Fund%Council% WORKING(DOCUMENT(! CGIAR!System!Resource!Mobilization!! Issues!Paper!! % % % % % Submitted!by:!! Fund!Office(!

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1 !!!!!!! % % % %! Fund%Council% 13 th %Meeting%(FC13) Bogor,%Indonesia% April%28?29,%2015% % % WORKING(DOCUMENT(! CGIAR!System!Resource!Mobilization!! Issues!Paper!! % % % % % Submitted!by:!! Fund!Office(!!!

2 CGIAR&System&Resource&Mobilization&Issues&Paper I. Executive&Summary& & 1. TheFundCouncil(FC)requested,atFC11,thedevelopmentofacomprehensiveCGIARResource MobilizationStrategy(RMS)tobepreparedinparalleltotheStrategyandResultsFramework(SRF)for presentationtofc12.linkingthesrfandtherms,inastrategyof commonresearchandcommon funding would ensure that there were a set of clearly shared research priorities, a transparent accountabilityframeworkandthenecessaryresourcestoenabletheimplementationoftheproposed researchagenda. 2. DuetoalongerdevelopmenttimelinethanoriginallyforeseenforfinalizationoftheSRF,theFC postponedapprovaloftherms,anrmmfocusedintersessionalactivityprogramhasbeenimplemented. The intersessional work program mainly focused on: (i) furthering work on Innovative Finance (IF) mechanismsanddevelopingconcreteproposalsfortheirimplementationbythecgiar;and(ii)working toremenergizetheexistingrmcommunityofpractice(rmmcop)acrossthecgiar. 3. Decliningfunding,withayearonyeardeclineofapproximately$40millioninWindow1and2 fundingforecastfor2015,thecontinuedrelianceonannualcommitments(whichrepresentsome60% oftotalcgiarfunding)aswellasasporadicscheduleofpaymentofcommitmentstothefundhave resultedina19%acrosstheboardcutincrpw1/w2budgets 4. Resource( Mobilization( Plan( of( Action( (RMPA). To address this increasingly critical situation, there is a need to break with the business as usual RM approach that is not bringing the results required to fund a solid long term research portfolio over time. The FC Resource Group (FCRG) thereforerecommendsthatthefcapprovean18monthrmpa,withthefinalobjectiveofmobilizing resources sufficient to enable the successful implementation of the 2 nd round of CRP proposals. This wouldbe,inessence,apledgingorreplenishmentprocess,withtheobjectiveofsecuringcommitments fortherequiredlevelofresourcesupmfront thatis,beforetheformalapprovalofthecrpportfolio. GiventhelimitedtimehorizonandimportanceoftheprocessinfundingthenextgenerationofCRPs, the implementation of the RMPA should proceed irrespective of the status of the SRF development process. 5. Proposed(financial(envelope(and(resource(mobilization(targets.TheFOestimatesthattheoverall financialenveloperequiredtofundthe2 nd roundofcrpswillbeintherangeof$5billion,overfive years.thetargetsproposedforthecoming18monthsareasfollows: a. Atleast40%oftheoverallfinancialenvelopeof$5billion(approximately$2billion)would becommittedbeforefc16(assumingthatcrppremproposalsaresubmitted,asplanned,in August2015); b. 80%ofthis$2billion(approximately$1.6billion)willbecommittedbyexistingFCdonors andtheremaining20%(approximately$400million)willbemobilizedthroughnewdonors, partnershipswiththeprivatesector,implementationofifmechanisms,etc.;and c. 60%oftheoverallfinancialenvelope(approximately$3billion)isexpectedtobecommitted throughbilateralprojectsatcenterlevelinsupportoftheobjectivesofthecrps. 1

3 II. Background&& 6. The(reform.(ThecurrentCGIARsystemisaresultofthereformprocessinitiatedin2008and culminatedin2010withtheestablishment of a new institutional framework and a multimdonor trust fund(thecgiarfund).oneofthemainreasonstopushaheadwiththereformwas,asoutlinedinthe recentoptionsteamreport,thefragmentedanddecliningnatureofcgiarfinancing.fundinghadnot kept pace with the new and emerging research needs (be they climate change, land degradation or otherpriorityareas)anditwasalsoclearthattheabsenceofacoordinatedandharmonizedfundraising approachwasdamagingsystemsustainability TheCGIARFundaimstoprovidereliableandpredictablemultiMyearfundingtoenableresearch planningoverthemediumtolongertermandresourceallocationbasedonasetofagreedpriorities(as setoutbythefundcouncilincollaborationwithothersystementities).thereformhadavarietyof importantobjectives,butoneofthemostimportantwasfocusedonensuringincreasedfundingstreams that would be both predictable and sustainable over time. Initially the increase in funding was significant,growingrapidlyacrossallthreefundingwindowsaswellasinbilateralprograms,withareal increaseinwindows1and2resources(whichonemightarguewerecentralelementsinthereform) thatmadeitpossibletofundcgiarresearchprograms(crps)toasatisfactorylevel. 8. The(Resource(Mobilization(Strategy.(Whiletheinitialresultswereveryimpressiveintermsofthe funding mobilized, the FC noted that the CGIAR operates in an increasingly competitive and resultsm orientedenvironmentforresourcemobilization.inlightofthischallenge,thefcrequestedthecgiar FO to facilitate the development of a comprehensive CGIAR RMS, which would analyze the existing financial landscape and set out a global RM approach for the entire system, enhancing coordination, efficiencyandtheeffectivenessofthecgiar srmefforts. 9. The RMS, which was commissioned by the FC following a preliminary RM Study discussed at FC11inMexicoCity,wastobedevelopedinparalleltoanewSRFthatwouldbemoreambitious,results drivenandaccountablethanthecurrentsrf.linkingthesrfandtherms,inastrategyof common researchandcommonfunding wouldensurethattherewereasetofclearlysharedresearchpriorities, atransparentaccountabilityframeworkandthenecessaryresourcestoenabletheimplementationof theproposedresearchagenda.thetwodocumentsweretobetabledfordiscussionandapprovalat FC12inBrussels. 10. WhenpresentedinBrusselsinNovember2014,theRMSmadeaseriesofpractical,prioritized recommendationsforimplementation 2,thatwereallgearedtoaddressingthemostpressingchallenges andexcitingopportunitiesfacedbythecgiar,including: a. PursuingincreasedinvestmentfromtraditionalandnewsourcestofundtechnologyMbased, researchmleddevelopmentpartnerships; 1 OptionsTeamReport,Draft2,12March2015,page10. 2 ThefulllistoftheRMSReport srecommendationscanbefoundonpages6m8at: 2

4 b. Maintaining current funding by conducting specialized prospect research and composing tailored proposals to maximize new and existing funding avenues within governments, corporationsandprivatefoundations; c. Developing a specialized communications strategy, including a systemmwide case for support,mediarelations,digitalsupportandbrandinginitiatives; d. Effectivelyutilizingvolunteerleaderstomobilizesignificantresourcesandraiseawareness onregionalandgloballevels;and e. Rolling out a series of capacity building activities across the CGIAR system, as well as collaboratingindatasharing,analyticsandtechnicalproposalwriting. 11. GiventheongoingconsultationprocessrequiredtofinalizetheSRF,thedecisionwasmadeto notproceedwiththeformaldiscussionandapprovalofthermsatfc12,giventheneedtoensureits alignment with the SRF. Noting the importance of initiating some RMMfocused activities despite the delayinconsideringtherms,thefcrequestedthefotoproposeand,followingreviewandapproval, implementaseriesofintersessionalrmactivitiesthatwouldbridgermcapacitybuildingandenhanced resultsuntilanewsrfwasapprovedanddecisionsmadeontherms. 12. Intersessional( RM( work. As commissioned by the FC, the FO, in collaboration with the CO, proposedanintersessionalworkprogramthatfocusedon:(i)furtheringworkoninnovativefinance(if) mechanismsanddevelopingconcreteproposalsfortheirimplementationbythecgiar;and(ii)working toremenergizetheexistingrmmcopacrossthecgiar WithregardstotheIFwork,LHGP,whohadworkedonIFMrelatedissuesintheoriginalRMS,was recruited to identify specific IF mechanisms most appropriate for the CGIAR and outline the detailed stepsnecessaryfortheirimplementation.thisworkhasbeencompletedandisbeingpresentedina separate paper tabled for the FC s review and approval. The importance of the IF work is to identify potentialuntappedpartnershipsandtherebyprovidethecgiaraccesstotechnicalpartnersaswellas fundingstreamsthatarecurrentlyunavailablegiventhecgiar sgrantmbasedfundingmodel. 14. Inparalleltothis,LHGPwasalsotaskedwithacapacitybuildingandawarenessMraisingprogram thatisfocusedonthedevelopmentofawebinarforfcandothercgiarstakeholderparticipation.this will provide a forum to share, in an informal setting, more information on the advantages and disadvantagesofdifferentifmechanismsandtheirpotentialutilityinthecgiar.thiswebinar,originally plannedforfcandfunddonormembers,hasnowbeenopeneduptoallowforparticipationbyother CGIARstakeholdersincluding,mostimportantly,RMcolleaguesatCenterlevel. 15. In parallel to the IF work, the FO is facilitating the revitalization of the RMMCoP, with participationfrommostcentersaswellastheconsortiumofficeandkeycenterrepresentatives.the RMMCoP s work was begun with a participatory exercise and onmline survey to identifying the highest priorityissuesforthermcommunityacrossthesystemandaplannedinmpersongatheringthatwilltake placeinearlyjune.thiseventwillincludecapacitymbuildingsessions(chosenfromthoseprioritizedin thesurvey)andexploreopportunitiesforconcretecollectiveactioninitiativesthatwouldproducerm pilotstobelaunchedinthesecondhalfofthecalendaryear. 3 AmoredetailedreportonIntersessionalRMActivitiesisalsobeingtabledforFCreview. 3

5 16. RM(Challenges.InparalleltotheSRFandRMSdevelopmentwork,theFCalsoconsideredthe MidMTermReview(MTR)initslastsessioninBrussels.Givendiscussiononthesubjectofinstitutional and governance reform, the FC commissioned an Options Team to explore different options for consideration at FC13. The Options Team s analysis has, by definition, involved a review of funding issues given their linkage to governance and the CGIAR s institutional framework. It is useful to note someofthepointsraisedintheoptionsteamreportastheconsiderationsarehighlyrelevanttothe futureofthermfunctionwithinthesystem. 17. TheOptionsTeamnotesthat,whilefundinghasdoubledsincethereformprocessstarted,there arecriticalissuesthatremainwithregardstothemannerinwhichfundsareraised,rminstitutional responsibilities are assigned and fund management and commitment processes. In short, funding remainschallengedby: a. Aheavyrelianceonannualcontributionsratherthanmultiyearcommitments; b. Unpredictableandoccasionallysporadicpaymenttimesduringtheyear; c. Independent and disconnected decisionmmaking by the donor community on bilateral fundingexternaltothecgiarfundmechanism; d. ThecontinuationofwhatisessentiallyabilateralfundingmechanismthroughWindow3; and e. Consequently,directdonornegotiationwithindividualCentersonfunding. 18. Funding( decline( and( impact( on( research. The end result of these issues is an increasingly dysfunctionalsystemwherethefcapprovesaportfolioofcgiarresearchprograms(crps)thatexceed existingandprojectedfundinglevels,withthepossibilityofunderfundedcrpsandhastycutshavingto be implemented. As we speak the CRPs are facing a 19% cut across the board on WI+W2 available funding (based on latest 2015 projections for W1+W2), given the declining funding availability in the system this year. This is a significant percentage and may have a real impact on the research being carried out in the context of the current CRPs, with Centers considering shedding experienced staff whilehavingtoprepareforthe2 nd CRPcall. 19. Funding(decline.Asnotedearlierinthispaper,theCGIARreformprocessresultedinanincrease inresourcesmobilizedforinternationalagriculturalresearch,peakingatover$1.1billionin2013.there hassincebeenadeclinethatraisesconcernsaboutfuturefundingforthecgiar.asillustratedintable 1below,fundinglevelsforWindows1,2and3peakedin2013andaredeclining.Thisiscompoundedby thecontinuedlackofincentivestohavefunddonorsincreasetheircontributionstothecgiarfundas wellasencouragingbilateraldonorstobecomefundmembers.whileremaininganimportantsourceof fundingforthesystem,thereisasimilardeclineinbilateralfundingwhichmayhaveafurthernegative effectonthecgiar sresearchportfolio. & & & & 4

6 & Table&1.&Growth&and&Distribution&of&CGIAR&Funding&($million)&by&Year,&pre&and&post&CGIAR&Fund Prior&to&CGIAR&Fund& Year& & Unrestricted& Restricted& Total& 2008& & & 2009& & & 2010& & & CGIAR&Fund& & W1& W2& subxtotal& W3& Bilateral& subxtotal& Total& 2011& & & 917& 2012& & & 1039& 2013& & & 1176& 2014&estimated& & & 1044& 2015&projected! & & 959& Notes:(W1,(W2(and(W3(are(based(on(receipts(while(Bilateral(is(based(on(spending( 2014( (Bilateral(spend(is(estimated(as(figures(are(not(yet(available.( 2015( (Projections(include(received,(confirmed(and(unconfirmed(amounts( 20. Annual( vs.( multiannual. Furthermore, the initial surge in funding levels never completely addressedthechallengeofimprovingthepredictabilityoffundingovertime.whilethefundofficeand other CGIAR entities have endeavored to work with Fund donors on this issue, the increase in Fund donorsprovidingfundingviamultiannualcommitmentsforwindow1and2fundshasnotkeptpace withthesystem sfinancialrequirements.asillustratedintable2below,therearecurrently10active multiyearcontributionagreements,andthosecommitmentsaccountforroughly39%ofwindow1and 2funding.Giventhenumberofmultiannualcommitmentsendingin2015anduncertaintyovertheir renewal,thisissueisbecomingfarmoreproblematicthaninthepast.thismakesthefinancialsituation evenmorechallenging,inthatdecreasingfundinglevels,coupledwithuncertainfuturecommitments, makeitverydifficulttoplanmultiyearresearchprogramswithanydegreeofcertainty. Table&2.&Numbers&of&Multiannual&Contribution&Agreements&and&Value&($&millions)&for&W1&W2& & 2011& 2012& 2013& 2014& 2015& 2016& 2017& No.ofactivemultiyear agreements W1&W2inmultiyearagreements ($m/yr) W1/W2fundingreceived($m/yr)& * ShareofW1/W2receiptsin multiyearagreements 3% 16% 34% 37% 39%* Note:(*projected( 5

7 21. Accuracy( in( forecasting. Given the reliance on annual commitments that are subject to a significant level of variability, the FO has endeavored to forecast Window 1 and 2 receipts. Table 3 belowillustratesthevariabilityandlevelofvarianceinforecastingvismàmvisactualyearmendreceiptsfor CGIAR Fund income. The level of variance should provide FC members with reassurance that the FO carries out a conservative analysis that has produced increasingly accurate forecasts of expected receipts. Table&3.&Past&accuracy&of&predicting&W1&W2&receipts& & Total&W1&W2&Contribution&per&year&& Projectionatstartof Actualatendof Variance($m) Variance(%) year($m) year($m) % % % Distribution(of(receipts(during(the(calendar(year.Afinalissueworthflaggingistheevolvingtrend inreceiptofcommitmentsduringtheyear.ascanbeseenintable4below,therehasbeenanegative trend,whichbeganin2013,withthemajorityoffundsreceivedinthethirdandfourthquarters.this hashadrepercussionsonthecentersandcrps,withmountingcashflowissuesasworkprogramsare notalignedwithcashreceipts.thishascausedimplementationdelaysorforcedcenterstoresortto premfinancingresearchactivitieswithcashonhandtothenbereplenishedatalaterdate. 23. Table&4.&Distribution&of&W1&W2&receipts&during&the&year& Year Q1 JanuaryMMarch Q2 AprilMJune Q3 JulyMSeptember Q4 OctoberNovember % 4% 7% 80% % 22% 41% 34% % 9% 36% 39% & 6

8 III. Resource&Mobilization&Plan&of&Action&& 24. Consideringthebackgrounddescribedinabove,itisimportantfortheFCtotakeactionthat wouldenablethecgiarsystemtoputitselfonasolidfinancialfooting.whiletherearegovernanceand other elements that are not within the remit of this paper, there is a clear need for a break with businessasusual ifthesituationistobeaddressed.whatfollowsisaproposalthatthecgiaremploy anewrmmodalitytoimprovethepredictabilityandsustainabilityoffunding,aswellasincreasethe overallvolumeoffundingmadeavailableforthecgiar sinternationalagriculturalresearchportfolio. 25. TheFCshouldconsiderendorsingthisproposalatitsforthcoming13 th Session,whethertheSRF development process is finalized or not. While the SRF, with relevant links to the Sustainable DevelopmentGoals,remainstheuniquevaluepropositionoftheCGIAR,thefundingmodelproposed requiressignificantpreparatorywork,whichshouldbegininearnestinordertoensuresufficientpooled fundingisinplacetofundthe2 nd callforproposals,ensuring commonfundingforcommonresearch strategy. 26. Pledging.TheRGrecommendsthattheFCshouldapprovean18monthResourceMobilization PlanofAction(RMPA)withthefinalobjectiveofmobilizingresourcesadequatetoenablethesuccessful executionofthe2 nd round of CRP proposals. This would be, in essence, a pledging process, with the objective of securing commitments for the required level of resources upmfront that is, before the approvalofthecrpportfolio.thiswouldaddresssomeofthemainchallengesinthecurrentfunding frameworkandallowforanyrequiredadjustmentstotheproposedresearchportfoliobeforeapproval, andnotmidstream,asisoccurringatpresent. 27. Thisproposal,despitepastmisgivingsbytheCGIARdonorcommunity,isrootedinananalysisof resultsandhasbenefitedfromtheexperienceofothercgiarentities.ifonesurveysothermultimdonor trustfundsthatarebroadlysimilarinsizeandscopetothecgiarfund,itisnoticeablethatthemajority arefundedonthebasisofapledgingsystem.sixofthemainglobalfundsforhealth,educationand climatechangethatfunctiononasimilarbasistothecgiarfund,leveragingmultinationalsovereign andprivateresources,all,withtwoexceptions(ctfandgafsp),utilizeapledgingmechanism.these are: (i) Clean Technology Fund (CTF); (ii)global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP); (iii)globalallianceforvaccinationsandimmunizations(gavi);(iv)globalenvironmentalfacility(gef); (v)globalfundtofightaids,tuberculosisandmalaria(theglobalfund);and(vi)globalpartnershipon Education(GPE). 4 ItisinterestingtonotethatTheGlobalFund,GAVIandGPEinitiallyoperatedusing moreofanad(hocorannualfundingapproach(notdissimilarfromthecgiar s)andhavesinceswitched to RM mechanisms that require and/or incentivize donors to make longer term, multiannual commitments.gafspisactivelyconsideringshiftingtoamultimannualpledgingprocess,whileonlythe CTFhasavoluntarycommitmentprocess. 4 TheOptionsTeamPaperincludesanexcellentannexprovidinginMdepthdescriptionsofthesemultiMdonortrust funds.forinformationandeaseofreference,thisannexhasbeenaddedtothispaper. 7

9 28. Proposed(financial(envelope(and(resource(mobilization(targets.TheFOestimatesthattheoverall financialenveloperequiredtofundthe2 nd roundofcrpswillbeintherangeof$5billion,overfive years. 5 Thetargetsproposedforthecoming18monthsareasfollows: a. 40% of the overall financial envelope of $5 billion (approximately $2 billion) would be committed before FC16 (assuming that CRP premproposals are submitted, as planned, in August2015); b. 80%ofthis$2billion(approximately$1.6billion)willbecommittedbyexistingFCdonors andtheremaining20%(approximately$400million)willbemobilizedthroughnewdonors, partnershipswiththeprivatesector,implementationofifmechanisms,etc.;and c. 60%oftheoverallfinancialenvelope(approximately$3billion)isexpectedtobecommitted throughbilateralprojectsatcenterlevelinsupportoftheobjectivesofthecrps. 29. RMPA(implementation.CarryingouttheproposedRMPAwouldrequireasignificantshiftinthe mannerinwhichrmiscarriedoutbythecgiar,andneedstohavestrongfcsupportattheonset.this processwouldentail: a. AnRMPAthatiscloselyalignedtotheapprovedSRF; b. Ahighlyconsultative(pledging)process 6 thatwouldleadtofirmmultiannualcommitments fromatleast50%ofexistingfcmembersoverthecoming18months; c. Strong 2nd CRP Phase prem and full proposals that are detailed, present realistic, costed, modular and upscaleable research packages/flagships with well documented results frameworks(demonstratingaclearvaluemformmoneyproposition); d. Engagementplanstobedevelopedandimplementedwithexistinghighprioritydonorsas wellashighpotentialprospectivedonorstosecuremultiannualcommitmentscontributing tothe$2billiongoalbeforefc16; e. Coordinated implementation of an array of innovative resource mobilization initiatives, including multimcenter resource mobilization in support of CRPs, adoption of relevant IF approaches(tobefinancedbythedonorcommunity),publicprivatepartnershipsandother mechanismsasappropriate;and f. Afallbackmechanism,agreeduponwiththeConsortiumOfficeandotherconcernedsystem entities, that would automatically trigger a revision of proposed CRP financial envelopes should the financial targets outlined in paragraph 22 above not be reached, to ensure alignmentbetweentheavailablefinancialenvelopeandresearchprogram. 30. TheFO,alongwiththeCOandotherconcernedinstitutionalpartnerswillendeavortoinitiate thermpawithnoadditionalrequestforfinancialorhumanresourcesatthistime,althoughthismay change over the course of RMPA implementation. Should this be the case, the FO, following 5 Itshouldbenotedthat,astheSRFdoesnotincludeanyfinancialestimates,thisisbasedonanannualportfolioof $1billion,maintainingoverallfinancialrequirementsatcurrentlevels.Thesefiguresare,therefore,potentially subjecttochangeoncethereisgreaterclarityonthe2 nd roundofcrpsandtheirassociatedresearchcosts. 6 Theconsultativeprocesswillbecarefullycustomizedtotheneedsofcurrentandprospectivedonors,itwould includeelementsof:(i)raisingawarenesswithkeydecisionmmakers;(ii)discussingelementsofinterestfordonor financinginthecontextofthenewcrpcycle;(iv)organizinghighprofileeventstoshowcasepledging commitments,ifsorequestedbythedonor;and(v)aligningresearchanddonorinterests. 8

10 consultationsacrossthesystem,willprepareacostmeffectiveproposalforreviewandapprovalbythefc atalaterdate. 9

11 Annex:&Summary&Tables&describing&Global&Partnerships& Partnership& Global&Partnership&for&Education&(GPE)& Description& TheGPEisexclusivelyfocusedonsupportinglowMincomecountriesto educatechildrenfrompremprimarythroughsecondaryschool,providing financialandpolicysupporttocountriestodevelopandimplementtheir owneducationsectorplans. Established& 2002 DecisionXMaking& TheGPEBoard Body& Member&Count& 19 Board&Composition& DecisionXMaking& Chair&Selection& Chair&Term&+& Responsibilities& Head&of&Secretariat& Multilateral&Aid& Review& Simplemajority(thoughmustatleastonerepresentativefromthe followingconstituencies:recipientcountry;donorcountry;multilateral organization;civilsocietyorganization) Opencompetitiveprocess 3years(oneMtermextensionpossible) TheBoardChairconvenes meetingsoftheboardandothergpemeetings,supportsresourcem mobilizationeffortsandrepresentsthepartnershipandtheboardin politicalandpublicarenas. TheGPECEOdoesnothaveaplaceontheBoard,buthasanimportant roleinresourcemobilization,projectselectionandstrategy,and managesthesecretariat(~60staff). GPEwasreviewedinboththeMARandtheAMA.Itwasamongthe secondtieroforganizationsthat,in2011,themarassessedasbeing goodvalueformoney.sincethen,themarhascreditedthegpewith makingsolidprogressinmanykeyareas,especiallyfinancial&resources& Management.&UndertheAMA,theorganizationwasdeemedeither strongorvery&stronginall7ofthecomponentspartsoftheassessment. ParticularstrengthswereinCost&and&Value&Consciousness&and Contribution&to&Multilateral&System.Bothreportspraisedthereforms GPEhadalreadypassedandregisteredencouragementforthoseto 10

12 Multiyear& Fundraising?& NonXPublic& Fundraising& come.themaralsonotedthegpe sfocus&on&poor&countries. Yes,TheGPEoperatedformanyyearswithoutpredictablelongMterm financingcommitmentsfromdonors.adecisionwasmadeinmay2011 tolaunchaformalreplenishmentcampaigntomobilizeresourcesboth forthegpeandforbasiceducationgenerally,fortheperiod2011m2014. Todate,privatefundshavemadeup1.5%oftotalpledges.The Children sinvestmentfundfoundationanddubaicaresaregpe sonly twoprivatedonors. GPE LEGAL ARRANGMENTS The Global Partnership for Education (GPE) was established in 2011, as the successor of the Education for All-Fast Track Initiative partnership program, which started in The GPE is governed by the Charter of the GPE and the GPE Fund Governance Document. They establish the structure of the GPE, which consists of the GPE Board of Directors, the GPE Secretariat, the Trustee and Supervising and Managing Entities. The GPE Board of Directors is responsible for GPE strategic direction and policymaking, oversight of GPE operations, monitoring implementation to ensure GPE delivers its strategic goals, and is a global champion for education in developing countries. The Board approves the allocation of GPE funding and approving the Supervising or Managing Entity for each proposal. The Board s responsibilities in the GPE Fund Governance Document include directing the Trustee to withhold transfers of funding to a Supervising or Managing Entity or to require such entity to return funds to the Trustee if the entity has used funds in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the financial procedures agreement between the Trustee and the entity or the applicable decisions of the Board. The GPE Secretariat supports the work of the Board. It is housed at the World Bank and comprises a team of professional and administrative staff employed by the World Bank. The GPE Trust Fund is administered by the World Bank, as Trustee. The Trustee commits and transfers funds to the Supervising and Managing Entities in accordance with the approvals of funding by the GPE Board of Directors and the terms of the financial procedures agreements between the Trustee and those entities. The Trustee has no responsibility for the use of the funds transferred to the Supervising and Managing Entities or the activities carried out therewith. Supervising and Managing Entities include multilateral agencies (including the World Bank) and donor country partners approved by the GPE Board of Directors. Supervising Entities provide GPE funding to developing countries and other recipients and are responsible for supervising the use of the funds and the activities carried out therewith in accordance with their own policies and procedures and the applicable decisions of the GPE Board of Directors, including the purpose for which the funding was approved. Managing Entities carry out themselves the activities for which the funding was approved by the Board, in accordance with their own policies and procedures and the applicable Board decisions. GPE contributors enter into contribution agreements with the Trustee. GPE does not have legal personality or capacity to contract. It relies on the Supervising and Managing Entities for operational and fiduciary responsibilities and accountability and on the Trustee for financial trusteeship and administrative support. Following approval of funding by the GPE Board of Directors, the Trustee commits and transfers funding from the GPE Trust Fund to the relevant Supervising or Managing Entity pursuant to the Financial Procedures Agreement between the Trustee and the Supervising or Managing Entity. The Financial Procedures Agreement sets forth the terms and conditions for the commitment and transfer of funds by the Trustee to the entity and for the administration of the funds received by the entity, including provisions on the use of funds and maintenance of records and reporting. The terms of the Financial Procedures Agreements are similar to those of the GEF FPAs described above. 11

13 There is no other agreement or memoranda of understanding concerning the entity s responsibilities to the GPE Board of Directors or contributors to the GPE Trust Fund. Partnership& The&GAVI&Alliance&(GAVI)& Description& GAVIisaglobalhealthpartnershipbetweenprivateandpublicsector entitiescommittedtosavingchildren slivesandprotectingpeople s healthbyincreasingaccesstoimmunizationinlowincomecountries. Established& 2000 DecisionXMaking& TheGAVIAllianceBoard Body& Member&Count& 27+1nonMvotingCEO Board&Composition& DecisionXMaking&& Chair&Selection& Chair&Term&+& Responsibilities& Head&of&Secretariat& Multilateral&Aid& Review& Multiyear& *TheGAVICEOisanonXvotingmemberoftheBoard 2/3majorityofvotingmembers TheChairandViceMChairareselectedfromamongvotingBoard Memberseverytwoyears. 2years TheChairpresidesatallmeetingsoftheBoardandthe ExecutiveCommittee,andperformssuchotherdutiesasmaybe assignedbytheboard. GAVI sceoheadsasecretariatof~200staff.thegaviceohasa permanent,nonmvotingseatonthealliance sboard. GAVIwasreviewedinboththeMARandtheAMA.Generally,itwasseen asoneoftheeliteperformerswhenitcametogettingvalueforaid money.ofthe43organizationsassessedunderthemar,gaviwas amongthe9multilateralorganizationsdeemedtoofferukaidvery& good&valueformoney.resultsweresimilarintheama,wheregavi receivedavery&strong&ratingineachofthesevencomponentpartsof assessment.particularsuccessescameinthedelivering&results,& Transparency&and&Accountability,&and&Cost&and&Value&Consciousness& sectionsofthereport. Yes,GAVIswitchedtoa4Myeardonorcommitmentperiodinaresponse 12

14 Fundraising?& NonXPublic& Fundraising& & GAVI LEGAL ARRANGMENTS todevelopingcountries preferencetomatchthecycleofdonor commitmentsmorecloselywiththoseoftheirnationaldonors GAVIreceives17.3%ofitsdonationsfromthenonMpublicsector.NonM publicfundingisledbythegatesfoundation,whosedirectcontributions accountfor$2,673millionor90.7%thefund soverallprivatedonations sinceitsinception TheGAVIAlliance(GAVI)isaglobalhealthpartnershiprepresentingstakeholdersinimmunizationfrom bothprivateandpublicsectors:developingworldanddonorgovernments,privatesector philanthropistssuchasthebill&melindagatesfoundation,thefinancialcommunity,developedand developingcountryvaccinemanufacturers,researchandtechnicalinstitutes,civilsocietyorganizations andmultilateralorganizationsincludingtheworldhealthorganization(who),theunitednations Children'sFund(UNICEF)andtheWorldBank.GAVI smissionistosavechildren slivesandprotect people shealthbyincreasingaccesstoimmunizationinpoorcountries.gavipoolsdonorresourcesto fundvaccineintroductionprograms,supportsthedevelopmentofnewandunderusedvaccines,and improvesvaccinedeliverybystrengtheninghealthsystems.in2009,gaviwasestablishedasalegal entityinswitzerland;aswissfoundationwhichhasreceivedrecognitionasaninternationalinstitution undertheswisshoststateact.basedonthisstatus,gavibenefitsfromprivilegesandimmunitiesin SwitzerlandsimilartothoseaccordedtotheGlobalFundandotherinternationalintergovernmental organizations. Describedasthe quintessentialinformalpublicmprivatepartnership, GAVIwasdesignedasacasual allianceofpartnerswithasharedmissionandasmallsecretariatbasedattheunitednationschildren s Fund s(unicef)officeingeneva.thispublicmprivatepartnershipissupposedtoadvanceimmunization accessinpoorcountriesbymaximizingeachpartner sstrengthsinvaccineresearch;vaccine procurementanddeliverysystems;healthfinancing;andthevaccinemarket.theprivatesector s expectedcontributionstogaviincluderesearchinganddevelopingvaccinesthataddresstheneedsof developingcountries,providingvaccinemarketknowledge,expandingthenumberofvaccinesuppliers, andsecuringvaccinesupplies. GAVIstartedwithadualgovernancestructurewithGAVIontheprogrammaticsideandtheVaccine Fund(latercalledtheGAVIFund)onthefinancialside.Overtime,GAVIhasbecomemoreformalwitha moreindependentsecretariatinresponsetotheincreasednumberofresponsibilities,programs,and thelargeinflowofresources.agovernanceandreformcommitteedesignedachangemmanagement planin2008thattookeffectinjanuary2009,whichmergedtheoldgaviboardandthegavifund BoardintowhatisnowcalledtheGAVIAllianceBoardinOctober2008.TheBoardestablishesGAVI s policies,overseestheoperationsofgaviandmonitorsprogramimplementation.theboardbrings togetherexpertsfromboththepublicandprivatesectors.representativeboardmembersfrom multilateraldevelopmentagencies,donors,developingcountrygovernments,civilsociety,the pharmaceuticalindustry,andresearchandtechnicalhealthcommunitieshelptoshapegavisstrategic visionandpolicies.independentboardmembers,includingthosewithexperienceintheprivatesector, bringaninnovativeperspectivetoboarddiscussionsanddecisions,andassisttheboardinfulfillingits role.thenewgovernancestructureisintendedtoreflectthestrengthsofpublicmprivatepartnershipby 13

15 bringingtogetherfinancialandprogrammaticdecisionmmaking,streamliningaccountabilities,and providingoperationalefficiencies.subsequently,thesecretariatservicesweremovedfromuniceftoa newgavicorporatesecretariat. TheGAVISecretariat,withofficesinGenevaandWashington,D.C.,isledbytheChiefExecutiveOfficer (CEO)andissupportedbysixdepartments.TheSecretariatisresponsiblefordayMtoMdayoperations, includingmobilizingresources,coordinatingprogramapprovalsanddisbursements,developingpolicy, implementingstrategicinitiatives,monitoringandevaluation,legalandfinancialmanagement,and administrationforthegaviallianceboardandcommittees. GAVIisfundedbyseveralmechanismsthroughdirectcontributionsfromdonorgovernments,theBill andmelindagatesfoundation,andprivatedonations,butalsothroughthreepilot,innovativefinancing mechanisms InternationalFinanceFacilityforImmunisation(IFFIm),thepilotAdvancedMarket Commitment(AMC)forpneumococcalvaccinesandtheGAVIMatchingFund.TheWorldBankhasbeen highlyengagedintheestablishmentandmanagementofiffimandtheamc. Launchedin2006,IFFImisaninnovativefinancingmechanism,whichGAVIandtheWorldBankhave pioneered.iffimisasupranationalinstitution,establishedasaukcharity.itfinancesvaccine procurementandimmunizationcampaignsforgavi.iffimraisesfundsfromtheinternationalcapital marketsbyissuingbonds.iffim sassetsarelongmterm,legallybindinggrantagreementsfromsovereign donors.thefinancialstrengthofiffimtorepaythebondsisbasedonlegallybindingdonorpayments overaperiodofupto20years. AspeciallegalentityregisteredinEnglandandWalesasacompanylimitedbyguarantee,theGAVIFund Affiliate(GFA)wasestablishedtoacceptfundsfrompledgeagreementswithsovereigndonorsand assignedthesepledgestotheiffimcompanytobesecuritized.gfawasestablishedtokeepiffim independentfromthedonorsandtosafeguardgavi staxmexemptstatus.infebruary2013,gfawas removedfromtheiffimstructureinordertoreducecostsandstreamlineoperations,andgfaactivities havebeentransferredtoiffimandgavi. TheWorldBank,asTreasuryManager,managestheproceedsfromtheissuanceofIFFIm sbondsas liquidinvestmentsuntiltheyarerequestedbygavi.fundsflowfromiffimtogaviandaredisbursed, asrequiredforgaviprograms.iffimrepaysbondholdersusingfundsprovidedbydonorsunderthe grantpaymentobligations. IFFImisoverseenbyitsBoardofDirectors,whosemembersarecompetitivelyselectedfortheir technicalandfinancialcompetence.ithasnoemployees.ithasoutsourceditprincipalactivitiestothe WorldBank,asitsTreasuryManager,andtoGAVI,whichisresponsiblefortheprogramsfundedby IFFImandprovidesadministrativesupporttoIFFIm sboard. TheAMCwaslaunchedinJune2009withaUS$1.5billioncommitmentfromdonorswiththeaim to stimulatethedevelopmentandmanufactureofvaccinesneededinlowmincomecountries byproviding financialincentivestovaccinemanufacturers.undergrantagreementswiththeworldbank,donors commitfundstotheamctosubsidizethepurchaseofpneumococcalvaccinesatanaffordablepricefor developingcountries,therebyprovidingvaccinemanufacturerswithalongmterm,guaranteedmarket 14

16 priceforthevaccines.donorcontributionsarestructuredintwoways.fixedmpaymentcontributions aremadeannuallyinaccordancewiththepredeterminedpaymentschedulessetoutinthegrant agreement.onmdemandpaymentsaremadeinresponsetorequestsfromtheworldbank,whichare basedonrequestsreceivedfromgavitomeetspecificfundingrequirements.theworldbankmanages theamcfunds,gavifundsthevaccinepurchase,andunicefprocuresthevaccinesfrom manufacturers. TheAMCisnotaseparateentity;itisaprogramestablishedthroughcontractualarrangements.Its structureinvolvesthedonors,theworldbank,gavi,unicef,theamcindependentassessment Committee,GAVIMeligiblecountriesandAMCRegisteredManufacturerswhoseproducthasbeenatleast acceptedforprequalificationreviewbywho.thedonors,gaviandtheworldbankarepartiestothe AMCStakeholdersAgreementandmeetannuallytoreviewprogress. TheWorldBankhelpeddesigntheAMC,providesfinancialmanagementservicestotheprogram,and takesamcdonorcreditriskontheworldbank sbalancesheetbycommittingtomeetscheduleddonor paymentswhicharedelayedorindefault.specifically,theworldbankrecordstheamcdonorfundson itsfinancialstatementsasdesignatedassets,withacorrespondingliabilitytopassthroughthe paymentstogaviforthepurchaseofpneumococcalvaccinessubjecttothetermsandconditionsofthe AMC.TheWorldBank sbalancesheetcommitmentisanundertakingtopayamcfundstogavievenif thesefundshavenotactuallybeenreceivedasscheduledfromdonors. GAVIprovidesfundingdirectlytoeligiblecountriesinresponsetotheirapplicationsforfunding.For vaccines,fundingisprovidedeitherdirectlytothecountrywhichusesittoprocurevaccinesorthe vaccinesareprovidedbygaviitself,procuredthroughuniceforthepanmamericanhealth Organization srevolvingfund. Partnership& The&Clean&Technology&Fund&(CTF)& Description& TheCleanTechnologyFund(CTF),oneoftwomultiMdonorTrustFunds withintheclimateinvestmentfunds(cifs),promotesscaledmup financingfordemonstration,deploymentandtransferoflowmcarbon technologieswithsignificantpotentialforlongmtermgreenhousegas emissionssavings. Established& 2008 DecisionXMaking& TheCTFTrustFundCommittee Body& Member&Count& 16+2nonMvoting(aswellasavarietyofobservers) Board&Composition& 15

17 DecisionXMaking&& Chair&Selection& Chair&Term&+& Responsibilities& Head&of&Secretariat& Multilateral&Aid& Review& Multiyear& Fundraising?& NonXPublic& Fundraising& *WhentheCTFTrustFundCommitteeconsidersaninvestmentplan, programorprojectforacountry,arepresentativeofthatcountrysitson thecommitteeasanonmvotingmember.also,theworldbankandthe MDBshaveapermanentnonMvotingseatontheCommittee. Consensus(anymembermayveto) TheCommitteeelectstwoCoMChairsfromamongitsMemberstoserve an18mmonthterm.oneco Chairwillbetherepresentativeofarecipient eligiblecountry,andtheother,arepresentativeofacontributorcountry. 18months,TheCoMChairsshallpresideatallmeetingsoftheTrustFund Committee. AProgramManagerheadstheAdministrativeUnitoftheCIFs.The AdministrativeUnitsupportstheworkoftheCIF,theTrustFund Committeeandothercommittees.Itcurrentlyhasapproximately30 staffmembers. TheCTFwasevaluatedinboththeMARandtheAMAaspartoftheCIFs. IntheMAR,ratedtheCIFsinthe2 nd tierofaidorganizationswhenit cametoofferingvalueformoney.thecifsqualifiedforthetoptierof theama ssimilarmetrictheamarankedthecifsasstrongorvery stronginall7ofthekeycomponentcategories.theyscoredveryhighly inthecontributiontomultilateralsystemsandstrategicmanagement andperformancesectorsofthereport.aparticularstrengthhighlighted inthemarwasthatthecifsmetacriticalgapintheglobalclimate changearchitecture.aweaknesswasthelengthyprocesstodesign resultsframework. TheCTFdoesnotraisefundsthroughamultiyearprocess. TheCTF sonlycontributorsaresovereignnations. CTF LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS The Clean Technology Fund (CTF) was established in 2008 to provide scaled-up financing to contribute 16

18 to demonstration, deployment and transfer of low-carbon technologies with a significant potential for long-term greenhouse gas emissions savings. The establishment of the CTF was proposed by the World Bank, in consultation with other multilateral development banks (the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Finance Corporation) (collectively with the World Bank, the MDBs), developed and developing countries and other development partners. Agreement on the design and establishment of the CTF was reached between the MDBs, developed and developing countries and other development partners in May Following that agreement, the establishment of the CTF was approved by the Executive Directors of the World Bank in July and the other MDBs subsequently approved their participation in the CTF. The Governance Framework for the CTF was adopted in 2008 by the CTF Trust Fund Committee. The organizational structure for the CTF is set forth in the Governance Framework. The organizational structure consists of the CTF Trust Fund Committee, the MDB Committee, the Administrative Unit and the Trustee. The Governance Framework also provides for a Partnership Forum, a broad-based meeting of stakeholders in the CTF to provide a forum for dialogue on strategic directions, results and impacts of the CTF. The CTF Trust Fund Committee approves programming and pipeline priorities, operational criteria and financing modalities and the allocation of CTF resources. The MDB Committee facilitates collaboration, coordination and information exchange amount the MDBs. The Administrative Unit supports the CTF Trust Fund Committee. It is housed in the World Bank and consists of a relatively small number of professional and administrative staff employed by the World Bank. The CTF Trust Fund is administered by the World Bank, as Trustee. The Trustee commits and transfers funds to the MDBs in accordance with the approvals of the allocation of funds by the CTF Trust Fund Committee. The Trustee has no responsibility for the use of the funds transferred to the MDBs or the activities carried out therewith. CTF financing for projects is provided through the MDBs. Countries wishing to access CTF financing prepare an investment plan for the use of CTF resources through a joint MDB program. The CTF Trust Fund Committee approves the allocation of CTF financing for the investment plan. Prior to appraisal of a proposed project under the investment plan, the relevant MDBs then submit the project to the CTF Trust Fund Committee for approval of the allocation of CTF financing for the project. The MDB then proceeds with the further processing and approval of the project in accordance with the MDB s policies and procedures. The MDB enters into a financing agreement for the project with the recipient and disburses the CTF funding to the recipient and supervises the project in accordance with the MDB s policies and procedures. The MDBs report directly to the CTF Trust Fund Committee on operational matters and are accountable to the CTF Trust Fund Committee for the administration of the CTF funds they receive. CTF contributors enter into contribution agreements with the Trustee. Contributions may be provided in the form of grants, capital contributions or loans. The CTF does not have legal personality or capacity to contract. Rather, it relies on the MDBs for operational and fiduciary responsibilities and accountability and on the Trustee for financial trusteeship and administrative support. Following approval of funding for a CTF project by the CTF Trust Fund Committee, the Trustee commits and transfers funding from the CTF Trust Fund to the relevant MDB, which is then accountable to the CTF Trust Fund Committee for the administration of the funds. While the Trustee receives certain financial reports from the MDBs, the Trustee has no role in supervising or monitoring the use of the CTF funds transferred to the MDB or project activities carried out therewith. The Trustee has entered into a Financial Procedures Agreement (FPA) with each of the MDBs. The FPA sets forth the terms and conditions for the commitment and transfer of funds by the Trustee to the MDB and for the administration of the funds received by the MDB, including provisions on the use of funds and maintenance of records and reporting. The terms of the FPAs are similar to those of the GEF FPAs 17

19 described below. There is no other agreement or memoranda of understanding concerning the MDBs responsibilities to the CTF Trust Fund Committee. Partnership& The&Global&Agriculture&and&Food&Security&Program&(GAFSP)& Description& TheGlobalAgricultureandFoodSecurityProgram(GAFSP)investsin agriculturetoreducepovertyandimprovefoodandnutritionsecurityin lowmincomecountries Established& 2010 DecisionXMaking& TheGAFSPSteeringCommittee Body& Member&Count& 16 Board&Composition& DecisionXMaking& Chair&Selection& Chair&Term&+& Responsibilities& Head&of&Secretariat& Multilateral&Aid& Review& Multiyear& Fundraising?& NonXPublic& Fundraising& GAFSP LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS Consensus(anyvotingmembermayveto) TheChairischosenfromamongexistingSteeringCommitteemembers bymajorityvote. 1year TheChairpresidesoverdeliberationsoftheSteeringCommittee andisassistedbyasecretaryappointedfromthecoordinationunit. TheCoordinationUnitcomprisesasmallteamofabout10staff.A ProgramManagerheadstheCoordinationUnit. GAFSPwasevaluatedinneithertheMARnortheAMA. GAFSPdoesnotuseamultiyearfundingprocessasofyet,butthisissue isbeingdiscussed.atthelastjointmeetingbetweenthesteering CommitteeandthePrivateSectorWindowCommittee,avisionpaper, whichistomakeacaseformultimyearfundraisinggoals,was commissioned. 5.9%MGASFP sprivatefundingtodatehasbeenexclusivelyfromthe GatesFoundation. The Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) was established in 2010 to scale-up support 18

20 to help poor countries alleviate poverty, improve rural livelihoods and improve food security by raising agricultural productivity, linking farmers to markets, reducing risk and vulnerability and improving nonfarm rural livelihoods. The Framework Document for GAFSP was approved by the Executive Directors of the World Bank in January The GAFSP Governance Document was then adopted by the Steering Committee in May The Framework Document and the Governance Document set out the governance framework for GAFSP, consisting of a Steering Committee, a Technical Advisory Committee, a Coordination Unit and a Trustee. The Steering Committee approves funding for proposals and selects the entity that is to be the supervising entity for the proposal. The Technical Advisory Committee provides screening of proposals as inputs for the Steering Committee decisions. The Coordination Unit is a small team within the World Bank that supports the Steering Committee and the Technical Advisory Committee and facilitates communication between the Steering Committee and other partners of the GAFSP. The GAFSP Trust Fund is administered by the World Bank, as Trustee. The Trustee commits and transfers funds to the supervising entities in accordance with the approvals of funding by the Steering Committee. The Trustee has no responsibility for the use of the funds transferred to the supervising entities or the activities carried out therewith. The Framework Document and the Governance Document provide that the supervising entities are to be accountable for the use of the funds transferred to them and that they are to be responsible for the use of such funds and the projects carried out with such funds in accordance with their own policies and procedures and the applicable decisions of the Steering Committee. GAFSP funding is provided through the MDBs, IFAD, the World Food Programme (WFP) and FAO (collectively, the Supervising Entities). Following approval of funding by the Steering Committee, the Trustee transfers funds to the MDBs and IFAD to finance investments and to the MDBs, IFAD, WFP and FAO for technical assistance. The Supervising Entities are directly accountable to the Steering Committee for the proper handling of funds. GAFSP funding is provided to countries or regional organizations with legal personality. In submitting proposals for funding, they may propose the Supervising Entity, but the selection is ultimately made by the Steering Committee. The selected Supervising Entity assists the country or regional organization to design programs and assists in their implementation, in accordance with their own policies and procedures. The Supervising Entity enters into a grant agreement with the recipient country or regional organization and submits annual implementation results reports to the Steering Committee through the Coordination Unit. GAFSP contributors enter into contribution agreements with the Trustee. GAFSP does not have legal personality or capacity to contract. It relies on the Supervising Entities for operational and fiduciary responsibilities and accountability and on the Trustee for financial trusteeship and administrative support. Following approval of funding by the Steering Committee, the Trustee commits and transfers funding from the GAFSP Trust Fund to the relevant Supervising Entity pursuant to the Transfer Agreement between the Trustee and the Supervising Entity. The Transfer Agreement sets forth the terms and conditions for the commitment and transfer of funds by the Trustee to the Supervising Entity and for the administration of the funds received by the Supervising Entity, including provisions on the use of funds and maintenance of records and reporting. The terms of the Transfer Agreements are similar to those of the GEF FPAs described below. There is no other agreement or memoranda of understanding concerning the Supervising Entity s responsibilities to the GAFSP Steering Committee. The Transfer Agreements, however, provide that each GAFSP contributor shall have the right, as a third party beneficiary, to seek recourse against the Supervising Entity for any breach of the Supervising Entity s obligations under the Transfer Agreement. 19

21 Partnership& Global&Environment&Facility& Description& GEFworksinpartnershipwithanumberofimplementingagencies, providingnewandadditionalgrantsandconcessionalfundingtomeet theagreedincrementalcostsofmeasurestoachieveagreedglobal environmentalbenefits. Established& 1992 DecisionXMaking& TheGEFCouncil Body& Member&Count& 32 Board&Composition& DecisionXMaking&& Chair&Selection& Chair&Term&+& Responsibilities& Head&of&Secretariat& Multilateral&Aid& Review& Partnership& DoubleMWeightedMajority 60%majorityofthetotalnumberof participants,anda60%majorityofthetotalcontributionsisrequired. TheGEFCEOisChairoftheCouncilandisassistedbyaCoMChairwhois electedbythecouncil,fromamongthecouncil.theroleofcomchair alternatesbetweendonorandrecipientcountriesateachmeeting. TheGEFCEOchairstheBoarddeliberationsregardingreviewand approvaloftheworkprogram,resourcemobilizationandproject selection.thecomchairpresidesoverdeliberationsontheappointment oftheceoandapprovaloftheadministrativebudget. TheCEOpresidesoveralargesecretariatof~100staff.TheGEFCEO chairsthecouncil. TheGEFwasevaluatedinboththeMARandtheAMA.IntheMAR,the GEFqualifiedforthesecondtieroforganizationsintermsofvaluefor money;itwasdeemedasofferinggoodvalueformoney,qualifyingitfor the2 nd tieroforganizationsinthereport.nonetheless,itwasalso assessedasfulfilling&a&critical&nicheintheglobalaidmarket.theama rankedthegefasstrongorvery&stronginall7ofthekeycomponent categories,meaningitwaspartofthetoptierofaidorganizationsinthat report.itscoredveryhighlyintransparency&and&accountability,&a sentimentechoedinthemar.&inthe2yearsbetweenthe2011mar andthe2013progressreport,thegefimproveditsscoredueto improvedpartnership&behavior&withrecipientcountries. TheGEFisfundedbydonorcountries,whichpledgemoneyeveryfour 20