Risky Business: Protecting the Personal Assets of Ds&Os. Steven Cohen, Marsh Inc. Jay Dubow, Pepper Hamilton LLP Bob Hickok, Pepper Hamilton LLP

Transcription

1 Risky Business: Protecting the Personal Assets of Ds&Os Steven Cohen, Marsh Inc. Jay Dubow, Pepper Hamilton LLP Bob Hickok, Pepper Hamilton LLP Thursday, January 28, 2016

2 Topics Nuts and Bolts - D&O Liability, Indemnity, Advancement Structure of D&O Insurance Policies Executive Compensation Claw Back Government Enforcement Targeting Individuals D&O Exposure for Cybersecurity Breach Trends in Derivative Suits and M&A Class Actions Covering Ds&Os Overseas 2

3 Nuts and Bolts of D&O Liability Oh Oh 3

4 Nuts & Bolts: Liability and Protection Liability Standards Indemnification Advancement Exculpation D&O Insurance 4

5 Liability Standards Standards of Liability - Directors: gross negligence (Delaware & California) - Officers: ordinary negligence (California) Standard of conduct permitting corporate indemnification decisions and actions made in good faith and in a manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation Rebuttable Presumption of Valid Business Judgment - Protects directors in Delaware and California - Protects officers in Delaware, not California 5

6 Advancement Corporations may advance D&O litigation defense costs before final adjudication Indemnified person must execute an undertaking to repay if ultimately found not to be entitled to indemnification. Companies may commit contractually or in corporate bylaws to advance and indemnify even in litigation by or on behalf of the company against the indemnified person 6

7 Exculpation Most articles of incorporation exculpate directors from monetary liability to the company and stockholders to the greatest extent allowed by law - No monetary liability for gross negligence - Only protects directors, not officers (Delaware & California) Companies cannot exculpate directors for: - breach of the duty of loyalty - bad faith - intentional misconduct - knowing violation of law - transactions from which the director derived an improper personal benefit 7

8 Corporate Indemnity Fails When.. Corporation becomes insolvent Ds&Os engage in non-indemnifiable, non-exculpable conduct - Violation of the duty of loyalty - Self-dealing, bad faith, intentional or knowing wrongdoing - Failure of board oversight under Caremark (1996 Delaware) utter failure to assure reasonable information and reporting systems in place conscious disregard of a known duty to act directors knew or should have known that violations of law were occurring and failed to take steps to prevent or remedy 8

9 D&O Insurance Corporations have the power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of current and former officers and directors against any liability whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify such person against such liability 9

10 Overview of a D&O Policy Covered Claim Against Directors and Officers Covered Claim Against Corporate Entity (Public: Securities Only) Indemnification? No - Side A Insureds - Directors and Officers Yes - Side B Insured - Corporate Balance Sheet Side C Insured - Corporate Entity as a Defendant Personal Assets D&O Insurance Insuring Agreement A: Natural Person Insureds Personal Assets Protection Corporate Assets D&O Insurance Insuring Agreement B: Corporate Reimbursement - Natural Person Insured Corporate Risk Transfer Corporate Assets D&O Insurance Insuring Agreement C Corporate Entity Coverage Significant Defendant Allocation Coverage 10

11 D&O: Example Program Structure Excess Limits: Underlying limits are eroded / exhausted Total Maximum Aggregate Limit for D&Os Side A Only Excess / DIC Additional Personal Asset Protection for Directors & Officers Annual Aggregate Limit Side A Personal Asset Protection for Directors & Officers Insurance for covered Non-Indemnifiable Claims Statute Bankruptcy Difference in Conditions ( DIC ) Limits: Underlying Insurer: Wrongfully refuses to pay Is financially unable to pay Rescinds the policy Company refuses to indemnify Underlying insurers are not liable Bankruptcy; proceeds of underlying insurance are stayed Side B Corporate Asset Protection Insurance Reimbursement for covered Indemnifiable Claims Annual Aggregate Limit Side C Corporate Asset Protection Insurance for Corporate Liability when Company is named defendant in covered Claim Nil Retention Retention Retention 11

12 D&O Liability in Corporate Crisis 12

13 D&O Liability in Corporate Crisis A General Counsel s perspective What happens when things go REALLY bad? - government enforcement is at the door - stockholders make demands on the board - investors file securities fraud class actions suits - the Ds&Os all want separate legal counsel - Congress wants to hear about it - the company is running out of money 13

14 Executive Compensation Claw Back 14

15 Executive Compensation Claw Back Got a restatement? Current Rule Sarbanes-Oxley Section 304: CEO and CFO must return incentive-based compensation paid within one year prior to restatement due to someone s misconduct - Poster CEO Maynard Jenkins, CSK Auto, $2.7 million New Rule Dodd-Frank Section 954: All executives must return incentive-based compensation paid within three years prior to restatement regardless of any misconduct 15

16 Executive Compensation Claw Back SEC Dodd-Frank Rules Claw back mandatory (unless expense exceeds stake) Claw back reaches back three years before restatement Claw back is for delta between amount paid and earned Companies must self-enforce Companies cannot indemnify or buy insurance for executives 16

17 DOJ Targeting Individuals Major Developments DOJ: Targeting individuals in Yates Memo, FCPA cases SEC: Targeting individuals in cooperation policy, whistleblower policy, settlement admissions policy 17

18 DOJ Targeting Individuals DOJ Yates Memo Six Factors: - No corporate cooperation credit unless individuals are identified - Staff should target individuals from the outset - Civil and criminal staff should share information - No trade off s of larger corporate fine for release of individuals - No corporate settlements without clear plan for individuals - Civil staff should pursue individuals regardless of ability to pay 18

19 DOJ Targeting Individuals Yates Memo - Insurance Coverage Implications From the individual s perspective - Secure separate counsel - Secure advancement and indemnification - Maximize Side A coverage From the company s perspective - Expect more requests for separate counsel - Expect more protracted government investigation - Secure flexibility to refuse advancement - Relevance of Side A coverage? 19

20 SEC Targeting Individuals The Cooperation Program - Individuals cooperate in exchange for avoiding DOJ referral, and/or paying lower fines and/or suffering industry bar - Per WSJ, used in 92 cases so far The Whistleblower Program - Cash rewards for individuals who voluntarily give the SEC original information May 13, 2015 Enforcement Director Ceresney speech - More reverse proffers to get individuals to cooperate 20

21 SEC Targeting Individuals June 2013, SEC Chairman Mary Jo White announced new policy: in egregious cases, the SEC will demand an admission as a condition of settlement Criteria include: - Number of harmed investors - Deterrence - Wilfulness - Obstruction of SEC investigation As of March 14, 2015, SEC obtained admissions in 18 cases involving 19 companies and 10 individuals. 21

22 Coverage Considerations Increased pursuit of individuals - More requests for separate counsel SEC s Policy of Wrongful Admissions - Impairs D&O corporate indemnity - Impairs insurance coverage 22

23 Cyber Breach And D&O Exposure 23

24 Cyber Breach D&O Suits MobileIron IPO Securities Class Action - MobileIron s IPO offering materials did not disclose a hack of a major customer. Stock price continues to suffer. Home Depot Derivative Action - 56 million customer credit card numbers compromised. Complaint alleges data breaches at other major retailers (Target, Neiman Marcus) should have been a wake-up call. Wyndham Derivative Action - Dismissed in October 2014 based on board s judgment to refuse a demand. Allegations of board failure of oversight would not have satisfied Caremark high showing anyway. 24

25 Cyber Breach D&O Suits Ahead? Many consumer lawsuits against companies few stockholder / investor suits against Ds&Os Triggers for securities class actions - Stock price drop raising questions about prior positive disclosures about corporate cyber-security measures and risks - Stock price drop on publication of an SEC or FINRA investigation raising questions about prior disclosures Triggers for derivative suits - Consumer suits, government actions, and securities class actions that expose the company to loss raising questions of failure of board oversight 25

26 Cyber Breach D&O Insurance Cyber policies cover different losses than D&O policies What are the differences? How is insurance underwriting for D&O policies responding to the onslaught of data breach occurrences and losses? 26

27 Corporate Litigation M&A By the numbers - more than 90 percent of M&A transactions valued at $100 million end up in litigation Merger objection lawsuits claim that directors and officers breached their fiduciary duties in negotiating mergers Trending Issues: - Judicial trend to reject pre-closing disclosure settlements for expansive releases and modest attorney fee awards - Plaintiffs bar trend toward post-closing money damages class actions for breach of fiduciary duties - Result exposes ex-directors to personal liability for nonexculpable breach of loyalty claims - Plaintiffs have low odds but high potential rewards 27

28 Corporate Litigation Derivative Suits Historically, derivative suits settled for minor prophylactic governance measures and small attorneys fee awards Recently, derivative suits have settled for big money: - $275 million for Activision Blizzard (2014) - $139 million for News Corp. (2013) - $137.5 million for Freeport-McMoRan (2015) - $62.5 million for Bank of America Merrill Lynch (2012) Plaintiffs firms are noticing 28

29 Corporate Litigation Derivative Suits Demands Plaintiffs must make a demand on the board of directors to bring the desired action on behalf of the company or to plead that demand would be futile What is the status of D&O insurance coverage for board investigations in response to demands? Will insurers cover expenses of Ds&Os for separate counsel in the demand investigation? 29

30 Corporate Litigation Books and Records Stockholders may to take pre-suit discovery of books and records to investigate D&O wrongdoing Issues include - Delaware changing race to the courthouse dynamics - Delaware allowing more discovery of privileged information - Delaware allowing discovery in aid of pleading - Trends - Walmart v. IBEW (Del. 2014) allowed books and records discovery of internal FCPA investigation, including privileged information and back up tapes - Sharing of discovery among potential plaintiffs When does D&O insurance coverage kick in? When should Ds&Os get counsel? 30

31 Protecting Ds&Os Overseas D&O Exposure - Shareholder suits once viewed as a U.S. phenomenon Canada and the Netherlands now permit D&O lawsuits - Regulatory investigations - Foreign suits by employees, vendors, competitors and customers. - Anti-bribery and corruption laws Gaps in Coverage - Not all countries allow foreign insurers to pay claims - Foreign insurance regulations may require local policies 31

32 Be Careful Out There 32