Catastrophe Risk Management in a Utility Maximization Model
|
|
- William Mills
- 6 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Catastrophe Risk Management in a Utility Maximization Model Borbála Szüle Corvinus University of Budapest Hungary borbala.szule@uni-corvinus.hu Climate change may be among the factors that can contribute to the changing of weather in certain geographic regions. Sometimes extreme weather conditions are related to natural catastrophe events, such as for example floods, that can influence the economy as well. In case of a natural catastrophic event the reconstruction efforts may not only occur individually in the regions affected by the catastrophe, but aid may come also from the central government. Catastrophe insurance may also contribute to the reconstruction in case of a catastrophic event, although the economic risks of catastrophes are not always managed by catastrophe insurance. In this paper certain possibilies of catastrophe risk management are modeled in a theoretical framework. In the model a natural catastrophic event may affect one of the regions of an economy, while in other regions no catastrophe can occur. According to the assumptions, in case of a catastrophe the central government may contribute to the reconstruction by imposing a tax on the regions that have not been damaged by the catastrophe. Alternatively, if certain conditions hold, a catastrophe insurance can also be bought by the region that can be affected by the natural catastrophe. These two possibilites are compared in the paper in a theoretical model, where regions are risk averse (have a concave wealth utility function) and catastrophe insurance premium is calculated based on actuarial principles. In this theoretical framework, the method with the maximum utility of the regions can be considered as the optimal catastrophe risk management possibility. 1. Introduction Climate change may affect the economy in several ways. Some scientists have argued for example, that global warming can have an effect on the frequency of extreme weather events. Analysis of management of risks associated with these changes may be interesting, since there are numerous regions in the world that are exposed to natural catastrophes, such as for example floods or earthquakes. Depending on the severity of the natural catastrophic event, not only can the number of casualties be significant, for example also infrastructure can be damaged that generally makes also the rescue and reconstruction efforts more difficult. Natural catastrophes thus usually have far-reaching consequences also in the economy. Although among others for example also the environmental effects of catastophes can be significant, this paper focuses on risk management issues in connection with economic losses. If possible, damaging effects of natural catastrophes should be restricted preventive measures like for example building high dams may prove to be useful (against risk of floods). Unfortunately, only rarely can the occurrence of natural catastrophes be totally eliminated. In case of a catastrophic event generally reconstruction is needed so that economic activity can continue. It is also important because of the economic linkages between regions: often if one of the regions has experienced a natural catastrophic event, the effect of damages can also influence
2 other regions with which the affected region has economic relationships (for example the inhabitants of the affected region can spend less on consumption as before the catastrophe). The full economic recovery of a region after a natural catastrophe can take a long time. Obviously, economic recovery after a catastrophe can be quicker with higher financial support accessible by the region that experienced the catastrophic event. Concrete solutions to financially helping a region hit by a catastrophe may differ significantly across regions, since also the features of catastrophes and characteristics of regions are not identical. However, there are basically two main methods of financing at least part of reconstruction after a catastrophe: - one of the possibilites is a catastrophe insurance solution - the other possibility is an aid financed by a central government. Of course, also a mix of these possibilites can help in the reconstruction of a region hit by a catastrophe. The question of how to find the optimal catastrophe risk management solution in a given situation, also arises. This question is not necessarily easy to answer, since usually catastrophe losses can differ significantly across regions. This study uses a theoretical framework to try to find the optimal catastrophe risk management option. In this theoretical model expected utility of regions are compared in case of catastrophe insurance and tax financed governmental aid given to a region hit by a catastrophe. This theoretical model is relatively simple compared to the complexity of concrete empirical situations, some of the aspects of a decision about catastrophe risk management options can however be demonstrated based on the results. 2. Catastrophe events and their economic effects Catastrophes can basically be grouped into two categories: natural catastrophes and manmade disasters, the following theoretical parts of this study focus on the analysis on natural catastrophes (in other parts of the study data about both types of catastrophes occures). In that case by the way risk prevention sometimes can not be fully achieved, for example in case of earthquakes even very strong building rules may not be enough to entirely protect buildings or for example infrastructure in a region. Trying to find an optimal catastrophe risk management option can thus be considered as a relevant question in case of many regions in the world. Natural catastrophes can have different causes, the main sources of insured losses in 2010 worldwide are shown in Figure 1 (losses are measured in million USD, loss values are based on property and business interruption, excluding liability and life insurance losses). Due to the randomness of the occurrence of big natural catastrophes the main sources of losses in different years are not necessarily very similar. The size of the effect of a natural catastrophe is also influenced by (among other factors) the population growth tendencies: if a region is exposed for example to earthquakes and population growth is relatively large in that region, then (parallel to the growing population) an earthquake can have more serious consequences later when also population density (and thus may be also the number of buildings) can be higher.
3 Figure 1: Insured losses in million USD in Storms Earthquakes Floods Cold, frost Droughts, bush fires, heat waves Source: Swiss Re[2011] Catastrophe insurance is not always accessible to regions potentially exposed to natural catastrophes, and even if theoretically insurance is available, for example not every individual buys it in the given region. The value of estimated total economic losses and the cost to insurers associated to these losses can differ significantly. In 2010 for example, estimated value of economic losses of natural catastrophes and man-made disasters was approximately 218 bn USD while the cost to insurers was approximately 43 bn USD (Swiss Re 2011). From these losses in 2010 the Asian region has the largest part, as it is shown in Figure 2: Figure 2: Total economic loss by region in 2010 Seas/Space 9,5% Africa 0,2% Oceania/Australia 6,0% North America 9,4% Asia 34,3% Europe 16,1% Latin America and Caribbean 24,5% Source: Swiss Re[2011] In the interpretation of catastrophe data, certain definitions also play an important role: in the analysis of data in Figure 2 for example it should be mentioned that a (catastrophic) event is included in the Swiss Re (Sigma) statistics if insured claims, total economic losses or the number of casualties exceed a certain limit, for example this limit is 86,5 million USD in terms of total economic losses (Swiss Re 2011). Of course, for example extreme weather events can also have
4 serious consequences on the economy, and with the adoption of other limits, the concrete loss numbers could differ from those shown for example on the previously analysed Figure 2. Nevertheless, information based on these limits may also be interesting: Figure 3 for example shows the ratio of total economic loss and the GDP of given regions: Figure 3: Total economic loss in 2010 as a percentage of GDP 1,10% 0,95% 0,28% 0,19% 0,13% 0,02% Latin America and Caribbean Oceania/Australia Asia Europe North America Africa Source: Swiss Re[2011] Figure 3 refers also to the fact that the relative severity of the catastrophe depends not only on the absolute value of the losses, but also on the ability (for example measured by the GDP) of a region to help to finance at least part of the reconstruction in the region hit by the catastrophe. In case of Asia for example (that had the largest part of total economic losses experienced in 2010, where economic losses has been caused by for example extraordinary rainfalls that were followed by floods, typhoons and earthquakes) the ratio of catastrophe-related economic losses relative to the GDP is not so high as for example in the Oceania / Australia region, where economic losses were caused by for example earthquakes, floods and storms (Swiss Re 2011). 3. Modeling of insurance optimality in a utility based framework Theoretically there are some methods for dealing with catastrophes: if possible, prevention (for example not building on areas exposed to flood risk) or mitigation (for example a quick reconstruction to avoid for example infections) can prove to be useful. Catastrophe insurance can also play an important role in post-disaster financing. The availability of catastrophe insurance can be even more widespread if local insurance companies can also rely on reinsurance companies that can carry a part of the losses. In case of a catastrophe insurance the insurance premium is traditionally paid in advance (before the catastrophe can occur) and if the catastrophe event happens, a given sum is paid. This inflow of money can stimulate the economy after the catastrophe by for example playing a role in the financing of reconstruction efforts. Insurance does not necessarily exist for a given risk: there are some requirements that are to be fulfilled so that insurance can be offered by private insurance companies (Banyár 1994):
5 - each individual in the group of insured is exposed to the same risk - the group of insured is homogeneous - the number of insured should be sufficiently large. In addition to this, a risk is usually considered to be insurable if the insurance event occurs randomly and independently (in case of the insured). Independence in this context means that the probability that one of the individuals in the group of insured experiences the insurance event does not affect this probability in case of an other individual in the group of insured. Based on this traditional approach insurance is best applicable in case of independent, noncorrelated risk. The law of large numbers in case of a pool of insurance policies can be interpreted so that the larger the pool of independent risks the lower the variability of the (financial) result of the insurance company. In case of a catastrophe however sometimes the opposite of this relationship can be observed: if one of the individuals in the insurance pool is damaged by the catastrophe, the probability of damages in case of other individuals in the insurance pool is relatively high. Thus, it also means that the pooling of correlated risks increases variability in case of an insurance pool. This phenomenon is usually observable in relatively small insurance pools: if the insurance pool (the number of individuals in the insurance population) is high, the risk diversification effect as a consequence of the law of large numbers can occur. Catastrophe insurance exists in some cases, thus these insurance calculation problems (as a consequence of non-correlated risks) can sometimes be managed in practice. Catastrophe insurance however is not necessarily very cheap, and the individual exposed to a catastrophe risk can decide whether to buy catastrophe insurance. This decision can be a very complex process, but theoretically it can be modeled based on evaluating expected wealth utilities. Figure 4: Insurance premium in a theoretical model utility, in case of a catastrophe utility, no catastrophe maximum insurance premium expected utility wealth Figure 4 shows how maximum insurance premium can be calculated (if insurance is offered by insurance companies) in a simple theoretical framework, where this calculation is done based on wealth utility functions. Given the wealth utility function of an individual (in the
6 homogeneous insurance pool) one can calculate the wealth with or without the occurrence of a catastrophe. By using the probability of the catastrophe event, expected utility level can be determined and the maximum insurance premium is that value that can be subtracted from the original wealth so that the resulting wealth has exactly that utility level as the expected utility calculated with the probability of the catastrophe. In actuarial calculations insurance premium is calculated as the sum of a net premium (that corresponds to the expected value of the loss in this framework) and the insurance loading (for example it should cover administrative expenses of an insurance company). In this simple theoretical model expected value of loss as a consequence of a catastrophe is the difference between the following two values: - the original wealth - the wealth belonging to the expected utility level. In case of a convex utility function (that refers to a situation when individuals are risk seeking) insurance is not offered by insurance companies, since the maximum insurance premium that the risk seeking individual were ready to pay would not even cover the expected loss. If the utility function however is concave (the case of risk averse individuals), insurance contracts are theoretically possible, since individuals are ready to pay more than the expected loss (that corresponds to the net premium). In that case the insurance company in this theoretical model can decide whether the maximum insurance premium is enough to offer insurance. Recall however that the insurance pool should also be relatively large (the number of individuals in the insurance population should usually exceed a certain limit) so that insurance premium can be calculated with a prudent actuarial method. It is worth mentioning, that in this framework only one catastrophe can occur: it can be interpreted so that the time period in the model is calibrated so that it allows for maximum one catastrophe. The cumulation of effects of more than one catastrophic event is thus not analyzed in this theoretical model. In the following part a theoretical model is introduced in which individuals are assumed to be risk averse (have a concave wealth utility function). In this model catastrophe insurance and post-catastrophe central tax are analysed as two alternative catastrophe risk management options, and conclusions are derived about the optimality of these methods based on some simple theoretical assumptions. 4. Assumptions of the theoretical model In this theoretical model optimal catastrophe risk management options for an economic entity (for example a country) with numerous geographic regions are analyzed. In case of a large economic entity (country) usually not all regions are exposed to the same type of catastrophe risk. This feature can be modeled so that only one of the regions is exposed to a catastrophe. The number of unexposed regions is denoted by N in the model. According to the assumptions only one period is considered: during this period only one catastrophe event can occur. Similar to the model mentioned in Section 2 this theoretical model does not analyze potential accumulation of
7 wealth effects arising from more catastrophes, either. It is also assumed that economic effects of only one type of catastrophe are analyzed. The wealth of individuals can have several components in practice. An important feature of wealth is liquidity. Some components of wealth are illiquid, which means that it can not be sold in the market, or sometimes illiquidity is also mentioned in connection with wealth components that theoretically can be sold, but selling can not be done immediately. In contrast to this, in case of liquid wealth components, sale of the given asset can be immediate in the markets. In the theoretical model the wealth of regions is assumed to consist of an illiquid and a liquid part (corresponding for example a house and the income). In the absence of catastrophe the total wealth (W) of the homogeneous regions is: W = H + where H denotes the illiquid wealth and the liquid part of the wealth is denoted by L. In case of a catastrophe both parts of wealth of the region exposed to the catastrophe are affected. The total damage caused by the catastrophe in the exposed region is a random variable: L ξ = d H + (L-F), with probability p 0, with probability (1-p) where d is the ratio of the damage in case of the illiquid wealth and p is the probability of the catastrophe event, and F denotes a part of liquid wealth that is not affected by the catastrophe. In practice often also those regions are affected economically by the catastrophe that were not directly damaged. In this model, this phenomenon is modeled so that liquid assets of regions are not independent. According to the assumptions, the liquid wealth of the unexposed regions is equal to the liquid wealth of the exposed region. Individuals in the theoretical model are assumed to be the regions in the economic entity (country). This assumption reflects the phenomenon that if the insurance pool consists of for example individual households, then catastrophe losses can be correlated within a region. Of course, the definition of regions can be difficult, in this model it is assumed that an adequate determination of regions is possible, based on for example geographic features and probability of a given type of catastrophe. If the insurance pool consists of regions, correlation between losses belonging to regions may be lower (compared to the case when insurance pool consists of for example individual households), thus insurance calculations may be made more easily.
8 Figure 5: Utility in case of the region exposed to the catastrophe U(H+L-d H-(L-F)) U(H+L) p (d H-(L-F)) expected utility wealth Regions are assumed to be risk averse, thus utility of wealth of the regions is measured by a concave wealth utility function. Figure 5 illustrates the expected value of the possible loss as a consequence of a catastrophe, this expected value is p (d H + (L-F)). The concave utility function of the regions is denoted by U(W). Mathematically, in case of a concave utility function 2 du ( W ) du ( W ) the derivatives of the functions have given signs: > 0 and < 0. A possible 2 dw dw function form for the utility function is the logarithmic one: in the following U ( W ) = ln( W ) is assumed in the model. 5. Catastrophe risk management options According to the assumptions, a catastrophe event can affect the wealth of both exposed and unexposed regions. There is a wide range of possible solutions how to manage the wealth effects of a catastrophe in practice, in this theoretical model two possible catastrophe risk management options are compared: - if catastrophe insurance is available on the insurance market, the exposed region could possibly buy a catastrophe insurance that could cover the total damage - in the absence of catastrophe insurance a tax could be imposed on the regions not hit by the catastrophe event to cover a part of the total damage. An important difference between these options is that insurance premium is paid in advance (at the beginning of the period), while tax is paid at the end of the period in the model. According to the assumptions, calculation of insurance premium is based on actuarial principles, the total insurance premium is equal to the sum of the expected value of losses and the insurance loading: where c refers to the insurance loading. ( d H + L F ) p ( 1 + c)
9 If the region that is exposed to the catastrophe buys a catastrophe insurance (by assuming that this insurance is offered and the liquid wealth of the region is enough to pay the insurance premium), then the utility of this region is: ( L + H ( d H + L F ) p ( 1+ c) ) ln. In this case the utility of the regions that are not exposed to the catastrophe event is: ln ( L + H ). The other possible catastrophe risk management option plays a role in case of a catastrophe event. In the model it is assumed that a central government of the economic entity (country) can impose a tax on the regions where no catastrophe event occured so that an aid can be paid to the region hit by the catastrophe. The total transfer financed by the tax is part (x) of the damage of the illiquid assets in the model. This assumption of the model reflects the phenomenon that sometimes central government supports reconstruction of buildings and infrastructure in a region hit by a natural catastrophe. According to the assumptions, the regions where no catastrophe event occurs, pay the equal amount of tax: x d H N Given the ratio x the utility level of the region exposed to the catastrophe depends on the random variable ξ (the value of the damage), thus the expected utility level is compared with the utility in case of a catastrophe insurance. According to the assumptions in the model, the expected utility in case of a reconstruction tax : ( F + H d H + d H x) + ( 1 p) ln( L H ) p ln + The utility level of regions where no catastrophe event occurs also depends on the damage caused by the catastrophe. The expected utility level of these regions in case of a tax which is used for partly reconstruction of illiquid assets damaged by the catastrophe: d H x p ln F + H + + N ( 1 p) ln( L H ) In the theoretical model it is assumed that expected utility levels can be compared (a higher utility level can be considered as better) and in addition to this utility levels of regions can be aggregated. It is assumed that the total utility level of the economic entity (country) can be calculated as the sum of utility levels of the regions. Optimal catastrophe risk management option in this theoretical model can be identified as the option with the highest total utility level.
10 6. Optimal catastrophe risk management In case of an increase in the reconstruction tax the expected utility levels of the regions change. This tax is only imposed after a catastrophe has hit a region. 0,096 Figure 6: Utility levels of regions as a function of the rate x 0,095 0,095 0,094 0,094 0,093 0,093 0,092 0,092 0, ,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1 value of x exposed region one of the unexposed regions Source: own calculations The utility level of the region exposed to the catastrophe and the utility level of the other regions change oppositely. Figure 6 illustrates this phenomenon (F=0.01, L=0.1, H=1, p=0.005, d=0.5). Optimum value of the reconstruction tax can be calculated based on the total utility of all regions. With the assumption that total utility of the regions can be calculated as the sum of the individual utility levels the optimal level of the tax is the value that maximizes the following expression (the sum of utility values for all groups): p ln ( F + H d H + d H x) + ( 1 p) ln( L + H ) d H x + N p ln F + H + N + ( 1 p) ln( L + H ) Maximum is calculated by calculating the first derivative of this expression, in case of an optimum it should be equal to zero. The optimum value of the reconstruction tax is: x * 1 = 1 1+ N = N N + 1 This is a simple expression and relatively easy to interpret: in this simple model framework the optimal contribution rate to the reconstruction of damages caused by a catastrophe event approaches 1 as the number of regions increases. This result thus means that the higher the number of regions not exposed to the catastrophe (compared to the number of regions hit by the
11 catastrophe, in this model there is only one such region), the larger the optimal tax-financed reconstruction support. If the optimal reconstruction tax is imposed, total utility level of regions in case of an imposed reconstruction tax is maximal. The optimality of a given catastrophe management option can also be analyzed, since for given parameters the option with the higher total utility level can be found. In the following a situation is analysed when the economic entity consists of two regions, and one of the regions is exposed to a natural catastrophe. Figure 7 illustrates a situation when total utility level in case of a reconstruction tax changes with the value of x (F=0.9, L=0.95, H=1, p=0.001, d=0.5, c=0.2, N=1). It can be observed on Figure 7 that total utility level in case of catastrophe insurance is constant, since the value of x has no effect on utility in the absence of this type of tax. The (optimal) value of x is equal to 0.5 where total utility in case if a reconstruction tax is maximal, since in this case * 1 1 x = =. Figure 7 shows a situation where the optimal reconstruction tax results in a N higher aggregate utility level than the catastrophe insurance. The parameters on Figure 7 are not necessarily representative for practical experience, the results illustrated on Figure 7 however indicate that theoretically there can be situations where total utility of the regions can be higher with reconstruction tax than with a catastrophe insurance. Figure 7: Aggregate utility level in case of different catastrophe risk management options insurance tax 0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1 the value of x Source: own calculations Parameter values in case of Figure 7 indicate that this situation is characterized by relatively similar values of liquid and illiquid assets, a low number of regions, and among others a relatively costly insurance). The relation of the two catastrophe risk management options changes if for example catastrophe insurance does not cost so much as in case of the parameters of Figure 7. Figure 8 illustrates a situation with the same parameters as those in case of Figure 7 except that the insurance loading is lower (F=0.9, L=0.95, H=1, p=0.001, d=0.5, c=0.05, N=1):
12 Figure 8: Aggregate utility levels with a low cost catastrophe insurance insurance tax 0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1 the value of x Source: own calculations With lower insurance loading (illustrated on Figure 8) the better alternative is the catastrophe insurance. These results of the theoretical model indicate that cost of catastrophe insurance is an important factor that influences the optimality of catastrophe risk management options. The results of the theoretical model were calculated based on the assumption that there is a theoretical choice between catastrophe insurance and a post-catastrophe reconstruction tax imposed on regions not hit by the natural catastrophe. Of course, this choice does not necessarily exist, not even theoretically. If an insurance company can not build a large enough (and appropriate) insurance pool, then usually no catastrophe insurance is available. In this case, in this theoretical model only a centrally imposed tax is available for financing a post-catastrophe reconstruction. In the theoretical model introduced in this paper the optimal solution (that maximizes total expected utility) can be found if for given parameters the total expected utility level is calculated for both the catastrophe insurance alternative and the reconstruction tax alternative. These alternatives differ significantly, for example in case of a catastrophe insurance the region exposed to a catastrophe pays insurance premium before a catastrophe can occur, while in case of a reconstruction tax the other (not damaged) regions pay after a catastrophe event has happened. The optimality of these two catastrophe risk management options in the theoretical model depends on the values of the model parameters. In addition to this, if catastrophe insurance theoretically proves to be better than the other alternative, then it is also necessary to analyze whether a catastrophe insurace is theoretically available. In case of an insurance the pooling of individual risks is of central importance, thus for example reinsurance companies can contribute to the availability of catastrophe insurance. 7. Conclusions Natural catastrophes can cause large economic losses, the management of catastrophe risk can thus contribute to the financial stability of the economy. The range of solutions is wide in practice, but catastrophe risk management is sometimes a mix of catastrophe insurance and government participation in the financing of reconstruction after a catastrophe. These two alternatives are compared in a theoretical model in this paper in a model framework where the
13 alternative with the higher total expected utility level is considered to be the optimal option. Based on the results of the theoretical model one of the conclusions is that the optimal rate of the reconstruction tax increases as the number of regions not affected by the catastrophe increases relative to the number of regions hit by the catastrophe. An other interesting result of the theoretical model is that the optimality of these two alternatives depend heavily on the value of the insurance loading: with higher insurance loading reconstruction tax tends to result in a higher aggregate expected utility than catastrophe insurance. With low costs in addition to the net premium (a lower insurance loading) however catastrophe insurance (if it is available) can be the optimal catastrophe risk management option (that results in a higher expected utility level). References Banyár, J.(1994): Az életbiztosítás alapjai ( Basics of life insurance, in Hungarian) Bankárképző Biztosítási Oktatási Intézet, Budapest Swiss Re (2011): Natural catastrophes and man-made disasters in 2010: a year of devastating and costly events (authors: L.Bevere, B.Rogers, B.Grollimund) Swiss Re, Sigma No. 1/2011.
ICRM Seminar 2014General
Closing the Nat Cat protection gap: Jakarta General Agenda What is Nat Cat protection gap? Nat Cat risk to Jakarta Estimation of insured and insurable portfolio Assumptions for Nat Cat modeling Nat Cat
More informationModeling Extreme Event Risk
Modeling Extreme Event Risk Both natural catastrophes earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods and man-made disasters, including terrorism and extreme casualty events, can jeopardize the financial
More informationCatastrophe Reinsurance Pricing
Catastrophe Reinsurance Pricing Science, Art or Both? By Joseph Qiu, Ming Li, Qin Wang and Bo Wang Insurers using catastrophe reinsurance, a critical financial management tool with complex pricing, can
More informationThe Importance and Development of Catastrophe Models
The University of Akron IdeaExchange@UAkron Honors Research Projects The Dr. Gary B. and Pamela S. Williams Honors College Spring 2018 The Importance and Development of Catastrophe Models Kevin Schwall
More informationCATASTROPHE RISK MODELLING AND INSURANCE PENETRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
CATASTROPHE RISK MODELLING AND INSURANCE PENETRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES M.R. Zolfaghari 1 1 Assistant Professor, Civil Engineering Department, KNT University, Tehran, Iran mzolfaghari@kntu.ac.ir ABSTRACT:
More informationInsuResilience Solutions Fund (ISF) Transforming concepts into products
InsuResilience Solutions Fund (ISF) Transforming concepts into products The need for climate risk insurance solutions Increasing risks of natural disasters Increasing intensity and frequency of extreme
More informationCatastrophe Risk Capital Charge: Evidence from the Thai Non-Life Insurance Industry
American Journal of Economics 2015, 5(5): 488-494 DOI: 10.5923/j.economics.20150505.08 Catastrophe Risk Capital Charge: Evidence from the Thai Non-Life Insurance Industry Thitivadee Chaiyawat *, Pojjanart
More informationCATASTROPHIC RISK AND INSURANCE Hurricane and Hydro meteorological Risks
CATASTROPHIC RISK AND INSURANCE Hurricane and Hydro meteorological Risks INTRODUCTORY REMARKS OECD IAIS ASSAL VII Conference on Insurance Regulation and Supervision in Latin America Lisboa, 24-28 April
More informationUsing Reinsurance to Optimise the Solvency Position in an Insurance Company
Using Reinsurance to Optimise the Solvency Position in an Insurance Company Philippe Maeder, Head of Pricing Life & Health for Latin America Table of Contents / Agenda Solvency Framework Impact of Reinsurance
More informationSmall States Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility
Small 2005 States Forum 2005 Annual Meetings World Bank Group/International Monetary Fund Washington, DC DRAFT September 24, 2005 www.worldbank.org/smallstates Small States Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility
More informationFrance s Funds and Insurance Schemes for Natural Disasters. Update
France s Funds and Insurance Schemes for Natural Disasters Update 1 Mandatory cover of losses arising from Natural Catastrophes in: all Physical Damage (a.k.a. Fire ) insurance policies covering risks
More informationCatastrophe Risk Engineering Solutions
Catastrophe Risk Engineering Solutions Catastrophes, whether natural or man-made, can damage structures, disrupt process flows and supply chains, devastate a workforce, and financially cripple a company
More informationInnovative Solutions for Disaster Relief
Innovative Solutions for Disaster Relief How development organizations and foundations can use Capital Markets to prepare and leverage funds for future natural disasters Agenda Natural catastrophes in
More informationStability and Capacity of Property Liability Insurance Markets. Neil Doherty Cartagena, Colombia May 2007
Stability and Capacity of Property Liability Insurance Markets Neil Doherty Cartagena, Colombia May 2007 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 Market Stability: Combined Ratio in Colombia Life P&C 1975 1976
More informationCatastrophe Risk Insurance and its Pricing Issues for Emerging Markets
Catastrophe Risk Insurance and its Pricing Issues for Emerging Markets P R O F. D R. A. S E V T A P K E S T E L M I D D L E E A S T T E C H N I C A L U N I V E R S I T Y T H E I N S T I T U T E O F A P
More informationCharacterization of the Optimum
ECO 317 Economics of Uncertainty Fall Term 2009 Notes for lectures 5. Portfolio Allocation with One Riskless, One Risky Asset Characterization of the Optimum Consider a risk-averse, expected-utility-maximizing
More informationNatural Disasters in 2007: An Analytical Overview
Natural Disasters in 2007: An Analytical Overview Chapter 1: Impact of Natural Disasters This chapter deals with the overall trends in natural disasters and their impacts for the year 2007. It also addresses
More informationSchroders Insurance-Linked Securities
October 2015 For professional investors or advisers only. Not suitable for retail clients. Schroders Insurance-Linked Securities Advised by Secquaero Advisors AG Schroders Insurance-Linked Securities
More informationPCDIP. Philippine City Disaster Insurance Pool
PCDIP Philippine City Disaster Insurance Pool Disaster Risk The Philippines is located in one of the world s most disaster-prone regions. Positioned on the Pacific Ring of Fire and within the Western North
More informationEx Ante Financing for Disaster Risk Management and Adaptation
Ex Ante Financing for Disaster Risk Management and Adaptation A Public Policy Perspective Dr. Jerry Skees H.B. Price Professor, University of Kentucky, and President, GlobalAgRisk, Inc. Piura, Peru November
More informationAAS BTA Baltic Insurance Company Risks and Risk Management
AAS BTA Baltic Insurance Company Risks and Risk Management December 2017 1 RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM The business of insurance represents the transfer of risk from the insurance policy holder to the insurer
More informationKingdom of Saudi Arabia Capital Market Authority. Investment
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Capital Market Authority Investment The Definition of Investment Investment is defined as the commitment of current financial resources in order to achieve higher gains in the
More informationINDEX BASED RISK TRANSFER AND INSURANCE MECHANISMS FOR ADAPTATION. Abedalrazq Khalil, PhD Water Resources Specialist, World Bank
INDEX BASED RISK TRANSFER AND INSURANCE MECHANISMS FOR ADAPTATION Abedalrazq Khalil, PhD Water Resources Specialist, World Bank Outline Introduction: Climate Change and Extremes Index Based Risk Transfer:
More informationNON-TRADITIONAL SOLUTIONS August 2009
www.miller-insurance.com NON-TRADITIONAL SOLUTIONS August 2009 An introduction to risk finance By James Mounty CONTENTS How insurance works 03 What is risk finance 05 Probability distributions 07 Sample
More informationMODEL VULNERABILITY Author: Mohammad Zolfaghari CatRisk Solutions
BACKGROUND A catastrophe hazard module provides probabilistic distribution of hazard intensity measure (IM) for each location. Buildings exposed to catastrophe hazards behave differently based on their
More informationImpact of Climate Change on Insurers Threats and Opportunities
1 Impact of Climate Change on Insurers Threats and Opportunities Budapest, October 8 th, 2013 Climate circumstances of our planet are undergoing significant changes leading to increasing number of extreme
More informationEvaluating Sovereign Disaster Risk Finance Strategies: Case Studies and Guidance
Public Disclosure Authorized Evaluating Sovereign Disaster Risk Finance Strategies: Case Studies and Guidance October 2016 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
More informationRisk Mitigation and the role of (re)insurance
Risk Mitigation and the role of (re)insurance Michael Eberhardt, CFA < copyright name, company or Institute> This presentation has been prepared for the Actuaries Institute 2016 Managing Extreme Events
More informationUPDATED IAA EDUCATION SYLLABUS
II. UPDATED IAA EDUCATION SYLLABUS A. Supporting Learning Areas 1. STATISTICS Aim: To enable students to apply core statistical techniques to actuarial applications in insurance, pensions and emerging
More informationBig Data - Transforming Risk and Insurance. Driving Change
Big - Transforming Risk and Insurance George Attard Head of Aon Benfield Analytics, International Catastrophe Risk Management Market Challenges Lack of risk awareness Low disposable income High concentrations
More informationOVERVIEW. Linking disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. Disaster reduction - trends Trends in economic impact of disasters
Linking disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation Inter-Agency Secretariat for the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) A. Trends OVERVIEW B. Disaster reduction a tool for
More informationDeveloping a Disaster Insurance Framework for Pakistan
Developing a Disaster Insurance Framework for Pakistan Fund Design Options RECURRING NATURAL HAZARDS ERODE RESILIENCE A NATIONAL DISASTER INSURANCE FUND TO SUPPORT VULNERABLE LOW-INCOME PEOPLE The people
More informationSoutheast Asia Disaster Risk Insurance Facility
Southeast Asia Disaster Risk Insurance Facility PROTECT THE GREATEST HOME OF ALL: OUR COUNTRIES SEADRIF is a regional platform to provide ASEAN countries with financial solutions and technical advice to
More informationREDUCING DISASTER RISK a challenge for development
Reducing Disaster Risk: a challenge for development REDUCING DISASTER RISK a challenge for development A Global Report from : United Nations Development Programme Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
More informationOctober The benefits of open reinsurance markets. 1. Introduction
October 2015 The benefits of open reinsurance markets 1. Introduction Open reinsurance markets are vital to enable reinsurance markets to operate efficiently, to diversify risk globally and to promote
More informationThe impact of present and future climate changes on the international insurance & reinsurance industry
Copyright 2007 Willis Limited all rights reserved. The impact of present and future climate changes on the international insurance & reinsurance industry Fiona Shaw MSc. ACII Executive Director Willis
More informationMICROINSURANCE SCHEMES FOR PROPERTY: EXAMPLES FROM LATIN AMERICA
MICROINSURANCE SCHEMES FOR PROPERTY: EXAMPLES FROM LATIN AMERICA A. Smolka 1, A. Moser 2, A. Allmann 3, D. Hollnack 3, and M. Spranger 4 1 Head, Risk Evaluation Natural Perils, GeoRisks Research, Munich
More informationNews release. Page 1/5. Contact: Media Relations, Zurich Telephone Lucia Bevere, Zurich Telephone
News release a Swiss Re s sigma on natural catastrophes and man-made disasters in 2011unveils USD 116 billion in insured losses and record economic losses of USD 370 billion Contact: Media Relations, Zurich
More informationPioneer ILS Interval Fund
Pioneer ILS Interval Fund COMMENTARY Performance Analysis & Commentary March 2016 Fund Ticker Symbol: XILSX us.pioneerinvestments.com First Quarter Review The Fund returned 1.35%, net of fees, in the first
More informationAfrican Insurance Organisation
Ad-Hoc Expert Meeting on CAPACITY-BUILDING FOR THE INSURANCE SECTOR IN AFRCA 23 February 2009 African Insurance Organisation An Introduction by Ms. Prisca SOARES Secretary General, African Insurance Organisation
More informationJune 18, Bermuda: Reinsurance Market Capital in Focus
June 18, 2015 Bermuda: Reinsurance Market Capital in Focus Bermuda is an island the size of Manhattan. As anyone who has ever tried to buy real estate in a big city like Manhattan knows, there is a wide
More informationChapter 1 NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISASTERS
Chapter 1 NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISASTERS MULTIPLE-CHOICE QUESTIONS 1. People live in dangerous areas for what reasons? a. for the views b. because of cheap land c. because the land is fertile d. for proximity
More informationDEFINING THE PROTECTION GAP. 1: Decide who /what should be protected:
DEFINING THE PROTECTION GAP Introduction In recent years, we ve seen a considerable increase in disasters, both in their frequency and severity. Overall economic losses from such disasters currently average
More informationECO 317 Economics of Uncertainty Fall Term 2009 Notes for lectures 9. Demand for Insurance
The Basic Two-State Model ECO 317 Economics of Uncertainty Fall Term 2009 Notes for lectures 9. Demand for Insurance Insurance is a method for reducing (or in ideal circumstances even eliminating) individual
More informationClimate change and the increased risk in the insurance industry. Dac Khoa Nguyen. Macquarie University
Macquarie Matrix: Special edition, ACUR 2013 Macquarie University Abstract There has been no solid economic argument for taking action to prevent or amend the effects of climate change due to the uncertainty
More informationWEATHER EXTREMES, CLIMATE CHANGE,
WEATHER EXTREMES, CLIMATE CHANGE, DURBAN 2011 ELECTRONIC PRESS FOLDER Status: 25.11.2011 Contents 1. Current meteorological knowledge 2. Extreme weather events 3. Political action required 4. Insurance
More informationDISASTER RISK FINANCING STRATEGIES AND ITS COMPONENTS
DISASTER RISK FINANCING STRATEGIES AND ITS COMPONENTS Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, Principal Administrator, Insurance and Private Pensions, OECD Joint DAC-EPOC Task Team on Climate Change and Development Co-operation
More informationINSTITUTE AND FACULTY OF ACTUARIES SUMMARY
INSTITUTE AND FACULTY OF ACTUARIES SUMMARY Specimen 2019 CP2: Actuarial Modelling Paper 2 Institute and Faculty of Actuaries TQIC Reinsurance Renewal Objective The objective of this project is to use random
More informationKnowledge FOr Resilient
Date: 14 December 2017 Place: Novi Sad Knowledge FOr Resilient society FINANCIAL RESILIENCE TO HAZARDS AND CLIMATE FINANCE: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH OF TOOLS AND METHODS FOR DISASTER RISK FINANCE Outline
More informationNatural catastrophes: A risk transfer concept for Italy
Natural catastrophes: A risk transfer concept for Italy AIDA Michael seminar Schwarz, on natural December catastrophes 2007 Milan, 19 January 2009 AIDA Seminar, 19 January 10 Nat Cat Insurance Solutions
More informationThe 1995 Report on the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 22 (No. 85, October 1997) 496-500 The 1995 Report on the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) Working Group Chapter 17 - Financial Services by Andrew
More informationHalf Year Report 2011
Zurich Financial Services Group Half Year Report 2011 Report for the six months to June 30, 2011 About Zurich Zurich is one of the world s largest insurance groups, and one of the few to operate on a truly
More informationPal. Jour., 2017, 16, 211:217 Copyright 2017 by Palma Journal, All Rights Reserved Available online at:
Pal. Jour., 2017, 16, 211:217 Copyright 2017 by Palma Journal, All Rights Reserved Available online at: http://palmajournal.org/ Study and Design of Gensai Products: Reducing the Amount of Damage After
More informationPortfolio Investment
Portfolio Investment Robert A. Miller Tepper School of Business CMU 45-871 Lecture 5 Miller (Tepper School of Business CMU) Portfolio Investment 45-871 Lecture 5 1 / 22 Simplifying the framework for analysis
More informationConsumer s behavior under uncertainty
Consumer s behavior under uncertainty Microéconomie, Chap 5 1 Plan of the talk What is a risk? Preferences under uncertainty Demand of risky assets Reducing risks 2 Introduction How does the consumer choose
More informationEUROPEAN NON-LIFE INSURANCE GROUPS RANKING 2010
EUROPEAN NON-LIFE INSURANCE GROUPS RANKING 2010 June 2011 Table of contents: 1. Presentation 2. Methodology 3. General Comments 4. Comments by Group Annexes Partial reproduction of the information contained
More informationHazard Mitigation Planning
Hazard Mitigation Planning Mitigation In order to develop an effective mitigation plan for your facility, residents and staff, one must understand several factors. The first factor is geography. Is your
More informationChapter 2: Natural Disasters and Sustainable Development
Chapter 2: Natural Disasters and Sustainable Development This chapter addresses the importance of the link between disaster reduction frameworks and development initiatives, based on the disaster trends
More informationOperating and financial review Zurich Financial Services Group Half Year Report 2011
Operating and financial review 2011 Half Year Report 2011 2 Half Year Report 2011 Operating and financial review The information contained within the Operating and financial review is unaudited. This document
More informationPost July 2013 Renewal Update
Catastrophe Reinsurance Post July 213 Renewal Update 1 July 213 Australian and New Zealand Catastrophe reinsurance renewals saw an additional AUD1.2 billion of vertical catastrophe reinsurance purchased
More informationDisasters and Climate Change: Hazards of Nature or Risks from Development
Disasters and Climate Change: Hazards of Nature or Risks from Development Ajay Chhibber Director, Independent Evaluation Group World Bank Fourth Disasters and Development Seminar Tuesday, November 28,
More informationMossin s Theorem for Upper-Limit Insurance Policies
Mossin s Theorem for Upper-Limit Insurance Policies Harris Schlesinger Department of Finance, University of Alabama, USA Center of Finance & Econometrics, University of Konstanz, Germany E-mail: hschlesi@cba.ua.edu
More informationRANKING. European Non-Life insurance groups. One more year, FUNDACIÓN MAPFRE issues the report
RANKING One more year, FUNDACIÓN issues the report European Non-Life insurance groups «European Non-Life Insurance Groups Ranking», based on the premium volume of each group, with a complete analysis of
More informationSERBIAN REINSURANCE MARKET
Branko Pavlović, Delta Generali osiguranje SERBIAN REINSURANCE MARKET ABSTRACT Reinsurance is a very important part of the insurance business, as without it the insurance companies would not be able to
More informationNATURAL PERILS - PREPARATION OR RECOVERY WHICH IS HARDER?
NATURAL PERILS - PREPARATION OR RECOVERY WHICH IS HARDER? Northern Territory Insurance Conference Jim Filer Senior Risk Engineer Date : 28 October 2016 Version No. 1.0 Contents Introduction Natural Perils
More informationThe financial implications of climate change: the North East and beyond. Focus on Climate Change, Pace Energy and Climate Center, June 27, 2012
The financial implications of climate change: the North East and beyond Focus on Climate Change, Pace Energy and Climate Center, June 27, 2012 Agenda Introduction Financial impacts of weather extremes
More informationFrancesco Rispoli, IFAD, Italy
Scaling up insurance as a disaster resilience strategy for smallholder farmers in Latin America 11 th Consultative Forum on microinsurance regulation for insurance supervisory authorities, insurance practitioners
More informationClimate Change and Natural Disasters: Economic Impacts and Possible Countermeasures
Climate Change and Natural Disasters: Economic Impacts and Possible Countermeasures Prof. Dr. Gerhard Berz, ret. Head, Geo Risks Research Dept., Munich Reinsurance Company Natural Disasters 1980-2005
More informationClimate Insurance Fund (CIF)
Climate Insurance Fund (CIF) Developing Climate Insurance Markets Around the Globe Through Equity/Debt Investments and Technical Assistance to Facilitate Healthy Development Agenda 1 The Climate Insurance
More informationROGER M. COOKE AND CAROLYN KOUSKY. in new research, we have been examining the distributions of damages from
Are Catastrophes Insurable? ROGER M. COOKE AND CAROLYN KOUSKY the economic costs of natural disasters in the United States (adjusted for inflation) have been increasing in recent decades. the primary reason
More information1H 2014 Global Catastrophe Recap
1H 2014 Global Catastrophe Recap Table of Contents Overview 3 Economic Losses 3 Multi-Billion Dollar Economic Loss Events 4 Insured Losses 5 Billion-Dollar Insured Loss Events 6 Additional Comments 6 Contact
More informationLessons learned: structuring and pricing index-based insurance in developing countries
Lessons learned: structuring and pricing index-based insurance in developing countries I4 Technical Meeting, 13-14 June 2012, Rome Marcel Küttel, Weather Underwriter, Swiss Re Corporate Solutions Swiss
More informationA Bivariate Shot Noise Self-Exciting Process for Insurance
A Bivariate Shot Noise Self-Exciting Process for Insurance Jiwook Jang Department of Applied Finance & Actuarial Studies Faculty of Business and Economics Macquarie University, Sydney Australia Angelos
More informationEconomics of Climate Adaptation
Shaping Climate-resilient Development Economics of Climate Adaptation A Framework for Decision-makers Dr. David N. Bresch, Head Sustainability & Political Risk Management, Swiss Re david_bresch@swissre.com
More informationDeveloping Catastrophe and Weather Risk Markets in Southeast Europe: From Concept to Reality
Developing Catastrophe and Weather Risk Markets in Southeast Europe: From Concept to Reality First Regional Europa Re Insurance Conference October 2011 Aleksandra Nakeva Ruzin, MPPM Executive Director
More informationStochastic Analysis Of Long Term Multiple-Decrement Contracts
Stochastic Analysis Of Long Term Multiple-Decrement Contracts Matthew Clark, FSA, MAAA and Chad Runchey, FSA, MAAA Ernst & Young LLP January 2008 Table of Contents Executive Summary...3 Introduction...6
More informationFinancial Solutions for Risk Management. Sovereign Debt Management Forum Washington DC October 20, 2016
Financial Solutions for Risk Management Sovereign Debt Management Forum Washington DC October 20, 2016 Uninsured losses from natural catastrophes are a growing burden for governments Natural catastrophe
More informationFrench Protection Covers Against Natural Disasters. P. Tinard Sr. Cat Modeler R&D Technical Studies Public Reinsurance
French Protection Covers Against Natural Disasters P. Tinard Sr. Cat Modeler R&D Technical Studies Public Reinsurance Agenda - Highlights on the French context - Main characteristics of the Nat Cat compensation
More informationDisaster Risk Financing and Contingent Credit
Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Policy Research Working Paper 5693 Disaster Risk Financing and Contingent Credit A Dynamic
More informationInsuring Climate Change-related Risks
Insuring Climate Change-related Risks 19 February 2016 Austrian Climate Change Workshop Day 2 Tobias Grimm Senior Project Manager Corporate Climate Centre Climate & Renewables Munich Re some facts About
More informationInsuring against natural hazards
Insuring against natural hazards Insuring against hydro- geomorphological risks and disasters G. BRUGNOT, Cemagref 27/09/00 1 Which natural risks we will consider We will mainly concentrate on : Floods
More informationGLOSSARY. 1 Crop Cutting Experiments
GLOSSARY 1 Crop Cutting Experiments Crop Cutting experiments are carried out on all important crops for the purpose of General Crop Estimation Surveys. The same yield data is used for purpose of calculation
More informationDesigning property reinsurance programmes The pragmatic approach. Net retention. oss reserves. approx. 1% Net retention. approx.
Net retention oss reserves Net capacity et premiums Gross capacity Net capacity approx. 1% < 10% Gross capacity Gross premiums 10 25 Gross premium volume Capital plus loss reserves N t retention > CHF
More informationRisks. Insurance. Credit Inflation Liquidity Operational Strategic. Market. Risk Controlling Achieving Mastery over Unwanted Surprises
CONTROLLING INSURER TOP RISKS Risk Controlling Achieving Mastery over Unwanted Surprises Risks Insurance Underwriting - Nat Cat Underwriting Property Underwriting - Casualty Reserve Market Equity Interest
More informationPredicting Disaster, Managing Losses
Predicting Disaster, Managing Losses Thomas R. Loster GeoRisks Research, Munich Re Head of Weather/Climate Risks Research Finance, Environment and Sustainable Development Corporate Responsibility and Capital
More informationMethodology Calculating the insurance gap
Methodology Calculating the insurance gap Insurance penetration Methodology 3 Insurance Insurance Penetration Rank Rank Rank penetration penetration difference 2018 2012 change 2018 report 2012 report
More informationReport on insurer catastrophe risk survey 2016
Report on insurer catastrophe risk survey 2016 Prudential Supervision Department Reserve Bank of New Zealand April 2017 Ref #6939645 v1.1 1. Summary In late 2016 / early 2017 the Reserve Bank conducted
More informationCatastrophe Risk Financing Instruments. Abhas K. Jha Regional Coordinator, Disaster Risk Management East Asia and the Pacific
Catastrophe Risk Financing Instruments Abhas K. Jha Regional Coordinator, Disaster Risk Management East Asia and the Pacific Structure of Presentation Impact of Disasters in developing Countries The Need
More informationEExtreme weather events are becoming more frequent and more costly.
FEATURE RESPONDING TO CATASTROPHIC WEATHER, CAPTIVES ANSWER THE CALL EExtreme weather events are becoming more frequent and more costly. According to Munich Re, in 2017 insured catastrophic losses were
More informationCARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK SUPPORT FOR HAITI TO MEET COMMITMENT TO CARIBBEAN CATASTROPHE RISK INSURANCE FACILITY FOR THE HURRICANE SEASON
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AUTHORISED CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK SUPPORT FOR HAITI TO MEET COMMITMENT TO CARIBBEAN CATASTROPHE RISK INSURANCE FACILITY FOR THE 2017-2018 HURRICANE SEASON This Document is being made
More informationRISK MANAGEMENT 5 SAMPO GROUP'S STEERING MODEL 7 SAMPO GROUP S OPERATIONS, RISKS AND EARNINGS LOGIC
Risk Management RISK MANAGEMENT 5 SAMPO GROUP'S STEERING MODEL 7 SAMPO GROUP S OPERATIONS, RISKS AND EARNINGS LOGIC 13 RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS IN SAMPO GROUP COMPANIES 15 Risk Governance 20 Balance between
More informationManaging Environmental Financial Risk Gregory W. Characklis Department of Environmental Sciences & Engineering University of North Carolina at Chapel
Managing Environmental Financial Risk Gregory W. Characklis Department of Environmental Sciences & Engineering University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Carolina Climate Resilience Conference, September
More informationGlobal Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery. of the Hyogo Framework for Action. Kobe, January 15, 2007
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery New Initiative to Enable / Accelerate the Implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action Kobe, January 15, 2007 Maryvonne Plessis-Fraissard Senior
More informationSwiss Re Media Conference. Monte Carlo, 10 September 2018
Swiss Re Media Conference Monte Carlo, 10 September 2018 Today s agenda First part: Plenum presentation Making the world more resilient Moses Ojeisekhoba, CEO Reinsurance Underwriting and renewals Edouard
More informationAn Empirical Note on the Relationship between Unemployment and Risk- Aversion
An Empirical Note on the Relationship between Unemployment and Risk- Aversion Luis Diaz-Serrano and Donal O Neill National University of Ireland Maynooth, Department of Economics Abstract In this paper
More informationNatural Perils and Insurance
Natural Perils and Insurance Quiz Question #1 Which floor in a high rise building should be avoided in an earthquake prone area? 1) First Floor 2) Third Floor 3) Top Floor 4) High rise buildings should
More informationCatastrophe Insurance System in France
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 20 (No. 77 October 1995) 474-480 Catastrophe Insurance System in France by Serge Magnan * 1. Introduction Since the beginning of the fifties, French insurance companies
More informationReinsuring for Catastrophes through Industry Loss Warranties A Practical Approach
Reinsuring for Catastrophes through Industry Loss Warranties A Practical Approach Ali Ishaq, FCAS, MAAA Abstract: Within the last couple of decades natural and man-made catastrophes have become a source
More informationDr. Joseph A. Weinstock Asian Development Bank
New Directions of Asian Development Bank in Reducing Disaster Risk Dr. Joseph A. Weinstock Asian Development Bank January 20, 2005 Kobe, Japan Global Disasters 1974 2003: People Affected Region Mean Annual
More informationGlobal insured losses from disaster events were USD 54 billion in 2016, up 43% from 2015, latest Swiss Re Institute sigma says
News release Global insured losses from disaster events were USD 54 billion in 2016, up 43% from 2015, latest Swiss Re Institute sigma says Global total economic losses from disaster events were USD 175
More information