Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate M&A Decisions #

Transcription

1 Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate M&A Decisions # Jennifer Wu a and Kee H. Chung b,* a Department of Business and Management, Wheaton College, Norton, MA b School of Management, State University of New York (SUNY) at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY # The authors thank Veljko Fotak, Sahn-Wook Huh, Jack Jiang, Dominik Roesch, Cristian Tiu, Brian Wolfe, and seminar participants at the State University of New York at Buffalo, Duquesne University, National Taiwan University, and National Taiwan Normal University for their valuable comments and suggestions. All of the remaining errors are our own. * Corresponding author: Kee H. Chung, School of Management, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260, USA; keechung@buffalo.edu; Tel:

2 Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate M&A Decisions Abstract This paper analyzes the effect of hedge fund activism on corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and shareholder wealth. Using Schedule 13D filings by hedge funds and M&A announcements made by US companies from 1993 to 2015, we show that hedge fund activism leads to lower M&A activities, more favorable market reactions to M&A announcements, better operating performance, and lower takeover premiums. Overall, our study provides robust evidence that hedge fund activism increases shareholder wealth by forcing firms to make fewer but better acquisitions. We conduct various tests to explore other possible explanations of our results. JEL classification: G23, G32, G34 Keywords: Hedge fund activism, M&A performance, Schedule 13D filings, Event study, Abnormal stock returns

3 1. Introduction In this study, we analyze the effect of hedge fund activism on corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and shareholder wealth. Although prior research explores various channels through which hedge funds influence corporate decisions, there is relatively little evidence regarding the role of hedge fund activism in corporate M&A decisions and its ramification for shareholder value. 1 Using Schedule 13D filings by hedge funds and M&A announcements made by US companies from 1993 to 2015, we show that hedge fund activism leads to lower M&A activities, more favorable market reactions to M&A announcements, better operating performance, and lower takeover premiums. Overall, our study provides robust evidence that hedge fund activism increases shareholder wealth by forcing firms to make fewer but better acquisitions. Prior research shows that hedge funds play an important role in many corporate decisions. A strand of studies shows that hedge fund activism affects operating performance, corporate governance, and firm value (e.g., Kahan and Rock, 2007; Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi, 2008; Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008; Clifford, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009; Boyson and Mooradian, 2011; Gantchev, Gredil, and Jotikasthira, 2015). 2 Greenwood and Schor (2009) show that positive abnormal returns associated with hedge funds announcements of activist intention can largely be attributed to the ability of activists to force firms into a takeover target. Greenwood 1 Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler (1998) show that activist block purchases are followed by a decrease in the frequency of M&A. However, the authors do not examine the effect of activist block purchases on the efficiency or quality of M&A. 2 Kahan and Rock (2007) analyze the governance role of hedge funds compared to that of other institutional investors. Becht et al. (2008) find that the activist investment of the UK pension fund Hermes results in superior performance. Brav et al. (2008) document abnormal stock returns around hedge fund activism announcements. They also find that hedge fund target firms exhibit increases in payout, operating performance, and CEO turnover. Clifford (2008) compares the value creation and improvement in operating performance between activist and passive hedge fund target firms. Klein and Zur (2009) analyze confrontational hedge fund activism campaigns and find positive abnormal stock returns around the campaign. Boyson and Mooradian (2011) find evidence that hedge funds facilitate changes in corporate governance, cash flows, and operating performance that benefit target firms shareholders as well as hedge fund investors. Gantchev et al. (2015) find evidence of spillover effects of activism that the peer firms with fundamentals that are similar to hedge fund activism targets reduce agency costs and improve operating performance. 1

4 and Schor (2009) also show that firms targeted by activists are more likely to be acquired than otherwise similar firms. Boyson, Gantchev, and Shivdasani (2016) show that hedge fund activism increases firms probability of receiving a takeover bid, target announcement returns, acquisition premiums, and completion rates. Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2015b) and Brav, Jiang, Ma, and Tian (2016) show that hedge fund activism improves firm productivity and innovation efficiency. Jiang, Li, and Mei (2016) analyze activist risk arbitrage in which activist shareholders block an announced M&A deal through public campaigns to obtain better terms. The authors show that activist risk arbitragers both promote investor interests and make good returns for themselves. In contrast to the prior research (e.g., Greenwood and Schor, 2009; Boyson, Gantchev, and Shivdasani, 2016) that focuses on hedge funds ability to force firms into a takeover target, our study focuses on hedge funds ability to improve firms M&A decisions through activist interventions and how this could affect the welfare of acquiring firms shareholders. Acquisition decisions are amongst the most important corporate decisions that require large investments. There could be a significant conflict of interest between managers and shareholders in these major corporate decisions. Our study sheds light on whether and how hedge funds could mitigate the conflict of interest through activist interventions in corporate M&A decisions. Anecdotal evidence shows that certain M&A decisions trigger hedge fund activism. On July 16, 2012, in a proxy statement filed to campaign against Sigma Designs Inc., Potomac Capital Management, a New York based hedge fund, casted doubt on Sigma Designs aggressive acquisition strategies spending more than $251 million on acquisitions over five years with limited improvements in operating revenue. Potomac Capital Management urged Sigma Designs to refrain from further acquisitions. 3 On August 12, 2012, they reached an agreement to elect directors 3 See 2

5 recommended by Potomac Capital Management at the 2012 Annual Meeting. To the extent that the level of Sigma Designs acquisition activities was indeed excessive due to its poor governance structure (e.g., poor board monitoring), the hedge fund s activism may change the firm s future acquisition activities. As the existing evidence speaks favorably on the impact of hedge fund activism on shareholder wealth, it may also benefit Sigma Designs shareholders. We provide answers to these questions using a large sample of hedge fund activisms and corporate M&A decisions. This study uses Schedule 13D filings by hedge funds from 1998 to 2012 and M&A announcements made by US companies between 1993 and 2015 to examine how hedge fund activism affects the intensity and quality of corporate M&A. We use the difference-in-differences design and the propensity score matching method to isolate the effect of hedge fund activism from the effects of selection bias and other confounding factors. We show that hedge fund interventions result in a significant reduction in the number of M&A, the total transaction value of M&A, the average deal size, and the acquisition expense ratio after accounting for market-wide changes in these variables. These results are in line with the finding of prior research (Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, 2015; Brav et al., 2016) that firms targeted by activists typically reduce capital and R&D expenditures for immediate returns to shareholders such as dividends and stock buyback. 4 To assess the effect of hedge fund activism on shareholder wealth and firm performance through its influence on firms M&A decisions, we calculate the acquirer s cumulative abnormal returns around M&A announcements as well as changes in analysts earnings forecasts and 4 In a letter sent to S&P 500 CEOs on March , Laurence Fink, Chairman and CEO of BlackRock Inc., emphasizes the importance of creating long-term value. He noted that companies tend to respond to activism by delivering an immediate return such as cash dividends or stock repurchases rather than investing in innovation, skilled workforces or essential capital expenditures necessary to sustain long-term growth. See 3

6 industry-adjusted return on assets during the post M&A announcement period for both the treatment group (i.e., firms with hedge fund activism) and the control sample of propensity score matched firms (i.e., firms with no hedge fund activism). We find strong evidence that hedge fund activism results in significant improvements in the above M&A performance measures after controlling for market-wide changes in M&A performance. To explore possible ways through which hedge fund activism improves M&A performance, we look at whether shareholder activism provided by hedge funds reduces the likelihood of a poor acquisition/merger deal and the takeover premium. We consider a deal poor if the acquirer s cumulative announcement abnormal return belongs to the bottom tercile of the distribution. We find that the reduction in both the likelihood of making a poor M&A deal and the takeover premium between the pre- and post-hedge fund activism periods is significantly greater for the treatment group than the corresponding value for the control group, indicating that hedge fund activism improves M&A performance. Prior research shows that diversification M&A in general destroy firm value (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990; Matsusaka, 1993; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Schoar, 2002). Fan and Goyal (2006) find that vertical mergers are associated with positive wealth effects that are significantly larger than those for diversification mergers. Recently, a survey study by McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016) shows that disagreement with corporate strategies such as diversification M&A is one of the most important factors that trigger activist intervention. Brav et al. (2008) also show that hedge fund activists push firms to focus on the core business and oppose acquisitions outside the scope of a firm s core competency. Built upon these results, we examine whether hedge fund activism reduces diversification M&A. Following prior research, we assume that a takeover is a diversification acquisition if the acquiring and acquired firms have different 4

7 three-digit SIC codes. We find strong evidence that hedge fund activism results in a significant reduction in the frequency and aggregate dollar value of diversification M&A after accounting for market-wide changes in these measures. Prior studies (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995) show that a firm with diversified business segments is worth less than the sum of the stand-alone value of each business segment (i.e., the diversification discount). Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) argue that the diversification discount could be attributed to the fact that diversifying firms tend to acquire inefficient assets or companies. Based on these findings, we test whether the effect of hedge fund activism on M&A activities is stronger for firms with multiple business segments than for firms with a single business segment. Consistent with our expectation, we find that hedge fund activism plays a significant role in reducing diversification M&A by firms with multiple business segments only. Prior studies show that entrenched managers or board of directors are associated with excessive M&A activities at the expense of shareholders (see, e.g., Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007, 2009; Harford and Li, 2007; Schmidt, 2015). Other studies (see Brav et al., 2008; Boyson and Mooradian, 2011; Gantchet et al. 2016) show that hedge fund activists take many governancerelated actions that are aimed to improve managerial and firm performance. These results suggest that hedge funds activism improves M&A decisions by mitigating the adverse effect of poor corporate governance on M&A performance through their intervention. Consistent with this expectation, we find that firms with relatively weak governance exhibit a significant decrease in M&A activities and a considerable improvement in the M&A performance subsequent to the hedge fund activist intervention, whereas firms with strong governance do not exhibit similar patterns. Overall, our findings suggest that hedge fund activism plays a role of external disciplinary force and, to a certain extent, substitutes weak internal governance mechanisms. 5

8 Although our empirical findings are consistent with the idea that hedge fund activism improves corporate M&A decisions, we cannot rule out the possibility that the results are driven by some other reasons. For instance, hedge funds may select firms that already have plans to improve their business strategies or governance structures voluntarily without the influence or pressure from hedge fund activism. To explore this possibility, we conduct our analysis using a sample of hedge fund interventions where hedge funds and their target firms have confrontational engagements. We consider this analysis to be an alternative test of the effect of hedge fund activism because improvements in M&A performance in these cases are less likely due to firms voluntary decisions. The majority of firms in our sample with confrontational hedge fund interventions ultimately accommodate or adopt certain changes in governance structure or business strategies. Similar to the results from the full sample, we find a decrease in diversification M&A and an increase in abnormal stock returns for firms with confrontational hedge fund interventions. Hedge funds are considered to be sophisticated investors with superior ability to pick stocks (Griffin and Xu, 2009). One may argue that the improved M&A efficiency could be due to hedge funds abilities to select firms that will improve M&A performance. In such a case, it is difficult to determine whether the improved M&A performance is due to hedge funds stock picking skills or their activism. To separate the activism effect from the stock picking skill, we focus our analysis on those hedge funds that switch from passive to active investors. A hedge fund-firm pairing is included in the switch group if the hedge fund filed at least one Schedule 13G or 13G/A on the firm within one year preceding the initial Schedule 13D filing. We show that the switch group exhibits lower M&A activities than the control sample. We also find that abnormal stock returns and changes in earnings forecasts are greater for the switch group relative to the control group although not statistically significant. 6

9 Our study contributes to the literature in two important dimensions. Opponents of hedge fund activism argue that hedge fund target firms may pass up profitable investment opportunities due to the reduction in internal funds that results from higher dividend payouts and/or larger stock repurchases. Scholars view this action of sacrificing the future for a quick buck as investmentlimiting interventions (see Bebchuk et al. (2015) for a detailed discussion). 5 Our study adds to this debate by providing empirical evidence that hedge fund target firms do not appear to sacrifice good M&A opportunities at the expense of long-term shareholders. Despite the tightening in acquisition spending, the quality of M&A improves after hedge fund interventions. This result is consistent with the finding of Brav et al. (2016) that innovation efficiency increases after hedge fund interventions in spite of a reduction in R&D expenses. Overall, our results suggest that making fewer but better M&A is a potential mechanism through which firm value increases following hedge fund interventions (Brav et al., 2008; Clifford, 2008). Our study also adds to the stream of literature that investigates the role of institutional investors in M&A. Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) show that institutional investors with a high portfolio turnover rate exert little influence on corporate acquisition decisions. Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) show that only independent institutions with concentrated long-term investments are associated with superior post-merger performance. Roosenboom, Schlingemann, and Vasconcelos (2014) show that stock liquidity reduces institutional incentives to monitor corporate takeover decisions, except when the disciplining effect of the threat of exit is high. Our study extends the 5 See 7

10 literature by investigating the effect of shareholder activism provided by hedge funds on the extent and quality of corporate M&A. 6 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes data sources and variable measurement methods and presents descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents and interprets our main empirical findings. Section 4 explores other possible explanations of our empirical results. Section 5 provides the results of robustness tests. Section 6 provides a summary and concluding remarks. 2. Data sources, variable measurement methods, and descriptive statistics 2.1. Data sources and sample construction When an individual or group of individuals acquires beneficial ownership of more than 5% of a voting class of a firm s equity securities with an intention to influence the firm or its management, they are required to file a Schedule 13D with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). We obtain the SEC Filings Index from the WRDS SEC Analytics Suite, which includes the index information of the SEC filings. 7 We then collect all initial Schedule 13D filings from the SEC s EDGAR database for the 15-year period from January 1998 to December The total number of Schedule 13D filings during our study period is around 26,000. In addition to institutional money managers and hedge funds, corporations file Schedule 13Ds when two firms merge or form a business alliance. As noted by Mikkelson and Ruback 6 Following Bushee (1998, 2001), Chen et al. (2007) and Roosenboom et al. (2014) classify institutional investors based on portfolio turnover and diversification and show that transient investors (e.g., investors with a diversified holding and/or a high turnover rate) provide poorer monitoring than non-transient investors. Hedge funds may not easily fit into this classification. First, unlike other institutions that are required to maintain a diversified portfolio, hedge funds can hold a large and concentrated position in individual companies (Brav et al., 2008). Moreover, hedge funds have been regarded as short-term investors (Kahan and Rock, 2007). 7 For example, the SEC Filing Index includes, but not limited to, company name, GVKEY, company SEC CIK, type of form, filing date, the reporting registrant company name, the reporting registrant CIK, Reference Name of Complete Report Filing, etc. The Reference Name of Complete Report Filing, a URL, indicates the file name and the address on EDGAR for user to download the complete report. 8

11 (1985), corporate takeovers are usually preceded by accumulation of small ownership in the target firm. As our study aims to explore how hedge fund activists influence corporate M&A decisions, we focus on hedge funds portfolio investment and discard the filings of cross-holdings for the purpose of a takeover. Following Greenwood and Schor (2009), we cross-reference Schedule 13D filings with a list of investment managers on the Thomas Reuter database and consider only those activists who have filed a Schedule 13F at any point in the past. 8 This filtering step enables us to classify activists into investment activists and takeover activists, but restricts the sample to those institutions managing more than $100 million in US stocks, reducing the sample size (i.e., the number of initial Schedule 13D filings) to around 6,900. We then manually confirm the identity of activists as hedge funds using the information provided on corporate websites and news articles that discuss them. 9 We filter out commercial banks, investment banks, brokerage firms, pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, REITs, and non-hedge-fund-individuals. 10 In most cases, we are able to distinguish hedge fund activists from non-hedge fund activists based on web search. Some of the activists classified as non-hedge funds may have a hedge fund but the hedge fund is not its main product for investors. We classify them as non-hedge fund activists. 11 Following Brav et al. (2008) and Greenwood and 8 Specifically, we match the name of reporting person (REGCONAME) on the Schedule 13D filing with the name of manager (MGRNAME) on the Thomas Reuter 13F filings. Of the original 1,257 distinct reporting persons on Schedule 13D filings, we are able to match 898 with the exactly same name appearing on 13F filings and 74 with a name that is slightly different from that on 13F filings (for example, Karpus Management Inc. on Schedule 13D vs. Karpus Investment Management on Schedule 13F). We use information on corporate websites and web news to confirm these cases. 9 Due to self-reporting by hedge funds, hedge fund databases such as TASS and CISDM provide a limited sample of the hedge fund universe. Footnote 5 in Brav et al. (2008) indicates that they are able to match less than half of their sample to TASS/CISDM (in an early version, they indicate the matching rate around 20%-25%). In footnote 21, Clifford (2008) also reports a low matching rate (30%) to TASS/CISDM. 10 Hedge fund individuals include those who are active in hedge fund management and founders of a hedge fund. We search websites to obtain the background of individuals. Hedge fund individuals in our sample include Stephen Feinberg, George Soros, and Leon Cooperman. 11 For example, Lazard Asset Management LLC, a New York based company with around $148 billion asset under management, is an investment company that offers mutual funds to high net worth individuals and institutional 9

12 Shor (2009), we also make an exception to Franklin Mutual Advisers, an investment company that offers mutual funds but behaves like a hedge fund activist. This step further reduces the 13D filings down to 2,568. A further restriction based on available accounting information on COMPUSTAT to conduct the propensity matching process described in Section 2.3 reduces the sample to 1,397 hedge fund-target pairs, 1,305 target firm-year observations, and distinct 1,103 target firms. Because our study focuses on corporate M&A decisions around activist interventions, we identify firms with prior M&A activities. To do this, we retrieve all mergers and acquisitions between US firms from the Thomson Reuter s Securities Data Company (SDC) database with (i) announcement dates between 1993 and 2015, (ii) disclosed transaction values greater than $10 million, (iii) deals coded as merge (M), an acquisition of majority interest (AM), an acquisition of certain interest (AC), or an acquisition of assets (AA), and (iv) economically significant deals, which are defined as those deals with the relative deal size (i.e., the ratio of the transaction value to the acquiring firm s market value) larger than 1% (Moeller et al., 2005). We include in the study sample only those firms that undertook at least one qualified M&A during a five-year window prior to hedge fund activisms An example of hedge fund activism On March 18, 2008, HealthCor Management filed a Schedule 13D with the SEC indicating that it owns 6.83% of Magellan Health Services. HealthCor Management has been a passive blockholder since its initial Schedule 13G filing on August 6, The Schedule 13D filing included a letter sent to Rene Lerer, the President and CEO, and the Board of Directors, that praised Magellan s growth and large cash flows but noted as problematic its previously announced plan investors in addition to investment advisory and research services. They also launched a hedge fund. See 10

13 to make diversification acquisitions using its large cash balance. Magellan has previously highlighted acquisitions as a means for diversification and growth, and acquired National Imaging Associates and ICORE in HealthCor Management noted that:... the underperformance of ICORE since its acquisition makes cautious about future acquisitions that are consummated for the sake of diversification; we see no reason to waste more capital for the sake of grandeur empire building acquisitions outside of a company s core competency are not being viewed favorable by investors. Prior to the public pressure from HealthCor Management, Magellan has undertaken two major acquisitions with more than $400 million in value and with an average acquisition size approximately 18% of Magellan s total assets during Many believed that Magellan expanded beyond its core behavioral health care business because of these acquisitions. Although Magellan had previously highlighted acquisitions as a means for growth, it has been involved in only one significant acquisition with $110 million in value during the period under HealthCor Management s active monitor. HealthCor Management increased its stakes in Magellan in 2008 and took a smooth exit in 2012 after it switched to a passive blockholder in May Sample characteristics Panel A in Table 1 provides a yearly breakdown of our study sample of 1,305 firms that had hedge fund activism during the period from 1998 through For convenience, we use the acronym FHFA to denote firm (or firms) with hedge fund activism. Of the 1,305 FHFA, 1,223 had one hedge fund activist, 72 had two hedge fund activists, and 10 had three hedge fund activists. As a result, the total number of hedge fund activists during the study period is 1,397 (= 1,

14 x x 10). Similar to the result reported in Boyson, Gantchev, and Shivdasani (2016), we find a higher level of hedge fund activism during the period. Of the 1,305 firms that had at least one hedge fund activist during the sample period, 403 firms had at least one M&A deal during the five-year period prior to hedge fund activism and 783 firms did not have any M&A deal during the same five-year period. 12 Of 403 firms that had at least one M&A deal, 358 firms have complete data that are required for our empirical analysis, which constitute our study sample. We use data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), COMPUSTAT, Thomson Reuters Ownership Database, and Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Panel B shows the number of hedge fund activism events across the Fama-French 12 industries. The results show a high level of hedge fund activism in high tech, finance, wholesale and retail, and healthcare, medical equipment, and drug industries, and a low level of hedge fund activism in utilities, chemical and allied products, consumer durables and nondurables, and energy industries. Similar to prior research, our study sample includes such active hedge funds as Blum Capital Partners, Icahn Carl, Steel Partners, Jana Partners, Third Point, Steel Partners, Ramius Capital, and Elliott Associates Measures of M&A intensity We measure M&A intensity by the total number of M&A deals, the total transaction value of M&A deals, the average deal size, and the average relative deal size using the data from COMPUSTAT and SDC. Additionally, we use acquisition expenses and the acquisition expense ratio (acquisition expenses scaled by total assets) as measures of M&A intensity. 12 Of these 403 firms, 379 firms had one hedge fund activist, 22 firms had two hedge fund activists, and two firms had three hedge fund activists. Hence, the total number of hedge fund activists for these firms is

15 2.5. Descriptive statistics We conduct our analysis using the treatment sample and the control sample of propensity score matched firms. The initial set of potential control firms includes all firms in COMPUSTAT with at least one M&A deal during the five-year period prior to the event date. In the logistic model, we include variables that are shown in prior studies to determine activists decision to establish new positions. These variables include the market value of equity (MVE), Tobin s Q ratio, financial leverage, sales growth rate, dividend yield, return on assets (ROA) measured at t- 1, change in ROA between years t-3 and t-1, institutional ownership, and analyst following (Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler, 1998; Brav et al., 2008; Boyson and Mooradian, 2011; Brav et al., 2016). We provide the definitions of these variables in the Appendix (Table A2). In addition to these variables, we also include the acquisition expense ratio in the logistic model to control for prior acquisition expenses. All accounting variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. In each year, we match each of the 358 FHFA that had at least one qualified M&A during the five-year period preceding the activist intervention (the treatment group) with a firm that has the closest propensity score in the same two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry. We provide the results of the logistic regression in the Appendix (Table A1). The results show that hedge fund activism is higher for smaller firms, value firms, firms with low growth, higher leverage, lower dividend payout, greater institutional ownership, and higher analyst following 13. As reported at the bottom of column (1) in Table A1, the unconditional baseline probability of 13 The signs of the coefficients on Table A1 are in large consistent with the existing literature. Hedge fund activists generally set up agenda to influence the management team or to make real policy changes. They are apt to cooperate with the management or to advocate their agenda publicly seeking other shareholders support. Accordingly, they target firms with higher institutional ownership and analyst coverage. Large stake of institutional ownership is also found to increase the likelihood of success by the activists (Appel, Gormley, and Keim, 2016). 13

16 becoming an activist target is 1.7% per year. These results are consistent with the findings of prior studies (see, e.g., Bethel et al., 1998; Boyson and Mooradian, 2011; Brav et al., 2008). 14 Table 2 reports the summary statistics in the event year for the 358 matching pairs of the treatment and control firms. The last three columns show the difference, the t-statistic, and the probability of the equality of the mean value between the treatment and control samples. Panel A shows that the treatment sample and the control sample are similar across most firm characteristics, except for Tobin s Q. Although M&A intensity is not one of the matching variables, the treatment and control samples are similar in M&A intensity in the year of and prior to hedge fund activism. For example, the treatment (control) firms spent an equivalent of 3.0% (3.1%) of their total assets in M&A during the event year. Panel B shows that, on average, the treatment (control) firms had 0.27 (0.29) M&A with the total deal value of $769 ($698) million in the intervention year, and had 0.61 (0.64) M&A with the total deal value of $1,143 ($1,065) million during the three-year period prior to hedge fund activism. 15 Panel C shows that the treatment firms and control firms are also similar in CEO ownership, director ownership, antitakeover defense, and the composite E-index. 3. Empirical analyses 3.1. M&A intensity subsequent to hedge fund interventions We begin our empirical analyses by examining the relation between hedge fund activism and the intensity of M&A. As in Table 2, we conduct our analyses using the treatment sample of 358 FHFA and the control sample of 358 propensity score matched firms. The panel data include the 14 Throughout this study, we report the results using the 358 FHFA in column (1) of Table A1. We also find qualitatively similar results using 403 FHFA. 15 Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2015a) find that 25.5% of the firms targeted by hedge fund activism drop out of COMPUSTAT within two years, which is higher than the mean attrition rate of firms in COMPUSTAT. We find a slightly larger attrition rate for the treatment sample (55%) than for the control sample (71%) surviving through three years post event year. 14

17 observations from three years prior to an activism event to three years after an activism event (i.e. [t-3, t+3]). To account for the effects of extraneous factors and selection bias, we adopt the difference-in-differences regression framework throughout the study. Specifically, we use the following regression model in this section: M&A i,t = β 1 (DHFA i POST i,t ) + β 2 POST i,t + δ Control i,t + α t + α i + ε i,t ; (1) where the dependent variable M&A i,t is one of the five M&A intensity measures described in Section 2.4, DHFA i is a dummy variable that is equal to one for FHFA and zero for their matched control firms, POST i,t is a dummy variable that is equal to one if firm-year (i,t) observation is within [t+1, t+3] years of the activism event and zero otherwise, and Control i,t is the set of control variables. We also include year and firm fixed effects (α t and α i ) in the model. Following prior research, we use market capitalization and firm age as controls (see Brav et al., 2016; Bebchuk et al., 2015). Note that β 1, the coefficient on the interaction term DHFA i POST i,t, indicates whether there is a difference in the level of M&A intensity between FHFA and the control sample during the post activism period. The results (see Panel A of Table 3) show that β 1 estimates are negative and significant, regardless of which measures of M&A intensity are used in the regression, indicating that hedge fund activism results in a significant reduction in the total number of M&A deals, the total transaction value of M&A deals, the average deal size, the average relative deal size, and the acquisition expense ratio after accounting for market-wide changes in these variables. Considering that the average duration of hedge fund activism is around two years (Boyson and Mooradian 2011; Brav et al., 2008), we also use a shorter observation window of [t-2, t+2] and report the results in Panel B. In five of six measures, we obtain results that are significant and comparable to 15

18 those reported in Panel A. 16 On the whole, these results suggest that hedge fund activism tends to make firms to spend less on acquisitions and undertake fewer and smaller M&A M&A performance subsequent to hedge fund activism We adopt two measures of M&A performance widely employed in the literature (Chen et al., 2007; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007). The first measure is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the M&A announcement date. We estimate the market model for each deal over a 200-day period ending 11 days before the announcement date using the CRSP value-weighted market return. We then use the estimated parameters to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns over the ten-day ( 5, +5) event window centered on the announcement date. The second measure is the change in analysts earnings forecasts between the pre- and post- M&A periods. This measure captures the change in the analysts expectation of the acquiring firm s earnings per share (EPS) that results from M&A. We measure the change in EPS ( EPS) by the difference between the first median analyst forecast in the three-month period after the M&A completion date and the last median analyst forecast in the three-month period prior to the M&A announcement date. We obtain analyst forecasts from the I/B/E/S database. We calculate both performance measures for each M&A deal. The sample includes M&A transactions made by firms in the treatment and control groups within three years before and after the hedge fund intervention year during the period. We employ the following regression model to measure the effect of hedge fund activism on M&A performance after controlling for the heterogeneity of deal characteristics: Performance i,t = β 1 (DHFA i POST i,t ) + β 2 POST i,t + β 3 DHFA i + δ Control i,t 16 We find similar results when we use the observations from five years prior to an activism event to five years after an activism event (i.e. [t-5, t+5]). 16

19 + α t + α IND + ε i,t ; (2) where the dependent variable Performance i,t includes the two measures of M&A performance that we described above (CAR and EPS) and two additional operating performance measures constructed at the firm level: IROA and IROA. IROA is the industry-adjusted return on assets and IROA is the change in IROA during the period [t, t+3], where t refers to the deal announcement year. DHFA i and POST i,t are the same as defined in regression model (1). Control i,t represents a vector of control variables that are previously found to determine the performance of M&A (e.g., relative deal size, method of payment, status of the target firm, and tender offer). We also include year and industry fixed effects (α t and α IND ) in the regression model. The coefficient β 1 indicates whether the change in the M&A performance between the pre- and post-activism periods is different between the treatment group (FHFA) and the control group. The regression results (see Table 4) show that β 1 estimates are positive and significant for all four measures of M&A performance, suggesting that hedge fund activism improves M&A performance after controlling for any market-wide change in M&A performance. In Panel B, we also report the results with the observation window of [t-2, t+2]. The coefficients are again comparable to those reported in Panel A. Taken together with the results in Table 3, our results show that hedge fund activism leads to lower M&A activities and favorable market and analyst reactions to M&A activities. In the next section, we explore possible explanations for the favorable market and analyst reactions Hedge fund activism and the quality of M&A decisions Testing whether hedge fund activism reduces poor acquisitions 17

20 Prior research shows that active institutional monitoring improves M&A performance (Chen et al., 2007; Roosenboom et al., 2014). 17 In a similar vein, we conjecture that shareholder activism provided by hedge funds reduces the likelihood of a poor acquisition. To test this conjecture, we modify regression model (2) by replacing the dependent variable with a binary variable indicating poor M&A deals. We identify poor deals using the following steps: (i) we calculate CAR for each qualified M&A deal described in Section 2.1; (ii) we consider a M&A deal to be poor if it belongs to the bottom tercile of CAR in a given year; (iii) we create the binary variable Poor which is equal to one if the firm has at least one poor M&A in a particular year and zero otherwise. 18 Table 5 presents the regression results with the dependent variable Poor. We report the results of the linear probability model (LPM) regression in column (1) and the results of the logistic regression in columns (2) and (3) with different fixed effects. 19 The negative coefficients on the interaction term DHFA i POST i,t indicate that the change (i.e., reduction) in the likelihood of making a poor M&A deal between the pre-and post-activism periods is significantly greater for FHFA than the corresponding value for the control group. Hence, hedge fund activism improves M&A performance after controlling for any market-wide change in M&A performance Testing whether hedge fund activisms reduce takeover premiums Prior research finds evidence that entrenched managers tend to make overpayments in acquisition deals (see Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell, 2012). We conjecture that hedge 17 Roosenboom et al. (2014) suggest that increased intervention by institutions is likely to increase pressure on managers to withdraw deals with negative announcement returns. However, withdrawal of deals with poor announcement returns has been viewed as evidence that managers learn from and react to the market, even without activist intervention (Luo, 2005). 18 We obtain similar results when the Poor deal is the bottom tercile of "value destruction" calculated as the product of CAR and the market capitalization measured at the prior fiscal-year end. 19 We exclude the dummy variable DHFA i whenever firm fixed effects are included in the model. 18

21 fund activism may reduce overpayments for target assets. To test this conjecture, we start with a subsample of M&A deals used in Section 3.2 which allows us to calculate the takeover premium. As in Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004, 2005), we measure the takeover premium by (transaction value/the target s market value of equity) We then estimate regression model (2) using the takeover premium as the dependent variable. We show the regression results in Table 6. Columns (1) and (2) show the results when we include acquiring firm characteristics and deal characteristic as control variables. Columns (3) and (4) show the results when we further include target firm characteristics in the regression model. The results show that the coefficients on the interaction term (DHFA i POST i,t ) are negative and significant, suggesting lower takeover premiums subsequent to the activist intervention. We acknowledge that the offer premium itself is not a clean measure of overpayment because larger offer premiums may simply reflect larger synergistic values of M&A. Taken together with the results in Section 3.2, however, the market reacts more favorably to acquisition announcements made by FHFA during the post intervention period. The synergy hypothesis is less plausible because it predicts a positive interaction term. Overall, our evidence indicates that hedge fund activism improves M&A performance through the avoidance of poor deals and the reduction in the takeover premium Testing whether hedge fund activism reduces diversification M&A McCahery et al. (2016) show that disagreement with corporate strategies such as diversification M&A is among the most important factors that trigger activist intervention. Brav et al. (2008) also show that hedge fund activists push firms to focus on the core business and 20 We use the target firm s market value of equity 30 days prior to the deal announcement date. 19

22 oppose acquisitions outside the scope of their core competency. In a similar vein, we conjecture that hedge fund activism reduces diversification M&A. To test this conjecture, we estimate regression model (1) with two new dependent variables separately: the intensity of diversification M&A and the intensity of non-diversification M&A. Following prior research, we assume that a takeover is a diversification acquisition if the acquiring and acquired firms have different threedigit SIC codes. For each firm, we calculate the number and total transaction value of diversification M&A and non-diversification M&A in each year and use them as measures of the intensity of each type of M&A. The first two columns in Table 7 show the results for diversification M&A and the next two columns show the results for non-diversification M&A. Columns (1) and (3) show the results when the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of M&A in each year. Columns (2) and (4) show the results when the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the total transaction value of M&A in each year. The results show that the coefficients on the interaction term (DHFA i POST i,t ) are negative and significant for diversification M&A, regardless of whether we use the number or aggregate dollar value of M&A. In contrast, the corresponding coefficients for non-diversification M&A are not significantly different from zero. These results indicate that hedge fund activism results in a significant reduction only in the frequency and aggregate dollar value of diversification M&A Testing whether the effect of hedge fund activism on M&A activities is stronger for firms with multiple business segments Prior research (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995) shows that a firm with diversified business segments is worth less than the sum of the stand-alone value of each business segment (i.e., the 20

23 diversification discount). Graham et al. (2002) argue that the diversification discount is largely attributable to the fact that diversifying firms tend to acquire inefficient assets or firms. Based on these findings, we conjecture that the effect of hedge fund activism on M&A activities is stronger for firms with multiple business segments than for firms with a single business segment. To test this conjecture, we employ the following regression model: M&A i,t = MULTIPLE i [β 1 (DHFA i POST i,t ) + β 2 POST i,t ] + SINGLE i [β 3 (DHFA i POST i,t ) + β 4 POST i,t ] + δ Control i,t + α t + α i + ε i,t ; (3) where MULTIPLE i (SINGLE i ) is equal to one for firms with multiple segments (single segment) and zero otherwise, and all other variables are the same as defined in regression model (1). We obtain the business segment information from the COMPUSTAT Industrial Segment (CIS) database. Following Berger and Ofek (1995), we exclude financial service firms and firms with financial service segments (SIC code between 6000 and 6999). 21 A firm is considered to have multiple segments if it reports more than one business or operating segments with different SIC codes one year prior to the activism event year. 22 Panel A of Table 2 shows that the mean number of business segments (1.79) for the control group is similar to that (1.74) for the treatment group. Panel A of Table 8 shows the regression results using five different measures of M&A activities. For ease of comparison, the estimates of β 1 and β 2 for firms with multiple business segments are reported in odd-numbered columns and the corresponding estimates (β 3 and β 4 ) for firms with a single business segment are reported in even-numbered columns. The F-test statistics 21 Our results are robust to the inclusion of financial service firms and firms with financial service segments. 22 Tong (2011) also uses the number of segments to identify firm diversification. 21

24 for the equality of the coefficients on the interaction term (β 1 = β 3 ) are reported in the bottom of table. The results show that the coefficients on the interaction term (DHFA i POST i,t ) are negative and significant only for firms with multiple segments. The F-test results indicate that the difference between β 1 and β 3 is statistically significant. These results are consistent with our expectation that hedge fund activism plays an important role in reducing poor M&A only for firms with multiple business segments. We showed earlier (in Section 3.3.3) that hedge fund activism reduces only diversification M&A. To test the effect of hedge fund activism on diversification M&A and the effect of the number of business segments simultaneously, we estimate regression model (3) using the intensity of diversification M&A and the intensity of non-diversification M&A separately as the dependent variable. Panel B reports the results when we measure the intensity of M&A by the total number of M&A deals and the total transaction value of M&A deals. The first four columns show the results when we use the intensity of diversification M&A as the dependent variable and the next four columns show the results when we use the intensity of non-diversification M&A as the dependent variable. The results show that the coefficients on the interaction term are negative and significant only for firms with multiple business segments and diversification M&A, indicating that hedge fund activism plays a significant role in reducing diversification M&A by firms with multiple business segments. Collectively, the above results suggest that as hedge fund activists find that their target firms lack business focus or exhibit excessive diversification, they tend to make target firms to refocus on the core business and less diversified through spin-off or divesture of inefficient assets (Bethel et al., 1998; Brav et al., 2015b). Consequently, firms that lack business focus at the outset avoid 22

25 further expansion into non-core businesses by reducing their M&A activities, particularly diversification M&A Testing whether the effect of hedge fund activism on M&A performance is stronger for firms with poor governance Numerous studies have examined the relation between corporate governance and M&A decisions. For example, Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007, 2009), Harford and Li (2007), and Schmidt (2015) show that entrenched managers or board of directors are associated with a high propensity to make acquisitions at the expense of shareholders. Prior research (see Brav et al., 2008; Boyson and Mooradian, 2011; Gantchet et al. 2016) also shows that hedge fund activists take many governance-related actions that are aimed to rescind antitakeover defenses, to enhance board independence, to seek fair board representation, and to oust CEO or chairman. These results suggest that hedge funds activism improves the FHFA s M&A decisions by mitigating the adverse effect of poor corporate governance on M&A performance through their intervention. If this were true, we would expect that the effect of hedge fund activism on M&A performance is stronger for firms with weaker governance at the onset of the intervention. We use CEO ownership, director ownership, and E-index as our empirical proxies for the quality of corporate governance. We obtain CEO ownership from the ExecuComp database and director ownership and antitakeover provisions from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) database. We provide the definition of these variables in Table A2. A firm is considered to have weak (strong) governance if its CEO ownership or director ownership is below (above) the corresponding median value of the sample in the activism event year, or if its E-index is above (below) the median value of the sample. We then estimate the following regression model: 23