Large Losses and Equilibrium in Insurance Markets. Lisa L. Posey a. Paul D. Thistle b

Transcription

1 Large Losses and Equilibrium in Insurance Markets Lisa L. Posey a Paul D. Thistle b ABSTRACT We show that, if losses are larger than wealth, individuals will not insure if the loss probability is above a threshold. In a two risk type model of an insurance market with adverse selection, if the high risks loss probability is above the threshold, then no trade occurs at the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium. Keywords: adverse selection, contracts, no trade JEL Classification: D82, D86, G22 a Department of Risk Management, Pennsylvania State University, 369 Business Building, University Park, PA 16802, , llp3@psu.edu b Corresponding author: Department of Finance, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 4505 Maryland Parkway, Box , Las Vegas, Nevada, , , paul.thistle@unlv.edu

2 Large Losses and Equilibrium in Insurance Markets 1. Introduction. Individuals can face large potential losses that exceed their wealth. With a median net worth for US households of $68,828 in 2011 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014), it is easy to see that a large medical expense or liability judgment could easily wipe out a household s net worth. 1 We show that, when losses exceed wealth, risk averse individuals will not insure if the probability of loss exceeds a threshold. We examine the implications of this for insurance markets with adverse selection. We show that if high risks do not buy insurance then there is no trade in the insurance market. The Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium contracts for both high and low risks are the null contracts. This is the reverse of the adverse selection death spiral since it is high risks rather than low risks that drop out of the market. Shavell (1986) and Sinn (1982) consider the case where losses exceed wealth. Shavell shows that, for a fixed loss probability, there is a wealth threshold where individuals do not insure if their wealth is below the threshold and fully insure if it is above the threshold. Sinn notes that whether the premium exceeds the maximum willingness to pay depends on the probability of loss but does not consider threshold values. Neither author considers the case of asymmetric information. Hendren (2013, 2014) gives conditions under which the unique equilibrium contract in an insurance market with adverse selection is the null contract. The no trade condition is that lower risks are never willing to pay to be in a pool with higher risks. This leads to an adverse selection death spiral. If the no trade condition does not hold, then either there is an equilibrium 1 In 2009, the average cost of an auto crash fatality was $6,000,000 and the average cost of an injury was $126,000 (AAA, 2011).

3 2 where insurance is bought or there is no equilibrium. As Hendren (2014) points out, the equilibrium of market unraveling (no trade) and the unraveling of market equilibrium (no equilibrium) are mutually exclusive. We analyze the standard Rothschild-Stigliz (1976) model of adverse selection. The no trade condition does not hold in this model, so we would expect active trade in equilibrium. We relax Hendren s implicit assumption that losses do not exceed wealth and show that if the high risks loss probability exceeds the threshold, the unique Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium contracts are the null contracts there is no trade or else there is no equilibrium. The no trade equilibrium is the result of high risks dropping out of the market. High risks do not buy insurance at an actuarially fair price because it covers losses they would not be able to pay if uninsured and is therefore too expensive. Low risks would be willing to buy insurance at their actuarially fair price if a minimum level of coverage were provided. The need to screen high risks limits the coverage for low risks to a level that is below this minimum and the low risks choose not to insure. A key factor in our analysis is the assumption that final wealth cannot be negative so a portion of any loss greater than wealth will be externalized. For example, if an individual has a liability loss greater than their wealth, the injured third party may not receive full compensation. Similarly, the medical expenses of uninsured or underinsured patients with insufficient wealth may ultimately be borne by medical providers. Our results may provide an explanation for why health insurance markets are not well-functioning for low income populations. 2 2 We thank Nathan Hendren for this insight.

4 3 2. The Decision to Buy Insurance Assume individuals have utility function u, with, and and finite, have initial wealth w, and face a potential loss l with probability p. The loss is larger than wealth,. If an individual incurs a loss, they are left with final wealth of zero due to bankruptcy protection. Insurance is actuarially fairly priced so if it is purchased, full insurance is optimal and yields expected utility. If insurance is purchased, expected utility is. If, the individual cannot pay for full coverage. If, they will not buy insurance since doing so gives final wealth of zero with certainty, while not doing so gives final wealth of zero with less than certainty. This implies there is a critical value < w/l such that the individual will not buy insurance if. The net benefit of buying insurance when p w/l is (1) Observe that,,, (2) and. If, there is never a benefit to buying insurance and. If then, at least in some neighborhood of zero, and there is a net benefit to buying insurance if the probability of loss is low enough. Then there is a unique such that. This proves the following result: Proposition 1: Assume. Then there is a, where, such that individuals buy full insurance if and do not buy insurance if The threshold probability is increasing in and decreasing in.

5 4 3. Rothschild-Stiglitz Equilibrium Now consider the implication of the decision not to buy insurance for equilibrium in the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) framework. Loss probabilities, and for high and low risks are private information, where. is the proportion of the population that is high risk and the proportion that is low risk. Contracts are denoted where is the premium and is the indemnity net of premium. Firms simultaneously offer contracts, and then individuals decide which, if any, contract they will buy. In equilibrium contracts must break even, satisfy the self-selection constraint which, if offered, would earn positive profits. Let, and there must be no other contract denote the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium contracts. The Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium exists if the proportion of high risks is large enough,. Now consider the no trade condition. Let be the pooled loss probability. If, as in Hendren s case, the no trade condition is: (3) and. (4) Condition (3) says that low risks are unwilling to pay the actuarially fair price of pooled coverage. As noted in Hendren (2014), in the canonical two type case with, condition (4) can only hold for risk averse individuals if. Hendren s analysis for implies that either there is an equilibrium where non-null contracts are traded (if ) or equilibrium does not exist (if ). 3 We show that if losses are larger than wealth, Hendren s no trade condition does not apply. 3 See Hendren s (2013) Theorem 1 and subsequent discussion.

6 5 The Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium when is illustrated in Figure 1. If individuals are uninsured, they are at the point. The traditional fair odds lines for high and low risks, P H and P L as well as the pooled fair odds line P P, depicted as emanating from, are relevant only above the horizontal axis. The wealth combinations actually faced by policyholders level off at the horizontal axis, at, for all. FIGURE 1 Equilibrium with Large Losses P L

7 6 Let be the value of at which the fair pooled price line is just tangent to the low risk indifference curve through E 0. Proposition 2: Assume,. Then the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium contracts are the null contracts,. Proof: The curves U H 0 and U L 0, the high and low risk indifference curves through E 0, are the individual rationality constraints. Low risks prefer any policy along P L above point B, and prefer no insurance to any policy along P L below B. Since, the high risk fair odds line lies completely below the indifference curve U 0 H, so high risks do not insure. Since the self-selection constraint U 0 H is flatter than U 0 L, it must intersect the fair odds line P L below B, for example, at point A. Low risks prefer to remain uninsured. If the pooled fair odds line, labeled P P in Figure 1, lies below the indifference curve U 0 L, i.e., if, then the equilibrium is. Since both high and low risks obtain the null contract, this is a pooling equilibrium. However, the more important characteristic of the equilibrium is that no trade occurs. The existence of equilibrium depends on the location of the pooled fair odds line. In Figure 1, P P lies below the low risk indifference curve U 0 L. Since the proportion of high risks is large enough, the equilibrium exists. If the proportion of high risks were too small, the pooled fair odds line would intersect the low risk indifference curve and the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium would fail to exist. Thus, there is either an equilibrium with no trade or there is no equilibrium. It is interesting to consider how the equilibrium changes as p H changes (we assume equilibrium exists). 4 Suppose that. Then the high risk fair odds line is tangent to the indifference curve U H 0 at full insurance and high risks are fully insured. The self-selection constraint U H 0 still intersects the low risk fair odds line at point A so the equilibrium contracts 4 The critical value, increases as p H approaches p L.

8 7 are the full insurance contract for high risks and the null contract for low risks. For the high risk contract is actuarially fair full insurance. As falls the high risk contract moves up the 45% full insurance line. The intersection between the high risk indifference curve that is the self-selection constraint and the low risk fair odds line moves up the low risk fair odds line. As long as the intersection is below B low risks will not insure. There is a probability,, at which the intersection is at B. Then for, we have the usual Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium where high risks fully insure and low risks receive partial coverage. 4. Conclusion We show that, if losses are larger than wealth, there is a threshold where individuals will not insure if the loss probability is above the threshold. In a market with adverse selection and, if the high risks loss probability is above the threshold, then no trade occurs at the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium. Hendren s no trade condition does not apply when losses are larger than wealth. However, Hendren s broader point, that the unraveling of insurance markets involves either no equilibrium or no trade and that these possibilities are mutually exclusive, remains valid.

9 8 References American Automobile Association, 2011, Crashes vs congestion: What is the cost to society? Hendren, N. 2013, Private information and insurer rejections, Econometrica, 81(5): Hendren, N. 2014, Unravelling vs unravelling: A memo on competitive equilibriums and trade in insurance markets, Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 39: Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz, 1976, Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(4): Shavell, S., 1986, The judgement proof problem, International Review of Law and Economics, 6: Sinn, H-W., 1982, Kinked utility and the demand for human wealth and liability insurance, 17: U.S. Census Bureau, 2014, Household Wealth in the U.S.: