Asymmetric Information

Transcription

1 Asymmetric Information 16

2 Introduction 16 Chapter Outline 16.1 The Lemons Problem and Adverse Selection 16.2 Moral Hazard 16.3 Asymmetric Information in Principal Agent Relationships 16.4 Signaling to Solve Asymmetric Information Problems 16.5 Conclusion

3 Introduction 16 Our analysis of markets thus far has assumed that participants have complete information in market transactions. All participants in a transaction know the relevant information. All participants face the same level of uncertainty. In reality, many market transactions occur under conditions of incomplete information, in which one or more parties to a market cannot determine with certainty all of the important attributes of a market or a particular good. This is asymmetric information. An imbalance of information across participants in a transaction

4 The Lemons Problem and Adverse Selection 16.1 A common manifestation of asymmetric information in markets is the lemons problem. An asymmetric information problem occurs when a seller knows more about the quality of the good he is selling than does the buyer. First formally analyzed by economist George Akerlof, who studied the usedcar market Consider the market for a used car from a private-party seller. Assume there are two types of used cars, good ones (plums) and bad ones (lemons). Half of the cars available are plums, and half are lemons. Potential buyers value plums at $10,000 but place no value on lemons. Sellers value plums at $8,000 and also have no value for lemons.

5 The Lemons Problem and Adverse Selection 16.1 Observable Quality First, think about market outcomes if quality attributes are observable to both sellers and buyers. Since sellers value plums at $8,000 and buyers value plums at $10,000, the half of used cars that are plums will sell at prices between these two values. Both parties are better off following the trade. Buyers value the cars more than former owners, and former owners are happier with the money. Lemons have no value, so none will be sold.

6 The Lemons Problem and Adverse Selection 16.1 Unobservable Quality Now, consider what happens when sellers know whether their offering is a plum or a lemon but buyers do not. Buyers know 50% of cars are lemons. Therefore, buyers recognize that the probability that they will purchase a lemon is 50%. What is the most a buyer is willing to pay for a used car? Since buyers value plums at $10,000 and lemons at $0 and since there is a 50% chance that a given car is a lemon, the most a buyer is willing to pay is EV $ 10, $ $5, 000 Any buyer who pays more is worse off (in expectation) from engaging in the trade.

7 The Lemons Problem and Adverse Selection 16.1 Unobservable Quality Now, think about the owner of a plum who is considering whether to sell. The seller values his car at $8,000 but recognizes that because buyers can t know for sure whether or not his car is a plum, he could never get more than $5,000. Therefore, he does not offer the car for sale. The lemons problem is that Pareto-improving market transactions fail to occur because of asymmetric information.

8 The Lemons Problem and Adverse Selection 16.1 Adverse selection: market characteristics leading to more low-quality goods and fewer high-quality goods available The existence of quality differences is not by itself a market failure; instead, it is a lack of information. This leads to a market price that provides no incentive for plums to be offered for sale but every incentive for lemons to be offered for sale. Information asymmetries hurt not only those with little information but also those with more information. Both sides lose because a lack of complete information prevents trades. In this example, buyers and owners of plums are both hurt despite the owners having complete information.

9 The Lemons Problem and Adverse Selection 16.1 Other Examples of the Lemons Problem Among the many markets characterized by information asymmetries: Used merchandise sold online Home improvement Vehicle repairs Labor Insurance

10 The Lemons Problem and Adverse Selection 16.1 Institutions That Mitigate Lemons Problems The lemons problem destroys economic value by preventing beneficial exchanges. In response, institutions to mitigate information asymmetries have developed. These can work in three ways: 1. Address the information asymmetry directly by allowing buyers to observe quality characteristics before a transaction takes place 2. Punish sellers who misrepresent their lemons as plums 3. Use incentives to increase the number of plums brought to market

11 The Lemons Problem and Adverse Selection 16.1 Reducing Asymmetric Information Directly Third-party examinations of quality (e.g., mechanics) Offering standardized, unbiased information products (e.g. Carfax) Incentives for Truthful Quality Reporting Reputation (e.g., online feedback) Warranties and return policies (offered by seller) Lemon laws mandate warranties and return policies for new and used vehicles in many states. Increasing the Average Quality of Cars Placed on the Market Leasing can increase the average quality of used cars by encouraging return, regardless of quality.

12 The Lemons Problem and Adverse Selection 16.1 Beyond Used Cars Yelp and Angie s List Consumer Reports Referrals and references Background checks Accreditation services

13 The Lemons Problem and Adverse Selection 16.1 Adverse Selection When the Buyer Has More Information: Insurance Markets Thus far we have considered the case of the seller having more information than the buyer. However, in some markets the buyer holds the information advantage. Consider insurance. Health, auto, life, others Requires the seller to pay the buyer compensation in the event of a covered incident What information do the buyers have that sellers lack? Risk! Sellers are unable to determine quality, or the likelihood that a buyer will have claims. Thus insurance buyers are adversely selected in insurance markets.

14 The Lemons Problem and Adverse Selection 16.1 Mitigating Adverse Selection in Insurance A number of mechanisms have emerged to deal with adverse selection in insurance markets. 1. Group policies Tying insurance to employment removes the link between the individual s riskiness and the decision to purchase insurance. Pooling individuals reduces the effect of any given poor-risk person. 2. Screening Detailed questionnaires, health exams, driving records, and so on 3. Denying coverage

15 Moral Hazard 16.2 Moral Hazard Moral hazard arises when one party to a transaction cannot observe the other party s behavior. When quality is difficult to observe, a party to a transaction may have a financial incentive to engage in fraud. For example, money managers handling clients funds In insurance markets, adverse selection refers to the problem of deciding whom to insure and at what price. Moral hazard refers to the effect of being insured on the behavior of an individual. Knowing you are insured may make you more willing to take risks, since part of your risk is being borne by a third party.

16 Moral Hazard 16.2 Moral Hazard in Insurance Markets Consider comprehensive auto insurance. Comprehensive insurance compensates drivers in the event their vehicle is stolen (among other things). How might drivers behavior change if they know they are covered by a comprehensive insurance policy? The coverage may lead them not to try to prevent theft. Examples: Parking on the street instead of a garage Parking in relatively unsafe areas Not locking the car

17 Moral Hazard 16.2 Figure 16.1 Moral Hazard in the Insurance Market Marginal benefit, MB Marginal cost, MC MC In a market without insurance, an agent will act to improve the potential for a good outcome up until A*, where the marginal benefit of further action, MB, equals the marginal cost, MC. If the policy offers partial insurance, the agent will have the incentive to take action but not to the same degree as in the absence of insurance. MB PI MBFI MB If instead the agent obtains full insurance, there is no marginal benefit to acting to improve the potential for a good outcome, because he will be fully compensated for any bad outcome. 0 A * Quantity of PI A* actions taken to improve outcome

18 Moral Hazard 16.2 Moral Hazard Outside of Insurance Markets Another common instance of moral hazard occurs between borrowers and lenders in financial markets. Borrowers liability may be limited (e.g., in bankruptcy proceedings), meaning they may be willing to take unjustified risks with borrowed funds. The recent financial crisis has highlighted the issue of too big to fail. Implicit guarantees to large financial institutions may increase risk taking. Employer employee relationships often are a source of moral hazard. Inability to observe all of employees activities provides an opportunity and incentive for employees to shirk.

19 Moral Hazard 16.2 Lessening Moral Hazard Market mechanisms have developed to diminish the effects of moral hazard. Insurance policies often mandate actions to be taken by the insured. Commercial property insurance often requires working smoke detectors and regularly inspected fire extinguishers. Policies can be structured to encourage good behavior. Some auto insurance deductibles fall after each accident-free year. Life insurance premiums usually fall when efforts are made to improve health (e.g., quit smoking).

20 Asymmetric Information in Principal Agent Relationships 16.3 Principal agent relationships are a set of economic transactions that feature information asymmetry between a principal and his hired agent, whose actions the principal cannot fully observe. Involves one party (the principal) hiring a second party (the agent) to perform a task and being unable to completely observe the effort of the agent Information asymmetry is insufficient to develop a principal agent problem. There must also be a misalignment between the incentives and preferences of the principal and the agent. For example, an employer wants her employees to work as hard as possible, but employees want to work as little as possible without being fired.

21 Asymmetric Information in Principal Agent Relationships 16.3 Principal Agent and Moral Hazard: An Example Consider a mall kiosk selling mobile phones. The kiosk is owned by Selena (the principal), who hires a single employee (Joe, the agent) to staff the kiosk. If Joe works hard, the kiosk earns a daily profit of $1,000 with 80% probability and $500 with 20% probability (expected profit of $900). If Joe shirks, the probabilities are reversed (expected profit of $600). Joe does not like to work hard and requires at least $150 per day to do so. Selena cannot observe Joe s effort. Selena would be happy to pay Joe a flat rate of $150 per day to work hard, but as she cannot observe his effort (and profits are uncertain), she cannot be sure that he will indeed follow through. How can Selena encourage Joe to work hard?

22 Asymmetric Information in Principal Agent Relationships 16.3 Principal Agent and Moral Hazard: An Example Rather than paying Joe a flat rate, Selena can instead pay Joe a wage that varies with the profits of the kiosk. For example, Joe will be paid $255 if daily profits are high ($1,000) and $0 when profits are low ($500). If Joe works hard, the 80% probability of high profits yields an expected wage of $200 and a surplus of $50. (Remember, he is indifferent between $150 and exerting high effort.) If Joe shirks, the 20% probability of high profits yields an expected wage of $50, with no cost to him because he need not exert any effort. Thus, Joe will be indifferent between working hard and shirking. However, if Selena chooses to pay Joe $255 if the profits are high, he will now clearly prefer to work hard.

23 Asymmetric Information in Principal Agent Relationships 16.3 Principal Agent and Moral Hazard: An Example Does Selena prefer this arrangement? Paying $255 to Joe for high-profit days yields an expected wage of $204. This is less than the increase in expected profits associated with Joe working hard ($300), so she will prefer this compensation plan. Expected profits are significantly higher than under the fixed compensation plan of $150 per day,.

24 Asymmetric Information in Principal Agent Relationships 16.3 The Principal Agent Relationship as a Game This example (and most principal agent relationships) can be thought of as a sequential game. In the first stage, the principal chooses from a set of contracts. In the second stage, the agent chooses a level of effort resulting in payoffs to the principal and agent. The goal for the principal is to choose a contract structure that induces the agent to choose a high level of effort.

25 Asymmetric Information in Principal Agent Relationships 16.3 Figure 16.2 The Principal Agent Problem as a Sequential Game ( 750, 0 ) Agent Work hard (Worker: Joe) B Shirk Flat wage Principal ( 450, 150 ) P (Owner: Selena) A P( 696, 54 ) P Wage tied to kiosk s profit C Work hard Agent Shirk (Worker: Joe) ( 549, 51) If Selena pays a flat $150, the interests of Joe and Selena do not align. Joe gains more by shirking ($150 compared to a payoff of $0 if he works hard, because of his cost of effort). Selena prefers that he work hard so that she earns $750, compared to $450 if Joe does not work. If Selena links Joe s pay to profit, Joe s and Selena s interests align. Joe will choose to work hard, earning him $54 and Selena $696. As a result, Selena chooses to link Joe s pay to the kiosk s profit.

26 Signaling to Solve Asymmetric Information Problems 16.4 One major result of principal agent problems is that good agents or products are not identifiable and therefore cannot command full value. Signaling is a solution to the problem of asymmetric information in which the knowledgeable party alerts the other party to an unobservable characteristic of the good. Often, economic actors will attempt to communicate their quality via a signal. A costly action taken by an economic actor to indicate something that would otherwise be difficult to observe To signal high quality credibly, a signal must be less costly for high-quality agents than low-quality agents.

27 Signaling to Solve Asymmetric Information Problems 16.4 The Classic Signaling Example: Education Education specifically the granting of degrees is a classic case of signaling. Individuals with college degrees earn more in their lifetime than individuals with only a high school diploma. Is this because the training that education provides increases an individual s value or something else?

28 Signaling to Solve Asymmetric Information Problems 16.4 The Classic Signaling Example: Education Highly productive workers like to let employers know they are indeed highly productive so they might receive a job offer and/or a higher wage. However, simply telling an employer on your résumé that you are productive is cheap talk. A college degree, however, signals that you are indeed productive. College is difficult. It takes time, a lot of money, and an ability to learn and apply new information. These are the same attributes that often make employees productive. The fact that a third party (an accredited university) has issued a degree is a credible signal of productivity.

29 Signaling to Solve Asymmetric Information Problems 16.4 The Classic Signaling Example: Education We can use numbers to make this example clearer. Suppose there are two types of workers, high-productivity and lowproductivity. Each year of higher education costs high-productivity workers $25,000, including psychic costs of going to class, finishing assignments, studying for exams, and so on. Each year of higher education costs low-productivity workers $50,000 because of their higher psychic costs. C C H L $25,000/ $50,000/ y y

30 Signaling to Solve Asymmetric Information Problems 16.4 The Classic Signaling Example: Education Over a lifetime, high-productivity workers produce $250,000 worth of value to employers, whereas low-productivity workers produce $125,000 of value regardless of education. Thus, employers are willing to pay high-productivity workers up to $125,000 more in wages. However, employers must be able to tell them from the lowproductivity workers. Suppose employers view a four-year degree as a signal of high productivity and are willing to pay workers with a degree $125,000 more. Is this an effective strategy? For this to be effective, it must be incentive-compatible. High-productivity workers must find it advantageous to use college as a signal, and low-productivity workers must find a college degree to be not worth the effort.

31 Signaling to Solve Asymmetric Information Problems 16.4 The Classic Signaling Example: Education To determine whether the strategy is effective, compute the net benefits for each type of worker; ignore discounting. NB NB H L Benefit ( C 4years) 125, ,000 $25,000 H Benefit ( C 4years) 125, ,000 $ 75,000 L High-productivity workers earn $25,000 more in surplus with a college degree, while low-productivity workers lose $75,000. Therefore, this is an effective strategy, as the low-productivity workers will choose not to go to college.

32 Signaling to Solve Asymmetric Information Problems 16.4 Figure 16.3 Education as a Signal on the Job Market

33 Signaling to Solve Asymmetric Information Problems 16.4 Other Signals How might the following be used as signals? Buying an engagement ring for your fiancée Offering a 10-year warranty (e.g., Hyundai cars) Driving an expensive car Certifying your products as organic Since quality is not always observable, signals are a market mechanism that can overcome some problems associated with information asymmetry.

34 Conclusion 16.5 This chapter has examined asymmetric information. In a world in which quality is not always observable, signals are a market mechanism that can overcome some problems associated with information asymmetry. In the next chapter, we examine other market failures related to incomplete property rights, including externalities and public goods.

35 In-text figure it out Suppose consumers value a high-quality used laptop computer at $400, while they value a low-quality used laptop at $100. The supply of highquality laptops is Q H = P H 100, while the supply of low-quality laptops is Q L = 2P L 50. Potential buyers cannot tell the difference between high-quality and low-quality laptops. Answer the following questions: a. Buyers believe there is a 50% probability that a used laptop will be high-quality. What price would buyers be willing to pay for any used laptop? b. If the price you determined is offered, how many high-quality laptops will be available? How many low-quality? Are buyers correct that 50% of used laptops for sale are high-quality? Explain. c. What do you expect to happen over time as information about the true odds of buying a high-quality used laptop become known? Explain.

36 In-text figure it out a. If buyers expect that 50% of the used laptops available are highquality (meaning that the other 50% are low-quality), the expected value of a laptop is equal to $100 $200 $50 $250 Therefore, $250 is the most that buyers would be willing to pay for a used laptop. b. If the price of a used laptop is $250, the quantity supplied of highquality laptops is Q H = = 150, while the supply of lowquality laptops is Q L = 2(250) 50 = 450. Therefore, 600 used laptops, 150 high-quality and 450 low-quality, will be for sale. The probability of buying a high-quality used laptop is not 50% but 150 / 600 = 0.25, or 25%. Because of asymmetric information, buyers are not willing to pay much for a used laptop.

37 c. Over time, buyers will adjust the expected value of used laptops. This will further reduce the price buyers are willing to pay. Owners of high-quality used laptops will be even less inclined to sell them, reducing even more the proportion of high-quality used laptops available. It is possible for the market to end up with only lowquality used laptops available. In-text figure it out

38 Additional figure it out Suppose consumers value a high-quality used laptop computer at $400 and a low-quality used laptop at $100. The supply of high-quality laptops is Q H = P H 100, and the supply of low-quality laptops is Q L = 2P L 50. Buyers cannot tell the difference between high-quality and low-quality laptops before the purchase. Answer the following questions: a. Assume that buyers believe there is a 75% probability that a used laptop will be high-quality. What price would buyers be willing to pay for any used laptop? b. If the price you determined is offered, how many high-quality laptops will be made available? How many low-quality laptops? Are buyers correct in their assumption that 75% of the used laptops available for sale are high-quality? Explain. c. What do you expect to happen over time as information about the true odds of buying a high-quality used laptop become known? Explain.

39 Additional figure it out a. If buyers expect 75% of the used laptops available to be highquality (meaning that the other 25% are low-quality), the expected value of a laptop is equal to $100 = $300+$25 = $325 Therefore, $325 is the most that buyers would be willing to pay for a used laptop. b. If the price of a used laptop is $325, the quantity supplied of highquality laptops is Q H = = 225, while the supply of lowquality laptops is Q L = 2(325) 50 = 600. Therefore, there will be 825 used laptops, 225 high-quality and 600 low-quality, for sale. The probability of buying a high-quality used laptop is not 75% but 225 / 825 = 0.273, or 27.3%. Because of asymmetric information, buyers are not willing to pay much for a used laptop.

40 c. Over time, buyers will adjust the expected value of used laptops. This will further reduce the price buyers are willing to pay. Owners of high-quality used laptops will be even less inclined to sell them, reducing even more the proportion of high-quality used laptops available. It is possible for the market to end up with only lowquality used laptops available. Additional figure it out

41 In-text figure it out Anastasia and Katherine own a café. They run the risk of loss due to small kitchen fires. This risk can be mitigated by taking precautions (e.g., purchasing fire extinguishers, training employees). Assume that the marginal cost of precautions can be represented by MC = A, where A is equal to the actions to mitigate the risk of a fire. Likewise, the marginal benefit of these precautions is MB = 100 2A. Answer the following questions: a. If the cafe has no insurance, what is the optimal level of precautions? b. Suppose the restaurant has insurance that reduces the marginal benefit of taking precautions to MB = 90 4A. What happens to the optimal level of precautions? Explain.

42 In-text figure it out a. Anastasia and Katherine will take precautions until their marginal benefits equal their marginal costs A 80 8A 20 10A A 2 b. With the insurance policy in place, the benefits of precautions fall: 90 4A 80 8A 10 12A A.83 The policy reimburses Anastasia and Katherine in case of a fire, which reduces the owners incentive to try to prevent a loss.

43 John owns a restaurant, and as with any cooking establishment, it carries a risk of fire. This risk can be mitigated by precautions (e.g., purchasing fire extinguishers, training employees). Assume that the marginal cost of precautions can be represented by MC = A, where A is equal to the actions taken to mitigate the risk of a fire. Likewise, the marginal benefit of these precautions is MB = 100 A. Answer the following questions: a. If the restaurant has no insurance, what is the optimal level of precautions? b. Suppose the restaurant has insurance that reduces the marginal benefit of taking precautions to MB = 80 A. What happens to the optimal level of precautions? Explain. Additional figure it out

44 Additional figure it out a. John will take precautions until their marginal benefits are equal to their marginal costs. 100 A 60 9A 40 10A A 4 b. With insurance in place, the benefits of precautions fall. 80 A 60 9A 20 10A A 2 This outcome is due to the fact that the policy reimburses John in case of fire, which reduces the owner s incentives to try to prevent a loss.

45 In-text figure it out Pablo is a struggling artist who wants to rent an apartment from Donald. Pablo loves to draw, so much so that he often draws on any surface he can find, including walls. In fact, Pablo would get $300 in utility from being able to draw on the walls of the apartment. On the other hand, Donald would like Pablo to leave the apartment walls clean and free of marks. If Pablo draws on the walls, it will cost Donald $500 to have the apartment repainted. Therefore, Donald is considering charging Pablo a damage deposit of $500. Answer the following questions: a. Explain why this situation could be considered a principal agent problem. Who is the principal? Who is the agent? b. Draw the extensive form of this principal agent problem and use backward induction to solve for the Nash equilibrium.

46 a. Donald is the principal and Pablo is the agent. Donald would like Pablo to treat the apartment the same way he (Donald) would. However, Donald cannot be at the apartment to monitor Pablo s behavior all of the time. Therefore, a principal agent problem exists. Donald s and Pablo s interests do not coincide. In-text figure it out

47 In-text figure it out b. The extensive form of this principal agent problem: Agent (Pablo) B Charge no damage deposit Principal (Donald) A Charge damage deposit of $500 C Agent (Pablo) ( 500, 300) Paint on Walls Leave walls untouched ( 0, 0 ) ( 0, 200 ) Paint on Walls P( 0, 0)P P Leave walls untouched We can use backward induction to solve the game. If Donald does not charge a damage deposit, Pablo will want to draw on the walls because $300 > $0. Donald will then have to repaint the apartment and lose $500. If Donald charges the damage deposit, Pablo will leave the walls untouched because $0 > $200. In this case, Donald will not lose $500 because he will not have to repaint. Given this information, the Nash equilibrium occurs where Donald charges the damage deposit and Pablo does not draw on the wall.

48 Additional figure it out The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is considering leasing land for oil drilling to DBD, Inc. Extracting the oil would yield a $10 million profit for DBD. After drilling, DBD can choose to plug the well properly and reclaim (clean up) the land, but this would cost $2 million. If DBD chooses not to reclaim the land, the BLM will have to take over the responsibility at a cost of $3 million. (DBD is a small corporation that will go bankrupt if sued for damages.) The BLM is considering charging DBD a refundable bond in the amount of $3 million to cover the costs of reclamation should DBD not follow through. Assume the price of the lease is $5 million. Answer the following questions: a. Explain why this situation could be considered a principal agent problem. Who is the principal? Who is the agent? b. Draw the extensive form of this principal agent problem and use backward induction to solve for the Nash equilibrium.

49 a. The BLM is the principal and DBD is the agent. The BLM would like DBD to reclaim the land after drilling. However, the BLM cannot monitor DBD s behavior all of the time. Therefore, a principal agent problem exists. The incentives facing BLM and DBD do not coincide. Additional figure it out

50 Additional figure it out b. The extensive form of this principal agent problem: Principal (BLM) Agent (DBD) B No Bond A $3M Bond C Agent (DBD) ( $5M, $3M) Reclaim Do not reclaim ( $2M, $5M ) P P( $5M, $3M ) Reclaim Do not reclaim ( $5M, $2M) P We can use backward induction to solve the game. If no bond is charged, DBD will not reclaim the land and the BLM will have to spend $3 million of the $5 million revenue from the lease on reclaiming the land. ($300 > $0). If the BLM charges a bond, DBD will be better off reclaiming the land because $2 million cost is less than the $3 million bond. Given this information, the Nash equilibrium occurs where the BLM charges the bond and DBD reclaims the land.

51 In-text figure it out Last year, Used Cars R Us sold very few cars and ended up with a large economic loss. The owner, Geoffrey, has developed two strategies to help the dealership sell more vehicles in the coming year by signaling that it deals in only high-quality used vehicles: Geoffrey has decided to pursue one of two strategies: 1. Change the name of the dealership to Quality Used Cars R Us. 2. Offer a 60-day bumper-to-bumper warranty for every car sold. Answer the following question: Which is the more effective signal of high quality? Explain.

52 In-text figure it out To be a good indicator of quality, a signal must be relatively cheap for high-quality producers and expensive for low-quality producers. Therefore, the better signal is the 60-day warranty. If the cars sold at Used Cars R Us are truly high-quality, the warranty will not be very expensive for the dealership. On the other hand, if Used Cars R Us only sold lemons, the warranty would be very expensive and negate the benefit of increased sales. Thus, consumers can be more confident that a dealership offering a warranty has higher-quality products than those that do not. The change of the name of the dealership would just be cheap talk. Any dealership can alter its name, and the cost of doing so will not vary between high-quality and low-quality sellers.

53 Additional figure it out CheapFix is a big-city mechanic shop that specializes in brake repair. After a number of poor online reviews of its brake service, management has decided to hire new mechanics and pursue a new marketing strategy to change consumer perceptions about the quality of the shop s workmanship. Management has decided to pursue one of two strategies: 1. Change the name of the shop to QualityFix 2. Offer a 3-month warranty on brake service Answer the following question: Which of these two strategies is the more effective signal of high quality? Explain.

54 Additional figure it out Remember, for a signal to credibly indicate high quality, it must be cheaper for high-quality producers and more expensive for low-quality producers. Therefore, the best signal is the 3-month warranty. If the new brake service is indeed high-quality, this policy should be less expensive than it would be for a low-quality shop. On the other hand, the change in the name of the shop is cheap talk, whose cost does not vary across shops.