Knowing the FIELD for infrastructure and service regulation at local level: actors, information, incentives

Transcription

1 Knowing the FIELD for infrastructure and service regulation at local level: actors, information, incentives Firenze 31 October 2014 Performances in the Water Sector: Benchmarking, Regulation Drivers & Information Sharing Franco Becchis, Turin School of Local Regulation 1

2 THE DESIGN Is the local dimension relevant for regulation? Are there peculiar critical aspects in local regulation? Do we need a new approach? 2

3 The local case: improper costs of regulation NPVy = f (α, net, θ) net = f (HLD) P n N HLD > P n N HLD C HLD > C HND 3

4 Traditional economics wins Game theory Incentive based contract theory Mechanism design 4

5 Traditional economics fails Network Relationships Institutions Legacy 5

6 Concepts of incentives, incentivecompatibility in information transfer, mechanisms for information disclosure Game Theory & Mechanism Design Erving Goffman. Social settings, front stage and back stage, in which the front stage plays a performance meant to manage the impressions of an audience Sociology Social Network Analysis & Social Physics Ronald Coase, Oscar Williamson, Douglass North, Elinor Ostrom. Models of regulation and typologies of transactions cannot be merely transplanted from an institutional context to another. Institutions matter! Framework of Incentives to Empower Local Decision-makers A multidisciplinary methodology for the analysis of local actors, incentives and information endowment that surround and lie behind the success or the failure of local services, infrastructures and projects, defining the playing field where their implementation and regulation takes place. e.g. concept of Instrumental use of networks by individuals; centrality index; quantitative analysis; measuring the power within a network of players Institutional Economics Political Economy Analysis Aims to situate development interventions within an understanding of the prevailing political and economic processes in society (incentives, relationships, distribution and contestation of power) all of which greatly impact on development outcomes. 6

7 THE MATRIX - FIELDS Categories of players Players Incentives Information endowment Information exchange Types of relations 7

8 Categories of players 8 Politicians Public officials Market actors (non-financial) Market actors (financial local or national/international) Lobbies Consumer organizations Administrative tribunals (administrative,procedural, budget conflicts) Consumers / final users Players incentives Institutional & Shadow Efficiency in provision of the service Profit Market share Effectiveness and quality Equity / redistribution / accessibility Electoral consensus Consensus Political control Religious control Ethnic control Maintaining / increasing own budget Financial public budget constraints Legacy (NEW)

9 9 Information endowment Information on: Operational costs Investment costs Physical assets Revenues (NEW) Demand side (NEW) Direct ownership (resident) vs indirect ownership (NEW) (non-resident, through transmission) of information? In case of indirect ownership, what are the costs to obtain information? Information exchange (NEW) Nature: mandatory (check, sanctions) control voluntary uses Truth revealing incentive compatibility? (Yes / No) Truth revelation mechanisms?

10 Types of relations Appointment Election Lobby pressure Strong political influence Corruption Command Control Regulation: price, quantity, quality, accessibility, distributional Sentences / rule of law / judicial enforcement Assignment Business relationship (NEW) Market power (NEW) 10

11 1. High degree of subjectivity (some solution tested, e.g. focus groups: see the case of district heating in Turin; or pools of referees?) 2. Difficulty to compare case studies that are economically and socially different 3. At the time being FIELD is a static snapshot of the situation. How to include the time dimension? Policy-oriented tool 11

12 THE CASE STUDIES ANALYZED SO FAR THIS PRESENTATION FOCUSES ON: Belgrade (Water) Sofia (Water) CAIRO (Egypt) Classification: Lower-middle income economy (WB) -- Regulatory framework: WWS sector --> Egyptian Water Regulatory Agency 12

13 Source: LORENET State and Local governments through Water Associations Under reform Bulgaria Serbia Who has the ownership of waterworks and plants? If applicable, who is in charge of tendering the services? What is the average duration of concessions? Can they be re-negotiated? Who manages the service? Is PPP a common practice in the Country? Who regulates tariffs, profits/revenues and so on? Who plans investments? Water Associations to existing WSO, or will choose concessioners Water Associations with the support of Water Service Op. Water Service Operators State Local governments Municipalities and the State administration On average: up to 35 ys. Existing case: 25 ys Renegotiation: yes Water Service Operators, generally public companies. One case of PPP No. It exists (one case in Sofia), but this model is not common. The State Energy and Water Regulatory Commission Water services operators with approval by the regulator State Local governments Municipalities By law: up to 99 years. Renegotiation is possible. In practice: no experience in the water sector. Municipalities and public companies No 2011 Law on Public Private Partnership and Concessions, but limited in scope by the Law on Communal Services and difficult to be applied for low capacity of local public The Government policy-makers sets a reference price, local authorities set tariffs. The Directorate for Water of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry & Water Management and local authorities What is the structure of revenues? Customer bills (+) EU funds (-) Customer bills (mainly) and subsidies 13

14 BELGRADE: PLAYERS & INCENTIVES 14

15 Belgrade Water sector Players e.g. WB, IFC, EBRD Int l Financial Institutions (WB, IFC, EBRD) Consumers Consumer organizations Belgrade Waterworks and Sewerage Public operator, founded by the City Water Council Local Govt Central Govt Consultative bodies National Conference on Water Public bodies Market operators International financial institutions and donors Consumers and their organizations (potentially) Private operators / PPPs Foreign Investors Not existing yet

16 Belgrade Water sector Players Incentives (first 3 in the rank) Int l Financial Institutions Consumers 1.Consensus 2.Efficacy & quality 3.Efficiency 1.Equity 2.Efficacy & quality 3.Consensus 1.Equity 2.Efficacy & quality 3.Consensus Water Council Local Govts Consumer organizations Public Operator 1.Consensus 2.Efficacy & quality 3.Efficiency 1.Efficacy & quality 2.Efficiency 3.Equity 1.Efficiency 2.Profit 3.Market share Central Govt National Conference on Water 1.Consensus 2.Equity 3.Efficacy & quality 1.Equity 2.Efficacy & quality 3.Efficiency (potentially) Private operators / PPPs Foreign Investors 1.Profit 2.Market share 3.Efficiency 1.Market share 2.Profit 3.Efficiency

17 Belgrade Water sector Players Incentives (shadow) 4 th Int l Financial Institutions Consumers 5 th Water Council 5 4 th th Public Operator 6 th Local Govts 4 th Consumer organizations 5 4 th th Electoral consensus Political control Bureaucracy (Maintaining / increasing own budget) Financial public budget constraints 6 4 th 5 th th Central Govt 4 th National Conference on Water (potentially) Private operators / PPPs Foreign Investors

18 SOFIA: PLAYERS & INCENTIVES 18

19 Sofia Water sector Players EBRD Consumers Int l Financial Institutions Consumer organizations National Regulator Local Govts Sofiyska Voda PPP operator. Now Municipality of Sofia (22.9 %) and the French company Veolia Water (77.1 %). Central Govt Political Parties Public bodies Market operators International financial institutions and donors Consumers and their organizations Veolia Water International operator

20 Sofia Water sector Players Incentives EBRD Consumers 1.Profit 1.Efficiency 2.Efficacy 3.Equity National Regulator Consumer organizations 1.Equity 2.Political control 3.Bureaucracy Local Govts Sofiyska Voda Central Govt 1.Electoral consensus 2.Public budget constraints 3.Efficacy & quality 1.Efficiency 2.Efficacy 3.Equity 1.Profit 2.Market share 3.Efficiency 1.Political control 2.Electoral consensus 3.Public budget constraints Political Parties Veolia Water 1.Political control 2.Electoral consensus 1.Profit 2.Market share 3.Efficiency

21 COMPARISON ON WEIGHTED TOTAL INCENTIVES Weight given to each incentive according to the position in the ranking: 1 st position: 8 2 nd position: 4 3 rd position: 3 4 th position: 2 5 th position: 1 21

22 BELGRADE: SOME RELATIONSHIPS 22

23 Belgrade Water sector Appointment; Strong Political Influence Int l Financial Institutions Consumers Consumer organizations Water Council Local Govt Public Operator Central Govt National Conference on Water Private operators / (potential) PPPs Foreign Investors

24 Belgrade Water sector Lobby pressure Int l Financial Institutions Consumers Voice by Albert Hirschman? Consumer organizations Water Council Local Govt Public Operator Central Govt National Conference on Water Foreign Investors Private operators / (potential) PPPs

25 Belgrade Water sector Regulation Int l Financial Institutions Consumers Consumer organizations Water Council Local Govt Public Operator Central Govt National Conference on Water All P = Price Ql = Quality Qt = Quantity A = Accessibility D = Distributional aspects All = All types of regulation Private operators / (potential) PPPs Foreign Investors

26 Belgrade Water sector Data transfer Int l Financial Institutions Consumers Consumer Organizations Water Council Local Govt Public Operator Central Govt National Conference on Water = The player owns information on industrial costs, operational costs, physical assets Private operators / (potential) PPPs Foreign Investors

27 SOFIA: SOME RELATIONSHIPS 27

28 Sofia Water sector Appointment; Strong Political Influence EBRD Consumers National Regulator Consumer organizations Local Govt Sofiyska Voda Central Govt Political Parties Veolia Water

29 Sofia Water sector Lobby pressure EBRD Consumers National Regulator Local Govt Sofiyska Voda Central Govt Political Parties Veolia Water Voice by Albert Hirschman? Consumer organizations

30 Sofia Water sector Regulation EBRD Consumers National Regulator Consumer organizations Local Govt Sofiyska Voda Central Govt Political Parties Veolia Water

31 Sofia Water sector Data transfer EBRD Consumers National Regulator Consumer organizations Local Govt Sofiyska Voda Central Govt Political Parties Veolia Water = The player owns information on industrial costs, operational costs, physical assets

32 Outbound / Inbound Relation Ratio Index: foreword outbound and inbound relations registered for each player were calculated, according to who is the agent of the relation and who is the passive target. An index was created to assess the activism of each player in the context analyzed, based on the number of outbound relations that the player exerts. The index has been calculated dividing the sum of outbound relations registered for a single player by the total sum of outbound relations registered in that city (Outbound relations ratio). The same procedure has been adopted for inbound relations (Inbound relations ratio). 32

33 Outbound Relation Ratio Index: a demonstration Outbound relations of Player X Total outbound relations of the city players = Player X s Outbound RRI 33

34 NEXT STEPS Build a large portfolio of case studies to further test it: Water services in Arba Minch (Ethiopia) Local welfare (Turin) Biogas plant (Piemonte) Local public transport (Istanbul) Others to be identified 34

35 Franco Becchis Scientific Director