Consultation by Commission Services on legislative steps for the Packaged Retail Investment Products initiative

Transcription

1 ID number Consultation by Commission Services on legislative steps for the Packaged Retail Investment Products initiative Daniel Nicolaes Chairman BZB Beroepsvereniging van Zelfstandige Bank- en verzekeringsbemiddelaars Aalststraat 114, B Oudenaarde

2 BZB (Beroepsvereniging van Zelfstandige Bank en verzekeringsbemiddelaars) is the largest professional organisation of banking and insurance intermediaries in Belgium. Our members are almost all exclusively tied agents of credit institutions. Almost all of them are also active as insurance intermediary. Only a few are tied agents for investment firms or broker in banking and investment services. If you require any clarification, please do not hesitate to contact us: Daniel Nicolaes, Secretary General, daniel@nicolaes-verhille.be, +32 (057) Carine Vansteenbrugge, Administrative and legal Director, carine@bzb.be, +32(055) As the professional organization of Banking and insurance intermediaries in Belgium we experience the lack of consistent approach concerning retail investment products. Our members at the same time self employed intermediary in banking and investment services and insurance intermediary have to comply with different information and sales rules according to the legal form of the product they sell. This can influence their advice. Since the tied agents / insurance intermediaries are familiar with investment products a lot of middle offices or masterbrokers are very active in the Belgian market to propose to these intermediaries investments packaged as life insurance policies. This creates a situation where the retail investor enjoys a different protection according to the product sold by his financial advisor because of the different rules. Often the retail investor doesn t realize this. As professional organization we are aware of the problems this can create. Also the fact that insurance intermediaries who are not registered as intermediary in banking and investment services can offer quasi full service in investments with less strict obligations causes a non level playing field. Therefore we support the plans of the Commission on level playing field and investor protection issues in the retail investment market. We also feel that the two key regulatory pillars of the PRIPS work are the rules on pre-contractual product disclosure and rules on sales. Q. 1: Should the PRIPs initiative focus on packaged investments? Please justify or explain your answer. Q. 2: Should a definition of PRIPs focus on fluctuations in investment values? Please justify or explain your answer. Q. 3: Does a reference to indirectness of exposure capture the 'packaging' of investments? Please justify or explain your answer. Q. 4: Do you think it is necessary to explicitly clarify that the definition applies to fluctuations in 'reference values' more generally, given some financial products provide payouts that do not appear to be linked to specific or tangible assets themselves, e.g. payouts linked to certain financial indices, the rate of inflation, or the overall value of a fund or business?

3 Q. 5: Do you have any other comments on the proposed definition? If you consider it ineffective in some regard, please provide alternatives and explain your rationale in relation to the criteria for a successful definition outlined above. Q.1. The focus on packaged investment products is not crucial. We consider it more important that all investment products sold to retail consumers should be treated in the same way and provide the consumer the same kind of protection. The focus on packaging leaves out a great deal of private placements. Also it is not clear whether under this definition the Life Settlements which are not wrapped in a life insurance are included. The definition should foresee also this kind of investment products. Q.2. Some very risk full products like Life Settlements give a fixed rate and guaranteed capital to the consumer. The definition does not cover these kind of products when they give a fixed rate an guaranteed capital. Since these products are not simple products these should be covered by the PRIPs regime. Q.3. It is not clear whether under this definition the Life Settlements which are not wrapped in a life insurance are included. Is the use of trusts a form of packaging? The definition should foresee also this kind of investment products. Q.4. The definition should explicitly be clarified. However our remark concerning Life Settlements with a fixed rate should be taken in consideration. Q. 6: Should simple (non-structured) deposits be excluded from the scope of the initiative? Please justify or explain your answer. Q. 7: Do you consider option 1 or option 2 preferable for achieving this? Please explain your preference, and set out an alternative if necessary, with supporting evidence. Q. 8: Should such an exclusion be extended to financial instruments which might raise similar issues as deposits (e.g. bonds), and if so, how might these be defined? Please justify or explain your answer. Q.6. Simple deposits do not fall under the PRIPs regime. There is no reason to foresee an explicit exclusion for simple deposits. Q.7. The first option is preferable because it is more clear when a deposit should be seen as a PRIP. Q.8. An exclusion for bonds should not be considered. Simple bonds do not fall under the scope of PRIPs. An explicit exclusion is not necessary.

4 Q. 13: Do you see benefits from such an indicative list being developed? If not, please provide alternative proposals and evidence for why these might be effective. Q. 14: Do you have any suggestions on the possible contents for such a list, including on how to define items placed on the list? Q.13. Yes, an indicative list excludes doubts about products to which the regime of PRIPs would or would not apply. Q.14. NO. Note: specific questions related to possible MiFID and IMD changes as outlined here are not being raised in this consultation; for these areas please see the MiFID and IMD consultations, as set out above in section 1.3. You may of course respond on the approach outlined in general here. Q. 15: Should direct sales of UCITS be covered by means of including the relevant rules within the UCITS framework? Q. 16: Do you have any comments on the identified pros and cons of this approach, and any evidence on the scale and nature of impacts (costs as well as benefits)? Q.15. Yes. Q.16. Since our membres are almost all self employed intermediaries in banking and in insurances we agree with the general approach. For the intermediaries who already have to comply with IMD and MiFID this has the advantage that they don t have to work according to new separate rules when selling PRIPs. Q. 17: Should the design of the KIID be focused on delivering on the objective of aiding retail investment decision making? If you disagree, please justify or explain your answer. Q. 18: Should the KIID should be a separate or 'stand alone' document compared with other information that might be necessary, e.g. background information, other disclosures, or contractual information? Please justify or explain your answer. Q. 19: What measures do you think will be necessary to ensure KIID remain streamlined and focused solely on key information? Q.17. We fully agree. Q.18. To make the comparison possible we feel that the KIID would best be a stand alone document. It would be easier for the consumer to compare the key elements of the investment product. We have to avoid that the KIID disappears in the background when provided together with other information.

5 Q.19. The limitation in length will be crucial. Approval by the national supervisor prior to publication is recommended. Q. 20: While the same broad principles should be applied to all PRIPs, should detailed implementations of some of these principles be tailored for different types of PRIP? Please justify or explain your answer, and provide examples, where relevant, of the kinds of tailoring you might envisage. Q. 21: Do you foresee any difficulties in requiring the KIID to always follow the same broad structure (sequence of items, labelling of items)? Please justify or explain your answer. Q. 22: Do you foresee any difficulties in requiring certain parts of the key information and its presentation (e.g. on costs, performance, risks, and guarantees) to be standardised and consistent as possible, irrespective of tailoring otherwise allowed? Please justify or explain your answer. Q. 23: Can you provide examples and evidence of the costs and benefits from your experience that might be expected from greater standardisation of the presentation and content in the KIID? Q. 24: Should the content of the KIID be controlled so that there is no possibility for firms to add additional information unless expressly allowed for? Q.24. We consider it necessary that the content of the KIID should be controlled. Q. 25: Do you foresee and difficulties in applying these broad principles to the KIID for all PRIPs, as the building blocks on content and format for a 'level 1' instrument? Please justify or explain your answer. Q. 26: Are there any other broad principles that should be considered on content and format? Q.25. We fear that it is not sufficient to just require information on the costs of the product. It should be clarified which costs or how to present these costs. A standard should be developed for the presentation of the costs. Q.26. It should be required that the KIID is written in the language( s) of the country where the PRIP is marketed. Q. 27: Should product manufacturers be made generally responsible for preparing a KIID? Please justify or explain your answer. Q. 28: Are you aware of any problems that might arise in the distribution of particular products should responsibilities for producing the KIID be solely placed on the product manufacturer? Q. 29: If intermediaries or distributors might be permitted to prepare the documents in some cases, how would these cases be defined?

6 Q.27. Since the product manufacturers are best placed to provide the KIID. They have the necessary information to prepare the KIID. Q.28. The pre-contractual disclosures should be best left to the company that markets/ distributes the PRIP or to the intermediaries or directly to the retail investors. Since a lot of products are altered by the distributors and the product originator does not always have sight on these alterations it seems logical that the one that finally distributes the product to the intermediaries would have the responsibility to produce a KIID. Q.29. When a distributor alters the product then he should prepare the KIID. Q. 32: Should the summary prospectus be replaced by the KIID for PRIPs? Please outline the benefits and disadvantages you see with respect to such an approach. Q. 33: Should Solvency II disclosures provided prior to the investment decision be replaced by the KIID for PRIPs? Please outline the benefits and disadvantages you see with respect to such an approach. Q. 34: Do you agree with the suggested approach for UCITS KIIDs? Q. 35: Are there any disclosures, e.g. required by the existing regimes, which you believe the PRIPs KIID should not include, but which should still be disclosed, e.g. separately to the KIID? Do you have any practical examples for such elements? Q.32. Yes, we notice that consumers rarely read or even require the summary prospectus. Replacing the summary prospectus by the KIID for PRIPs would have the advantage that the consumer would be better informed concerning the key features of the product. Q.33. Yes. Q.34. Yes. Q. 36: What in your view will be the main challenges that will need to be addressed if a single risk rating approach is to work for all PRIPs? Q. 37: Do you consider there are any other techniques that might be used to help retail investors compare risks? Q.36. There will have to be sufficient attention to the guidelines on how the risks should be rated. Also we feel that there should be guidelines on the use of the right terminology. Q.37. No. Q. 38: What in your view will be the main challenges that will need to be addressed in developing common cost metrics for PRIPs? Q. 39: How can retail investors be aided in making 'value for money' comparisons

7 between different PRIPs? Q.38. The main challenge in our view will be how to define the costs and how to include all costs. There are a lot of costs that now stay hidden. In order to be able to compare PRIPs it s essential that all costs are included in the KIID. For this purpose a standard should be developed. Q.39. Consumers could be aided in making value for money comparisons with a graphical presentation showing which part of the money is really invested. Q. 40: Do you consider that performance information should always be included in a KIID? Q. 41: What in your view will be the main challenges that will need to be addressed in ensuring performance information can be compared between different PRIPs? Q.40. Yes, because it makes it easier for the consumer to compare PRIPs. Relevant information for the consumer would also be the worst possible performance and the best possible performance. Q.41. It will be necesarry to develop guidelines to make sure that the KIID shows the performance of the PRIP and for instance not of the underlying fund. Q. 42: Do you agree that a consistent approach to the description of guarantees and capital protection in the KIID should be sought, e.g. through detailed implementing measures, for different PRIPs? Q. 43: What information should be provided to retail investors on the cost of guarantees? Q.42. Yes, because we have seen in Belgium (e.g. Lehman products)that consumers had the wrong idea about how their investment was protected. In our view the guidelines on guarantees and capital protection should be the same for all PRIPs. Q.43. The cost of guarantee should be included in the disclosure of the costs.