Regulation and Supervision of Systemically Important Financial Market Infrastructures

Transcription

1 Regulation and Supervision of Systemically Important Financial Market Infrastructures Sylvie Mathérat Deputy General Director - Operations Banque de France

2 PLAN I. Systemic Infrastructures II. FMI regulation and authorities responsibilities III. The recovery and resolution framework applicable to FMIs 2

3 I. Systemic Infrastructures 3

4 I. Systemic Infrastructures Financial market infrastructures FMI: defined as a multilateral system among participating institutions, including the operator of the system, used for the purposes of clearing, settling, or recording payments, securities, derivatives or other financial transactions (definition from the CPSS-IOSCO PFMIs) PS : Payment System CSD : Central Securities Depository SSS : Securities Settlement System CCP : Central Counterparty TR : Trade Repository n.b. Exchange Markets not covered as far as they do not operate such functions While safe and efficient FMIs contribute to maintaining financial stability and economic growth, FMIs also concentrate risk The interdependencies of payment and settlement systems, CPSS,

5 I. Systemic Infrastructures a. What makes a financial market infrastructure systemically important? What makes an infrastructure critical? Its potential to trigger or transmit, in the event of malfunctioning, further disruptions amongst participants or systemic disruptions in the financial area more widely (systemic importance). Indeed, systemic infrastructures can concentrate risks (e.g. CCPs absorb counterparty risks). Systemically important financial infrastructures can be identified by the same three criteria as systemically important financial institutions : 1. Size: transactions processed, participants, markets served, market share 2. Substitutability: few available alternatives to using the FMI at short notice 3. Interconnectedness: June 2008 CPSS Report The interdependencies of payment and settlement systems All CSDs, SSSs, CCPs and TRs are considered systemically important because of their critical roles in the markets they serve Payment Systems are considered systemically important if they are the sole or principal payment system in a country Because of their systemicity, FMIs risks should be well addressed 5

6 I. Systemic Infrastructures b. These risks are addressed by the PFMIs, adopted by CPSS-IOSCO in April 2012 The Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures are similar to the Basel requirements for banks, but applied to infrastructures: A set of harmonised, strengthened standards for FMI oversight Mostly principles-based The PFMIs strengthen, update and rationalise the previous CPSS-IOSCO principles in response to post-crisis G20 commitments: 24 principles, 9 categories: Strengthened principles Credit Risk Liquidity Risk Operational Risk New principles Segregation and Portability General Business Risk Tiered Participation Arrangements FMI Links Disclosure of Market Data to TRs 6

7 I. Systemic Infrastructures c. Systemically Important Infrastructures have certain specific characteristics In terms of substitutability: Although the PFMIs (n 20, 22) aim to enhance substitutability among FMIs, by encouraging convergence between FMI standards and by trying to ensure that interconnections between FMIs function safely...substitutability is not guaranteed for certain FMIs which provide specific or unique services In terms of interconnectedness: FMIs are systemic in nature, so their interdependencies need to be specifically monitored Institution-based interdependencies: Tiered participation arrangements (PFMI n 19) System-based interdependencies: Risks linked to interconnectedness between clearing and settlement systems (PFMI n 20) Operational environment interdependencies: dependence on third-party providers (PFMI Annex F) 7

8 I. Systemic Infrastructures c. Systemically Important Infrastructures have certain specific characteristics For FMIs, there is no category equivalent to Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G SIFIs) however, in some regards, FMIs fulfil a quasi-public utility function: CCPs: manage counterparty risk, reduce systemic risk CSDs: reduce credit and liquidity risks Authorities have established a «proportionality up» system, by which they can define stricter principles for such FMIs (CCPs, CSDs) which are of particular systemic importance : for credit and liquidity risk management, for operational risk (PFMIs n 4, 7, 17) Authorities (FSB) have defined and implemented four safeguards for global CCPs, which define specific requirements for these CCPs due to their specific risk profiles Fair and open access by market participants to CCPs Cooperative oversight arrangements between relevant authorities Resolution and recovery regimes Appropriate liquidity arrangements for CCPs in the currencies in which they clear

9 II. FMI regulation and authorities responsibilities

10 II. FMI regulation and authorities responsibilities a. A specific regulation framework for FMIs Various authorities are in charge of FMI regulation: Central Banks: carry out oversight of FMIs Market authorities: carry out supervision of FMIs rules with regards to financial market regulations Bank supervisors (for the specific case of CCPs which hold a banking license): carry out supervision of FMIs with regards to prudential norms These three types of authorities monitor all aspects of an FMI s activity The PFMIs outline 5 responsibilities for these authorities: A: FMIs should be effectively regulated... B: by authorities with the necessary powers and resources... C: authorities regulation framework should be transparent... D: authorities should explicitly adopt the CPSS-IOSCO PFMIs... E: authorities should cooperate with each other whenever necessary this responsibility is of crucial importance today, due to the global nature of FMIs and their status as quasi-public goods 10

11 II. FMI regulation and authorities responsibilities b. Monitoring the implementation of the PFMIs Similar to the monitoring carried out for financial institutions: peer review aimed at having a transparent picture of implementation in each FSB country, and encouraging the less advanced countries in the field of PFMIs implementation to speed up the process. Peer review under the auspices of CPSS and IOSCO, covering FSB jurisdictions Level 1: assessing regulatory adoption of the PFMIs Level 2: assessing the consistency of the regulatory framework with the PFMIs Level 3: assessing consistency in outcomes Objective: to assess the implementation in each jurisdiction of the principles which have been most strengthened Credit Risk (PFMI n 4), Liquidity Risk (PFMI n 7) and Operational Risk (PFMI n 17) Implementation monitoring task force Work began in early 2013 and a first report is expected for autumn 2013 Reports will be elaborated until every jurisdiction has reached full implementation of PFMIs 11

12 II. FMI regulation and authorities responsibilities b. Monitoring the implementation of the PFMIs Objective of the peer review : to assess the implementation in each jurisdiction of the principles, notably for those on which requirements have been most strengthened Credit Risk (PFMI n 4) : cover 2 Liquidity Risk (PFMI n 7) : cover 2 Operational Risk (PFMI n 17) : secondary, or third site Implementation monitoring task force Work began in early 2013 and a first report is expected for autumn 2013 Reports will be elaborated until every jurisdiction has reached full implementation of PFMIs 12

13 III. The recovery and resolution framework applicable to FMIs 13

14 III. The recovery and resolution framework applicable to FMIs a. A specific recovery and resolution framework is needed for FMIs A specific recovery and resolution framework is needed for FMIs because of: (i) the need to ensure continuity of their critical functions (ii) the lack of alternative providers for these critical functions (iii) the systemic risk that a market ceases to function if an FMI closes abruptly (iv) the concentration of risks around CCPs due to the mandatory clearing of OTC derivatives How should FMI recovery and resolution frameworks differ from those of financial institutions? In contrast to banks, a CCP s recovery plan should be written into its rules (e.g. loss allocation procedures) A CCP s resolution plan could allow for a write-down of its liabilities, much like a bail-in for financial institutions however, the liabilities of a CCP are typically different in kind from those of a bank, e.g. initial and variation margin rather deposits and bonds 14

15 III. The recovery and resolution framework applicable to FMIs b. Important areas for establishing strong recovery and resolution capabilities FMIs should adopt preventive measure (i.e. ensure adequate risk management) and establish recovery plans (effective rules to address losses) Authorities should ensure FMIs set up recovery plans, and oversee the execution of these plans Beyond recovery: a resolution regime covering FMIs should be established in each jurisdiction Authorities are primarily responsible for preparing and implementing resolution plans Each of the above elements is enhanced by cooperation and coordination among authorities (domestic or cross border) 15

16 III. The recovery and resolution framework applicable to FMIs c. The definitive report on FMI resolution and recovery regimes April 2012: CPSS IOSCO PFMIs: require FMIs to prepare a recovery plan After new public consultations (scheduled for Summer 2013), there will be two different publications: Resolution: a specific annex on FMIs shall be added to the FSB s 2011 Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions Recovery: an ad-hoc CPSS/IOSCO report: Recovery of FMIs 16