Microfinance and Inequality

Transcription

1 MPRA Munch Personal RePEc Archve Mcrofnance and Inequalty KAI Hsako and HAMORI Shgeyuk Kobe Unversty, Kobe Unversty September 2009 Onlne at MPRA Paper No , posted 29. September :36 UTC

2 Mcrofnance and Inequalty * Hsako KAI Kobe Unversty Emal: Hsako_Ka_Kobe@yahoo.co.jp Shgeyuk HAMORI Kobe Unversty Emal: hamor@econ.kobe-u.ac.jp Abstract Ths paper examnes the relatonshp mcrofnance and nequalty by provdng a cross-country emprcal study of 61 developng countres. Mcrofnance plays an mportant role n the fnancal market n many developng countres. Although mcrofnance s expected to sgnfcantly affect macro varables, we lack enough emprcal research on Impact Analyss at the macro level, such as the effect of mcrofnance on nequalty. We expect mcrofnance to have an equalzng effect, and provde a frst detaled cross-country emprcal analyss n ths regard. We fnd that mcrofnance can lower nequalty, and poorer countres need to focus more on the equalzng effect of mcrofnance. Keywords: Mcrofnance, Inequalty, Impact Analyss at Macro Level JEL classfcaton number: O11 *) We would lke to thank to Professor Fumharu MIENO and Professor Nobuak MATSUNAGA for many helpful comments and suggestons.

3 1. Introducton The ncome dfference between the rch and the poor s rather sgnfcant n developng countres such as Latn Amerca and Afrca, causng serous problems n ther respectve socetes. Hgh ncome nequalty n poor countres leads to crme and poltcal nstablty and hampers the processes of economc development and poverty reducton. In partcular, hgh nequalty s due to an mperfect fnancal market n developng countres. Owng to mmature fnancal regulatons and poor admnstraton of justce, moral hazard and adverse selecton are rampant n developng countres. Moreover, poor countres are fragle to external shocks because they depend on the agrculture ndustry, owng to whch they face hgher external rsk. Accordngly, credt ratonng takes place snce the market excludes the poor wthout collateral whch can assure these hgh rsks. Ths s one of the sgnfcant reasons for hgh nequalty n poor countres. In order to ease nequalty and develop the fnancal sector, t s necessary to deal wth such market falure. Fnancal deepenng (or development of fnancal market) s consdered a powerful tool that lowers nequalty and has recently been analyzed from the theoretcal and emprcal perspectves. However, theoretcal studes on fnancal deepenng have not reached a unform concluson and have been controversal. Some argue that fnancal deepenng leads to effcent credt allocaton and reducton of rsk through dversfed nvestment and nformaton producton of fnancal ntermedares, whch stmulates economc development and hence lowers nequalty. Furthermore, t can be argued that fnancal depth eases the credt constrants on the poor and ncreases ther productve assets and productvty, thus contrbutng to poverty reducton (World Bank, 2001; 1

4 Jallan and Krkpatrck, 2002). On the other hand, others argue that fnancal deepenng benefts only the rch, thus ncreasng nequalty. Beck, Bemrgnc-Kunt, and Levne (2004) pont out that snce the poor depend manly on nformal fnance such as borrowng from relatves or frends, the development of the fnancal sector s benefcal only to wealthy people. Moreover, Fnancal depth lowers nequalty solely durng late-stage development, whle fnancal deepenng ncreases nequalty n the early stage of development. Ths s because only wealthy people can access the fnancal market (Greenwood and Jovanovc, 1990, cted n Beck et al (2004)). Furthermore, there are only a few emprcal studes and a more detaled analyss s requred, although most of the studes ndcate that fnancal depth lowers nequalty (L et al, 1998; Beck et al, 2004). As such, whle the mpact of overall fnancal depth on nequalty seems to be obscure, we focus on the role of mcrofnance as a tool for fnancal depth endowed wth the equalzng effect. Mcrofnance drectly eases the credt constrants on the poor and s expected to lower nequalty. Mcrofnance s a fnancal servce for the poor and s largely appled n developng countres as low-rate fnance wth ts unque technque known as group lendng. Group lendng s a fnancal servce that offers loans to groups of borrowers who are jontly lable for the loans. Mcrofnance nsttutons (MFIs) transfer the opportunty cost to borrowers by allowng them to carry out screenng and montorng. Group members screen each other s repayment ablty, whch eases adverse selecton. They also montor each other, whch mtgates moral hazard. Accordngly, lenders do not need to cover the hgh opportunty cost, whch s normally requred for provdng loans to the poor, and 2

5 they can also acheve a low default rate. Mcrofnance also has a dynamc ncentve, whch s a useful tool that allows ther clents to pay back loans, snce future loan access s avalable only f borrowers pay back ther orgnal loans. Usng these effectve mechansms, mcrofnance offers loans to the poor who were ntally excluded from the formal fnancal market because they were not credtworthy. Mcrofnance eases credt constrants and now plays a sgnfcant role n the fnancal market n developng countres. Mcrofnance allows the poor to have access to fnancal servces, make nvestments, and dversfy ther busness, thus leadng to an ncrease n ther ncome. Moreover, mcrofnance offers not only fnancal servces but also tranng wth strong dscplnes, whch enables borrowers to ncrease ther productvty. They can also cope wth external shocks and acheve consumpton smoothng. As such, mcrofnance enables the poor to ncrease ther ncome, consumpton, and productvty, whch contrbutes to lowerng nequalty. Ahln and Jang (2008) descrbe a model n whch the adopton of mcrofnance s consdered fnancal development and show that mcrofnance decreases nequalty. Accordng to them, mcrofnance lowers nequalty by ncreasng the ncome of the poor and lowerng the ncome of the wealthy people snce the wages pad by employers ncrease. Green, Krkpatrck, and Murnde (2006) argue that mprovement n the fnancal access to the poor can drectly enhance poverty reducton, snce an mperfect fnancal market, whch excludes the poor, s an mportant factor that affects poverty (Stgltz, 1998). As such, although the equalzng effect of mcrofnance can be explaned theoretcally, we lack suffcent research nformaton on the emprcal analyses n ths regard. There 3

6 manly exsts Impact analyss (Imp-Act) at the household level such as analyses on the effect of mcrofnance on household ncome or consumpton. There s a consensus that mcrofnance decreases the consumpton volatlty of households and leads to consumpton smoothng and ncreased producton (Cuong, Bgman, Den Berg, and Theu, 2007; Khandker, 1998; Parker and Nagarajan, 2001; and Zaman, 2001). However, Imp-Acts such as the effect of mcrofnance on ncome or poverty reducton are controversal, provde dfferent results for dfferent subjects, and lack unversalty. For example, Ptt and Khandker (1998) show that mcrofnance ncreases household consumpton, whle Morduch (1999) ndcates that mcrofnance does not have a sgnfcant mpact on consumpton (cted n Roodman and Morduch(2009)). Mosley and Hulme (1998) show that mcrofnance does not offer loans to the poorest. However, there are only a few Imp-Acts at the macro level, and there are only a few studes on the mpact of mcrofnance on nequalty. The effect of mcrofnance on nequalty has been examned wthn a partcular country, and there has not been any cross-country analyss thus far. Cuong, Bgman, Den Berg, and Theu (2007) analyzed Vetnam Bank for Socal Polces and concluded that t lowers nequalty, but ts effect s nsgnfcant. Mahjabeen (2008) used the general equlbrum (CGE) model to show that mcrofnance n Bangladesh lowers nequalty. There s no suffcent emprcal nformaton on the effect of mcrofnance on nequalty, and further analyss s requred. Ths paper provdes a detaled emprcal cross-country analyss of 61 developng countres concernng the mpact of mcrofnance on nequalty. Mcrofnance has grown wth each passng year snce the 1980s and plays an mportant role n the fnancal market n many developng countres. Although mcrofnance s expected to sgnfcantly affect macro varables, we lack enough emprcal research on Imp-Acts at 4

7 the macro level, such as the effect of mcrofnance on nequalty. We expect mcrofnance to have an equalzng effect, and provde a detaled emprcal analyss n ths regard. The contrbuton of ths paper s twofold. Frstly, our study consders mcrofnance as a fnancal system that drectly affects nequalty and focus the relatonshp between mcrofnance and nequalty, although many prevous lteratures analyze whether fnancal depth as a whole lowers nequalty. We explan the role of mcrofnance as a tool for fnancal depth endowed wth equalzng effect. Secondly, our analyss provdes a more unversal result by usng the cross-country methodology, whle prevous emprcal studes conduct country analyses and provde dfferent results for dfferent subjects or dfferent countres. Thus, consderng that we can (1) show more unversalty of mcrofnance s mpact, (2) ndcate mpact assessment at the macro level, whch has hardly been analyzed, and (3) explan the role of mcrofnance n fnancal development, our study s sgnfcant. 2. Model We use the cross-country regresson methodology, followng recent emprcal lteratures such as Mlanovc (2002), n order to examne the mpact of mcrofnance on the nequalty n developng countres. Our emprcal analyss s based on the cross-country data of 61 developng countres, and the emprcal specfcatons are as follows: Model 1: y = α + βm + ηx + e, 5

8 Model 2: y = α + βlogm + ηx + e, where y ndcates the nequalty measure; M represents the degree of mcrofnance ntensty; X s the vector of control varables; and e denotes random dsturbance ( : country). Model 1 s the specfcaton that ncludes mcrofnance ntensty for examnng the effects of mcrofnance on nequalty. Model 2 s the specfcaton where the logarthm of the mcrofnance ntensty s employed to robustly examne the equalzng effect of mcrofnance. The degree of mcrofnance ntensty s ncluded to assess the mpact of mcrofnance on nequalty. We employ the number of MFIs and the number of borrowers n a country as the measure of mcrofnance ntensty. We can expect that mcrofnance eases the credt constrants on the poor, thus decreasng nequalty. The analyss also ncludes control varables such as the logarthm of GDP per capta, ts square term, nflaton rate, democracy ndex, and regonal dummy. We assume that a hgher ncome level ncreases nequalty, but ts effect declnes after a certan level. Kuznets nverted-u hypothess ponts out that nequalty ncreases untl the country s ncome reaches a certan level, and after the turnng pont, nequalty declnes. Therefore, we nclude the logarthm of GDP per capta and ts square terms n the model as well, followng prevous lteratures, whch also nclude these varables n ther model. Furthermore, our analyss ncludes openness n order to assess the mpact of openness on nequalty. We employ a trade (export and mport) to GDP rato as the measure of openness, followng emprcal lterature such as Mlanovc (2002) and Wade (2004). 6

9 The neoclasscal theory shows that openness results n economc development, ncreases employment, and lowers nequalty through mproved resource allocaton and technology transfer. Further, the Heckscher-Ohln-Samuelson model ndcates that openness ncreases the demand of low-sklled labor n poor countres snce developng countres export low-sklled labor-ntensve products, whch lowers nequalty. On the other hand, varous studes show that openness worsens nequalty. Accordng to them, openness ncreases the demand of hgh-sklled labor n developng countres snce t requres a hgher level of economc actvtes through outsourcng and foregn drect nvestment (FDI). Its emprcal result has also been controversal. We expect hgher nflaton to be assocated wth hgher nequalty because hgh nflaton harms manly the poor and t ncreases the number of poor people. We also assume that nequalty declnes as democracy ntensfes, followng standard poltcal economy theores (Gradsten et al, 2001). Further, our model ncludes regonal dummy varables, ncludng the dummes of South Afrca, Eastern Europe and Central Asa, Mddle East and North Afrca, and Latn Amerca for examnng the nequalty/dfference among the regons Data Ths paper uses the cross-sectonal data of 61 developng countres whch s obtaned from World Development Indcators (WDI) publshed by World Bank. We use the 2007 cross-sectonal data for regresson usng the number of MFIs n a country as the measure of mcrofnance ntensty. We also use the pooled data for 1 The base regon s Asa. 7

10 regresson usng the number of borrowers n a country as the measure of mcrofnance ntensty. Snce World Bank publshes nequalty data almost every fve years and ts year of publcaton dffers among countres, the data for our analyss s the earlest avalable data, from 2003 to The data on the number of MFIs n the country s obtaned from the Mcrocredt Summt Campagn 2 and the democracy ndex that we employ s Insttutonalzed Democracy obtaned from Marshall and Jaggers (2009). The defnton and summary statstcs are shown n Table Emprcal Results Table 2 dsplays the results of regresson usng the number of MFIs as the degree of mcrofnance ntensty. Its frst column (a) s the result of Model 1, whch employs the number of MFIs as the degree of mcrofnance ntensty, and ts second column (b) s the result of Model 2, whch employs the logarthm of the number of MFIs as the degree of mcrofnance ntensty. Our results show that mcrofnance ntensty measures are sgnfcantly negatve n both columns (a) and (b), ndcatng that mcrofnance lowers nequalty. It can be argued that mcrofnance has a sgnfcant equalzng effect. Table 3 shows the result of regresson usng the number of borrowers n a country as the degree of mcrofnance ntensty. Smlarly, ts frst column (a) s the result of Model 1, whch employs the number of MFIs as the degree of mcrofnance ntensty, and ts second column (b) s the result of Model 2, whch employs the logarthm of the number of MFIs as the degree of mcrofnance ntensty. The results show that the coeffcent on the number of borrowers and the coeffcent on the logarthm of number of borrowers 2 8

11 are sgnfcantly negatve n both the columns. It can be found that mcrofnance leads to a declne n nequalty, ndcatng the robustness of the equalzng effect of mcrofnance. Wth regard to control varables, the logarthm of GDP per capta and ts square terms, the dummes of Eastern Europe, Central Asa, and Latn Amerca are sgnfcant n both columns (a) and (b), and South Afrca are sgnfcant n column (b), whch s consstent wth our predcton. Democracy s postvely sgnfcant n column (b) and t s ncompatble wth our predcton, although our result s consstent wth prevous emprcal lterature (Gradsten et al, 2001). In both the columns, the logarthms of GDP per capta are sgnfcantly postve and ts square terms are sgnfcantly negatve. It s found that nequalty worsens as the country develops, but after a certan development level, nequalty declnes. Ths supports Kuznets nverted-u hypothess. Moreover, the dummes of Eastern Europe and Central Asa are sgnfcantly negatve, whle those of Latn Amerca and South Afrca are sgnfcantly postve n both the columns. It can be argued that nequalty n Eastern Europe and Central Asa s relatvely lower, whle that n Latn Amerca and South Afrca s relatvely hgher. 5. Concluson Most developng countres face the problem of hgh ncome nequalty, whch leads to crmes and poltcal nstablty that hamper economc development. It can be argued that fnancal market falure s one of the bggest reasons for hgh nequalty, and the development of the fnancal market s requred n order to lower nequalty. Some studes consder overall fnancal deepenng as a tool to reduce nequalty and analyze 9

12 the equalzng effect of fnancal depth, but ther results are stll controversal. On the other hand, mcrofnance as a partcular tool for fnancal deepenng s expected to lower nequalty more by drectly easng the credt constrants on the poor. However, we lack the suffcent emprcal research nformaton n ths regard, and a more detaled analyss s requred. Ths paper provdes a cross-country emprcal study of 61 developng countres concernng the mpact of mcrofnance on nequalty. We show that mcrofnance plays an mportant role n creatng a fnancal system endowed wth the equalzng effect. There are only a few country analyses on the mpact of mcrofnance on nequalty, and a cross-country analyss has not been conducted thus far. To the best of our knowledge, our study s the frst one to ndcate the unversalty of the equalzng effect of mcrofnance, applyng the cross-country methodology. Moreover, we contrbute to the research accumulaton of the mpact assessment of mcrofnance at the macro level, whch has hardly been analyzed. The man results of the emprcal analyss n ths paper are as follows: (1) Mcrofnance has a sgnfcant equalzng effect. (2) Our emprcal results support Kuznets nverted-u curve. As such, our emprcal results confrm that mcrofnance lowers nequalty, and t can be used for an effectve redstrbuton polcy. Moreover, we found that economc development lowers nequalty after country ncome reaches a certan level, whle economc growth ncreases nequalty up to a certan level of economc development such as n developng countres. Apparently, economc growth n developng countres 10

13 does not have a sgnfcant trckle down effect or an equalzng effect, and t sgnfcantly ncreases nequalty. Accordngly, poor countres need to focus more on the equalzng effect of mcrofnance. The hgh nequalty n developng countres s largely due to the credt constrants on the poor or the fnancal market falure, whch beseges sorely the wealthy people. Mcrofnance can provde loans to the poor effectvely wth a hgh repayment rate usng ts unque technque and s expected to ease the credt constrants on the poor and hence lower nequalty. Snce mcrofnance s consdered to be unable to fnance tself and reles on external support such as subsdes, governments need to develop the mcrofnance market wth suffcent assstants. The fnancal sector should not depend on the market force uncondtonally, and a market nterventon that creates a fnancal system especally for the poor n order to redstrbute wealth s requred. Mcrofnance can be an effectve tool wth regard to ths requrement. Mcrofnance also allows the poor not only to obtan loans but also to ncrease ther productvty through borrowng actvty wth tranng, whch leads to development of socal system n poor countres. Thus, mcrofnance copes wth market falure n order to prompt well-balanced fnancal development, leadng to economc growth and mprovement of socal welfare. 11

14 References Ahln, C., & Jang, N. (2008). Can mcro-credt brng development?. Journal of Development Economcs, 86(1), Beck, T., Demrgüç-Kunt, A. & Levne, R. (2004). Fnance, nequalty and poverty: Cross-country evdence. NBER Workng Papers Cuong, N.V., Bgman, D., den Berg, M.V., & Theu, V. (2007). Impact of mcro-credt on poverty and nequalty: The case of the Vetnam Bank for socal polces, Paper submtted to: Mcrofnance: What Do We Know?, December , Gronngen, The Netherlands Gradsten, M., Mlanovc, B., & Yng, Y. (2001). Democracy and ncome nequalty: An emprcal analyss. CESfo Workng Papers No.411 Green, C.J., Krkpatrck, C.H., & Murnde, V. (2006). Fnance for small enterprse growth and poverty reducton n developng countres. Journal of Internatonal Development, 18(7), Greenwood, J., & Jovanovc, B. (1990). Fnancal development, growth, and the dstrbuton of ncome. Journal of Poltcal Economy, 98(5), Jallan, H., & Krkpatrck, C. (2002). Fnancal development and poverty reducton n developng countres. Internatonal Journal of Fnance & Economcs, 7(2), Khandker, S.R. (1998). Fghtng Poverty wth Mcrocredt: Experence n Bangladesh, New York: Oxford Unversty Press, Inc. L, H., Squre, L., & Zou, H.F. (1998). Explanng nternatonal and ntertemporal varatons n ncome nequalty. Economc Journal, 108(446), Mahjabeen, R. (2008). Mcrofnancng n Bangladesh: Impact on households, 12

15 consumpton and welfare. Journal of Polcy Modelng, 30(6), Marshall, M.G., & Jaggers, K. (2009). Polty IV Project: Poltcal Regme Characterstcs and Transtons, Annual Tme-seres , Avalable at Mlanovc, B. (2002). Can we dscern the effect of globalzaton on ncome dstrbuton? Evdence from household budget survey. World Bank Polcy Research Workng Paper 2876 Morduch, J. (1998). Does mcrofnance really help the poor? New evdence from flagshp programs n Bangladesh. New York Unversty, Avalable at nyu.edu/ projects/morduch/documents/mcrofnance/does_mcrofnance_really_help.pdf. Mosley, P., & Hulme, D. (1998). Mcroenterprse fnance: s there a conflct between growth and poverty allevaton?. World Development, 26(5), Parker, J., & Nagarajan, G. (2001). Can mcrofnance meet the poor's needs n tmes of natural dsaster?. Mcroenterprse Best Practces, Development Alternatves, Inc. Ptt, M.M., & Khandker, S.R. (1998). The mpact of group-based credt on poor households n Bangladesh: Does the gender of partcpants matter?. Journal of Poltcal Economy, 106(5), Roodman, D., & Morduch, J. (2009). The mpact of mcrocredt on the poor n Bangladesh: Revstng the evdence. Center for Global Development Workng Paper 174. Stgltz, J. (1998). The role of the state n fnancal markets. Proceedngs of the World Bank Annual, Conference on Development Economcs, Washngton, DC: The World Bank. Wade, R.H. (2004). Is globalzaton reducng poverty and nequalty?. World 13

16 Development, 32(4), World Bank (2001). World Development Report 2000/2001. New York: Oxford Unversty Press. Zaman H. (2001). Assessng the poverty and vulnerablty mpact of mcro-credt n Bangladesh: A case study of BRAC. Background paper for the WDR 2000/

17 Table1 Varables Defntons and Summary Statstcs Varable Defnton Mean Standard Devaton Inequalty Gn coeffcent Number of MFI The number of MFIs(mcrofnance nsttutons) n a country Number of Borrowres The number of borrowers who borrow from MFIs n a country 101, ,663 The Logarthm of GDP per capta The Logarthm of GDP per capta (constant 2000 US$) Trade(Export+Import) to GDP rato Exports of goods and servces + Imports of goods and servces (% of GDP) Inflaton rate Inflaton, GDP deflator (annual %) Democracy ndex Insttutonalsed Democracy South Afrca Eastern Europe and Central Asa Mddule East and North Afrca Latn Amerca South Afrca Dummy South Afrca = 1, Others = 0 Eastern Europe and Central Asa Dummy Eastern Europe and Central Asa = 1, Others = 0 Mddule East and North Afrca Dummy Mddule East and North Afrca = 1, Others = 0 Latn Amerca Dummy Latn Amrca = 1, Others = Source; Number of MFIs n the country: Mcrocredt Summt Campagn ( Number of Borrowers n the country: Trend Lnes MFI Benchmarks (Mcrofnance Informaton exchange) Democracy ndex; Marshall and Jaggers(2009) Others: World Development Indcators(WDI) 15

18 Table2 (a) (b) Number of obs 61 Number of obs 59 F( 10, 50) F( 10, 48) Prob > F 0 Prob > F R-squared R-squared Adj R-squared Adj R-squared Root MSE Root MSE coeffcent p-value coeffcent p-value Number of MFI * Logarthm of number of MFI * Logarthm of GDP per capta ** ** Square of logarthm of GDP per capta Square ** ** Trade to GDP rato Inflaton rate Democracy South Afrca Eastern Europe and Central Asa *** *** Mddule East and North Afrca Latn Amerca *** *** _cons

19 Table3 (a) (b) Number of obs 120 Number of obs 120 F( 10, 109) F( 10, 109) Prob > F Prob > F R-squared R-squared Adj R-squared Adj R-squared Root MSE Root MSE coeffcent p-value coeffcent p-value Number of borrowers *** Logarthm of number of borrowers ** Logarthm of GDP per capta ** ** Square of logarthm of GDP per capta Square *** ** Trade to GDP rato Inflaton rate Democracy ** South Afrca * Eastern Europe and Central Asa *** *** Mddule East and North Afrca Latn Amerca *** *** _cons