The Effect of Internal Control Deficiencies on Firm Risk and Cost of Equity Capital

Transcription

1 The Effect of Internal Control Deficiencies on Firm Risk and Cost of Equity Capital Hollis Ashbaugh-Skaife University of Wisconsin-Madison Daniel W. Collins* University of Iowa William R. Kinney, Jr. University of Texas-at Austin Ryan LaFond MIT-Sloan School of Management April 2006 We thank Lynn Turner and workshop participants at Columbia University, Nanyang Technological University, and Singapore Management University for helpful comments and suggestions, and thank Glass Lewis & Co. for data assistance.

2 The Effect of Internal Control Deficiencies on Firm Risk and Cost of Equity Capital Abstract In an attempt to increase investor confidence in financial reporting, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) mandates management evaluation and independent audits of internal control effectiveness. The mandate is costly to firms but may benefit firms through lower information risk which translates into lower cost of equity capital. We use unaudited pre- SOX 404 disclosures and SOX 404 audit opinions to assess how changes in internal control quality affect risk and the cost of equity capital. After controlling for other risk factors, we find that firms with internal control deficiencies have significantly higher idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, and cost of equity capital. Furthermore, we document that the remediation of an internal control deficiency is followed by a significant reduction in the cost of equity capital. The magnitude of the cost of equity capital effects of the internal control deficiency are economically important ranging from 50 to 150 basis points depending on the analysis. Overall, the results of our cross-sectional and change analysis tests are consistent with strong internal controls being valued by the capital market.

3 The Effect of Internal Control Deficiencies on Firm Risk and Cost of Equity Capital I. Introduction In this study we investigate whether firms with internal control deficiencies (ICDs) exhibit higher systematic risk, higher idiosyncratic risk and higher cost of equity capital relative to firms with strong internal controls. Further, we investigate whether the existence of ICDs, as evidenced by managements assertions about the adequacy of internal controls under Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (U.S. Congress 2002), and the remediation of previously reported internal control problems as evidenced by the auditor s opinion on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting under Section 404 of SOX, are related to changes in firms cost of equity capital. Much of the prior research that investigates the impact of SOX has focused on the costs of SOX internal control auditing and reporting. This study is the first to document the relation between internal control quality and idiosyncratic and systematic risk as well as the potential benefits of strong internal controls in terms of cost of capital consequences. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond (2006) and Doyle, Ge, and McVay (2006b) posit that weak internal controls allow or introduce both intentional and unintentional misstatements into the financial reporting process that lead to lower quality accruals. Consistent with this conjecture, these studies find that firms that report weak internal controls exhibit greater noise in accruals and larger abnormal accruals relative to firms not reporting internal control deficiencies. We posit that poor internal controls that result in less reliable financial reporting increase the information risk faced by investors that manifests in higher cost of capital.

4 Recent theoretical work by Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2005) models the direct and indirect effects of information risk on cost of capital in a multi-security CAPM setting. With respect to the direct effects, they show that low quality information increases market participants assessed variances of a firm s cash flows and the assessed covariances with other firms cash flows leading to a higher cost of capital. Moreover, they show that the quality of accounting systems, which includes not only the financial disclosures that firms make to outsiders, but also internal controls, have an effect on firms real decisions including the assets appropriated by management that reduce the expected value of cash flows to investors, thus contributing to an indirect effect on firms cost of capital. Based on the theoretical work in Lambert et al. (2005), we use the disclosure of an ICD as a signal that the firm has higher information risk than firms with strong internal controls. 1 As expected, we find that firms that report ICDs exhibit significantly higher betas, idiosyncratic risk and cost of equity capital relative to firms not reporting internal control deficiencies. These differences persist after controlling for other factors that prior research has shown to be related to these risk measures. Our finding that the differences in these risk measures pre-date the first disclosures of ICDs suggests that market participants assessment of non-diversifiable market risk (beta), idiosyncratic risk and cost of equity capital incorporated expectations about internal control risks based on observable firm characteristics. This conjecture is consistent with Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney, (2006) and Doyle et al. (2006a) who demonstrate that firms with 1 Unlike measures of information quality that are based on estimates (e.g., abnormal accruals), the disclosure of an ICD is an attestation that the quality, in terms of reliability, of financial information is threatened. 2

5 more complex operations, recent changes in organization structure, greater accounting risk exposure and less investment in internal control systems are more likely to disclose ICDs. We use initial ICD disclosures provided by management and auditors opinions under SOX 404, along with the determinants of ICD disclosures (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney 2006; Doyle et al. 2006a), to structure change analysis tests designed to investigate whether initial ICD disclosures are related to predictable changes in firms cost of capital. 2 Our change analysis reveals that ICD firms experience a statistically significant increase in market-adjusted cost of capital, averaging about 93 basis points, around the first disclosure of an ICD. Moreover, we find that ICD firms with the lowest probability of reporting internal control problems exhibit a greater cost of capital change (125 basis points on average) relative to those ICD firms with the highest likelihood of reporting control problems based on observable firm characteristics (49 basis points on average). This result is consistent with the market incorporating incomplete adjustments for internal control risks into firms cost of capital assessments prior to the revelation of which firms have ICDs, and then updating these risk assessments after ICDs are revealed. To further investigate the effects of disclosures about internal control weaknesses and remediation on firms cost of capital, we conduct two additional change analyses. First, we examine cost of capital changes around unqualified SOX 404 audit opinions for those 2 Auditing Standards No. 2 (AS No. 2) requires two audit opinions on internal control effectiveness: (a) the auditor s opinion on management s assessment, and (b) the auditor s own opinion (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB] 2004). The dual opinions can cause confusion. For example, when management s report properly discloses a material weakness in internal control, the auditor s opinion on management s assessment is clean or unqualified, but the auditor s own opinion is that internal control is ineffective which requires an adverse opinion. To avoid confusion, we will use adverse to refer to the auditor s own opinion on the effectiveness of internal control. 3

6 firms that rectified previously disclosed ICDs under SOX 302. If revelation of internal control problems contributes to an increase in firms cost of capital as our first set of change results suggest, then successful remediation of those problems should lead to a decrease in cost of capital. Consistent with this prediction, we find that ICD firms that subsequently receive an unqualified SOX 404 opinion exhibit an average decrease in market-adjusted cost of capital of 151 basis points around the disclosure of the opinion. In contrast, we find that firms that previously disclosed an ICD and subsequently received adverse SOX 404 audit opinions exhibit no significant change in cost of capital around the opinion release. Second, we conduct a cost of capital change analysis on those firms that received unqualified SOX 404 opinions that had no prior disclosure of internal control weaknesses. Consistent with the market forming prior probability assessments of likely internal control problems based on observable firm characteristics, we find a significant decrease in the average market-adjusted cost of capital of 116 basis points around the disclosure of an unqualified SOX 404 audit opinion for those firms that were most likely to report ICDs. In contrast, we find no significant cost of capital change for those firms that received an unqualified SOX 404 audit opinion that were least likely to report an ICD. Collectively our cross-sectional and inter-temporal tests present consistent evidence that internal control risk is an important determinant of both idiosyncratic risk and systematic market risk that affects the market s assessment of firms cost of capital. We document that firms that have strong internal controls or firms that remediate prior internal control weaknesses, as evidenced by an unqualified SOX 404 audit opinion, are 4

7 rewarded with a significantly lower cost of capital. Thus, our study represents one of the first to document potential benefits of a systematic reporting structure to communicate information about internal controls in terms of cost of capital consequences. Our study contributes to the literature that seeks to examine the effects of information quality on investors risk assessments and cost of equity capital in two important ways. First, prior research examining the effect of information quality on the cost of equity capital has used measures of information quality that are dependent upon researcher estimates of information attributes or subjective metrics of voluntary disclosure (Botosan 1996; Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker 2003; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 2004). We use the unique setting of SOX internal control reporting to identify firms that have internal control problems or that certify that their internal controls are adequate to provide a cleaner partitioning of firms in terms of information quality than in prior studies. Moreover, the independent auditors SOX 404 opinions provide unambiguous signals about the resolution of internal control problems that allows us to structure tests of changes in information system quality on firms cost of capital in ways that minimize competing explanations for our results. A second contribution that we make to the information quality literature is that we document both direct and indirect effects of information quality on firms cost of equity capital. Much of the prior accounting research that investigates the effects of information transparency and disclosure quality on cost of equity capital measures these effects after controlling for the effects of systematic risk on expected return (Botosan 1997; Botosan and Plumlee 2002; Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker 2003; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 2005). Relying on the theoretical framework developed in Lambert et al. 5

8 (2005), we predict and find that firms with internal control weaknesses exhibit higher betas and higher idiosyncratic risk. Thus, we document linkages between information systems quality and market risk measures largely overlooked in prior literature. More importantly, our results suggest that studies that investigate the effect of information transparency or disclosure quality on cost of capital after controlling for the effects of market risk (beta) are removing part of the information quality effects they seek to document. Indeed, a concurrent study by Ogneva, Raghunanadan, and Subramanyan (2005) finds no association between ICDs and firms cost of capital after controlling for the effects of market beta and other innate risk characteristics on expected return. This approach effectively ignores the effect that internal control weaknesses can have on expected return through beta and idiosyncratic,risk, which we document in this study. Our study also contributes to the growing literature designed to assess the economic consequences of the SOX legislation. Much of the prior literature focuses on the costs of implementing SOX requirements and internal control auditing and reporting specifically (Li, Pincus, and Rego 2006; Zhang 2005; Berger, Li, and Wong 2005; Solomon and Bryan-Low 2004). This paper, along with a concurrent study by Ogneva et al. (2005), is among the first to investigate the potential benefits of SOX in terms of cost of capital effects. In contrast to the Ogneva et al. (2005) study that finds no association between internal control weaknesses and cost of equity capital, we find clear evidence that internal control risk matters to investors and that firms reporting strong internal controls or firms that correct prior internal control problems benefit from lower cost of capital. 3 3 See later discussion for sample, design choices, and cost of capital proxy differences between our study and the Ogneva et al. (2005) study that contribute to the differences in results. 6

9 The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the theoretical underpinnings of our analysis and sets forth our predictions about internal control weaknesses and remediation, market and idiosyncratic risk and cost of capital. Section III provides institutional background and summarizes related work. Section IV describes our samples and provides descriptive statistics. Section V presents our empirical findings and Section VI concludes. II. Linkages between Internal Control Weaknesses, Firm Risk and Cost of Equity Capital Lambert et al. (2005) develop a model in a multi-security CAPM setting that links the quality of accounting disclosures and information systems to firm risk and cost of equity capital. In the Lambert et al. (2005) framework, accounting information system quality is broadly defined to include not only the disclosures the firm makes to outsiders, but also the internal control systems that a firm has in place. A key insight from their analysis is that the quality of accounting information and the systems that produce that information influence a firm s cost of capital in two ways: (1) direct effects where higher quality accounting information does not affect firm cash flows, per se, but does affect market participants assessments of the variance of a firm s cash flows and the covariance of the firm s cash flows with aggregate market cash flows; and (2) indirect effects where higher quality information and better internal controls affect real decisions within the firm, including the amount of firm resources that managers appropriate for themselves. The expression they derive for the expected return for a firm, i.e., cost of equity capital, reduces to 7

10 (R ~ R f H ( Φ) + 1 E(V ~ j Φ) E j Φ ) =, where H( Φ) =. J H ( Φ) 1 1 ~ ~ Cov V j, V k Φ Nτ k = 1 (1) Where R is the risk free rate, Φ is the information available to investors to make their f assessments regarding the distribution of future cash flows for firm j, V ~ j is a random vector of future cash flows for firm j, and N τ is the aggregate risk tolerance of the market. Notice that the covariance term can be decomposed into two components: the firms own variance (idiosyncratic risk) plus the covariance with all other firms cash flows in the market (beta risk) as follows: ~ Cov V j, (2) J k = 1 ~ V k ~ ~ ~ Φ = Cov( V, Φ) + j V j Cov V j, J k j ~ V k Φ. Lambert et al. (2005) analyze the direct effects of information system quality by introducing an accounting information signal, Z ~ j (e.g., earnings), that provides a noisy signal about the (future) end-of-period cash flows of the firm, V ~ j. That is, Z ~ j = V ~ j + ~ ε j where ~ ε j is the noise or measurement error in the information signal. Because the (future) end-of-period firm cash flows are unobservable, the market s assessment of the covariance structure of firm j s future cash flows with all other firms in the market is conditioned by the quality or precision of firm j s accounting signal. Specifically, J k= 1 Cov(V ~ j,v ~ k Z ) = j J Var( ~ ε j ) ~ ~ Cov( V j, V Var( Z ) Var( ~ ε j ) ~ ~ ~ ~ ) = ~ (, ),. ( ) Cov V j V j + Cov V j Vk Var Z j 1 k k= 1 j k (3) 8

11 As equation (3) shows, investors assessment of the variance of firm j s cash flows and covariance of firm j s cash flows with the cash flows of all other firms in the market is proportional to the measurement error or noise in the information signal about firm j s future cash flows. Importantly, the effect of measurement error in the information signal does not diversify away as the number of securities grows large--the effect is present for each and every covariance term with firm j. Substituting equation (3) for the covariance term in the expression for H(Φ) in equation (1) and recognizing that Z ~ is a noisy signal from information set Φ that is j available to investors yields the following expression for expected return (cost of capital): (R ~ R f H ( Φ) + 1 E j Φ ) =, H ( Φ) 1 where H( Φ) = E(V ~ j Φ) ~ 1 Var( ε j ) ~ ~ ~ ~ (, ), ( ) Cov V j V j + Cov V j Nτ Var Z j k 1. ~ V k (4) Thus, as the noise in a firm s accounting signals [ Var ~ ε ) ] increases, the firm s cost of equity capital increases. Moreover, Lambert et al. (2005) show that the quality of a firm s information system, which includes its internal controls, has an effect on a firm s real decisions, including the amount of firm cash flows that managers appropriate for themselves. Weaker internal controls increase managers appropriation of firm resources, which decreases the ratio of expected cash flows available to investors relative to the covariance of firm cash flows with the market as shown in equation (4). This translates into a higher cost of equity capital. ( j 9

12 In sum, we posit that the quality of a firm s internal control over financial reporting affects investors assessments of firm risk and cost of capital through (1) the precision of the signals produced by the accounting system; and (2) by the amount of resources that managers can appropriate for themselves. If a firm s internal control is weak, then the quality or precision of its accounting signals is impaired. Consistent with this conjecture, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney (2006) and Doyle et al. (2006b) find that firms reporting internal control deficiencies (ICDs) exhibit noisier accruals after controlling for other firm characteristics that affect accrual quality. Combining these empirical findings with the theory in Lambert et al. (2005), we develop both cross-sectional and intertemporal predictions. In the cross-section, we predict that firms with ICDs will exhibit higher idiosyncratic risk, higher systematic (beta) risk and higher cost of capital relative to firms with strong internal controls. Moreover, we expect firms costs of capital will increase when the first revelation of internal control problems is made public under SOX 302 or 404 reporting provisions, and will decrease when external auditor SOX 404 opinions affirm that the firm s internal control weaknesses have been fully remedied. In formulating our inter-temporal tests, we recognize that investors hold priors on the likelihood that firms will face internal control problems based on observable firm characteristics (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney 2006; Doyle et al. 2006a). Thus, we predict that the effect of negative or positive signals about firms internal control quality will have a greater (smaller) effect on cost of capital the smaller (the greater) the probability of a firm reporting an internal control weakness. The unique regulatory setting surrounding disclosures on internal control weaknesses and remediation allows us 10

13 to triangulate our research question in ways that mitigate competing explanations for our results. III. Institutional Background and Reporting Environment Prior to passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in July 2002, public companies in the U.S. were required to maintain books and records that would protect corporate assets and facilitate GAAP-based financial reporting (e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977). However, pre-sox statutes did not require management evaluations of internal control or public assertions about control adequacy, although some publicly disclosed internal control assertions voluntarily (McMullen, Raghunandan, and Rama 1996) and the statutes did not require independent audits of internal control. 4 SOX changed the public assertion, audit, and audit reporting landscape in two steps. Section 302 of SOX (effective August 29, 2002) mandates that a firm s CEO and CFO certify in periodic (interim and annual) SEC filings that the signing officers have evaluated... and have presented in the report their conclusions about the effectiveness of their internal controls based on their evaluation (302 (a) (4) (C) and (D)). Neither Section 302 nor SEC interpretations describe procedures for evaluating controls and do not require independent audits of internal control or management s certifications. However, in conducting the financial statement audit, the auditor might become aware of 4 The Act did require external auditors to report to the board of directors any material weaknesses in the firm s internal control over financial reporting noted during conduct of the financial statement audit. 11

14 internal control problems and require that management acknowledge any known material weakness in its SOX 302 certification. 5 Management certifications and ICD disclosures under SOX 302 began appearing in The lack of specific management review and evaluation procedures and the lack of independent audit requirements for internal control probably lowers the likelihood of ICD detection and increases the variance of outcomes, as does the fact that changes in control deficiencies that are not judged material weaknesses do not require disclosure prior to the effective date of Section 404 (see SEC 2004 question 9). Section 404 and SEC regulations require management to document its review of internal control over financial reporting as the basis for management s report and to have its report audited by the auditor of its financial statements. AS No. 2 (effective for larger firms for fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2004) provides guidance for the independent audit to support the auditor s opinion on management s report and adds a requirement that the auditor express a separate opinion about internal control effectiveness. In the empirical work to follow, we use material weakness ICDs made under SOX Sections 302 and 404 as well as the disclosure of lesser deficiencies that are not required to be disclosed (see AS No ) as signals of poor information quality. We consider all types of ICDs for three reasons. First, while the incentives to discover and requirements to disclose ICDs differ across SOX 302 and SOX 404 internal control 5 In particular, the SEC staff states... we are not requiring any particular procedures for conducting the required review and evaluation. Instead, we expect each issuer to develop a process that is consistent with its business and internal management and supervisory practices (SEC 2002). Also, AS No. 2 (2004), which became effective for accelerated filers for fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2004 requires the auditor to perform limited procedures quarterly to determine whether material changes in internal control have occurred that should be disclosed in 302 certifications (paragraphs ). 12

15 reporting regimes, all disclosures are likely to reflect important weaknesses in internal controls. 6 Second, sequencing 302 and 404 disclosures for specific firms allows for within-firm testing of the effects of changes in internal control on the market s assessment of information risk. Third, because of the short history of mandated internal control reporting, the number of ICD disclosures is small. Using all disclosures of ICDs increases the power of our tests. Neither SOX nor AS No. 2 specifies how remediations of previously disclosed ICDs are to be reported. 7 However, in its report on internal control effectiveness, management can comment on its success in remediating previously disclosed weaknesses and continuing section 302 certifications require disclosure of material changes in internal control since the last certification. Some managers have asserted successful remediation of previously disclosed material weaknesses and their auditors have, by inference, attested to the remediation by issuing an unqualified audit opinion on the internal control over financial reporting in their audit reports filed on Form 10-K. Thus, SOX 404 audit opinions provide independent third party verification that previously disclosed material weaknesses have been remediated. Accordingly, we rely on SOX 404 audit opinions to identify firms that rectified their ICDs. 6 For example, voluntary disclosure of a deficiency or significant deficiency may reflect management or auditor uncertainty about whether a deficiency might be judged a material weakness, a belief that voluntary disclosure may facilitate a reputation for diligence and transparency or a legal defense, or perhaps a signal that a rumored deficiency is not a material weakness. 7 AS No. 4 (2006) entitled Reporting on whether a previously reported material weakness continues to exist, provides guidance for the auditor engaged to report on remediation of particular material weaknesses as of a particular date (PCAOB 2006). This standard is effective February 6, 2006, which is after the period of our study and applies to stand alone assertions by management and audit reports rather than to 10-K or 10-Q filings. 13

16 IV. Sample and Descriptive Statistics IV.1 Internal Control Deficiency Sample Details Our initial sample of firms providing ICD disclosures is obtained from compilations of SEC filings reported in Compliance Week, a weekly electronic newsletter published by Boston s Financial Media Holdings Group, and Glass-Lewis & Co., LLC, a leading investment research and proxy advisory firm. The sample period spans filings made from November 2003 to September In addition, we supplement these two databases with additional hand collected data from SEC filings. 8 This results in an initial sample of 1,053 firms disclosing at least one internal control deficiency in either the SOX 302 or 404 reporting regimes. Our cross-sectional and change analyses use sub-samples based on these 1,053 ICD firms. Of the 1,053 ICD firms, 667 have the necessary data to estimate our idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk models and 221 have the necessary data to conduct our crosssectional cost of equity capital tests (described below). There are 162 firms that have the necessary data to be included in our first cost of equity capital change analysis that examines the change in cost of equity capital at the time of the first ICD disclosure. Our remaining analyses that examine the change in ICD firms cost of equity capital use subsamples defined by the type of SOX 404 audit opinion. We identify 38 firms that reported an ICD under 302 but received an unqualified SOX 404 report. These 38 firms comprise our remediation sample. There are 50 firms that have persistent problems with their internal control because they disclosed an ICD under SOX 302 and received an 8 The additional hand collection was used to supplement the initial database in instances where firms had delayed their filings yet indicated that they were expecting an adverse opinion or filed their 10-K after sample periods covered by the Glass Lewis and Compliance Week database. 14

17 adverse SOX 404 opinion. These firms comprise our no-remediation change in cost of equity capital sample. For the sake of completeness, it is important to note that there are 527 firms that disclosed an ICD under SOX 302 but did not have a SOX 404 opinion. These firms do not have a SOX 404 opinion because they are either non-accelerated filers (i.e., are not required to file a SOX 404 opinion because they have less than $75 M in float) or they had not yet filed a 10-K that contained a SOX 404 report by the sample cutoff date of September Table 1 reports the ICD sub-samples used in our empirical tests that vary conditional on our risk comparisons and the data requirements. IV.2 Descriptive Statistics Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the sub-sample of firms having sufficient data to conduct our cross-sectional tests of the association between internal control deficiencies and idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk. Idiosyncratic risk (I_RISK) is the standard deviation of the residuals from the following model estimated over the current and prior four years using daily returns, requiring at least two years of daily returns: EXRET i, t = β 0 + β1rmrft + ε i, t (5) where EXRET is firm i s return on day t minus the risk free rate, RMRF is the day t excess return on the market obtained from /ken.french/data_library.html). Systematic risk (BETA) is measured as the coefficient on the RMRF term from the following model: EXRET = + (6) i, τ β 0 + β1rmrfτ ε i, τ 15

18 where EXRET is firm i s return for month τ minus the risk free rate, RMRF is the month τ excess return on the market obtained from ken.french/data_library.html). Equation (6) is estimated using monthly returns requiring a minimum of 24 and maximum of 60 observations over the current and prior four fiscal years. 9 Firms are also required to have sufficient accounting data on Compustat to calculate control variables included in our analysis of I_RISK and BETA as follows: STD_CFO (Standard deviation of Cash flow from operations (Compustat #308) divided by total assets (Compustat #6) calculated using the prior five fiscal years, requiring a minimum of three years of data) LEV (Total debt (Compustat #9 plus Compustat #34) divided by total assets (Compustat #6) CFO (Cash flow from operations (Compustat #308) divided by total assets (Compustat #6) BM (Book value of equity (Compustat #60) divided by market value of equity (Compustat #199* Compustat #25) SIZE (Natural log of fiscal year end market value of equity (Compustat #25 * Compustat #199) DIVPAYER (One if the firm pays dividends (Compustat # 21), zero otherwise). All control variables are measured as of a firm s 2004 fiscal year-end. The upper half of Panel A of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the 667 firms disclosing control deficiencies (ICD=1) that have sufficient data to be included in the I_RISK and BETA analysis. The lower half of Panel A of Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for the control sample (ICD=0), representing all firms with sufficient data on both CRSP and Compustat that did not disclose an internal control deficiency in 9 We use monthly returns to estimate BETA to reduce the bias in BETA due to infrequent trading (Dimson 1979). 16

19 either the SOX 302 or SOX 404 reporting regime (3,507 firms). On average, ICD firms have statistically higher I_RISK, larger BETAs, lower cash flows from operations, are smaller and are less likely to pay dividends relative to control firms. Panel B of Table 2 provides correlations among the control variables and the ICD indicator variable. The upper right hand portion of the panel presents Pearson productmoment correlations, while the lower left hand portion presents the Spearman rank-order correlations. To facilitate discussion, we focus on the Pearson correlations, but note that the Spearman rank-order correlations are generally consistent with the Pearson correlations. The ICD variable is positively correlated with both I_RISK (0.079) and BETA (0.074). In addition, the ICD variable is negatively correlated with CFO (-0.037), SIZE (-0.062), and DIVPAYER (-0.098). As expected, I_RISK and BETA exhibit a relatively large positive correlation (0.561). However, in terms of magnitude, the correlation between I_RISK and SIZE (-0.590) is the largest. V. Results V.1 Cross-Sectional Results We begin our empirical tests by investigating the relation between weak internal controls and idiosyncratic risk (I_RISK) and market risk (BETA) using OLS regressions that control for other factors that prior research has shown to be related to idiosyncratic risk (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 2005; Hanlon, Rajgopal, and Shevlin 2004; Pastor and Veronesi 2003; Wei and Zhang 2004) and market risk (Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes 1970). Specifically, we estimate the following models: 17

20 I _ RISK = β + β ICD + β STD β DIVPAYER + ε _ CFO + β LEV 3 + β CFO + β BM β SIZE + 6 (7) BETA = β + β ICD + β STD β DIVPAYER + ε _ CFO + β LEV 3 + β CFO + β BM β SIZE + 6 (8) where all variables are as previously defined. CFO and STD_CFO are used to capture operating performance and the volatility of operations, respectively. We expect firms with under-performing operations and more volatile operations to exhibit greater I_RISK and larger BETAs. SIZE and DIVPAYER capture firm size and maturity, where large, more mature firms are expected to be less risky and therefore have less I_RISK and smaller BETAs. Finally, we expect firms with higher leverage (LEV) to exhibit greater I_RISK and larger BETAs. We make no prediction on the association between BM and the risk measures. BM can reflect financial distress, which would lead to a positive association between BM and the risk measures, or can proxy for growth opportunities, which would lead to a negative association between BM and the risk measures (Fama and French 1996). Panel A of Table 3 displays the results of investigating the relation between ICD and I_RISK. As expected, we find that smaller firms that less often pay dividends and report lower levels and greater volatility of cash flows from operations exhibit greater idiosyncratic risk. We find a negative and significant coefficient on BM, consistent with the findings of Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2005). The analysis using the complete sample of ICD and control firms finds a negative and significant coefficient on LEV, contrary to expectations. However, when we eliminate firms from the sample that do not 18

21 have debt (or trivial amounts of debt), the results indicate that firms with more debt exhibit higher idiosyncratic risk. 10 Turning to the variable of interest, we find a positive and significant coefficient on ICD. This result indicates that after controlling for operating, financing, and other risk attributes, firms with weak internal controls exhibit greater idiosyncratic risk than firms that do not report internal control deficiencies. Panel B of Table 3 displays the results of estimating our model of BETA. Consistent with expectations, we find a positive coefficient on STD_CFO and negative coefficients on CFO and DIVPAYER, indicating that underperforming, less mature firms with more volatile operations exhibit larger market risk. Similar to the results presented in Panel A of Table 2, we find a negative coefficient on LEV. However, when we eliminate firms with little or no debt in their capital structure, the coefficient on LEV becomes insignificant. Inconsistent with expectations, we find a positive coefficient on SIZE. As noted earlier, many of the firm fundamentals that we control for in our risk models are highly correlated. When we estimate a reduced form of equation (8) that excludes DIVPAYER from the model, we find a negative relation between SIZE and BETA as shown in prior research (Beaver et al. 1970). More importantly, after controlling for firm operating risk and financing risk, we find a positive coefficient on ICD indicating that firms with weak internal control exhibit higher BETAs relative to firms with strong internal controls. 10 The tabled result that LEV is negatively associated with I_RISK is consistent with the findings of Duffee (1995). Duffee (1995) reports that the positive relation between leverage and risk measures documented in prior work is due to the samples used in the empirical analysis. When Duffee (1995) requires firms to have debt, he finds a positive relation between leverage and risk. Relaxing this requirement results in either insignificant results or in some instances the opposite result. Following Duffee s (1995) work, we delete firms that have LEV values less than 0.10 and find that a positive association between leverage and I_RISK. 19

22 The results reported in Table 3 serve to benchmark the relation between firms information quality as a function of internal controls and I_RISK and BETA after controlling for firm fundamentals documented in prior research to be related to idiosyncratic and market risk. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney (2006) report that firms are more likely to have internal control deficiencies when they have more segments, engage in foreign sales, participate in M&A, and engage in restructurings. These economic events also influence firms operating performance and the volatility of operations. Thus to ensure that our ICD variable is not proxing for some other inherent operating risk, we expand our I_RISK and BETA models with the ICD determinants documented in Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney (2006) and estimate the following OLS regression: RISK = β0 + β1icd + β2std _ CFO + β3lev + β4cfo + β5bm + β6size + β7divpayer + β8segments + β9foreign _ SALES + β10m & A + β11restructure + β12rgrowth + β13inventory + (9) β14 % LOSS + β15rzscore + β16 AUDITOR _ RESIGN + β RESTATEMENT + β AUDITOR + β INST _ CON + β LITIGATION + ε where RISK is equal to either I_RISK or BETA, and SEGMENTS is the number of reported business segments in 2003 (Compustat Segment file) FOREIGN_SALES is equal to one if a firm reports foreign sales in 2003, and zero otherwise(compustat Segment file) M&A equals one if a firm is involved in a merger or acquisition from 2001 to 2003, and zero otherwise (Compustat AFNT #1) RESTRUCTURE equals one if a firm was involved in a restructuring from 2001 to 2003, and zero otherwise (this variable is coded one if any of the following Compustat data items are non-zero: 376, 377, 378 or 379) RGROWTH is the decile rank of average growth rate in sales from 2001 to 2003 (the percent change in Compustat #12) INVENTORY is the average inventory to total assets from 2001 to 2003 (Compustat #3/ Compustat #6) 20

23 %LOSS is the proportion of years from 2001 to 2003 that a firm reports negative earnings RZSCORE is the decile rank of Altman (1980) z-score measure of distress risk, AUDITOR_RESIGN equals one if the auditor resigned from the client in 2003, zero otherwise (8-K filings) RESTATEMENT equals one if a firm had a restatement or an SEC AAER from 2001 to 2003 and zero otherwise LITIGATION is coded one if a firm was in a litigious industry SIC codes 2833 to 2836; 3570 to 3577; 3600 to 3674; 5200 to 5961; and 7370, and zero otherwise INST_CON is the percentage of shares held by institutional investors divided by the number of institutions that own the stock as of December 31, 2003 (Thomson Financial Securities Data) AUDITOR is coded one if the firm engaged one of the largest six audit firms for 2003, and zero otherwise (Compustat), where the largest six audit firms include PWC, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, Grant Thornton and BDO Seidman. All ICD determinant control variables are measured as of the firm s 2003 fiscal year end (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney 2006). 11 We do not make predictions on the coefficients on the additional control variables due to the fact that many of the variables are proxying for similar constructs (e.g., more risky operations). Table 4 displays the results of estimating equation (9). The first column reports the results where I_RISK is regressed on firm fundamentals and the factors that instill more internal control risk and greater incentives to report ICDs. The second column reports the results using BETA as the risk measure. Regardless of risk measure, after including the additional control variables in the risk models, we continue to find a positive and significant coefficient on ICD. These findings, combined with the results reported in Table 3, indicate that firms reporting internal control deficiencies exhibit greater idiosyncratic and systematic risk. These results suggest that firms with weak internal 11 We measure the ICD determinant control variables at the end of fiscal 2003 because most of the ICD reports in the sample occur during the fiscal 2004 reporting period. Thus by using the 2003 values we are able to control for the factors that result in firms being more likely to report an ICD over the analysis period. 21

24 controls present greater information risk to investors, as investors assess larger variances in cash flows (I_RISK) and covariances in cash flows (BETA) as a result of firms low quality financial information (Lambert et al. 2005). Our third set of tests focuses on firms cost of equity capital. As suggested by the analytical results in Lambert et al. (2005), our general hypothesis is that firms with internal control deficiencies will exhibit higher cost of equity capital relative to firms with strong internal controls. Based on prior research (Botosan 1997; Francis et al. 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond 2006), we use firms expected rate of return, as reported in Value Line, as our measure of the cost of equity capital. Value Line issues four reports each calendar year. Between reports, however, Value Line updates the price information contained in their database and subsequently recalculates its estimate of expected returns. There is some variability in the updating of prices within the Value Line database. Some firms are updated each month resulting in twelve expected return estimates for a given fiscal year, while others are updated less frequently. We estimate the cost of equity capital as the simple average of the Value Line expected return measures over the fiscal year. 12 Theoretical and empirical research indicates that a good measure of expected return will be positively related to beta and the book-to-market ratio and negatively related to size (Sharpe 1964; Linter 1965; Black 1972; Berk 1995; Fama and French 2004; Botosan and Plumlee 2004). Guay, Kothari, and Shu (2003) suggest evaluating cost of equity capital measures based on the association between measures of expected 12 Our results are robust to setting the cost of equity to the median expected return over the firm s fiscal year, and using only the first (or last) expected return for a given Value Line report period. The correlations across various measures of expected return based on different requirements of price updating exceed

25 returns and realized returns. They posit that expected returns, on average, should equal realized returns if investors expected returns reflect rational expectations. In assessing the validity of Value Line s expected returns as a proxy for firms cost of capital, we find that the Value Line expected returns exhibit a positive (negative) and significant association with beta and the book-to-market ratio (size), as expected. In addition, the Value Line cost of capital measure meets the Guay et al. (2003) rational expectations test. 13 Thus, we consider Value Line s expected returns to be a valid estimate of firms cost of equity capital for our sample and research objectives. Panel A of Table 5 displays the descriptive statistics for the cost of capital estimates (CC) and the risk measures that serve as control variables in our cost of capital tests; BETA, SIZE, BM, and I_RISK. The mean (median) CC value for ICD firms is % (13.750%) whereas the mean (median) CC value for the control firms is significantly less (12.523% and %, respectively). The univariate tests also indicate that both the mean and median values for BETA, SIZE, BM and I_RISK are larger for the ICD firms. As an initial test of our predictions regarding the effects of internal control deficiencies on the cost of equity capital, we use the following model: CC = β 0 + β1icd + β2beta + β3size + β4bm + β5i _ RISK + ε (10) where all variables are as previously defined. 13 Botosan and Plumlee (2004) conclude that the Value Line cost of capital estimate and the PEG ratio (see Easton 2004) are equally valid estimates of firms cost of equity capital. However, the PEG ratio estimate potentially has drawbacks in our setting. Specifically, to derive a cost of capital estimate the PEG ratio requires positive and increasing earnings forecasts. This introduces a potentially serious sample selection bias against ICD firms as Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney (2006) and Doyle et al. (2006a) find that ICD firms have a much higher incidence of losses than non-icd firms. We examine the implications of the PEG ratio s positive earnings and positive earnings growth requirements for the ICD firms later in Section V.3. 23

26 Panel B of Table 5 reports the results of estimating equation (10). We first estimate equation (10) without I_RISK due to the relatively high correlation between I_RISK and SIZE (-0.59). The signs of the coefficients on the risk factors are as expected in that we find that BETA and BM are positively related to cost of equity capital. The results also indicate that SIZE is negatively related to the cost of capital as expected. The second column of panel B includes I_RISK in the model and we find a positive and significant coefficient on I_RISK. However, with I_RISK in the model the coefficient on SIZE is no longer significant. Turning to the primary variable of interest, we find a significantly positive coefficient on ICD in both analyses. These results indicate that firms with internal control deficiencies incur higher costs of equity capital than firms that do not suffer from internal control weaknesses. This finding provides empirical evidence supporting the theoretical work of Lambert et al. (2005) who predict that firms with stronger internal controls and higher quality financial information will exhibit a lower cost of capital. Ogneva et al. (2005) examine the implications of SOX 404 internal control reporting for cost of equity capital. They view internal control problems as having two potential effects on the cost of capital. The first effect arises from information risk associated with poor internal controls and the second effect arises from internal control problems being inherently more likely for firms facing greater operating risk. Ogneva et al. (2005) find that the cost of capital effect of internal control deficiencies disappears after controlling for beta and factors associated with an increased likelihood of reporting internal control deficiencies. Based on this finding, Ogneva et al. (2005) conclude that internal control problems do not have a direct effect on the cost of capital. However, as 24

27 noted earlier, measuring the cost of capital effects after controlling for beta ignores the effects that internal control weaknesses may have on cost of capital through beta risk (Lambert et al. 2005). To provide further evidence on the effect of ICDs on the cost of capital and provide a comparison to the findings of Ogneva et al. (2005), we expand our CC model with the ICD disclosure factors of the Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney (2006) model: CC = β0 + β1icd + β2beta + β3size + β4bm + β5i _ RISK + β6segments + β7foreign _ SALES + β8m & A + β9restructure + β10rgrowth + β11inventory + β12 % LOSS + β13rzscore + β14 AUDITOR _ RESIGN + β RESTATEMENT + β AUDITOR + β INST _ CON + β LITIGATION + ε (11) where all variables are as previously defined. Table 6 presents the results of the cross-sectional CC model including the additional control variables (equation 11). While the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on ICD is reduced relative to the results presented in Table 4, we continue to find a positive and significant association between the cost of equity capital and the reporting of an ICD. V.2 Change Analysis The results reported above suggest that weak internal controls are associated with higher cost of equity capital, but these cross-sectional results do not provide a sufficient basis for inferring causality. To help establish a causal relation between internal control deficiencies and cost of equity capital, we conduct five change tests. The first analysis tests whether there is a change in the cost of equity capital when a firm first reports a control problem. Furthermore, because the market holds expectations for the quality of firms internal controls based on observable events (see Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and 25

28 Kinney 2006; Doyle et al. 2006a), we test whether the magnitude of change in cost of capital is inversely related to the market s assessed likelihood that a firm will report an ICD. We start by identifying the first ICD report date for 162 sample firms for which we have Value Line cost of capital estimates both before and after the ICD report date and data necessary to estimate the ICD determinant model in Appendix 2 that is used to calculate the firm-specific probability of reporting an ICD. We then compare the CC estimate pre-disclosure to the CC estimate post-disclosure. 14 In addition, we divide the 162 firms into deciles based on the likelihood of reporting an ICD to assess whether there are differences in the magnitude of the changes in cost of equity conditional on the likelihood of a firm reporting an ICD. Panel A of Table 7 reports the mean and median cost of equity capital estimates for all 162 firms with available Value Line data pre and post the first ICD disclosure. We report both raw and market-adjusted CC estimates, where the market adjusted cost of capital is the difference between the firm's cost of capital and the average cost of capital for all firms on Value Line not reporting an ICD over the same time interval. The descriptive statistics indicate that both raw and market-adjusted cost of capital increased after firms first disclosure of an internal control problem. Panel B of Table 7 reports the firm-specific change in cost of equity capital for the 162 firms with available Value Line data as well as the change in cost of equity capital for firms that were least likely and most likely to disclose an ICD (firms falling in the 14 In Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10, we report the results using market adjusted cost of capital measures, where market adjustments are made using all firm not reporting and ICD over the same time period. We also examine the change in the cost of capital using unadjusted and industry-adjusted cost of capital measures and find similar results. 26