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1 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT KENYA KENYA INDUSTRIAL ESTATES SECOND SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRY PROJECT (CREDIT 1738-KE) Industry and Energy Division Eastern Africa Department Africa Region DECEMBER 16, 1992 Report No This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

2 ABBREVIATIONS EDI - Economic Development Institute GTZ - Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit ICDC - Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation KFW - Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaurbau KIE - Kenya Industrial Estates NORAD - Norwegian Agency for Development PCR - Project Completion Report PPAR - Project Performance Audit Report SDR - Standard Drawing Rights SSI - Small-Scale Industry UNIDO - United Nations Industrial Development Organization IDA - International Development Association TA - Technical Assistance KSh - Kenyan Shilling CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Kenyan Shilling (KSh) Calendar 1989 Calendar 1990 Calendar 1991 US$ FLSCAL YEAR KIE: July 1 - June 30

3 THE WORLD BANK Wa&hington, D.C U.S.A. FOR OFFICLAL USE ONLY Office of Director-Goneral Operations Evaluaton December 16, 1992 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Kenya Industrial Estates Small-Scale Industry Project (Credit 1738-KE) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled 'Kenya Industrial Estates Small-Scale Industry Project (Credit 1738-KE) - Project Completion Report" prepared by the Eastern Africa Department, Africa Regional Office with Part II contributed by the Borrower. The project did not achieve its major objectives. Lending to small scale enterprises fell considerably short of targets and the financial intermediation capabilities of Kenya Industrial Estates (KIE) were not strengthened. As a consequence, 73% of the original credit of USS 6 million was canceled. Overall, the project is rated unsatisfactory and IDA performance is considered deficient. No agreement about the future role of KIE has been reached. The first Small Scale Industry (SSI) Project (Credit 750-KE) had failed. In designing this second SSI project, IDA staff attempted to address KIE's institutional weakness with introduction of new institutional guidelines, improvements in debt collection, financial restructuring, staff training, and technical assistance. However, this reform program did not turn the institution around. KIE's lack of autonomy remained a fundamental issue and KIE leadership and management continued to be weak. No audit is planned since the first Small Scale Industry Project has already been audited and the attached Project Completion Report is adequate. However, the restructuring of KIE remains a priority. Attachment This docunent has re tricted distribution and nmy be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Itrs contents nmy not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT KENYA KENYA INDUSTRIAL ESTATES SECOND SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRY PROJECT (CREDIT 1783-KE) TABLE OF CONTENTS Paye No. PREFACE... X EVALUATION SUMMARY... iii PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE Project Identity... I Background... 1 Project Objectives and Description... 2 Project Design and Organization... 2 Project Implementation... 3 Project Results... 4 Institutional Performance... 4 Sustainability... 6 IDA's Performance... 6 Borrower's Performance... 6 Project Relationship... 7 Project Documentation and Data... 7 Findings and Lessons Learned... 7 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S SPECTIE... 9 PART m: STATISlCAL NFO RMATION Related Bank Loans Project Timetable Credit Disbursement Project Implementation Project Costs and Financing Project Results Status of Covenants Use of Bank Resources This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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7 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT KENYA KENYA INDUSTRIAL ESTATES SECOND SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRY PROJECT (CREDIT 1738-KE) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Kenya Industrial Estates Second Small-Scale Industry Project in Kenya, for which Credit 1738-KE in the amount of SDR 5.8 million (US$6 million) was approved on October 21, The uncommitted balance of the credit amounting to SDR 4.6 million was canceled on March 20, 1991 in application of Section 6.03 of the General Conditions. The last disbursement was in December The PCR was jointly prepared by the Industry and Energy Operations Division of the Eastern Africa Department of the Africa Regional Office (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III), and the Kenya Industrial Estates, on behalf of the Borrower (Part II). Preparation of this PCR was started in September 1991 and is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report; the Development Credit and Project Agreements; supervision reports; correspondence between the Bank and the KIE; and internal Bank memoranda. Account was also taken of the PPAR (# 9191) which included a review of the earlier credit (# 750-KE) extended to KIE.

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9 - Ill - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT KENYA KENYA INDUSTRIAL ESTATES SECOND SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRY PROJECT (CREDIT 1738-KE) EVALUATION SUMMARY 1. Introduction. KIE was established in 1967 as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC) in an effort to strengthen Government's small-scale industry (SSI) development programs. It became an independent parastatal in 1977 and embarked on an ambitious nationwide program of industrial estate construction and management, entrepreneur development and providing loans to small-scale industries. IDA made its first credit to KIE (# 750-KE) in 1977 but the experience was disappointing. Later, under pressure from the Government, KIE took a number of significant steps to strengthen its institutional capabilities which persuaded IDA to make a second credit (# 1738-KE) to Kenya in 1986 for SSI development through KIE. This credit was in the amount of US$6.0 million, of which US$5.0 million was for the credit component and US$1.0 million for the technical assistance component. 2. Qbjectives. The main objectives of the project were to: (i) provide resources to small-scale enterprises with good potential for income generation and job-creation at a relatively low cost; (ii) help develop the capabilities of small-scale entrepreneurs, mainly Africans, by strengthening KIE's capability to provide intensive entrepreneur training, project supervision and technical assistance; (iii) transform KIE into a more efficient channel for SSI lending by strengthening its financial base and rationalizing its lending and industrial estate activities (Part I, para 3.01). 3. Implementation Experience. The credit became effective in April Project implementation got off to a slow start in September 1987 and stayed that way up to the last date for sub-project submission i.e. December 31, During this period, disbursements amounting to only US$0.83 million were made for 15 sub-projects. These figures are way below those estimated at appraisal (US$2.4 million for 200 sub-projects). The main reasons for the slow commitment appear to be: (a) the slow pace of implementation of the TA component, contributing also in part to (b) the poor quality of appraisal reports submitted to IDA for approval; (c) depreciation of the Kenyan shilling; and (d) IDA's suggestions to KIE to slow down lending and concentrate on improving the overall quality of its portfolio and collections of overdues which were unacceptably high. The disbursement of the TA component amounted to US$0.46 million, as against the allocation of US$1.0 million. The TA component was used for financing: (i) salary payments of the expatriate Finance Manager and the Deputy Training Manager; (ii) computerization study and installation of hardware and software in KIE; and (iii) an EDI seminar. This component could not be fully utilized because of substantially delayed (about 3 years) recruitment of the technical experts even though their recruitment was originally a condition of effectiveness, and due to cancellation of the credit. Total disbursements under the project were US$1.6 million. 4. IDA did not agree to KIE's request to extend the date of sub-project submission (December 31, 1989) for the reason that, in IDA's opinion, the institutional and financial problems afflicting KIE were

10 - lv - of such proportions that IDA did not see KIE evolving, as originally envisaged, into a viable lending institution for SSIs and that commitment of additional IDA funds for sub-loans through it would be counter-productive. Instead, IDA recommended that KIE limit its objective to non-financial assistance to SSIs (para. 7 below). Disbursements for sub-loans already approved, as well as for the commitments pertaining to the 2-year contract of the Entrepreneur Training Adviser (under the Technical Assistance component), however, were allowed to be continued till December On March 20, 1991, the uncommitted amount of the credit SDR 4.6 million representing 73% of the credit was canceled (Part I, paras ). 5. Results. Of the fifteen sub-projects financed, five are reported by KIE to be doing well, operating at 60-75% capacity; five are rated as fair; four are reported to be experiencing operational and management problems; and one has not yet started operations. Most sub-projects are operating at between 50% and 75% capacity. As of June 30, 1991, nine of these sub-projects had arrears of over six months; these include three sub-projects reported by KIE to be doing well and four rated as fair. Over 62% of the portfolio financed under the project was affected by arrears of over six months. According to information furnished by KIE, the financial rates of return of most sub-projects financed under the credit are 20% or more, while the economic rates of return of eleven sub-projects are 25% or more. However, these figures are not corroborated by the operational and repayment record of the sub-projects. (Part 1, para 6.01). By December 1989, the overall situation was unsatisfactory in two main respects. Firstly, KIE's financial condition had badly deteriorated with (a) arrears over 3 months affecting over 60 percent of all outstanding loans (and accounting for over a third of the amount outstanding), and (b) the possibility that fixed deposits which accounted for about 85 percent of its share capital may not be recoverable from troubled financial institutions. Secondly, management appeared to be unable to effectively remedy the above situation or to improve its own institutional capabilities (through appointing technical advisors in time, or making appropriate organizational changes). 6. Altogether, the objectives of the project were inadequately met. Firstly, resources were provided to a very small number of (comparatively large-sized) SSIs; secondly, only partial success was achieved in entrepreneur training; and, finally, while KIE's lending and industrial estate activities were rationalized and financial base strengthened, KIE did not become a more efficient channel for SSI lending because of lack of commitment on the part of the management and due to the influence of non-economic factors in lending decisions. 7. Sustainability. From the outset of this project, KIE's prospects of becoming a sustainable institution have been minimal. Sustainability could not be achieved because of the underlying mismatch of the stated and actual objectives of the Government; the Government's and KIE's commitment to the objectives agreed at appraisal were not demonstrated in practice. Further, KIE's mandate was overly ambitious and, as a parastatal, its management gave priority to achievement of non-commercial objectives, rather than to IDA's recommendations of ensuring professional soundness of its lending decisions. For these reasons, in the context of a separate Financial Parastatals Technical Assistance Project (approved by IDA in 1990), IDA advised the Government to discontinue KIE's lending activities, and to limit KIE to providing other services to small enterprises (Part I, para 8.01). 8. Findings and Lessons learned. The project proved to be a failure. Due to its project appraisal weaknesses, KIE was able to commit funds under the credit for only 15 sub-projects. Although KIE was able to improve its collection performance, the quality of the loan portfolio continued to deteriorate. KIE's financial position also became precarious due to investment of substantial funds with weak financial institutions which subsequently went into liquidation. KIE management was either unable or unwilling

11 v - to take corrective measures. The main reasons for the failure of the project were as follows. Firstly, the objectives were too ambitious for KIE to achieve; KIE did not have the capability or the potential to be an efficient channel for SSI lending and at the same time to be a provider of intensive entrepreneur training and technical assistance to SSIs. The position was made more difficult by the government giving KIE a starting portfolio of troubled projects without the financial or other support to resolve their problems. Secondly, KIE's management did not generate the needed professional commitment and capability to override non-commercial considerations in trying to accomplish the objectives agreed with IDA (Part I, para 13.01). Thirdly, the design of the project was flawed in as much as IDA continued to support KIE's multifarious activities, viz., lending to SSIs, industrial estate construction, and entrepreneur development, despite KIE's weak management capability. Fourthly, IDA's supervision was inadequate, and IDA was unwilling to enforce key conditions of effectiveness that might have contributed to the success of the project. 9. The lessons of experience are as follows. Firstly, project appraisal should start with an effective assessment of the institution's "enabling environment". If, as in this case, past experience has demonstrated that such environment is unfavorable to the project objectives (as observed under the earlier KIE project), the Bank group should not finance a follow up operation. Secondly, setting of project objectives should be related to the capabilities of the implementing agency. However, if these capabilities are too weak for the institution to achieve essential project objectives, again, the Bank group should refrain from lending. Thirdly, the Bank Group should devote greater time and effort to making a realistic assessment of the commitment of the beneficiary to the objectives of the project. Finally, if despite all the above, the Bank proceeds with a loan/credit, it should be based on a careful review of the risks, and on well designed measures to ensure considerable supervision to buttress the limited implementation capacity and to ensure compliance with covenants in legal agreements (Part I, para 13.02).

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13 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT KENYA KENYA INDUSTRIAL ESTATES SECOND SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRY PROJECT (CREDIT 1738-KE) PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Project Identity Name Credit No. RVP Unit Country Sector Sub-sector KIE Second Small-Scale Industry Project 1738-KE Africa Region Kenya Industry Small-Scale Industry 2. Background 2.01 The Government's objectives for the manufacturing sector, at the time of the appraisal of this project, included accelerated employment creation, provision of a larger share of factor payments for lower income groups in areas outside Nairobi, increased use of local inputs, emphasis on rehabilitation and expansion, production of inexpensive consumer goods, and the development of a significant small-scale enterprise sector The development of small-scale industry (SSI) was seen as an effort to reverse past sectoral policies under which high effective protection resulted in little employment creation and the high cost products of the import substitution enterprises, produced with imported materials, were not available to the low-income consumers. Small-scale industrial development was seen as contributing to Kenya's short-term strategy of reducing pressure on balance of payments during the adjustment process, by production of largely domestic resource-based import substitutes, and providing employmento persons displaced from other sub-sectors. Broadening of the entrepreneurial class through increased African participation was expected to provide an effective antidote to potential social unrest associated with the adjustment process The increased emphasis on small-scale industrial development reflected in the Government's Five Year Plan, current at the time, appeared to be an appropriate strategy for pursuing Government's longer-term objectives. The Kenya Industrial Estates Limited (KIE) which was the Government's principal tool for SSI development, had received in 1978 an IDA Credit of US$10 million equivalent to support its financing, entrepreneur development and technical assistance activities in the sector. However, IDA's experience with this project (SSI I Project) was disappointing in that KIE was unable to evolve into a viable institution due to excessive zeal for promotion and growth at the cost of project quality and scant regard for arrears collection, project supervision or financial viability. Later on, it appears, KIE, with the active encouragement of the Government and IDA, altered its attitudes and,

14 -2- based merely on the initiation of some steps which promised to re-orient and strengthen KIE, IDA felt comfortable with going ahead with a second credit (SSI II) to assist SSIs through KIE. 3. Project Objectives and Description 3.01 Project Objectives. The main objectives of the project were to: (i) provide resources to small-scale enterprises with good potential for income generation and job-creation at a relatively low cost; (ii) help develop the capabilities of small-scale entrepreneurs, mainly Africans, by strengthening KIE's capability to provide intensive entrepreneur training, project supervision and technical assistance; (iii) make KIE a more efficient channel for SSI lending by strengthening its financial base and rationalizing its lending and industrial estate activities; and (iv) through the dialogue with IDA, continue the process of re-orientation and improvement which KIE had initiated in the previous 18 modths. Though laudable, the objectives were too ambitious for KIE to achieve Proiect Description. The project aimed at supporting the Government's program of assisting SSIs through the following components: (a) (b) a credit component of US$5.0 million, representing 83% of the IDA credit, in the form of a line of credit to KIE for onlending to about (mainly smaller sized) 200 SSIs for plant and equipment, machinery, and permanent working capital; and a technical assistance component of US$1.0 million to finance: (i) two Deputy Managers for the new entrepreneur training and supervision functions; (ii) continuation of the Finance Manager position; (iii) development costs for the entrepreneur training program; and (iv) a survey to identify areas where SSIs could competitively provide intermediate inputs to medium- and large-scale industry. 4. Project Design and Organization 4.01 The implementation experience of the SSI I Project (# 750-KE) had revealed a number of operational and institutional weaknesses in providing assistance to SSIs in Kenya, most of which were attributable to KIE's inability to carry out effectively the multifarious responsibilities entrusted to it i.e., channelling credit to SSIs as a financial intermediary, establishing industrial estates in various parts of the country, and providing technical assistance and entrepreneurial training to SSIs. Given KIE's weaknesses and the ambitious agenda entrusted to it, the first SSI project proved to be a failure (Para 4.09, PPAR # 9191 dated December 17, 1990). In designing the SSI II project (# 1738-KE), IDA staff attempted to address KIE's institutional weaknesses by insisting on a new Policy Statement and Guidelines for Operations, improvement in debt collection performance, formulation of a comprehensive financial restructuring program, improvement in staff training in project appraisal and supervision, and strengthening of entrepreneur development programs. Assurances were also obtained regarding sharp reduction of its industrial estate development program and disposal of its Technical Service Centers, which had been incurring losses. To assist in the implementation of the above program, a technical assistance component was included in the project to fund expatriate positions for financial management, project supervision, and entrepreneur training.

15 4.02 Subsequent events, however, demonstrated that the project design was flawed, just as the previous one was. Given the background of politicized decision making in financing projects and collection of overdues, coupled with KIE's continued lack of capability to develop into an effective and professional financial intermediary, IDA should have made alternative arrangements for providing financial assistance to SSIs, leaving KIE to concentrate on promotion, technical assistance and entrepreneur training. 5. Project Implementation 5.01 Credit Component. The credit became effective in April Project implementation got off to a slow start in September 1987 and stayed that way up to the date for sub-project submission (December 31, 1989), stipulated in legal agreements. During this period, 19 sub-projects, 12 under the free limit of US$75,000 and 7 above the limit, were committed under the credit. Of these, four were canceled and disbursements amounting to US$0.83 million were made for 15 sub-projects. These figures are way below those estimated at appraisal (US$ million and 200 sub-projects). The sub-projects financed under the credit were in traditional sectors of chemicals (33% of the amount), printing (23%), food processing (18%), wood working (8%) and service industries (18%). Most of the enterprises were located in Nairobi (40%), followed by Nakuru (20%), Eldoret (13%); the remaining 27% were located in small rural towns. Over 94% of IDA financing went to sub-projects with investment costs of over K Sh 1.0 million. Most sub-projects experienced implementation delays from 11 weeks to 184 weeks due to shortage of raw materials, lack of working capital finance, poor management capabilities of the sponsors and problems of power supply in rural areas The main reasons for the slow commitment appear to be: (a) the poor quality of appraisal reports submitted to IDA for approval under the credit regarding which IDA sought a number of clarifications which were often not readily provided by KIE; (b) depreciation of the Kenyan shilling; (c) IDA's suggestions to KIE in 1988 to slow down lending and concentrate on improving the overall quality of its portfolio and collections of overdues which were unacceptably high; and (d) delayed arrival of experts under the technical assistance component (para below) Technical Assistance Component. The commitment and disbursement of the TA component amounted to US$ 0.46 m, as against the allocation of US$1.0 million. The component was used for financing: (a) salary payments of the expatriate Finance Manager and the Deputy Training Manager; (b) computerization study and installation of hardware and software in KIE; and (c) an EDI seminar. This component could not be fully utilized because of (i) substantial delay (about 3 years) in recruitment of the technical experts even though their recruitment was originally a condition of credit effectiveness, and (ii) cancellation of the credit Credit Cancellation. IDA did not agree to KIE's request to extend, from December 31, 1989 to December 31, 1992, the date of sub-project submission. IDA also felt that the institutional and financial problems afflicting KIE were of such enormous proportions that IDA did not see KIE evolving into a viable lending institution for SSIs and that commitment of additional IDA funds for sub-loans through it would be counter-productive. Disbursements for sub-loans already approved, as well as for the commitments pertaining to the 2-year contract of the Entrepreneur Training Adviser (under the Technical Assistance component), however, continued until December On March 20, 1991, the uncommitted amount of the credit SDR 4.6 million representing 73% of the credit was canceled.

16 -4-6. Project Results 6.01 Of the fifteen sub-projects financed, five are reported to be doing well, operating at 60-75% capacity; five are rated as fair; four are reported to be experiencing operational and management problems; and one has not yet started operations. Most sub-projects are operating at between 50% and 75% capacity. As of June 30, 1991, nine of these sub-projects had arrears of over six months; these include three sub-projects reported by KIE to be doing well and four rated as fair. Over 62% of the portfolio financed under Credit-1738 was affected by arrears of over six months. According to information furnished by KIE, the financial rates of return of most sub-projects financed under the credit are 20% or more, while the economic rates of return of eleven sub-projects are 25% or more. However, these figures are not corroborated by the operational and repayment record of the sub-projects. By December 1989, the overall situation was unsatisfactory in two main respects. Firstly, the deterioration of KIE's financial condition where arrears over 3 months affected over 60 percent of all outstanding loans (and accounted for over a third of the amount outstanding), and with the possibility that fixed deposits which accounted for about 85 percent of its share capital may not be recoverable from troubled financial institutions. Secondly, the inability of the management to effectively remedy the above situation or to improve its own institutional capabilities (through appointing technical advisors in time or making appropriate organizational changes) The objectives of the project were inadequately met. Firstly, resources were provided to a very small number of (comparatively large-sized) SSIs; secondly, only partial success was achieved in entrepreneur training; and, finally, while KIE's lending and industrial estate activities were rationalized, it did not become a more efficient channel for SSI lending because of lack of commitment on the part of the management and due to use of non-commercial considerations in its lending decisions. 7. Institutional Performance 7.01 KIE's performance under the first project (750-KE) had been disappointing. It was expected to transform itself from an industrial estate promoting and managing agency into a viable finartcial intermediary for small scale industries as well a to play a critical role in providing technical assistance and entrepreneur training to SSIs. KIE management and staff did not have financial background and they focussed on promotion, portfolio growth and industrial estate activities indiscriminately without any appreciation of their financial implications. Although IDA, UNIDO and a number of bilaterals provided considerable technical assistance to KIE during the early years to improve its operational and management capabilities, KIE did not measure up to the effort required to fulfil these high expectations. The track record of utilization of the credit in the first SSI project was also poor. In spite of a one year extension of the sub-project submission date for the SSI I project, KIE was able to draw down only about US$4.0 million out of the US$8.75 million allocated for sub-projects. About US$4.9 million of the uncommitted amount was canceled as KIE was perceived to be in deep financial trouble due to mounting arrears, poor state of its loan portfolio, laxity in entrepreneur selection and debt collections, and continuous losses despite large grants and subsidies. (A detailed evaluation of KIE's performance under the first credit is provided in PPAR # 9191, dated December 17, 1990) It appears that, in view of the cancellation of Credit 750-KE, and prospects of shrinking aid from bilateral sources, the Kenya Government pressed KIE to set its house in order and seek IDA assistance to improve its performance. Given this scenario, the appraisal report notes, KIE altered its attitude and took a number of significant steps to strengthen itself. These included a new Policy

17 Statement and Guidelines for Operations, improved debt collections, formulation of a comprehensive financial restructuring program and commitment to improve staff training in project appraisal and supervision, and an entrepreneur development program. As regards its industrial estate development program, KIE sharply reduced its new construction program and agreed to undertake such activity in the future only if appraised to be financially viable; it also agreed to sell or lease its Technical Service Centers, which had over the years been incurring losses. With these improvements already in place or about to be undertaken, IDA considered a second credit (# 1738-KE) to KIE justified in support of the Government's program of SSI development In keeping with the assurances given to IDA, KIE took the following actions to strengthen its institutional capabilities: (a) internal structure was reorganized (though inadequately) with a view to decentralizing operations and improving collections; (b) a Receivership Department was established to handle cases of chronic defaulters; (c) an award scheme was instituted to reward staff having the best collection performance; (d) interest rates, shed rentals and other fees were increased; and (e) a Deputy Manager of Training was appointed. However, most of these actions were taken as late as Even at this late stage, KIE had not appointed an expert to provide on the job training to staff in project appraisal and supervision and a Deputy Manager for Supervision. These delays were partly due to KIE's lack of commitment and to lack of management effectiveness in appointment of experts (and consequential delays in their appointment) to be financed from the TA component. KIE could not attract appropriate Kenyan professionals due to not being authorized to offer competitive salaries to high caliber staff On the operational side, KIE's overall lending activities slowed down significantly; loan approvals declined from K Sh million range in FY86-88 to K Sh 47 million in FY89 but recovered slightly to K Sh 55 million in FY90 (Annex 1). The main reasons for the slow-down were staffing problems in KIE, and IDA's suggestion to concentrate on debt collection. Annex III provides information on collection performance during FY86-FY90. The improved collection performance since 1986 (except in 1987), however, did not prevent further deterioration in KIE's overall portfolio due to accumulation of arrears. As of June 30, 1989, over 60% of all outstanding loans by number and about 79 % of the loan portfolio were affected by arrears of over 3 months (as against 56% and 76% respectively at the end of FY88) and these arrears of principal and interest amounted to over K Sh 155 million, accounting for 34% of total outstanding (Annex II). Provisions for bad and doubtful debts, as of June 30, 1989, amounted to K Sh 62 million. The major reasons for continuing high percentage of non-performing loans were KIE's reluctance to start legal action against borrowers who were politically important persons, and its inadequate emphasis on supervision of the portfolio Because of the indiscriminate promotional work undertaken by KIE over the years, it has depended continuously on subsidies and grants from the Government and the bilateral donors. It incurred losses annually for most of the early 1980's, and only nominal profits during the latter 1980's. However, these profits are illusory as (i) incomes were recorded on "accrual" basis instead of "realization" basis, (ii) the methodology of provisioning for bad debts was not found acceptable by the auditors, and (iii) the KIE had access to concessional finance from another donor. Apart from the deterioration in the quality of its portfolio, KIE's financial position was also adversely affected by the poor choice of financial institutions for investing its surplus funds. About K Sh 87 million, representing over 85% of KIE's share capital and about 18% of its net worth, was invested in institutions which later either went under receivership or were candidates for liquidation. KIE's external auditors qualified their report on FY89 accounts concerning the inclusion among KIE's assets of this amount. In view of these financial and institutional problems, and lack of KIE's seriousness in coming to grips with them, IDA informed KIE in October 1989 (as authorized by Section 6.03 of the General Conditions) that it was not

18 - 6 - inclined to extend the date for submission of sub-projects beyond December 31, 1989, unless a substantive restructuring of its operations was undertaken. This did not come about and IDA canceled the uncommitted amount of the credit (SDR 4.6 million) in March 1991, acknowledging that there was no way of transforming KIE into a viable institution, given the environment and the framework in which it operated. 8. Sustainability 8.01 Despite the justification provided in the Staff Appraisal Report for the SSI II project, KIE's prospects of becoming a sustainable institution have been minimal right from the outset of the project. Sustainability could not be achieved because of the mismatch in the stated and actual objectives of the Government; the Government's and KIE's commitment to the objectives agreed at appraisal were not demonstrated in practice. Further, KIE's mandate was overly ambitious and as a parastatal its management gave priority to achievement of non-commercial objectives rather than to IDA's recommendations of ensuring professional soundness of its lending decisions. For these reasons, in the context of a separate Financial Parastatals Technical Assistance Project (approved by IDA in 1990), IDA advised the Government to discontinue KIE's lending activities, and to limit KIE to providing other services to small enterprises. 9. IDA's Performance 9.01 IDA provided considerable assistance to KIE, both during the project identification and preparation stage and during the appraisal process, with a view to accelerating the pace of reforms KIE had committed to carry out to improve its effectiveness. However, given KIE's limited project implementation capabilities and the heavy reform agenda, and poor performance under the project, IDA should have carefully reviewed its plans to assist KIE, and subsequently should have at least enforced the conditions of effectiveness. Thereafter, IDA should have supervised the project more frequently and intensively and brought to the attention of the Government the perceived erosion of commitment on the part of the managemento carry through the reforms; but only two one-man missions visited KIE during However, it is recognized that, on the Bank side, there had been a considerable staff turnover due to the 1987 reorganization. 10. Borrower's Performance KIE's performance, as the implementing agency, appeared satisfactory during project preparation and early implementation stages. However, as time passed, its performance slipped mainly due to changes of management, and lack of adequate commitment to the reforms by the new management. Although KIE was able to obtain the Government's approval for offering improved salaries to its staff, these salary levels were still not adequate to recruit and retain qualified high caliber staff. Because of its own management capacity, its bureaucratic procedures and lack of autonomy, and lack of timely management initiatives KIE was not able to recruit some of the technical assistance personnel without whose services improvements in operations including through staff and entrepreneur training programs could not be started. KIE's financial and investment policies were leading the institution into a serious financial situation. KIE had also started contravening some of the covenants of the Project Agreement (Part III, item 7).

19 Project Relationship IDA-KIE relationships were satisfactory during the project preparation and appraisal stages. Thereafter, following the change in KIE management (in February 1986), IDA noticed an erosion of KIE's commitmento the reform process and non-compliance with some of the covenants in the Project Agreement. KIE's relationships with some other donors also started loosening so much so that by the end of FY90 the African Development Fund was the only donor left. Belgium and GTZ continued to provide some funding for the informal sector through KIE. 12. Project Documentation and Data The legal agreements included appropriate covenants requiring KIE to submit to IDA key information relating to its performance to facilitate monitoring. Provisions were also made for consultation with IDA on KIE's interest rate structure and for appointment of experts to strengthen appraisal capability. In order not to delay credit effectiveness, IDA waived certain conditions relating to appointment of experts, with the result that most of the experts did not get appointed. The Staff Appraisal Report did provide a useful framework for IDA/KIE during project implementation but it required intensive and more frequent supervision which IDA did not provide. 13. Findings and Lessons Learned As with the SSI I Project, the SSI II Project also proved to be a failure. Due to institutional and appraisal weaknesses, KIE was able to commit funds under the credit for only 15 subprojects. Although it was able to improve its collection performance, the quality of the loan portfolio continued to deteriorate. Because of management deficiencies, KIE was unable to recruit technical assistance experts to strengthen KIE's project appraisal, supervision and entrepreneur training capabilities. KIE's financial position was also became precarious due to investment of substantial funds with financial institutions which were under liquidation. KIE management was either unable or unwilling to take corrective measures. In view of these institutional and financial problems, IDA declined to extend the sub-project submission date and canceled the uncommitted amount, representing about 73 % of the credit. The main reasons for the failure of the project were as follows. Firstly, the objectives were too ambitious for KIE to achieve; KIE did not have the capability or the potential to be an efficient channel for SSI lending and at the same time to be a provider of intensive entrepreneur training and technical assistance to SSIs. The position was made more difficult by the government giving KIE a starting portfolio of troubled projects without the financial or other support to resolve their problems. Secondly, KIE's management lacked professional commitment and capability to override non-commercial considerations in trying to accomplish the objectives agreed with IDA. Thirdly, the design of the project was flawed in as much as IDA agreed to support KIE's multifarious activities, knowing quite well, from its experience of implementation of the SSI I Project, that as a parastatal KIE did not have the management capability or motivation to take timely steps to improve its performance. The change of attitude and the few initial steps taken by KIE towards reform, which persuaded IDA to appraise the SSI II Project, were not sustained and followed up by KIE's new management which was installed after the appraisal of the project. Fourthly, IDA's supervision was inadequate and IDA was unwilling to enforce key conditions of effectiveness that might have contributed to the success of the project.

20 The lessons of experience are as follows. Firstly, project appraisal should start with an effective assessment of the institution's "enabling environment". If, as in this case, past experience has demonstrated that such environment is unfavorable to the project objectives (as observed under the earlier SSI I project), the Bank group should not finance a follow up operation. Secondly, setting of project objectives should be related to the capabilities of the implementing agency. However, if these capabilities are too weak for the institution to achieve essential project objectives, again, the Bank group should refrain from lending. Thirdly, the Bank Group should devote greater time and effort to making a realistic assessment of the commitment of the beneficiary to the objectives of the project. Finally, if despite all the above, the Bank proceeds with a loan/credit, it should be based on a careful review of the risks, and on well designed measures to ensure considerable supervision to buttress the limited implementation capacity and to ensure compliance with covenants in legal agreements.

21 -9- PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT KENYA KENYA INDUSTRIAL ESTATES SECOND SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRY PROJECT (CREDIT 1738-KE) PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE Part A: Adequacy and Accuracy of Information in Part IiI of the PCR Most of the information contained in Part Ill is factual and accurate. This is particularly so where numerical information is reproduced; for example, sub-projects submitted, quality of portfolio etc. However, there were many more sub-projects financed by other co-financiers and which are not covered in the Part III analysis. Also the assessment of the initial KIE's approval and disbursement targets as "Overly ambitious" is perhaps fair. We do not agree with the evaluation of the compliance with the covenants in legal agreements. For instance, the recruitment of a Finance Manager, Financial Analyst, entrepreneur training advisor or submission of full reports etc, were effected, though perhaps not to IDA's satisfaction. This is not the same as non-compliance. Part B: Analysis Contained in Part I In our assessment the failure to attain the started objectives and targets can be attributed to:- (1) Unrealistically high and conflicting objectives and targets set for the KIE during the design stages. (2) Generally absence of an enabling and conducive environment for the growth of SSI in the country. (3) Mortality rate of Small Scale Industries is very high especially when one is dealing with first generation entrepreneurs. (4) IDA's failure to help KIE in bringing about early effectiveness of the credit-line. The first could have been avoided if lessons were drawn, from other existing SSI Programs that had the same range of objectives and mandate during the project design and appraisal stage. The second and third could probably have been appreciated and relevant covenants introduced to shield the institution from any blame if the objectives set-out could not be achieved due to unfavorable environment of SSI financing in Kenya. In view of these inherent weaknesses in

22 - 10- the project design blaming KIE for failing to succeed under such circumstances appears to be unfair. Part C. Evaluation of Bak's Performane There appears to have been a need for a more thorough study of the project and its environment considering that this was one of the very first such projects financed by the Bank in the continent which would have led to a better project design. An in-depth analysis was vital so as to ascertain whether an 'enabling environment' existed in terms of qualified and good management, political will and other support-institutional structures. Had such an indepth analysis been done in the KIE case some of the problems raised in Part B above could have been eschewed. We also believe there is need for the IDA'S policy to change to allow its officers to demonstrate practically on the ground how to effect changes necessary for a successful implementation of the project rather than writing aide-memoires after very short and infrequent missions to the institution. Part D: Evaluation of Borrowers Performance (KIE) As stated in B above the evaluation of the borrower contained in Part III of the PCR is fairly accurate. The quality of the portfolio deteriorated during the evolution and implementation of the project, culminating in the advice by IDA to concentrate on portfolio improvement in Substantial KIE funds were locked in some insolvent financial institutions and their recoverability is still uncertain even today. True, there existed opportunities for improving performance which were often not fully exploited by the company. There were a few cases where better management lending decisions were not taken but this should not be construed as having been a deliberate corporate or management policy. Many lessons have been learned by KIE as a result of this project and our association with the Bank. There is now greater emphasis on the smaller sub-projects and focus on appraisal of the entrepreneur. Similarly project monitoring and supervision has been intensified and the concerned departments have been strengthened. Debt and arrears collection is now a priority for the management and consequently a system of debt-collection has been advised which has an in-built incentive scheme. Today the management of KIE has already appreciated these short-comings and has, therefore, proposed major restructuring of the organization aimed at making the company profitable and sustainable. Even the mission statement of KIE has been refrained to reflect this new outlook. (Please see attached Restructuring proposal Document). KIE would appreciate the comments of IPA on the measures we are taking to restructure ourselves. The

23 present management of KIE is committed to ensuring that the organization succeeds in its stated objectives and the fact that the Government has categorized KIE has a strategic parastatal gives us strong impetus to pursue our goals with renewed vigor. Part E: Effectiveness of Relationships Between Bank-Group and Borrower According to KIE the relationship has been satisfactory. Some areas for future improvements include the following:- The frequency of project monitoring visits was too low to be effective in timely detection and correction of deviations from stated objectives and guidelines of the project. Feedback from IDA to KIE management following these visits often came too late to be of much use in correcting deviations. * There were also considerable delays in IDA making a decision whether to accept or reject sub-projects sent by KIE for commitments. * There were frequent changes of personnel in touch with KIE at the Bank-Group headquarters which affected continuity and relationships. Often this brought delays in our work-programs. X While the advice by IDA that KIE concentrate on arrears recovery was good and most opportune, it nonetheless resulted in diversion of attention and resources from further lending to improvements of existing portfolio. This fact should have been taken into consideration when KIE requested extension of the date of sub-project submission from 31st December 1989 to IDA should have not have taken a unilateral decision not to extend credit commitment deadline before consultations were done and early signals for this eventuality sent out to the cooperating agencies. Part F: Evaluation of Co-financiers The performance of co-financiers can be rated as good. Most of them were quicker in making timely decisions on KIE sub-projects than the Bank-Group. As a result many more sub-projects were financed through them than through the Bank-Group. It is important that co-financiers of a project to have common goals and objectives and agree on important matters of credit cancellation, evaluation and important covenants affecting the implementation of a project.

24

25 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT KENYA KENYA INDUSTRIAL ESTATES SECOND SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRY PROJECT (CREDIT 1738-KE) 1. Related Bank Loans/Credits PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION Loan/Credit ipus Year of Aproval Sa Industrial Deve- To provide financing for lopment Bank I medium and large-scale (Loan 946-KE) industrial projects 1973 Closed $5 million Industrial Deve- To provide financing for lopment Bank II medium and large-scale (Loan 1148-KE) industrial projects 1975 Closed $10 million Industrial Deve- To provide financing for lopment Bank III medium and large-scale (Loan 1438-KE) industrial projects 1977 Closed $20 million Small Scale To provide financing and Industry Project technical assistance to (Credit 750-KE) small-scale entrepreneurs 1977 Closed $10 million Industrial Deve- To provide financing for lopment Bank IV medium and large-scale (Loan 1817-KE) industrial projects 1980 Closed $30 million Industrial Sector To improve sectoral effi- Adjustment Credit ciency, stimulate private (Credit 1927-KE) investment, and encourage $145.7 million export production 1988 Closed Export Develop- To support an integrated ment Project package of policy reforms, (Credit 2197-KE) investments, studies and $100 million technical assistance 1990 On-going Financial Parasta- Restructuring of Financial tals TA Project Institutions 1990 On-going (Credit 2147-KE) $6 million

26 rject Timetable am Date Planned Date Revised Date Actual - Identification Sept Sept Sept Preparation January 1985 January 1985 January Appraisal March 1985 March 1985 March Negotiations Sept Sept Sept Board Approval Nov Dec October Signature Jan Nov November Effectiveness April 1986 April 1987 April Sub-project Submission Dec Dec Dec Credit Closing Dec March 1991 March 20, Completion June 1995 Sept.1991 Dec Comments: In view of KIE's continuing financial and institutional problems, and IDA's doubts regarding its viability as an independent lending institution, IDA canceled the uncommitted amount of SDR 4.6 million as on March 20, Credit Disbursement Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (USS'million) Bank FY Appraisal Estimate Actual

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