(the centralized contractual agent) (Alchian & Demsetz,1972), (Alchian & Woodward,1987),

Transcription

1 ( ) :,,,,,,,,, : (Williamson,1975,1985 ; Klein,et al,1978) ( ) (specificπidiosyncratic) (hold2up), (the centralized contractual agent) (Alchian & Demsetz,1972), (Alchian & Woodward,1987),,,,,,,,,, ( stakeholde2 rs),, (1995,1996) ; (1996), (1997), (1997,2000),, ( ) (Dow, 1993),,,,,, (Williamson,2000), Hart (Hart,1989) stakeholder,,, stakeholder,,, 3

2 :,,, (exclusive),,,,,,, ;, ; Alchian Demsetz (1972) (Coase,1937), (the centralized contractual agent),, (residual rights of control), ( Grossman & Hart,1986,Hart & Morre,1990 ; Hart,1995) (1993), ( ) ( ), ( ) (,1999,P209),,,,,,, : ( ),,,, : ( ), (par2 ticipation constraint),,, ; ( ),,,,,,, 4 Alchian & Woodard 1987 (exclusive, ),,,

3 2001 3,, ;,, Π Π,,, (,2000) ;,,,,, (specificπidiosyncratic),,, ;,,,,,,,, ( ),,,,,,,, (individual rationality constraint),,,, ( ) ( ), ( Klein,et al. 1978),,, ( ),,,,,,,,,, ;, (, 2000) 5

4 :,,,, (,2000),,,,, (Aoki,1980,1984),,,, (boldness) (bargaining power),, Dow(1993) ( Rubinstein Bargaining) ( KMF) (LMF),,,,,,,, ;,,,,,,, ( ),, (, ), :? (exclusive),, = u ( ) / [ u( ) - u], u( ),u, : ( ) ( ), ( ), 6 (2000) ( ) Aoki (patemalism),, Dow,, ( Rubin2 stein,1982) Blair,, (Blair & Kruse,1999)

5 ;,,,,,,,,,,,, ;,,,,,,?,,,,,,,,, ;,,,,,,,,, (inter2specific), (inter2exclusive),, ( ),,,,,,,,,,,,,,, : (1) ; (2), ; (3) ; (4),,,, 7

6 :,, ;,,,,,,,,, :,, ;,,,,,,,,, ;,,,,,,,, (Alchian & Demsetz,1972) ;, (Aoki,1980,1984 ;Williamson,1985) ;, (,1997),, :,,,,, : (1) ; (2),, 8, : (assignto) (monitor) (Alchian & Demsetz,1972,p782),, (policing device) (1995), (,2000)

7 2001 3,,,,, ;,, (Teece,1982, Arrow),,,,,,,,,,,,,, (pricing device),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ( ),,, (,1995),,,,,,,,,, ( ),,, ( ),,, (1934),, Leibenstein(1968) ( ) (input2completer), 9

8 :,,,,,,,,,,,,, ;,,,,, ( ),,,,,,, ;,, ( ),,,,,,,,,,,,, :,,,,,,,,,, (1995,1996),, 10

9 2001 3,,,,,,,,,,,,,,1932 :,,1990 1,,1997 :, 1,,2000 :,,2000 1,,2000 :, 6,1995 :,,1998 :, 9,1997 :, 6,1996 :, 4,2000 :, ,,1993 : ( ), Alchian,A. & Demsetz,Harold. 1972, Production,Information Costs,and Economic Organization, A. E. R.,Vol. 62 : Alchian,A., & Woodward,Susan,1987, Reflection on the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,vol. 143, no. 1, Aoki,M.,1984, Co2operative Game Theory of the Firm,Oxford university Press & Clarendon Press. Aoki,M.,1980, A Model of the Firm as a Stockholder2Employee Cooperative, A. E. R.,vol. 70,no. 4, Blair,M. & Kruse,D.,1999, Worker capitalists? Giving employees an ownership stake Brookings Review v. 17 no4,23 6 Coase. Coase,R.,1937, The Nature of the Firm, Economica, vol. 4,no. 3, Dow,G.,1993, Why Capital Hires Labor. A Bargaining Prespective, A. E. R.,vol. 83,no. 1, Grossman,S. & Hart,O.,1986, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership :A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, J. Political Economy, vol. 94, Hart,O.,1995,1Firm,Contracts and Financial Structure, Oxford University Press ;,,1998. Hart, O.,1989, An Economicst s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm,Columba Law Review, vol.,,, Hart, O. & Moore,1990, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,J. Political Economy, vol. 98, Klein, B., et al,1978, Vertical Integration,Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process,J. of Law and Economics, vol. 21. Leibenstein, Harvey,1968, Entrepreneurship and Development,A. E. R., vol. 58, Rubinstein,Ariel,1982, Perfect equilibrium in a Bargaining Mode,Econometrica, vol. 50, no. 1, Teece, D.,1982, Towards an Economic Theory of Multiproduct Firm,J. of Eonomic Behavior and Organization, vol. 3, Williamson, O.,1985,The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York : Free Press. Williamson, O.,2000, The New Institutional Economics : Taking Stock,Looking Ahead. J. Economic Literature, vol. 38, ( : ) ( : ) 11

10 Abstracts of Key Papers in English Foreign Aid, Public Spending, Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policies, and Long - Run Gro wth Liutang Gong and Heng2fu Zou This paper presents a group of models showing the striking different implications of foreign aid to the private sector and public sector. In the first model, with decentralized decisionmaking and without optimal choices of fiscal policies on behalf of the government, foreign aid to the private sector has no effect on the long2run capital accumulation and it raises private consumption one to one ; whereas foreign aid to the government leads to more public spending and higher private capital accumulation. In another model with optimal choices of both fiscal and monetary policies, foreign aid to the private sector gives rise to higher inflation and income taxation. Al2 though aid to the private sector raises private money holdings and consumption, it reduces capital accumula2 tion. However, when foreign aid is provided to the public sector, the government cuts both the inflation rate and the income tax rate, raises public spending, and provides more incentives for private capital accumulation and money holdings. In the long run, aid to the public sector leads to more private capital accumulation, con2 sumption, money holdings, and welfare. Specificity, Exclusiveness and Enterprise Institution Yang Ruilong & Yang Qijing In this paper, we consider that the ultimate purpose of the firm is to create and distribute the organizational rent, although the arrangements of residual claim right and control is very important. A lot of literatures con2 fuse the specificity with the economic base which can help the interested parties obtain some organizational rent, but in fact specificity will weaken the interested parties bargaining power. We put forward that the base of bargaining power is virtually the exclusiveness, a variable that exercises a great impact on the choice and evolution of enterprise instituion. In short,we consider that in reality the enterprise s institutional arrange2 ments is not the product of social welfare maximization or transational cost minimization,but the outcome of games among rational interested parties. 93