d ) ) d : Demon can choose how often to play γ (possibly not at all); each time he has played γ, he can decide whether to play it again or not. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 30/36

106 From PDL to Game Logic Reinterpret operations and invent new ones:?ϕ: Check whether ϕ currently holds γ 1 ; γ 2 : First play γ 1 then γ 2 γ 1 γ 2 : Angel choose between γ 1 and γ 2 γ : Angel can choose how often to play γ (possibly not at all); each time she has played γ, she can decide whether to play it again or not. γ d : Switch roles, then play γ γ 1 γ 2 := (γ d 1 γd 2 )d : Demon chooses between γ 1 and γ 2 γ x := ((γ d ) ) d : Demon can choose how often to play γ (possibly not at all); each time he has played γ, he can decide whether to play it again or not. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 30/36

107 Game Logic Syntax Let Γ 0 be a set of atomic games and At a set of atomic propositions. Then formulas of Game Logic are defined inductively as follows: where p At, g Γ 0. γ := g ϕ? γ; γ γ γ γ γ d ϕ := p ϕ ϕ ϕ γ ϕ [γ]ϕ Logic and Artificial Intelligence 31/36

108 Game Logic A neighborhood game model is a tuple M = W, {E g g Γ 0 }, V where W is a nonempty set of states For each g Γ 0, E g : W ( (W )) is a monotonic neighborhood function. X E g (w) means in state s, Angel has a strategy to force the game to end in some state in X (we may write we g X ) V : At (W ) is a valuation function. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 32/36

109 Game Logic Propositional letters and boolean connectives are as usual. M, w = γ ϕ iff (ϕ) M E γ (w) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 33/36

110 Game Logic Propositional letters and boolean connectives are as usual. M, w = γ ϕ iff (ϕ) M E γ (w) Suppose E γ (Y ) := {s Y E g (s)} E γ1 ;γ 2 (Y ) := E γ1 (E γ2 (Y )) E γ1 γ 2 (Y ) := E γ1 (Y ) E γ2 (Y ) E ϕ? (Y ) := (ϕ) M Y E γ d (Y ) := E γ (Y ) E γ (Y ) := µx.y E γ (X ) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 33/36

111 Game Logic: Axioms 1. All propositional tautologies 2. α; β ϕ α β ϕ Composition 3. α β ϕ α ϕ β ϕ Union 4. ψ? ϕ (ψ ϕ) Test 5. α d ϕ α ϕ Dual 6. (ϕ α α ϕ) α ϕ Mix and the rules, ϕ ϕ ψ ψ ϕ ψ α ϕ α ψ (ϕ α ψ) ψ α ϕ ψ Logic and Artificial Intelligence 34/36

112 Game Logic Game Logic is more expressive than PDL Logic and Artificial Intelligence 35/36

113 Game Logic Game Logic is more expressive than PDL (g d ) Logic and Artificial Intelligence 35/36

114 Game Logic Game Logic is more expressive than PDL (g d ) All GL games are determined. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 35/36

115 Game Logic Theorem Dual-free game logic is sound and complete with respect to the class of all game models. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 36/36

116 Game Logic Theorem Dual-free game logic is sound and complete with respect to the class of all game models. Theorem Iteration-free game logic is sound and complete with respect to the class of all game models. Logic and Artificial Intelligence 36/36

117 Game Logic Theorem Dual-free game logic is sound and complete with respect to the class of all game models. Theorem Iteration-free game logic is sound and complete with respect to the class of all game models. Open Question Is (full) game logic complete with respect to the class of all game models? R. Parikh. The Logic of Games and its Applications.. Annals of Discrete Mathematics. (1985). M. Pauly. Logic for Social Software. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Amsterdam (2001). Logic and Artificial Intelligence 36/36