Fiscal Risks in Italy

Transcription

1 Fiscal Risks in Italy IMF Conference on Fiscal Risks Paris October 28-29, 2008 Lorenzo Codogno Italy s Ministry of the Economy and Finance (MEF) Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning Directorate

2 Agenda Fiscal Risks (FR) Some comments on the IMF paper. Fiscal Risks in Italy some issues. Some considerations on contingent macroeconomic shocks and long-term sustainability of Italy s public finances. 2 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

3 SOME COMMENTS ON THE IMF PAPER The IMF methodology: pros A simple framework to assess and disclose worst-case scenarios consistently with past experience of budgetary planning in different countries. Tracking past projection errors helps to identify sources of FR and to improve projection methods used by governments. Transparency in official budgetary planning, open discussion about baseline projections and underlying assumptions, and design of preventive measures and fiscal rules. 3 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

4 SOME COMMENTS ON THE IMF PAPER The IMF methodology: cons Using cross-country data to construct the frequency distribution and percentiles of historical projection errors might be misleading as high-risk and low-risk countries have been mixed; country-specific time series data should be considered. Problem of short series. (US CBO 2007 uses 25 years). One-period-ahead projection errors might be insufficient since budgetary planning extends 3-5 years into the future. Horizon up to three periods ahead would be needed. Again, problem of short series. (US CBO 2007 extends to 5 years ahead). 4 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

5 SOME COMMENTS ON THE IMF PAPER Fiscal risk mitigation Is it worthwhile? In practice, most of the times the government is the economic agent that have the best ability and incentive to manage risk and is best placed to bear risk.... but there may be exceptions. Topical issue given recent sharp increase in contingent liabilities: need for risk mitigation in the future once the financial crisis is over. 5 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

6 SOME COMMENTS ON THE IMF PAPER Financial hedging and insurance instruments Self-insurance is the default option most of the times. Catastrophe bonds or insurance may be considered, especially when first order problems have been solved (try selling earthquake insurance to policymakers struggling to prepare the budget!). Main sources of fiscal risk are difficult to insure away (e.g. sub-prime, banking and exchange rate crisis). 6 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

7 SOME COMMENTS ON THE IMF PAPER Contingent reserves: risks of pro-cyclical effects Contingencies appropriation vs. contingency reserves. Reserves are reduced in bad times making for replenishment and thus calling for tightening policy when tightening is not desirable. Conversely, reserves tend to be abundant in good times calling for pro-cyclical use of the excess reserves. Conclusion: no binding rules to avoid pro-cyclical effects. 7 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

8 SOME COMMENTS ON THE IMF PAPER Transparency vs. moral hazard / endangering negotiations Striking a good balance between transparency and full disclosure on the one hand and risks of endangering future negotiations or triggering moral hazard on the other is a difficult exercise. Clearly fiscal policy should be set taking into consideration all fiscal risks, including those that are not disclosed or explicitly quantified, although... can a democratic debate accept undisclosed items as a basis for policy decisions? No clear-cut solution. 8 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

9 FISCAL RISKS IN ITALY SOME ISSUES Fiscal Risks Italy s experience Analysis of sources of FR to Italy s public debt projections: emphasis on unexpected permanent macroeconomic shocks to growth and interest rates rather than contingent liabilities. How do we integrate methodologies addressing FR and long-term fiscal sustainability? Risks of full disclosure: an example. 9 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

10 FISCAL RISKS IN ITALY SOME ISSUES Mixed feelings on experimental disclosure of contingent risks Classification of possible expenditure (in Euro Mn) SIGNED COMMITMENTS * Resources allocated to social security and labour (1) 1,000 1,000 1,000 Contracts for public sector employees (including school system) 2, Cooperation on development - AIDS Fund and IDA XIV Total Category 1 4,104 1,711 1,711 CUSTOMARY OBLIGATIONS * National Railways (FF.SS.) 4,000 3,500 3,500 National Road Board (ANAS) 1,000 1,500 1,500 ENAV Post Office Reserve to offset commitment's overruns 800 1,000 1,000 Resources for next round of collective bargaining with public sector employees To be established Extension of fiscal benefits 1,200 1,500 1,500 Total Category 2 7,160 7,660 7,660 Total (Categories 1and 2) 11,264 9,371 9,371 Estimates for new initiatives (Category 3)* 10,000 10,000 10,000 Total (Categories 1, 2 and 3) 21,264 19,371 19,371 In the Economic and Financial Planning Document for a table was introduced for the first time with some contingent liabilities (versus projections based on unchanged legislation ). 10 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

11 FISCAL RISKS IN ITALY SOME ISSUES FR in Italy s debt projections Unexpected events (e.g. lower-than-expected interest rates) led to overestimation of public debt in , while debt was underestimated in (e.g. lower-than-expected growth). 11 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

12 FISCAL RISKS IN ITALY SOME ISSUES The breakdown of projection errors Fiscal risks associated mainly to macroeconomic shocks affecting debt dynamics through deficit and growth-adjusted initial debt (both components are highly correlated because of growth shocks). Stock-flow adjustment with large impact in 1997 and MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

13 FISCAL RISKS IN ITALY SOME ISSUES A further breakdown of deficits Projection Errors (pp) - One-period-ahead projections Debt variation Deficit Primary balance Interest bill Deficit should be broken down into primary balance and interest bill to disentangle effects on current budgetary items (growth shocks) and on debt servicing (interest rate shocks), especially in high debt countries such as Italy. 13 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

14 FISCAL RISKS IN ITALY SOME ISSUES FR and macroeconomic shocks growth and inflation Negative shocks to growth led to underestimation of deficits and growth-adjusted initial debt. Revenues highly elastic to growth, but current expenditure fairly inelastic. Good performance in projecting inflation since EMU. 14 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

15 FISCAL RISKS IN ITALY SOME ISSUES FR and macroeconomic shocks interest rates Favorable interest rate shocks have been observed in Current financial turmoil might imply downside risk. 15 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

16 FISCAL RISKS IN ITALY SOME ISSUES Debt projections adjusted by FR worst-case scenario Fiscal risks introduced into debt projection by simulating dynamics with one-sd shocks to deficit (1.0 pp of GDP), growth-adjusted initial debt (1.1 pp), and stock-flow adjustment (1.7 pp). Worst-case scenario: should Italy suffer debt variations of 3.8 pp above the baseline case all over , the 2013 debt would be 115% of GDP. 16 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

17 LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY OF ITALY S PUBLIC FINANCES FR and long-term fiscal sustainability (LTFS) Focus on macroeconomic shocks instead of contingent liabilities, with shocks affecting LTFS in a lasting manner. The IMF methodology: historical projection errors give an order of magnitude of possible shocks in the future; FRadjusted debt projections. 17 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

18 LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY OF ITALY S PUBLIC FINANCES FR and long-term fiscal sustainability (LTFS) (cont d) LTFS challenges (e.g. demographics and productivity growth) are perceived to be more important when the debtto-gdp ratio is still high. The EPC-AWG methodology: indicators S1 and S2 to measure permanent fiscal adjustment needed to achieve solvency, e.g. Maastricht 60% debt ratio or intertemporal budget constraint (IBC). 18 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

19 LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY OF ITALY S PUBLIC FINANCES FR and long-term fiscal sustainability (LTFS) (cont d) For Italy, the EPC-AWG indicators reveal a substantial margin of safety (due to past pension reforms), giving an order of magnitude of shocks that can be absorbed without threatening LTFS. Italy can absorb shocks equivalent to a permanent 0.9pp reduction in the primary balance-to-gdp ratio and still achieve solvency. At 2013, the PV of estimated future primary surpluses is 145% of GDP, hence this would be the maximum level of debt consistent with meeting IBC. 19 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

20 LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY OF ITALY S PUBLIC FINANCES LTFS - Debt projections in baseline and worst-case scenarios Baseline scenario: debt reaches 13% of GDP in Worst-case scenario: debt reaches Maastricht 60% of GDP in 2050 and meets IBC. 20 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

21 LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY OF ITALY S PUBLIC FINANCES worst-case + : low growth + high interest rate in the long run Financial turmoil might have long-run effects on growth and real interest rates, thus compounding medium-run effects on budget and debt. Even in worst-case + scenarios, Italy s debt would decrease over time and meet IBC. 21 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

22 Conclusions (I) FR analysis should be incorporated to regular budget planning. Still, the focus should be baseline projections since they capture events likely to happen according to consensus and expert opinions. Interaction between FR in medium-term and LTFS must be addressed as well. A methodology must be shared by countries to ensure data comparability and transparency. Commonly-agreed approach to assess LTFS in EPC-AWG is an encouraging example. 22 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

23 Conclusions (II) Contingent liabilities might be associated with dramatic events, and so an excessive emphasis in discussing them might trigger self-fulfilling fears (e.g. in good times, making provisions to support banks just in case could fuel unwarranted fears). Moral hazard problems compounded by political economy constraints (obstacles to commit current and future governments to honour guarantees signed in the past). 23 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning

24 Conclusions (III) Fiscal consolidation in good times is key because dramatic events are eventually insured ex post by governments (e.g. bailouts) and so they should be prepared to intervene having already achieved a strong budget position. Devices for the government to share risk ex ante with the private sector must be used strategically, providing incentives to take actions that eventually reduce the overall exposure facing both parties. Increasing the coverage of fiscal risk disclosed by means of a Statement of Financial Risks is worth considering. 24 MEF, Department of the Treasury, Economic and Financial Analysis and Planning